2月初,，尼日利亞空軍轟炸了博科圣地組織（Boko Haram）在該國西北部的一個后勤基地,。此次空襲本身并沒有什么特殊之處。最近幾個月來,，尼日利亞空軍已經(jīng)對該軍事組織發(fā)動了數(shù)百次空襲,。但在這次轟炸中，尼日利亞空軍首次動用無人機(jī),。

對很多人來說,，這個新聞的爆點并非尼日利亞軍隊首次使用武裝無人機(jī)進(jìn)行實戰(zhàn)，而是這樣一個非洲國家的軍隊竟然也擁有武裝無人機(jī),。盡管美國,、英國和中國這些軍事強(qiáng)國擁有武裝無人機(jī)是人所共知的事實，但很少有人知道尼日利亞,、南非和索馬里也擁有武裝無人機(jī),。巴基斯坦和伊朗已經(jīng)分別在本國境內(nèi)將武裝無人機(jī)投入實戰(zhàn)。另外,，至少有十幾個其他國家也公開宣稱正在發(fā)展武裝無人機(jī)技術(shù),。此外，正在秘密制造或購買武裝無人機(jī)的國家更是不可勝數(shù),。

在過去18個月,，“武裝無人機(jī)俱樂部”的成員國至少已經(jīng)達(dá)到兩位數(shù)，這在很大程度上要歸功于價格更便宜,、比美國無人機(jī)技術(shù)更容易獲得的中國技術(shù),。

那么，目前到底有多少個國家已經(jīng)擁有了武裝無人機(jī),？這的確一言難盡,。它取決于我們怎樣定義“武裝無人機(jī)”。簡短的答案是,，至少有10個國家已經(jīng)擁有武裝無人機(jī),，而且這個數(shù)字很快還要大得多。

新美國基金會去年發(fā)布的一份報告顯示,，目前擁有武裝無人機(jī)的國家包括美國,、英國、中國、以色列,、巴基斯坦,、伊朗、伊拉克,、尼日利亞,、索馬里和南非。此外這份名單上還有兩個非政府組織——伊斯蘭抵抗運(yùn)動（哈馬斯）和黎巴嫩真主黨,。

當(dāng)然，大家要注意“武裝無人機(jī)”和“綁著手榴彈的航模飛機(jī)”之間的差異,。在國際軍火市場上,，一款飛機(jī)的航程和載彈量可以說是最重要的影響因素。根據(jù)軍控協(xié)議,，有些無人機(jī)是禁售的，而有些則不在軍控的范圍內(nèi),。

舉例來說,，美國空軍MQ-9“捕食者”無人機(jī)能夠長途奔襲幾百英里，向地面目標(biāo)發(fā)射“地獄火”精確制導(dǎo)導(dǎo)彈,。這種大殺器與那些綁著一顆遙控制導(dǎo)炸彈的小型航模飛機(jī)顯然就不是同一種工具,。而如今，“武裝無人俱樂部”不僅在低端增長,，而且在非常高端的領(lǐng)域也在增長,。

2015年11月，美國國防部批準(zhǔn)將MQ-9“捕食者”無人機(jī)技術(shù)銷售給意大利,，使該國成為繼英國（2007年）之后第二個獲得美國空軍主流無人機(jī)打擊技術(shù)的國家,。差不多就在同一時期，西班牙也宣布將在未來某個時間點對自己的MQ-9無人機(jī)機(jī)隊進(jìn)行武器化升級,。另據(jù)報道,，加拿大空軍也有意購買一款武裝無人機(jī)，不過目前西班牙和加拿大都尚未獲得美國對該技術(shù)的出口許可,。

美國能否開放武裝無人機(jī)技術(shù)的出口許可,，是決定未來武裝無人機(jī)將怎樣繁榮發(fā)展的一個重要因素——特別是它將決定尼日利亞、伊拉克和巴基斯坦等國的戰(zhàn)場上將出現(xiàn)哪種無人機(jī)的身影,。美國是導(dǎo)彈技術(shù)管制協(xié)定（MTCR）的簽約國——1987年,，在冷戰(zhàn)即將結(jié)束之際，以美國為首的一些國家自愿簽署了這份旨在控制巡航導(dǎo)彈技術(shù)擴(kuò)散的軍控協(xié)議,。

MTCR協(xié)定要求簽約國對能夠飛行185英里以上,、載重超過1100磅的航空技術(shù)采取“強(qiáng)力否決推定”原則（意思是，如果不能證明你的用途是不違背禁運(yùn)條例的，則推定為禁運(yùn)范疇）,。雖然該協(xié)定簽定時主要針對的是巡航導(dǎo)彈技術(shù),，但它也將許多大型的長程無人機(jī)技術(shù)包含在內(nèi)。

