北京離倫敦足有萬(wàn)里之遙,，但中國(guó)依然避免不了英國(guó)脫歐的沖擊波,。

由于中國(guó)歷來(lái)奉行不干涉他國(guó)內(nèi)政的外交政策，因此在6月23日的英國(guó)脫歐公投之前,，中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人有意對(duì)這一議題保持了沉默,。如今脫歐公投的結(jié)果已經(jīng)板上釘釘，中國(guó)政府也不得不認(rèn)真考慮英國(guó)脫歐將會(huì)給中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)及地緣政治利益造成哪些影響,。

從經(jīng)濟(jì)上看,，英國(guó)脫歐對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)是個(gè)相當(dāng)糟糕的消息。中英兩國(guó)2015年的雙邊貿(mào)易額約為785億左右,，在中國(guó)的各大貿(mào)易伙伴中，英國(guó)還排不到“第一梯隊(duì)”,，但英國(guó)脫歐很可能會(huì)給中國(guó)出口貿(mào)易造成遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)其體量的長(zhǎng)期影響,。

如果說(shuō)，英國(guó)脫歐作為一個(gè)歷史事件,，向世界傳遞了某種信息的話(huà),，那就是它標(biāo)志了我們所知的所謂“全球化”的結(jié)束。西方國(guó)家的政客們?yōu)榱擞蠂?guó)內(nèi)所謂的“全球化受害者”,，很可能會(huì)對(duì)自由貿(mào)易進(jìn)行打壓,。以平息那些覺(jué)得自身利益受到了全球化損害的選民的憤怒與沮喪。而中國(guó)作為全球最大的出口國(guó)和全球化最大的受益者,，一旦全球自由貿(mào)易水平出現(xiàn)下降,，并導(dǎo)致中國(guó)的出口引擎急劇減速，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的前景自然也將陷入慘淡,。

脫歐給英國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)的負(fù)面影響,，也將促使中國(guó)重新調(diào)整其在歐洲的經(jīng)貿(mào)戰(zhàn)略。過(guò)去幾年,，北京攜巨額投資以及一批可能利潤(rùn)豐厚的商機(jī),，頻頻向倫敦伸出橄欖枝。比如在國(guó)家主席習(xí)近平去年訪(fǎng)英期間,，習(xí)近平宣布了兩國(guó)之間價(jià)值570億美元的合作項(xiàng)目,。英國(guó)已經(jīng)成了許多中資企業(yè)最青睞的直接投資地。2015年,，中資企業(yè)在英國(guó)完成了22筆大額并購(gòu),。其中最大的一筆，便是中國(guó)廣核集團(tuán)斥資90億美元,，收購(gòu)了英國(guó)欣克利角核電站33.5%的股份,。

如果在脫歐之后,，英國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)因?yàn)椴淮_定性以及失去歐盟市場(chǎng)這一后盾而惡化，那么中國(guó)在英國(guó)的相關(guān)投資也會(huì)受到影響,。更令人擔(dān)憂(yōu)的是,，如果脫歐嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了倫敦作為全球主要金融中心的地位，那么中國(guó)利用倫敦作為人民幣國(guó)際化橋頭堡的計(jì)劃當(dāng)然也就泡湯了,。2015年,，中國(guó)政府相繼出臺(tái)了多項(xiàng)政策以實(shí)施這一重要戰(zhàn)略。中國(guó)人民銀行發(fā)行了50億元的人民幣債券,，與此同時(shí),，中國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)銀行在倫敦拋售了價(jià)值10億美元的雙重貨幣債券。而在英國(guó)脫歐之后,，很多國(guó)際知名銀行可能會(huì)將他們的資本市場(chǎng)運(yùn)營(yíng)搬離倫敦,，如此一來(lái)，倫敦必將失去全球金融中心的光環(huán),。中國(guó)必須尋找一個(gè)替代選擇,。

不過(guò)，英國(guó)脫歐也會(huì)在一定程度上給中國(guó)帶來(lái)一些政治上的好處,，從而或多或少地抵消了經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的損失,。首先是意識(shí)形態(tài)方面：英國(guó)脫歐對(duì)中國(guó)的宣傳部門(mén)來(lái)說(shuō)簡(jiǎn)直是一個(gè)天大的喜訊，他們立即不遺余力地宣傳道,，這是西方民主體制失靈的又一鐵證,。而在地緣政治方面，中國(guó)也能從英國(guó)脫歐中得益不少,。大約一直到10年以前時(shí),，中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人還把歐洲一體化看作一件好事。因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)為一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的歐洲將能夠與霸權(quán)主義的美國(guó)分庭抗禮,。

然而隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展,，中國(guó)如今已經(jīng)成為全球第二強(qiáng)大的國(guó)家，中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人對(duì)歐洲一體化也有了不同的看法,。一個(gè)統(tǒng)一,、強(qiáng)大的歐洲已經(jīng)不再符合中國(guó)的利益，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)與歐洲有可能結(jié)成一個(gè)反華的戰(zhàn)略同盟,，正如它們也曾聯(lián)手對(duì)抗過(guò)冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)的蘇聯(lián),。

