????說(shuō)起內(nèi)幕交易和高管，市場(chǎng)人士都心照不宣,。按照定義,，高管每次買進(jìn)或賣出股票，都是一次內(nèi)幕交易,。CEO們是否掌握了其他人所不知曉的公司信息,？那還用說(shuō)。他們利用這些信息進(jìn)行交易嗎,？太多人似乎都是這么干的,。

????這也不是什么秘密。有一個(gè)投資學(xué)派專門就關(guān)注高管交易——有些投資者稱其為合法的內(nèi)幕交易,。

????因此,，《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》（Wall Street Journal）能搜羅這么多涉及高管們進(jìn)行的問(wèn)題內(nèi)幕交易就沒(méi)什么好奇怪的了。當(dāng)然,，正如其他人所指,，《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》的研究本身就存在缺陷,，因?yàn)樗臄?shù)據(jù)具有誤導(dǎo)性。

????但揪住這個(gè)問(wèn)題糾纏不休的人根本就沒(méi)有抓住重點(diǎn),?！度A爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》根本沒(méi)必要進(jìn)行自己的研究。過(guò)去兩年,，美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)（Securities and Exchange Commission,，SEC）已逮住了眾多涉嫌內(nèi)幕交易的對(duì)沖基金，數(shù)目驚人,，其中有些基金就得到了公司高管的幫助,。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)正在推進(jìn)的一個(gè)案子盯上了是頂級(jí)對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理SAC Capital的史蒂文·科恩。最近,，美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)指控科恩的一名前交易員參與了史上最大的內(nèi)幕交易之一,。而且，大量研究早已顯示,，內(nèi)部人士的表現(xiàn)總是優(yōu)于大盤,，就算是專業(yè)全職投資者也很少能復(fù)制這樣的表現(xiàn)。

????十年前,，美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)曾經(jīng)推出了一個(gè)體系,，希望藉此限制、甚至根除高管通過(guò)內(nèi)幕信息獲利,。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)鼓勵(lì)（注意,，不是要求）高管們提前較長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間買進(jìn)（更多情況是賣出）公司股票。因此,，如果股票出售幾個(gè)月以前就已經(jīng)安排好了,，而且是定期的，那么就不存在欺詐,，對(duì)不對(duì)?

????不完全是這樣,。事實(shí)證明，這些計(jì)劃比美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)設(shè)想的更為靈活,。而且,，這還不是它們最大的缺陷。在大多數(shù)顯而易見的高管內(nèi)幕交易案例中,，CEO們總是能神奇地在公司發(fā)布?jí)南ⅲū确秸f(shuō)，本季度業(yè)績(jī)?nèi)跤陬A(yù)期）之前,，拋售一大筆股票,，少損失數(shù)十萬(wàn)、甚至數(shù)百萬(wàn)美元,。然而,，其他股東并不知情,，因此就會(huì)蒙受損失。

????但提前設(shè)定的計(jì)劃并不能阻止這類行為,。因?yàn)镃EO有權(quán)決定什么時(shí)候讓市場(chǎng)知道公司業(yè)務(wù)惡化,。那么，選擇在自己減持后再宣布利空消息似乎也是自然而言的事了,。

????科羅拉多大學(xué)波爾得分校（University of Colorado Boulder）的商學(xué)教授艾倫·扎格萊澤研究過(guò)這些計(jì)劃,。他說(shuō)，這些計(jì)劃的設(shè)立方式差別很大,，但沒(méi)有證據(jù)顯示,，這些高管在安排預(yù)設(shè)售股時(shí)毫不知情。事實(shí)上,，一項(xiàng)針對(duì)高管股票期權(quán)計(jì)劃的最新研究顯示,，公司宣布?jí)南⒌臅r(shí)間點(diǎn)更多是在股票授予計(jì)劃到期后，而不是到期前,。

????When it comes to insider trading and executives, the market has always responded with a wink and a nod. By definition, every time an executive buys or sells a stock it's insider trading. Do CEOs have information that no one else has about their company? You betcha. Do they trade on that information? Too many of them seem to.

????And this is no secret. There is a whole school of investing devoted to watching the trades of executives -- it's viewed by some investors as legitimate insider trading.

????So it's no surprise that the?Wall Street Journal?was able to round up a number of?questionable examples of insider trading?by executives. The?WSJ's study itself, as others have?pointed out, was flawed. It was set up in a way that was the data equivalent of entrapment.

????But those who are harping on that are missing the point. The?WSJ?didn't need to do its own study. In the past two years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has nabbed an alarming number of hedge funders for insider trading, some with the help of top executives. The SEC seems to be building a case against top hedge fund manager Steven Cohen of SAC Capital -- it recently charged one of Cohen's former traders with one of the biggest insider trading schemes in history. What's more, there are plenty of studies out there already that show insiders routinely beat the market, something very few full-time professional investors are able to replicate.

????A decade ago, the SEC came up with a system it thought would limit or eliminate executives from profiting from insider information. The agency encouraged executives, but didn't require them, to lock in dates well in advance for when they would buy or, more often, sell their companies' shares. If stock sales were planned for months, and were routine, then there would be no ability to cheat. Right?

????Not exactly. The plans proved to be more flexible than the SEC envisioned. But that's not their biggest weakness. In most instances of apparent insider trading by an executive, a CEO miraculously appears to be able to dump a big chunk of their stock holdings right before the company reports bad news, like the quarter was worse than expected, saving them hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of dollars. Other shareholders, not in the know, take the hit.

????But a pre-set stock plan won't stop that. That's because a CEO has the ability within some reason to decide when to let the market know that his business has taken a turn for the worse. Seems natural to release news that will be bad for shares on a day when you are holding less of those said shares.

????Alan Jagolinzer, a business professor at the University of Colorado Boulder who has studied these plans, says there is a lot of variation in the way the plans are set up, but there isn't any evidence to suggest that executives are kept in the dark as to when their pre-set sales will occur. Indeed, a recent study of executive stock option plans found that companies were more likely to announce bad news in the days after a stock grant expired than before.