????聯(lián)合品牌：我們?cè)谑袌?chǎng)推廣中使用的產(chǎn)品名稱(chēng)是：思科網(wǎng)絡(luò)管家，“基于Opsware公司的自動(dòng)化技術(shù)”,。

????不計(jì)渠道的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)政策：Opsware為鼓勵(lì)公司的銷(xiāo)售人員支持思科銷(xiāo)售團(tuán)隊(duì)（而不是與其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)）,，思科公司在Opsware銷(xiāo)售人員負(fù)責(zé)的區(qū)域內(nèi)每做成一筆生意，我們就給予本公司銷(xiāo)售人員一定的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì),。雖然這個(gè)政策花掉我們不少真金白銀,，但這樣做合情合理。因?yàn)樗伎泼夸N(xiāo)售一次產(chǎn)品,，就為我們開(kāi)啟了一扇大門(mén),，我們將有機(jī)會(huì)銷(xiāo)售規(guī)模更大、利潤(rùn)率更高的產(chǎn)品,。

????預(yù)防收購(gòu)措施：我們承諾在簽署出售公司的合約時(shí)提前告知思科公司,，并給予其競(jìng)標(biāo)的機(jī)會(huì)（如果他們想收購(gòu)的話(huà)）。請(qǐng)注意這項(xiàng)條款跟優(yōu)先購(gòu)買(mǎi)權(quán)（Right of First Refusal）截然不同,。

????源代碼許可：我們給了思科一個(gè)為期3年的許可證,，允許其查看我們的源代碼，并在此基礎(chǔ)上開(kāi)發(fā)衍生產(chǎn)品,，但同時(shí)提出了一個(gè)創(chuàng)新許可證制度,，這項(xiàng)制度不僅給予我們充分的保護(hù)，甚至給我們帶來(lái)了數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元的額外收入,。不管我們采取了什么行動(dòng),，我們都認(rèn)定思科方面永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)濫用源代碼，事實(shí)證明了我們的正確,。

歌利亞兌現(xiàn)諾言

????合作開(kāi)始后的9個(gè)月內(nèi),，思科公司先后與敦豪速遞（DHL）、好事多（Costco）,、斯普林特 （Sprint）,、澳洲電訊（Telstra）等公司及美國(guó)郵政管理局（USPS）達(dá)成了大宗銷(xiāo)售合約。沒(méi)過(guò)多久,，思科公司的銷(xiāo)量就足以超越向Opsware公司所做的季度最低銷(xiāo)售額保證,。源自思科方面的銷(xiāo)量很快就占據(jù)了我們公司訂貨量的25%以上,。思科公司巨大的分銷(xiāo)能力讓NAS軟件的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手消失得無(wú)影無(wú)蹤。同樣重要的是,，每銷(xiāo)售一款NAS軟件就為我們提供了一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì),，使我們得以向以前從未接觸過(guò)的客戶(hù)推銷(xiāo)SAS軟件,，進(jìn)而為具有高利潤(rùn)率的服務(wù)器軟件業(yè)務(wù)提供了強(qiáng)大的推動(dòng)力,。

????當(dāng)然，在合作的過(guò)程中,，我們也面臨許多挑戰(zhàn),。思科的員工在銷(xiāo)售產(chǎn)品時(shí)需要接受我們大量的培訓(xùn)和支持。雙方偶爾因某些客戶(hù)而產(chǎn)生爭(zhēng)執(zhí),，最后不得不訴諸于仲裁程序,。我們每周都要跟思科公司舉行一次專(zhuān)門(mén)的會(huì)議，追蹤,、推動(dòng)他們的銷(xiāo)售活動(dòng),，指引我們后續(xù)的服務(wù)器軟件銷(xiāo)售工作。我們不得不確定思科方面提出的產(chǎn)品變化和漏洞修補(bǔ)要求的優(yōu)先次序,，融入我們自己的路線(xiàn)圖之中,。

????然而，我們能夠泰然自若地處理這些要求,，因?yàn)槲覀冇袑?zhuān)門(mén)的銷(xiāo)售和產(chǎn)品管理人員來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)這些問(wèn)題,，而有保證的龐大收入流也讓整個(gè)公司意識(shí)到，這是一個(gè)值得配合的協(xié)議,。

????Co-branding: The product was marketed as Cisco Network Compliance Manager, "built on Opsware automation technology".

????Channel-neutral compensation: To motivate Opsware's sales people to support their Cisco sales counterparts instead of competing with them, we compensated them for every Cisco sale in their territory. While this cost us real money, it made sense because every Cisco sale opened the door for us to sell a much bigger, higher-margin product.

????Acquisition insurance: We committed to give Cisco advance notification of any agreement to sell the company, and the opportunity to enter the bidding if they wanted to. (Note this is very different from a Right of First Refusal.)

????Source code license: We gave Cisco a three-year license to view our source code and build on it, but came up with an innovative licensing approach that protected us fully and even generated millions in additional revenue. In any case, we bet they would never actually do anything with the code, and we were right.

Goliath delivers…

????Within nine months, Cisco was selling large network software deals into accounts like DHL, Costco, Sprint, USPS and Telstra, and a short time later, they were selling enough to exceed the quarterly minimum revenue guarantee to Opsware. The Cisco deal would go on to generate over 25% of our bookings. Cisco's massive distribution power vaporized our NAS competitors. Just as important, every NAS sale opened the door for our SAS product in accounts we had never penetrated before, providing a major thrust to our high-margin server business.

????Of course, there were many challenges along the way. Cisco people needed lots of training and support to sell the product. There were occasional conflicts over accounts that had to be arbitrated. We ran a separate weekly pipeline call with Cisco to track and drive their sales and direct our follow-on server sales calls. Product change and bug fix requests from Cisco had to be triaged and folded into our roadmap.

????However, we were able to handle these demands with equanimity, because we had a couple of dedicated heads in sales and product management to handle them, and a large guaranteed revenue stream that helped the whole company to realize this was a deal worth supporting.