過(guò)去半年,，因柴油車(chē)安裝作弊軟件以通過(guò)美國(guó)環(huán)保局排放檢測(cè)一事被曝光,，德國(guó)汽車(chē)制造商大眾一直處在水深火熱之中。

當(dāng)時(shí),，該公司一位高管曾被迫出席美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)聽(tīng)證會(huì),。在聽(tīng)證會(huì)上，大眾美國(guó)地區(qū)總裁兼CEO邁克爾?霍恩遭到了眾議院能源和商務(wù)委員會(huì)監(jiān)督與調(diào)查子委員會(huì)的質(zhì)疑和批評(píng),?；舳鞅硎镜狼福暦Q(chēng)自己并不知道受檢汽車(chē)中安裝了作弊軟件,?！都~約時(shí)報(bào)》隨后發(fā)表的一篇社論聲稱(chēng)，我們很難相信這并不是公司的決策,，而只是“幾位軟件工程師”的個(gè)人行為,。文章建議，大眾汽車(chē)應(yīng)該立刻說(shuō)出實(shí)情,。

但根據(jù)我的經(jīng)驗(yàn),，實(shí)際情況可能并非如此,。作為一名學(xué)者和顧問(wèn)，我在危機(jī)處理領(lǐng)域已從業(yè)三十多年,，目前開(kāi)始涉足公司責(zé)任領(lǐng)域,。一味追究某些高管肯定知道事情的原委，可能會(huì)錯(cuò)過(guò)危機(jī)的根源所在,?？赡苡性S多原因?qū)е铝舜舜挝C(jī)，但我認(rèn)為,，這并不是一次大陰謀,，大眾只是又一家不惜一切代價(jià)追求增長(zhǎng)的公司，是它的績(jī)效文化導(dǎo)致了這一問(wèn)題,，而不是來(lái)自公司高層的直接命令,。

過(guò)去兩年來(lái)，我耗費(fèi)大量時(shí)間來(lái)研究公司責(zé)任,，并編寫(xiě)了一本關(guān)于公司責(zé)任的教科書(shū),。最令我感到意外的一項(xiàng)研究來(lái)自一次全國(guó)商業(yè)道德調(diào)查，該調(diào)查以10年為周期,，研究員工如何看待公司的商業(yè)道德,。

一個(gè)重要發(fā)現(xiàn)是，導(dǎo)致員工在商業(yè)道德方面妥協(xié)的最常見(jiàn)原因,，確實(shí)來(lái)自公司的高層,，但個(gè)中細(xì)節(jié)并不是你所想象的那樣。研究顯示,，70%的員工認(rèn)為,，實(shí)現(xiàn)不切實(shí)際的商業(yè)目標(biāo)的壓力，是導(dǎo)致他們放棄道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的最大原因,，有75%的員工表示,，公司高層或管理中層是導(dǎo)致公司道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)下降的主要壓力來(lái)源。我在過(guò)去二十年的研究便證明了這一點(diǎn),。

例如,，早在上世紀(jì)90年代，我曾寫(xiě)過(guò)一個(gè)關(guān)于美國(guó)超市連鎖Food Lion的案例,。一段秘密拍攝的視頻被ABC新聞?lì)l道曝光,。這段視頻顯示，該公司故意出售腐爛的肉,，用漂白劑洗過(guò)的魚(yú),，出售的通心粉沙拉早已超過(guò)最佳使用期限，酸奶上的最遲銷(xiāo)售日期也被抹掉,。這家公司后來(lái)與ABC頻道對(duì)簿公堂,，并最終贏得了官司,，因?yàn)檫@位秘密拍攝者曾經(jīng)在他的工作經(jīng)歷問(wèn)題上撒過(guò)謊。盡管沒(méi)有哪位公司領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者告訴員工要把壞的魚(yú)挑出來(lái),，用漂白劑清洗,，然后再涂上烤肉醬，但他們也沒(méi)有必要發(fā)布如此赤裸裸的指令,。當(dāng)公司在努力追求行業(yè)第一的時(shí)候,，員工們自己就會(huì)找尋捷徑。

2004年遭遇柴油機(jī)微粒過(guò)濾器事件的三井有限公司也是如此,。我在新書(shū)中也提到了這家公司的案例,。三井的情況與大眾汽車(chē)類(lèi)似，當(dāng)時(shí)三井一家子公司的工程師,，在柴油微粒過(guò)濾器的排放數(shù)據(jù)上做了手腳,。為了遵守嚴(yán)格的新公共交通（如公交車(chē)等）規(guī)定，日本許多政府機(jī)關(guān)采購(gòu)了這款過(guò)濾器,。三井公司CEO槍田松瑩對(duì)此一無(wú)所知,。我寫(xiě)的案例記錄了這位果斷的CEO，如何在幾年內(nèi)完成了公司文化的驚人轉(zhuǎn)變,。

