特朗普政府高層日前表示,，本月晚些時候，美國國務卿雷克斯·蒂勒森將在華盛頓召集68個國家開會,，商討接下來如何聯(lián)手打擊極端恐怖組織“伊斯蘭國”,。

此次會議的背景是，“伊斯蘭國”控制著相當可觀的領土和人口,，雖然離覆滅已經(jīng)不遠,，但仍然威脅著美國和其他很多國家地區(qū)的安全。我們估算,，2014年以來,，“伊斯蘭國”在伊拉克與敘利亞控制地區(qū)的人口分別減少約80%和56%。其對占據(jù)領土內最大城市摩蘇爾的控制也正慢慢減弱,，所謂的首都拉卡已淪為孤城,，被多國聯(lián)軍攻下只是時間問題。2016年進攻“伊斯蘭國”的境外戰(zhàn)機數(shù)量達到巔峰,，如今大幅減少,。幾千名伊拉克和敘利亞境內的“伊斯蘭國”戰(zhàn)士或是被殲滅或被俘，或者淪為散兵游勇,，轉為地下活動,。

雖然多國部隊取得了不少勝利，但即便“伊斯蘭國”的所謂哈里發(fā)國家垮臺,，該組織和其他伊斯蘭原教旨主義教派——薩拉菲派圣戰(zhàn)組織也不會輕易銷聲匿跡,，今后很多年可能繼續(xù)陰魂不散。2003年美軍攻占伊拉克后不久,，當時指揮戰(zhàn)爭的陸軍上將大衛(wèi)·彼得雷烏斯曾問：“告訴我怎么收場,?！边@個問題現(xiàn)在也沒過時。短期內,，“伊斯蘭國”直接攻擊美國本土和盟友,，或誘發(fā)攻擊的威脅甚至可能有增無減。

過去兩年,，盡管在伊拉克和敘利亞境內自封的哈里發(fā)王國版圖縮小,，“伊斯蘭國”仍主導或誘發(fā)了多起恐怖分子襲擊，歐洲的巴黎,、柏林和美國的奧蘭多,、紐約都深受其害。而今,，“伊斯蘭國”的魔爪遍布全球,，除了位于伊拉克和敘利亞的核心哈里發(fā)王國，還有八個自設的省,，另有幾十個野心勃勃的組織以及數(shù)以萬計追隨組織有時直接接受指令的個人,，匿藏在亞洲、中東,、非洲,、歐洲和北美。

若要消滅“伊斯蘭國”的威脅,，最重要的第一步就是解放摩蘇爾和拉卡。唯有國不成國,，“伊斯蘭國”方有可能失去對全球恐怖分子的吸引力,。只有奪其疆土，才可能阻止恐怖分子攻擊美國等地區(qū),。然而和此前的基地組織一樣,，一旦失去大本營，“伊斯蘭國”很可能蔓延至別處,，繼續(xù)擴大影響,。

外國聯(lián)軍戰(zhàn)機未能消滅的“伊斯蘭國”戰(zhàn)士可能逃離伊拉克和敘利亞，回到故鄉(xiāng)尋求庇護,，或者涌入新戰(zhàn)場,。仍留在伊拉克和敘利亞的支持者和領導人將轉入地下，采用游擊戰(zhàn)術重新組織武裝,，伺機卷土重來,。該組織還將繼續(xù)在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)和社交媒體網(wǎng)站散步意識形態(tài)的宣傳，鼓勵極端行動,，煽動恐怖襲擊,。

“伊斯蘭國”是美國出兵伊拉克及此后撤離行動的產(chǎn)物,。2003年，美國的干預改變了伊拉克的政治平衡,。此前,，伊拉克由人口占少數(shù)的遜尼派掌權，美軍入侵后政權落到人口占多數(shù)的什葉派手中,，遜尼派穆斯林倍感不滿,，激起極端主義傾向。2011年,，美軍撤出伊拉克,，鄰國敘利亞又爆發(fā)內戰(zhàn)。眼見內戰(zhàn)臨近,，伊拉克境內的基地組織很快更名為“伊斯蘭國”,，跨過敘伊邊境，將活動重心轉移到敘利亞,。

巧的是,，美國當時正從伊拉克撤軍，導致許多意料之外的后果：中東失去了與伊朗影響力抗衡的力量,；伊拉克軍隊的職業(yè)化進程戛然而止,；什葉派領導的伊拉克日漸政治化、腐敗叢生,、越加羸弱時,，美國人反而抽身離去。就這樣,，2014年初發(fā)生了令美國政府震驚的一幕：“伊斯蘭國”士兵突然殺出敘利亞,，迅速挺進，一路打到伊拉克首都巴格達市郊,。

美國前總統(tǒng)小布什和奧巴馬都宣稱伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭已經(jīng)結束,。可戰(zhàn)爭不會因為一紙政令畫上句號,。關鍵是特朗普政府不要第三次犯同樣的錯誤,。要等到地方武裝奪回被“伊斯蘭國”占領的地區(qū)，地方政府真正有效地管理起來,，才能放心地宣布“伊斯蘭國”已被擊潰,。不僅要在伊拉克和敘利亞實現(xiàn)，還包括其他一些被“伊斯蘭國”劃為領地的地區(qū),，包括阿富汗,、尼日利亞、利比亞和埃及等,。

擊敗“伊斯蘭國”對敘利亞的難度尤其大,，目前該國還沒有受到認可的地方政府組織打擊恐怖分子,。解放拉卡后困難也不小，如何處置這座城市就是個問題,。即便多國聯(lián)軍奪取拉卡獲得進展,，就敘利亞未來談判期間美國也要適當重新參與。

