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歐洲銀行系統(tǒng)病入膏肓

歐洲銀行系統(tǒng)病入膏肓

Colin Barr 2011-06-22
 一根羽毛就能壓垮某些歐洲銀行

特里謝的噩夢(mèng),?

???

????歐洲大陸的金融機(jī)構(gòu)與2008年倒臺(tái)前的雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)有一個(gè)驚人的相似之處:它們都過(guò)于依賴借款,,特別是在市場(chǎng)震蕩中易受沖擊的廉價(jià)短期貸款。

????希臘違約目前看來(lái)已經(jīng)不可避免,,這一特征絕難讓人心安。上周末,,歐洲的決策者們未能就下個(gè)月向希臘撥付120億歐元(170億美元)救助貸款達(dá)成一致,,警告稱希臘政府必須率先表明其緊縮財(cái)政的誠(chéng)意。顯然,,騷亂還不足以促使他們下定決心,。

????值得注意的是,,大多數(shù)不顧后果的銀行——至少?gòu)倪@些指標(biāo)來(lái)看——并非處于瘋狂的希臘或揮霍的葡萄牙,而是處于所謂“負(fù)責(zé)任的國(guó)家”和所謂的“歐洲核心國(guó)”的德國(guó)和法國(guó),。這些銀行面臨的希臘違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)最大,,涉及金額可能高達(dá)900億歐元(1,290億美元)左右。

????雖然近期的報(bào)紙商業(yè)版一直在談?wù)摰聡?guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)興,,但節(jié)約和謹(jǐn)慎似乎并不是德國(guó)銀行業(yè)的特點(diǎn),。國(guó)際貨幣基金組織(International Monetary Fund)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,德國(guó)銀行業(yè)手頭每持有1歐元資本,,就會(huì)放出32歐元貸款,。如果你手頭還有記錄的話,就會(huì)知道當(dāng)初雷曼兄弟倒臺(tái)時(shí)的杠桿比率也只有31-1,。無(wú)論如何,,這意味著一旦出現(xiàn)3%的損失,就可能出現(xiàn)由納稅人買單的結(jié)局,。沒(méi)錯(cuò),,再來(lái)一次。

????德國(guó)銀行業(yè)并不是雷曼唯一的難兄難弟:國(guó)際貨幣基金組織的數(shù)據(jù)顯示(見(jiàn)右圖),,比利時(shí)銀行業(yè)的杠桿比率是30-1,,而法國(guó)銀行業(yè)是26-1??傆?jì),,歐元區(qū)17國(guó)銀行業(yè)的平均杠桿比率為26-1——是美國(guó)的兩倍。相比之下,,美國(guó)銀行業(yè)看來(lái)情況還不錯(cuò),。

????歐洲銀行業(yè)的杠桿比率可能聽(tīng)起來(lái)有些耳熟,因?yàn)樗鼈兒?007年金融市場(chǎng)開始暴跌前的美國(guó)大型投資銀行的杠桿比率相符,。在泡沫時(shí)期大舉發(fā)展房地產(chǎn)金融業(yè)務(wù)的小型投資銀行——雷曼兄弟和貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)的杠桿比率都超過(guò)了30-1,,而高盛(Goldman Sachs)、 摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)和美林(Merrill Lynch)等大型投行都在20多倍,。

????另一個(gè)相似之處是歐洲銀行業(yè)都高度依賴短期市場(chǎng)資金,,且資金來(lái)源都是類似美國(guó)貨幣基金這樣的全球最大的批發(fā)借款人。歷史顯示,,市場(chǎng)恐慌能令這些資金瞬時(shí)消失,,讓早已倍感壓力的歐洲央行(European Central Bank)更加為難。

????目前,,仍不清楚歐洲銀行業(yè)是否已意識(shí)到今年可能重蹈2008年覆轍,。盡管德國(guó)已不再要求私營(yíng)部門借款人必須接受調(diào)低后的償付條款,但并沒(méi)有跡象顯示歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人短期內(nèi)就會(huì)恢復(fù)理智,,制定出終結(jié)危機(jī)的一攬子方案,。

????這樣的走鋼絲式行為讓國(guó)際貨幣基金組織捏了一把汗,,上周他們警告稱,“雖然銀行體系修復(fù)取得進(jìn)展,,但進(jìn)度過(guò)于緩慢,?!?/p>

????眼下,,沒(méi)有理由相信違約的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)已經(jīng)迫在眉睫,,或者說(shuō)銀行業(yè)一定無(wú)力應(yīng)對(duì)希臘風(fēng)暴,。目前,,流動(dòng)性依然充足,,金融系統(tǒng)也不像3,、4年前那樣亢奮,。不過(guò),,危機(jī)當(dāng)前,,銀行過(guò)度放貸的現(xiàn)象絕對(duì)無(wú)法讓人心安,不管這種現(xiàn)象多么司空見(jiàn)慣,。

??? Financial institutions across the Continent share a terrifying trait with Lehman Brothers before its 2008 collapse: they rely too much on borrowed money, especially the cheap, short-term loans that are vulnerable to a market shock.

??? That's not exactly a handy characteristic when a Greek default seems almost inevitable. European policymakers this weekend failed to agree to terms on a 12 billion-euro ($17 billion) bailout loan due next month to Greece, warning that the Greek government must first show it is taking austerity seriously. Apparently mere riots aren't enough for these guys.

??? What's notable is that the most reckless banks, by these measures at least, reside not in gonzo Greece or profligate Portugal, but in the allegedly responsible states at the so-called core of Europe, Germany and France – the very banks that are most exposed to a Greek default, with some 90 billion euros ($129 billion) at stake.

??? Though it's hard to open the business section lately without finding a story about Germany's economic renaissance, thrift and prudence don't seem to characterize German banks. They hold 32 euros in loans for every euro of capital they have on hand, according to International Monetary Fund data. Lehman's leverage at the time of its collapse was 31-1, if you're keeping score at home. Either way it means a 3% loss leaves the taxpayers picking up the tab. Yes, that again.

??? The Germans aren't alone in Lehmanville: Belgian banks are using 30-1 leverage and French ones 26-1, the IMF numbers (see chart, right) show. All told, banks across the 17-country euro area average 26-1 leverage – double the ratio in the United States. Against all odds, European institutions have managed the nifty trick of making U.S. banks look good.

?? If the European leverage numbers sound familiar, it's because they are in line with the leverage ratios seen at the big U.S. investment banks before the financial markets started their nervous breakdown in 2007. Lehman and Bear Stearns, the smallish investment banks that gorged on real estate during the bubble, were both leveraged at more than 30-1 while Goldman Sachs (GS), Morgan Stanley (MS) and Merrill Lynch were well into the 20s.

??? And in another similarity, the European banks are heavily reliant on short-term market funding, from sources such as the U.S. money funds that are among the biggest wholesale lenders on the planet. History shows that a market panic can make those funds suddenly unavailable, potentially putting an already stretched European Central Bank even more on the spot.

?? Yet it's not clear the Europeans have picked up just yet on how this year might come to rhyme with 2008. While Germany has backed away from its demand that private sector lenders be forced to accept reduced repayment terms, there is still no sign that Europe's leaders will soon come to their senses and hammer out a package that ends the siege once and for all.

??? All this tightrope walking is unnerving the staff at the IMF, which warned last week that "though there has been progress on banking system repair, the pace is too slow."

??? For now, there is no reason to believe a default is imminent or that the banks would be unable to handle the Greek storm. Liquidity is still ample and the financial system isn't as hyped up as it was three or four years ago. But the sight of overextended banks in the middle of a crisis is never reassuring, no matter how familiar it may be.

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