那么,，對(duì)于指責(zé)大眾公司的監(jiān)管者以及正努力解決問(wèn)題的大眾高管來(lái)說(shuō)，他們究竟應(yīng)該做些什么呢,？首先,，對(duì)于大眾汽車(chē)而言，這確實(shí)是一次糟糕的危機(jī),，但我們必須承認(rèn),，相比通用汽車(chē)的點(diǎn)火裝置故障危機(jī)（通用汽車(chē)承認(rèn)死亡人數(shù)超過(guò)100人）或豐田汽車(chē)的突然加速問(wèn)題（近90人死亡），大眾汽車(chē)的此次危機(jī)并沒(méi)有那么嚴(yán)重,。而在上面兩個(gè)案例中，盡管要處理法律和監(jiān)管問(wèn)題,，這兩家公司生產(chǎn)的汽車(chē)仍然能夠成功售出,。大眾汽車(chē)同樣會(huì)度過(guò)危機(jī)，繼續(xù)銷(xiāo)售汽車(chē),。

其次,，把時(shí)間花在追究某些人是否知情，在什么時(shí)間知曉相關(guān)問(wèn)題,，并沒(méi)有多少意義,。相反，調(diào)查人員應(yīng)該研究導(dǎo)致此次危機(jī)的公司文化,，而大眾汽車(chē)需要找到一位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人,，帶領(lǐng)這家偉大的公司度過(guò)此次危機(jī),，正如三井公司一樣。但不要誤會(huì)：這需要時(shí)間,，而無(wú)論是監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu),、媒體還是股東，都不會(huì)愿意提供這樣的時(shí)間,。

第三,，大眾汽車(chē)既需要關(guān)注排放檢測(cè)造假的短期問(wèn)題，也要關(guān)注長(zhǎng)期的文化問(wèn)題——這種文化專(zhuān)注于成功與績(jī)效,，卻忘記提醒它的員工,，不要去做任何他們不希望被媒體曝光的事情。他們應(yīng)該怎么做,？

他們要知道,，一家擁有強(qiáng)大文化的公司更加難以進(jìn)行徹底變革，并且他們要專(zhuān)注于長(zhǎng)期的文化變革,，以避免未來(lái)發(fā)生類(lèi)似丑聞,。

保證公司的策略與其價(jià)值觀和愿景一致。

明確表明對(duì)不道德行為的零容忍,，并反復(fù)強(qiáng)調(diào),，沒(méi)有任何事情值得公司付出失去信譽(yù)的代價(jià)。

按照與對(duì)待運(yùn)營(yíng)和財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相同的方式,，測(cè)量和監(jiān)測(cè)信譽(yù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。

保證管理高層不會(huì)太過(guò)專(zhuān)注于管理危機(jī)，以至于忘記著眼未來(lái)經(jīng)營(yíng)公司,。

要做到這些并不容易,，而且不可能在幾個(gè)月內(nèi)完成，大眾汽車(chē)肯定要花數(shù)年時(shí)間,，才能讓員工以在這里工作為豪,，讓消費(fèi)者愿意購(gòu)買(mǎi)它的汽車(chē)，讓社區(qū)歡迎它的回歸,。

從許多方面而言,，相比大眾等公司在危機(jī)爆發(fā)之后才去努力解決問(wèn)題，對(duì)于正在閱讀這篇文章的高管們來(lái)說(shuō),，避免此類(lèi)危機(jī)的爆發(fā)要容易得多,。我能給所有公司最好的建議，或許便如希臘哲學(xué)家蘇格拉底所說(shuō)：“獲得名譽(yù)的方式是努力,，成為你理想的樣子,。”如果大眾汽車(chē)的每一個(gè)人都能認(rèn)真思考這句話，而不是只考慮如何實(shí)現(xiàn)管理層設(shè)定的激進(jìn)增長(zhǎng)目標(biāo),，大眾汽車(chē)恐怕也不至于陷入如今的窘境,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文作者保羅?A?阿爾真蒂是達(dá)特茅斯塔克商學(xué)院公司溝通教授。他著有《公司責(zé)任》一書(shū),。2014年,，道德村協(xié)會(huì)將其評(píng)為商業(yè)道德領(lǐng)域最具影響力人物之一。

譯者：劉進(jìn)龍/汪皓

審校：任文科

Over the last half year, the German automaker, Volkswagen, had been in the hot seat for installing software that covered up diesel emissions during testing by the EPA.