往往在一些管理不善的穆斯林國家,，“伊斯蘭國”容易得勢,，這并非偶然。建立政權其實很棘手,，所以入侵伊拉克后歷任美國政府都極力避免,。但如果一直處于無政府狀態(tài)，戰(zhàn)爭會無休無止,。

若要徹底擊敗“伊斯蘭國”并確保不會死灰復燃,，除了軍事手段，還需采取措施提升國家和地方政府的經(jīng)濟,、技術和政治實力?，F(xiàn)在要大力安撫民心，因為民怨會催生極端主義運動,。美國不必一力承擔,，但特朗普政府應該帶頭組織各方，與受害國家合作齊心協(xié)力打擊“伊斯蘭國”,。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

作者：James Dobbins,Seth G. Jones

譯者：Pessy

審稿：夏林

本文作者之一賽斯.G.瓊斯任非營利、無黨派智庫蘭德公司旗下國際安全與防務政策中心主管,，同時任約翰·霍普金斯大學兼職教授,。另一作者詹姆斯·多賓斯為美國資深外交官，退休前任美國國務院駐阿富汗和巴基斯坦的特別代表,，現(xiàn)任蘭德公司外交與安全政策特聘高級研究員。

Later this month, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson plans to host a 68-nation meeting in Washington to discuss the next moves by the coalition fighting the Islamic State, a senior Trump administration official said on Thursday.

This comes as the Islamic State, an actual state with territory and population, is on the verge of extinction, but remains a threat to the U.S. and many parts of the world. Since 2014, the group’s control over people has been cut by roughly 80% in Iraq and 56% in Syria, according to our estimates. The Islamic State is also slowly but steadily losing control of its largest remaining city, Mosul. Its capital, Raqqa, has been isolated and is awaiting assault. Foreign fighter flows to the region peaked in 2016 and have drastically shrunk. Thousands of Islamic State fighters in Iraq and Syria have been killed, captured, dispersed, or driven underground.

Yet despite these successes, the collapse of the Islamic State’s so-called caliphate will not eliminate the organization or other Salafi-jihadist groups, which will likely continue for years. “Tell me how this ends” then Major General David Petraeus asked in 2003, just after American forces had taken Iraq. This question is just as pertinent today. In the short term, the threat of Islamic State directed or inspired attacks on the U.S. homeland and its allies overseas may even grow.

Over the past two years, the Islamic State has conducted or inspired an increasing number of terrorist attacks from Paris and Berlin to Orlando and New York even as its self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria has shrunk. Presently, the Islamic State’s global footprint includes eight formal provinces outside of the core caliphate in Iraq and Syria; dozens of additional aspirant groups; and tens of thousands of inspired and sometimes directed individuals across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America.

The liberation of Mosul and Raqqa are important initial steps in diminishing the threat from the Islamic State. Without an actual state, the Islamic State will likely lose a substantial amount of its appeal. Without a secure territorial base to operate from, it may have a harder time organizing external attacks. Yet the Islamic State, like al Qaeda before it, will continue to metastasize and seek to spread its influence once it loses its home base.

Those foreign fighters that aren’t killed will likely flee from Iraq and Syria, returning to their homelands, seeking refuge in other countries, or flocking to new jihadist battlefields. Islamic State supporters and leaders in Iraq and Syria will go underground, seeking to regroup and renew the fight by turning to guerrilla tactics. And the Islamic State will continue to orchestrate an ideological campaign on the internet and social media sites to inspire radicalization and encourage attacks.

The Islamic State is a byproduct of the American intervention in Iraq and also of its subsequent departure. The 2003 intervention shifted the political balance in the country away from the formerly dominant Sunni minority toward the Shi’a majority, leaving Sunnis disgruntled, adrift, and ripe for radicalization. The year 2011 saw both the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and the opening of a civil war in neighboring Syria. With the advent of that civil war, al Qaeda in Iraq, soon to rename itself the Islamic State, shifted its center of gravity across the border.

The coincident American withdrawal from Iraq had several additional consequences. It removed a counterweight to Iranian influence; it halted professionalization of the Iraqi Army, and it reduced American visibility into the deteriorating condition of those forces as they became politicized, corrupted, and progressively weakened by the Shi’a-dominated regime in Baghdad. Washington was consequently taken by surprise when, in early 2014, Islamic State fighters burst out of Syria, rapidly advancing to the outskirts of Baghdad.

George W. Bush and Barack Obama both declared their wars in Iraq over. But wars don’t end by fiat. It will be important that the new administration in Washington not make this mistake a third time. The Islamic State will not be defeated until local forces can secure liberated territory and local governments can effectively administer these areas. This needs to occur not just in Iraq and Syria, but in the half dozen other lands where the Islamic State has established territorial footholds, to include Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya, and Egypt.

This challenge is particularly acute in Syria, where there is at present no acceptable local government to support. This makes the question of what to do with Raqqa once liberated particularly difficult. Even as the military campaign to take the city gains momentum, Washington will need to reengage diplomatically in the ongoing negotiations over Syria’s future.

It is not accidental that the Islamic State has taken root in some of the most poorly governed countries in the Muslim world. State-building is an unpopular mission, from which successive American administrations have shied. Yet the alternative is war without end.

If the Islamic State is to be defeated and stay defeated, military measures will need to be combined with economic, technical, and political assistance designed to improve state and local capacity. Popular grievances that have given rise to extremist movements need to be better addressed. These are not steps the United States should take alone, but Washington should lead in assembling and guiding donor coalitions working with each of the affected countries.

Seth G. Jones is director of the International Security and Defense Policy at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. James Dobbins, a veteran diplomat who most recently served as the State Department’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a senior fellow and Distinguished Chair in Diplomacy and Security at RAND.