??? 純粹依靠軟件的技術(shù)手段必然有可以動手腳的空間,，因而也必然會被聰明的小偷利用,。基于硬件的加密技術(shù)提供商Wave Systems技術(shù)總監(jiān)格雷格?卡茲米耶爾扎克說：“如果有人偷了一部手機(jī),，那就有辦法阻止它從外部接收自毀指令,。”比如小偷只要把偷來的手機(jī)放在一個能阻絕無線信號的手機(jī)殼里,，就能阻斷這部手機(jī)的所有電磁通訊,。據(jù)卡茲米耶爾扎克表示，將被盜手機(jī)放在這種手機(jī)殼里,，然后再進(jìn)行各種阻斷接受自殺信號的操作,，的確具有可能性。

????另一種手機(jī)防盜方案是用硬件,、而不是使用軟件,，讓手機(jī)變“板磚”，而且這種方法已經(jīng)受到業(yè)界越來越多的認(rèn)可,。這種方案要求在手機(jī)內(nèi)部植入一個硬件設(shè)備,，它可以防止小偷繞過軟件程序竊取手機(jī)內(nèi)部的加密數(shù)據(jù),。

????卡茲米耶爾扎克表示，硬件技術(shù)提供了一種更加安全的解決方案,。但是現(xiàn)在就斷言應(yīng)該使用哪種技術(shù)仍然是武斷的,，它應(yīng)該取決于小偷盜竊手機(jī)的動機(jī)?？ㄆ澝滓疇栐苏J(rèn)為：“加裝解決方案之前，我們需要了解一下小偷盜竊手機(jī)的動機(jī),。你的手機(jī)里最有價值的究竟是硬件,，還是儲存在手機(jī)里的數(shù)據(jù)？”

????基于軟件的技術(shù)可以防止手機(jī)被格式化或者重設(shè)為出廠設(shè)置,，但它不能有效保護(hù)儲存在手機(jī)硬件里的加密數(shù)據(jù),。而基于硬件的技術(shù)雖然令小偷有可能重新激活手機(jī)用來轉(zhuǎn)賣，但是卻能保護(hù)原機(jī)主儲存在手機(jī)里的加密個人信息,。對此,，卡茲米耶爾扎克說：“隨著我們放進(jìn)智能手機(jī)的東西越來越多，手機(jī)里儲存的數(shù)據(jù)往往比機(jī)器本身更有價值,?！?/p>

????有些廠商已經(jīng)針對這個問題推出了自己的防盜工具。比如蘋果就在2013年與iOS7一道推出了一款防盜軟件“激活鎖定”,，上個月三星也推出了“重新激活鎖定”功能,。這兩項功能都能讓消費者遠(yuǎn)程鎖定被盜的手機(jī)，防止小偷抹除手機(jī)中的數(shù)據(jù),，重新激活設(shè)備,，再轉(zhuǎn)賣給其他人。

????有些手機(jī)廠商還在最新款的手機(jī)中采取了硬件與軟件技術(shù)相結(jié)合的模式,。比如三星在最新款的手機(jī)中整合了Knox技術(shù),，新款iPhone也內(nèi)置了用來保護(hù)加密數(shù)據(jù)的專有硬件。不過硬件解決方案的缺點是沒辦法遠(yuǎn)程“種”到老款手機(jī)里,，不像軟件方案只需一次軟件升級就能解決這個問題,。

????不管手機(jī)廠商使用的是軟件方案、硬件方案還是軟硬件相結(jié)合的防盜方案,，目前他們?nèi)杂幸粋€最大的挑戰(zhàn)沒有解決,，那就是由誰來監(jiān)管手機(jī)的“自殺”功能。比如說,，如果有人想要合法地轉(zhuǎn)賣自己的手機(jī),，那么他應(yīng)該如何把“自殺”功能安全地轉(zhuǎn)讓給新用戶？坎普說：“你怎樣證明這個讓手機(jī)‘自殺’的人不是小偷,？因為只要有人知道你的密碼,，他就可以讓你的手機(jī)‘自殺’,。目前還沒有人搞清楚這個問題?！?/p>