As is often the case, the situation came to a head with the obligatory congressional hearing when the company’s Group America President and CEO, Michael Horn, faced questions and criticism from the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. In that testimony, Horn was apologetic, but said he was not aware that the software had been installed. The New York Times was quick to write in an editorial that it is hard to believe this was not a corporate decision rather than the work of “a couple of software engineers.” They went on to suggest that VW needs to come clean now and quickly.

My experience, however, working for over three decades as an academic and consultant on crises and more recently in the area of corporate responsibility, suggests otherwise. And, the idea that someone in senior management had to know misses the point of this crisis. It may be many things, but my sense is that rather than a large conspiracy, it is yet another example of a company hell bent on growth whose performance culture created this problem rather than direct orders from the top of the company.

Over the last two years, I spent a significant amount of time researching and writing a textbook on corporate responsibility. One of the most surprising studies that I came across in my work was a National Business Ethics Survey that looked at how employees viewed ethics in their organizations over a 10-year period.

What the study found was that the most common cause for an employee to compromise ethics did indeed come from the top, but not how you would think. In that study, 70% of employees identified pressure to meet unrealistic business objectives as most likely to cause them to compromise their ethical standards, and 75% identified either their senior or middle management as the primary source of pressure they feel to compromise the standards of their organizations. And my research over the last two decades backs this up.

For example, back in the 1990s, I wrote a case about Food Lion, the US supermarket chain that was caught in a hidden-camera expose by ABC News charging that the company knowingly sold rotten meat, fish cleaned with bleach, macaroni salad put out way past its prime, and yogurt whose sell-by date had been erased. The company fought ABC in court and won because the person using the hidden camera had lied about previous employment. And while no one in the company had ever told employees to keep putting bad fish out and cleaning it with bleach before adding barbecue sauce, they didn’t have to. In their quest to be number one, employees knew how to cut corners on their own.

The same was also true at Mitsui & Co. in its DPF incident in 2004, which I also wrote a case about for my new book. This case was similar to the situation at VW in that engineers at a subsidiary had been falsifying emissions data on diesel particulate filters (DPF). The filters were sold to many government agencies in Japan to meet aggressive new regulations on public transport such as buses. At Mitsui, the CEO, Shoei Utsuda, knew nothing about the situation. The case I wrote chronicled the amazing turn-around in culture that this heroic CEO was able to put into place over a period of several years.

So what should regulators trying to place blame and VW executives trying to fix the problem do? First, while this is a terrible crisis for VW, we all need to recognize that it pales in comparison to the crisis GM faced with its faulty ignition switches (the company now admits over 100 people died) or Toyota’s instant acceleration problem (close to 90 people died). In both cases, however, the companies went on selling cars successfully despite dealing with legal and regulatory issues. VW will also survive and continue to sell cars.

Second, it is useless to spend time trying to figure out who knew what and when. Instead, investigators should be studying the culture that lead to this crisis and the company, like Mitsui, needs to find a leader who can move this great organization beyond this incident. But make no mistake; it will take time, which is something that neither regulators, the media, or shareholders are going to be happy about.

Third, VW needs to focus on both the short-term issue of compromised emissions tests as well as the long-term issue of a culture so focused on success and performance that it forgot to remind employees not to do anything they wouldn’t want to read about online the next day. So how can they do that?

Realize that radical changes are more difficult in companies with a strong culture and focus on the long-term cultural changes necessary to avoid scandals like this one in the future.

Make sure that the strategy of the company aligns with its values and vision.

Explicitly state intolerance for wrongdoing and repeatedly suggest that nothing is worth losing your reputation over.

Measure and monitor reputational risk in the same way that the company looks at operational and financial risk.

Make sure that senior management does not get so caught up managing the crisis that they forget to run the company for the future.

None of this is going to be easy, and it will most definitely take years rather than months for VW to transform itself to the kind of company employees will be proud to work for, customers will be happy to buy from, and communities will be happy to welcome back.

In many ways, it is much easier for executives reading this to stop things like this from happening in the first place rather than trying to fix problems at companies like VW after they happen. Perhaps the best advice I could give all of those many companies was best said by the Greek philosopher Socrates: “The way to gain a good reputation is to endeavor to be what you desire to appear.” If everyone had thought about that at VW rather than how to meet the aggressive growth goals set forth by management, no one would be questioning them today.

Paul A. Argenti is Professor of Corporate Communication at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. He is author of Corporate Responsibility. The Ethisphere Institute listed him in 2014 as one of the most influential people in business ethics.