美國是MTCR的簽約國,，而中國和以色列等國卻并未簽署MTCR,。這不僅損害了美國的無人機(jī)產(chǎn)業(yè)（包括軍用和民用），同時也使中國成為一個極具吸引力的無人機(jī)供應(yīng)國,。以色列雖然也出口無人機(jī)技術(shù)，但出于自身安全考量,，以色列在出售武裝無人機(jī)技術(shù)時更加謹(jǐn)慎,。

目前關(guān)于中國武裝無人機(jī)的價格信息極少,。據(jù)分析人士估計,，中國制造的彩虹－4無人機(jī)的價格大概只有它所仿制的美國MQ-9“捕食者”的四分之一。另外,，從中國購買武裝無人機(jī)也不會碰到那么多監(jiān)管方面的麻煩。

這就是武裝無人機(jī)出現(xiàn)在尼日利亞,、巴基斯坦和伊拉克等戰(zhàn)亂地區(qū)的原因之一。這些國家都購買了中國產(chǎn)的彩虹－3或彩虹－4無人機(jī),。據(jù)報道,，去年阿爾及利亞空軍在評估彩虹－4無人機(jī)的過程中,，有兩架失事墜毀,，不過我們并不清楚在此事之后，阿空軍是否繼續(xù)執(zhí)行其采購計劃,。另據(jù)報道,，沙特阿拉伯和阿聯(lián)酋也購買了中國產(chǎn)無人機(jī)，因為有關(guān)軍控協(xié)議禁止他們從老買家美國那里購買該技術(shù),。

康奈爾大學(xué)政府學(xué)系副教授,，武器擴(kuò)散與國際安全問題專家薩拉?克雷普斯認(rèn)為，中國產(chǎn)無人機(jī)的興起,，正在將國際武裝無人機(jī)俱樂部分為兩個層次,。其高端是美國及其少數(shù)盟友,，他們擁有衛(wèi)星,、全球數(shù)據(jù)鏈和海外軍事基地等資源,，使美國無人機(jī)具備了知名的“全球打擊”能力。低端則是那些擁有中國產(chǎn)武裝無人機(jī)平臺的國家,，這些無人機(jī)最遠(yuǎn)只能飛到離地面控制員幾百英里的地方,。

不過她還指出，航程有限并不意味著這類低端無人機(jī)的殺傷力有任何欠缺,。對于許多正在本國境內(nèi)與反叛組織交戰(zhàn)的國家,，或者主要以鄰國為假想敵的國家來說，就算航程短了些,，高科技元素少了些,，也不是什么大問題，尼日利亞,、巴基斯坦和伊拉克等地的致命空襲就是證明,。中國產(chǎn)武裝無人機(jī)作為世界上最受歡迎的產(chǎn)品，雖然在理論上不如美國貨那么有效,，但在實戰(zhàn)中卻鋒芒不減。

好消息是,，至少目前看來,，那些已經(jīng)將無人機(jī)投入實戰(zhàn)的國家，都首先采用傳統(tǒng)的載人飛機(jī)進(jìn)行空襲,。也就是說,，盡管有人擔(dān)心一些軍事力量擁有武裝無人機(jī)后，對一些以前不會出動致命武力的情況,，也會采用相對低風(fēng)險的無人機(jī)進(jìn)行打擊,，但至少從最近幾個剛加入武裝無人機(jī)俱樂部的國家的情況來看，這一幕并未出現(xiàn),。

克雷普斯表示：“我從2009年起就開始研究這個問題,，我覺得這個問題實際上沒那么令人擔(dān)憂了。比如從英國的經(jīng)驗上就可以看出,，他們對無人機(jī)的使用還是相當(dāng)嚴(yán)格的,。對于卷入武裝沖突的國家來說，武裝無人機(jī)只是他們的工具箱中的另一個工具罷了,。它并不是‘終結(jié)者’,。”(財富中文網(wǎng))

譯者：樸成奎

審校：任文科

Last week Nigeria joined a dubious international clique when it bombed a logistics base used by the militant group Boko Haram in the country’s northeast. Though the airstrike itself was unremarkable—the Nigerian Air Force has conducted hundreds of strikes against Boko Haram in recent months—it was the first Nigeria has delivered via an unmanned drone.

For many, the news wasn’t that Nigeria had used a weaponized drone in combat for the first time, but that the Nigerian military has weaponized drones at all. While it’s well-understood that military powers like the U.S., U.K., and China possess armed drones, it’s less well-known that Nigeria, South Africa, and Somalia (most likely) have them as well. Pakistan and Iraq have both used weaponized drones in combat inside their own borders. At least a dozen other nations have publicly declared they are pursuing armed drone technologies, and countless others seek to discreetly build or buy them as well.