????除了“自殺開關(guān)”之外,，也有人嘗試了一些其它防盜方案，比如給被盜手機(jī)IMEI串號或驗證碼建立一個“黑名單”數(shù)據(jù)庫,，再比如紐約參議員杰弗里?克雷恩的提案建議,，出售一臺以上二手手機(jī)的人必須提供購買發(fā)票以避免黑市交易。但是CTIA在2012年提出的“黑名單”方案并沒有起到降低犯罪率的效果,，而克萊恩的議案自從去年十月提出之后,，至今仍卡在參議院委員會未能通過。

????參議員雷諾在一份聲明中稱：“隨著搶劫智能手機(jī)的案件達(dá)到有史以來的最高峰,，既然就這個問題已有解決方案可用,，那么加州就不能繼續(xù)坐視不理?！钡潜M管已有備選的防盜方案可用,，但它們是否能有效降低手機(jī)盜竊案，目前仍然有待觀察,。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：樸成奎

????Software-only based approaches have the potential to backfire. For one, they can be worked around by clever thieves. "If someone steals a phone, there are ways to block it from receiving communications that would kill a device," says Greg Kazmierczak, CTO of Wave Systems, a provider of hardware-based encryption technology. For instance, a thief could place the stolen phone in a signal-blocking phone case that would prevent all electromagnetic communications from reaching the device. According to Kazmierczak, it could be possible to put it into one of those cases and perform whatever you need to in order to stop the kill signal from coming in.

????Another alternative solution is to use hardware, rather than software to make stolen phones inoperable -- an approach that's becoming more widely recognized in the industry. This would involve embedding actual hardware into the phone that would prevent thieves from circumventing software technology to get access to data encrypted on the phone.

????Hardware technology offers a much more secure solution, says Kazmierczak. But the question of which technology to use is not arbitrary. It hinges on what drives thieves to steal phones in the first place. "We need to understand what the motivation is in the theft before instilling a solution," Kazmierczak says. "What's the most valuable component -- the hardware or the data you are storing in your device?"

????A software-based approach could protect a phone from getting wiped and reset to factory default, but it would not be as effective in protecting the user's data encrypted on hardware in the device. A hardware-based approach, on the other hand, might make it possible for thieves to reactivate the phone for resale, but would protect encrypted personal data about the original owner from getting stolen. "As we put more and more into these devices, the data is more valuable than the device itself," Kazmierczak says.

????Attempts to offer a solution to the problem are already in place by some providers. Anti-theft software like Apple's Activation Lock rolled out in 2013 as part of iOS 7 and last month Samsung released a "Reactivation Lock," both of which would allow consumers whose phones were stolen to lock them remotely and prevent thieves from wiping and reactivating their devices to be resold.

????And a few phone manufacturers are putting a hybrid of hardware and software technologies in place in their newest models. Samsung phones with Knox technology in them do this, as do newer iPhones that include proprietary hardware to protect encrypted data. The downside of such a hardware solution, of course, is that it can't be introduced remotely to older modeled phones in the same way a software update can be.

????Regardless of whether smartphone makers take a software, hardware, or combined approach to theft prevention, one of the biggest challenges they have yet to figure out is where the manpower to monitor and regulate a kill switch function will come from. When someone wants to resell a used phone legally, for example, how can they transfer kill switch capabilities to the new owner safely and securely? "How do you validate that it's the right person trying to kill the device? Someone could kill your phone if they know your password," Kemp says. "So far no one has figured that out yet."

????Other solutions beyond the kill switch have been attempted, including a database of blacklisted IMEIs or identification numbers for stolen phones, better policing and a proposed bill by New York senator Jeffrey D. Klein, that would require those people selling more than one used phone to provide receipts of purchase to prevent black-market business. But CTIA's blacklist, which was proposed in 2012 hasn't helped reduce crime numbers and Klein's bill has been stuck in a Senate Committee since it was proposed last October.

????"With robberies of smartphones reaching an all-time high, California cannot continue to stand by when a solution to the problem is readily available," said Senator Leno in a statement. But while solutions to the problem are available, how effective they'll be at actually curbing smartphone theft still remains to be seen.