出售風(fēng)云：我們?nèi)绾伟压举u(mài)給惠普
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????只要鼓起全部勇氣，我們就決不會(huì)失敗,。 ????— 威廉?莎士比亞,，《麥克白》 ????這是探討戰(zhàn)略性業(yè)務(wù)開(kāi)發(fā)之重要性的系列文章的結(jié)局篇（前四部分參見(jiàn) I, II ,，III and IV）。 ????在前一部分中,，我描述了在自動(dòng)化軟件供應(yīng)商O(píng)psware每年我們都會(huì)拋開(kāi)瑣事,，與董事會(huì)一起對(duì)公司的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略評(píng)估。2005年11月,，我們的結(jié)論是繼續(xù)獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng),，但到了2007年初，我們的評(píng)估結(jié)論卻大相徑庭,。公司業(yè)務(wù)強(qiáng)勁,，然而達(dá)到每季度的預(yù)期絕非易事，公司的成長(zhǎng)和所達(dá)到的市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)先地位也并沒(méi)有在股票市場(chǎng)上給我們帶來(lái)回報(bào),。我們走到了這樣一個(gè)決策的時(shí)間節(jié)點(diǎn)：投入更多資金進(jìn)行研發(fā)和銷售拓展,，還是嘗試出售公司。我們決定走后一條路,，但必須為股東贏得足夠高的售價(jià),。 ????大戲上演：2007年5月 ????二月份，我們照常與主要企業(yè)信息技術(shù)公司舉行業(yè)務(wù)更新會(huì)晤,，他們的收購(gòu)興趣導(dǎo)致了數(shù)次后續(xù)會(huì)談,。關(guān)鍵是找到某家公司，讓它開(kāi)價(jià),。5月22日,，我們向董事會(huì)匯報(bào)進(jìn)展。代號(hào)為“1號(hào)公司”的某個(gè)企業(yè)剛剛提出每股11美元的收購(gòu)價(jià),。那是38%的溢價(jià)——不錯(cuò),，但還不夠好。我們?cè)僖淮斡懻摚喝绻^續(xù)運(yùn)營(yíng)我們面臨什么樣機(jī)會(huì),、風(fēng)險(xiǎn),，而股東價(jià)值如何體現(xiàn)。反復(fù)討論的焦點(diǎn)就是：我們?cè)撨€價(jià)多少,？ ????最終的決定向所有有意競(jìng)購(gòu)公司的人發(fā)出了強(qiáng)烈信號(hào)：我們告訴1號(hào)公司,，董事會(huì)拒絕了每股11美元的報(bào)價(jià)，而且不會(huì)認(rèn)真考慮任何14美元以下的報(bào)價(jià),。這樣我們也等于告訴其它和我們進(jìn)行后續(xù)會(huì)談的公司【普惠（HP）和其它幾家公司】,，我們已經(jīng)收到收購(gòu)要約，但不會(huì)賤賣(mài)公司,，正可謂是一箭雙雕,。但14美元的價(jià)格有高達(dá)75%的溢價(jià)，1號(hào)公司,、普惠和其它所有人都選擇了退出,。我們則發(fā)出信函要求所有公司退回或銷毀我們與之共享的公司材料,。退出的黃粱美夢(mèng)看來(lái)就是美夢(mèng)而已了。我們將繼續(xù)又一個(gè)季度的艱苦跋涉,。 ????然而差不多一個(gè)月之后,，1號(hào)公司率先服軟，將收購(gòu)價(jià)增加到每股13.25美元,。太棒了,！接近我們的心理價(jià)位了！我們重新召集董事會(huì),，實(shí)事求是地嚴(yán)肅討論,，是繼續(xù)運(yùn)營(yíng)還是在這個(gè)價(jià)格附近出售公司。我們的分析表明,，只有收入年增長(zhǎng)75%以上,，才能實(shí)現(xiàn)15美元的股價(jià)。這個(gè)目標(biāo)很難實(shí)現(xiàn)：當(dāng)時(shí)華爾街的一致預(yù)測(cè)也不過(guò)28%,。 ????除了考慮上行空間,，我們還討論了獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。（請(qǐng)注意第6條,，宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩：我們完全沒(méi)有想到幾個(gè)月之后這個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就會(huì)如此巨大而真實(shí),。） |
????But screw your courage to the sticking-place, and we'll not fail. ????— William Shakespeare, Macbeth ????This is the final post in a series dealing with the importance of strategic business development (Here are Parts I, II, III and IV). ????In my last post, I described how, at Opsware, we would step back from the fray about once a year to go through a strategic review of our situation with the board. In November 2005, our conclusion was to keep on building an independent company, but in early 2007 another review led us to a different conclusion. Our business was strong, but meeting quarterly expectations was difficult and the market wasn't rewarding us for the growth and leading market position we had achieved. We were at a decision point: Plow even more money into R&D and sales expansion or explore a sale. We decided to explore a sale, but only if we could achieve a top-dollar price for our shareholders. ????The dance begins: May 2007 ????Our February update meetings with the major enterprise IT players had piqued their interest and led to several follow-ups. The key was to get someone to set an initial price. On May 22, we went back to the Opsware board with an update. A company we'll call Company 1 had just offered to buy the company for $11/share. That was a 38% premium—good, but not exceptional. Once again, we discussed the opportunities, risks and shareholder value implications of continuing in the business. We debated long and hard: What was our number? ????We decided to send a strong message to anyone considering us as a target: We told Company 1 that the Board had rejected its $11/share offer and would not give serious consideration to any new offer below $14/share. For good measure, we took the opportunity to notify the other companies who'd followed up with us (HP and several others) that we'd received an offer but were not interested in discussing any deal below $14. Since that was a 75% premium over our current price, Company 1, HP and everyone else told us they were out. We sent all of them letters requesting the return or destruction of any information we had shared. Those brief dreams of exit seemed to be just that—dreams. We went back to the slog of making yet another quarter. ????Then, almost a month later, the CEO of Company 1 came back offering $13.25/share. Yes! We were getting close to our magic number! We reconvened the board for a serious, fact-based discussion of staying the course versus selling in this price range. Our analysis suggested we would have to grow revenues at least 75% annually to exceed $15/share. That seemed impossible—Wall Street consensus was 28%. ????In addition to upside opportunities, we discussed the risks of staying standalone. (Note #6, macroeconomic slowdown: We had no idea how real a risk that would turn out to be just months later.) |