In the past 18 months the weaponized drone club has quietly grown to double-digit membership, largely thanks to Chinese technology that is both less expensive and easier to obtain than U.S. drone technology.

So how many countries now possess armed drones? The long answer is nuanced, depending on what exactly constitutes a “weaponized drone.” The short answer is at least 10, and soon it will be a far larger club than that.

According to a report the New America Foundation released last year, the list of countries that possess armed drones includes the U.S., the U.K., China, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Africa. Two non-state organizations—Hamas and Hezbollah—also make the list, though this is where the distinctions between “weaponized drone” and “model-aircraft-with-a-grenade-strapped-to-it” begin to become important, and not just in terms of tallying membership in the weaponized drone club. An aircraft’s range and the size of the payload it can carry has important ramifications in the international weapons marketplace, triggering international arms control agreements in some cases and not in others (more on that below).

Suffice it to say that a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper capable of traveling hundreds of miles to hurl precision-guided Hellfire missiles at targets on the ground is in practice a very different tool than a small recreational drone crudely hacked into a remotely guided missile. The weaponized drone club is growing not just at the less-sophisticated end of that spectrum but also at the very high end as well.

In November, the U.S. State Department approvedthe sale of weaponized MQ-9 Reaper technology to Italy, making it only the second country to receive the U.S. Air Force’s signature drone strike technology (following the U.K. in 2007). Around the same time, Spain also acknowledged that it would pursue weaponization of its own fleet of MQ-9s at some undetermined point in the future. The Canadian air force reportedly is shopping for an armed drone capability as well, though neither Spain nor Canada has received clearance from the U.S. to import the technology.

That clearance is key to a larger trend in the proliferation of weaponized drones, particularly the ones now emerging in combat roles in places like Nigeria, Iraq, and Pakistan. The U.S. is signatory to something called the Missile Technology Control Regime, or MTCR—a voluntary 1987 arms control agreement aimed largely at controlling the proliferation of cruise missile technologies as the Cold War came to a close.

The MTCR requires member nations to apply a “strong presumption of denial” on the sale and export of airborne technologies that can travel 185 miles or more and carry a 1,100-pound payload. Though signed with cruise missile exports in mind, the MTCR has ensnared many large, long-range aerial drones in its language as well.

While the U.S. is signatory to the MTCR, drone exporters like China and Israel are not. Not only has that hurt the U.S. drone industry (for both armed and unarmed models) in the global marketplace, but it’s made China a particularly attractive vendor. (While Israel exports its drone technologies, its security situation requires that it be a more discerning seller of weaponized drone technology.) Though pricing information is scarce, analysts estimate the price tag on a Chinese CH-4 drone isroughly a quarter that of the American MQ-9 Reaper it is designed to emulate. Buying weaponized drones from China also entails far fewer regulatory hurdles.

That’s one reason we’re now seeing armed drones entering combat in places like Nigeria, Pakistan, and Iraq, each of which operates Chinese CH-3 or CH-4 models. Two CH-4s reportedly crashed in Algeria last year during evaluation by the Algerian military (though it’s not clear if Algeria went through with its purchase after the botched demo). Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have reportedly purchased Chinese drones as well, as arms control considerations have thus far barred them from purchasing the technology from their usual weapons vendors in the United States.

The proliferation of armed Chinese drones is stratifying the weaponized drone club somewhat, says Sarah Kreps, an associate professor in Cornell University’s department of government and an expert on weapons proliferation and international security. At the high end of that strata there’s the U.S. and a handful of its allies that have the resources to sustain satellites, global data links, and foreign bases that offer the kind of global reach the U.S. drone program is renowned for, she says. Then there’s a lower tier that includes those countries operating Chinese-made weaponized platforms capable of flying only a few hundred miles from their ground controller.

That limited range doesn’t make the lower tier any less deadly, she says. For many countries battling insurgencies within their own borders or targeting the neighbor next door, a shorter range and fewer technological bells and whistles isn’t all that limiting, as evidenced by deadly strikes inside the borders of Nigeria, Pakistan, and Iraq. The fact that the weaponized drones most popular on the global market are theoretically less effective than U.S.-made drone hardware has not blunted their effect in practice.

The silver lining, at least for the time being: The countries that have thus far used armed drones are doing so in conflicts where conventional, manned airstrikes are already underway. That is, the argument that having armed drones will prompt militaries to launch relatively low-risk drone strikes in situations where they otherwise wouldn’t have used deadly force has not yet manifested itself among the latest inductees to the weaponized drone club.

“I’ve been working on this issue since 2009, and I feel like it’s actually become a little less worrisome,” Kreps says. “You look at the U.K. experience, for example, and they’re using them in pretty restrained ways. For countries involved in armed conflict this is another tool in their toolbox. It’s not Terminator.”