????一些新的世俗政黨匆匆組建，希望能趕上總統(tǒng)和議會選舉,，這些選舉后來看來還是相對公平和自由的,。但絕大多數(shù)此類政黨都是從零開始。與它們競爭的是一些伊斯蘭政黨,，特別是穆斯林兄弟會,，后者有著完善的地方網絡和高效的信息傳遞機制。

????而且也不存在外部靠山,。穆巴拉克被推翻后,，國際盟友的驚訝程度不亞于埃及國民。另外,，這些政黨曾在穆巴拉克近30年的獨裁統(tǒng)治期間給予其支持,，這也導致它們在埃及一些選區(qū)的可信度受損。

????這些最初的情形基本上確立了后來混亂的轉型期,，期間反復出現(xiàn)的兩大顯著特征是：當權者決策難,；街頭示威，時而升級為暴力沖突,。

????埃及蹣跚掙扎的經濟也對國內形勢于事無補,。就業(yè)和經濟活動尚未完全恢復到革命前的水平。預算赤字的壓力仍然存在,。外匯儲備減少,。國內外投資者都心有忌憚，不愿全力投資,。

????所有這些讓埃及政府確信,，應該向國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）求助，最終促成了上周的初步協(xié)議,。除了推動埃及人建立自行改革的框架，國際貨幣基金組織還能快速提供相當?shù)慕鹑谠?，并且?guī)椭鷱钠渌俜角阔@得更多資金,。但很多埃及人擔心，國際貨幣基金組織的介入可能意味著埃及會回到過去金融依賴國外的局面,。

????眼下,，埃及人民迫切希望看到革命的成果,，所有這些無一不讓人憂慮，因為這場革命的主旨可是要在埃及實現(xiàn)普遍小康以及更大程度的社會公正,。如今,，外國朋友和盟友們談起這個國家時，總是擔憂中夾雜著失望,。

????但如果要說對這個國家的民主轉型喪失希望,，現(xiàn)在還為時尚早。

????不要因為反復而氣餒,，利益相關方應該意識到,，道路崎嶇是不可避免的，努力保持革命勢頭,。就此而言,，這朵新近籠罩在埃及頭上的政治烏云也鑲著五道光明的金邊。

????? 第一,，政府將越來越意識到,，埃及不再是一個可以強行推行有爭議措施的社會，他們也不應該這樣做：如今制約和平衡已作用于多個層面,；它們很可能導致上周的新憲法聲明被部分廢除?，F(xiàn)在，確實有很多的聲音——但鑒于埃及最初的狀況,，它們也是民主轉型成功的關鍵,。

????? 其次，埃及的政治領導人們嘗試進行更大范圍地合作：在這方面,，最近的一些倡議令人鼓舞,，可進一步深化。

????New secular political parties scrambled desperately to organize in time for what turned out to be relatively fair and free elections for both the presidency and parliament. In the vast majority of cases they started from scratch. And they were competing with Islamic parties – particularly the Muslim Brotherhood – with well-structured local networks and highly-effective messaging.

????There were also no external anchors to speak of. Egypt's friends and allies were just as surprised as its citizens by the Mubarak overthrow. And their credibility among some domestic constituencies was undermined by the support that they had provided Mubarak over the nearly 30 years of his uncontested rule.

????These initial conditions virtually guaranteed what has proven to be a very messy transition – one dominated by two visible and recurrent characteristics: clumsy decision-making by those in positions of power; and street protests that sometimes succumb to violence.

????The internal dynamic is not helped by Egypt's struggling economy. Employment and activity have yet to regain fully pre-revolutionary levels. The budget deficit remains under pressure. Foreign exchange reserves have declined. And both domestic and foreign investors are hesitant to engage fully.

????All of this has convinced the government to turn to the International Monetary Fund for help, culminating last week in an initial agreement. In addition to contributing to a framework for an Egyptian-owned reform program, the IMF can provide significant quick-disbursing financial assistance and help mobilize additional funding from other official sources. Yet many in Egypt worry that the IMF's involvement could signal the return to the old days of external financial dependency.

????All this speaks to concern among Egyptians eager to harvest the revolution's quest for widespread economic well-being and greater social justice. Concern, mixed with disappointment, also dominates conversations among the country's external friends and allies.

????Yet it is too early to give up yet on Egypt's democratic transition.

????Rather than be discouraged by recurrent potholes, stakeholders should recognize the inevitable bumpiness of the journey and work hard to maintain momentum. In this regard, there are five silver linings in the new political cloud that now hangs over Egypt.

????? First, the government's growing realization that Egypt is no longer a society in which controversial steps can be rammed through, nor should they: Checks and balances are now operating at multiple levels; and they could well force the rescindment of part of last week's decree. They certainly are noisy today – but they are also key for a successful democratic transition given the country's initial conditions.

????? Second, renewed attempts at greater collaboration among leading political personalities in Egypt: The recent initiatives in this regard are encouraging and could be usefully deepened.