因此，中國(guó)的歐洲戰(zhàn)略已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了微妙卻又十分重要的變化,。中國(guó)開(kāi)始注重發(fā)展與一個(gè)個(gè)歐洲國(guó)家的關(guān)系,，同時(shí)經(jīng)常“發(fā)動(dòng)群眾斗群眾”,，令這些國(guó)家互相競(jìng)爭(zhēng)起來(lái),。如今,，中國(guó)的這套新戰(zhàn)略已經(jīng)取得了完全的成功。而歐盟對(duì)中國(guó)的“分化瓦解,，逐個(gè)擊破”戰(zhàn)術(shù),，卻還沒(méi)有想出統(tǒng)一的破解之道。幾乎每個(gè)歐洲國(guó)家都有自己的中國(guó)政策,，而這些國(guó)家在與中國(guó)打交道時(shí),，往往是最注重商業(yè)利益，而將人權(quán)與安全議題擺在次要位置,。明眼人都看得出,，如今沒(méi)有一個(gè)歐洲國(guó)家的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人敢在自己國(guó)內(nèi)的任何地方會(huì)見(jiàn)達(dá)賴(lài)?yán)铩８姓f(shuō)服力的是,，去年中國(guó)宣布成立亞投行之后,，以英國(guó)為首的所有歐洲主要國(guó)家立馬一窩蜂地跑去報(bào)名參加，雖然這樣做顯然是背離了美國(guó)的意愿,。

隨著英國(guó)通過(guò)公投退出歐盟,，英國(guó)自然將變得更加疲軟，而歐盟也將江河日下,。縮水版的歐盟將無(wú)法對(duì)抗中國(guó),，而它的內(nèi)部齟齬也會(huì)降低它作為一個(gè)戰(zhàn)略伙伴在美國(guó)眼中的價(jià)值,。

中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在計(jì)算英國(guó)脫歐給中國(guó)帶來(lái)的得失時(shí)，或許會(huì)喜憂(yōu)參半,。不過(guò)如果他們要是能夠選擇的話(huà),，北京的實(shí)用主義者們毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)更喜歡英國(guó)脫歐前更具確定性的世界。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者：樸成奎

Beijing may be 5,000 miles away from London, but China cannot escape the shock waves of Brexit.

Prior to the June 23 referendum in the United Kingdom, Chinese leaders had maintained a studious silence on the issue because of their long-standing policy of non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. Now that the British voters have spoken, Beijing has to take a serious look at how Brexit will affect its economic and geopolitical interests.

Economically, Brexit is terrible news for China. Even though the UK, which had $78.5 billion in bilateral trade with China in 2015, is not among China’s top trading partners, Brexit could have an outsize impact on China’s future export performance.

If there is one message broadcast to the world by Brexit, it is the end of globalization as we know it. Political leaders in Western countries will likely roll back free trade in response to the anger and frustrations of their voters who have felt threatened, if not victimized, by globalization. As the greatest beneficiary of globalization and the world’s largest exporter, Beijing could see its future economic prospects dim as the world retreats from free trade and China’s export engine sputters.

The anticipated adverse consequences of Brexit for the UK economy will also force China to readjust its commercial strategy in Europe. In the last few years, Beijing has been wooing London with investments and potentially lucrative commercial opportunities. In his visit to the UK last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced deals worth $57 billion. Many Chinese companies have made the UK one of their favorite destinations of direct investment. In 2015, Chinese companies completed 22 major acquisitions in the UK. The biggest was the $9 billion purchase of a 33.5% stake by China’s General Nuclear Power Corporation in Britain’s Hinkley Point nuclear power plant.

If the UK economy deteriorates because of the uncertainty and loss of access to the EU market following Brexit, the value of Chinese investments will be impaired. Even more worrying is that should Brexit fatally damage London as a premier global financial center, China will have to shelf its plan to use London as a linchpin for the “internationalization” of the Chinese currency, therenminbi. In 2015, Beijing took several initial steps to execute this strategy. The People’s Bank of China floated 5 billion yuan-denominated bonds while the Agricultural Bank of China, a major state-owned bank, sold $1 billion in dual currency bonds in London. In the aftermath of Brexit, many major global banks may move their capital market operations out of London, which will lose its luster as a global financial hub. China needs to look for an alternative.

Nevertheless, China’s potential economic losses could be offset by some political gains from Brexit. Ideologically, Brexit is a godsend for China’s propagandists, who have lost no time in portraying the event as a convincing example of the dysfunction of democracy. Geopolitically, China could also benefit handsomely from the aftershocks of Brexit. Until roughly a decade ago, Chinese leaders viewed European integration positively since they believed that a strong Europe would be a counter-weight to American hegemony.

However, as rapid economic development has made China the world’s second-most powerful country, Chinese leaders have rethought European integration. A united and strong Europe is no longer in China’s interest because of the risk that the United States and Europe could form a strategic alliance to gang up on Beijing in the same way they contained the Soviet Union.

Subsequently, China’s European strategy has undergone a subtle but important change. It has shifted to cultivating ties with individual European countries and often pitting them against each other. So far, Beijing’s new strategy has been a resounding success. And the EU has not developed a unified response to Beijing’s “divide and conquer” tactics. Nearly every European country has its own China policy, which subordinates human rights concerns and security issues to commercial interests. It is instructive that these days no European leaders dare to meet the Dalai Lama anywhere in their countries. It is even more revealing that when China announced the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) last year, all the major European countries, led by the UK, rushed to join, apparently against the wishes of the United States.

Now with British voters opting to exit the EU, the UK will be weaker, and the EU will be even weaker. A diminished EU will not be able to stand up to China, and its internal woes will reduce its value as a strategic partner of the U.S.

As Chinese leaders tally up the potential losses and gains from Brexit, they likely have mixed feelings. If they could choose, Beijing’s pragmatists would undoubtedly prefer the certainty of the pre-Brexit world.