上個月，美國貿(mào)易代表處發(fā)布了一份報告,，用20頁的篇幅濃墨重彩地描述了中美貿(mào)易問題,。其中，貿(mào)易秘密的竊取,、山寨,、知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護不力,、網(wǎng)絡(luò)隱私問題、以打壓美國產(chǎn)品為代價推廣本國產(chǎn)品的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策,、補貼問題,、歧視性的產(chǎn)品標(biāo)準、傾銷過剩產(chǎn)能,，以及限制購買美國服務(wù)的渠道等問題,，都是美國政府在中美貿(mào)易上最關(guān)心的問題。

這份報告的出爐并不令人意外,，因為中國的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策與規(guī)劃不可避免地會影響到美國企業(yè)與工人,，無論現(xiàn)在和以后都是如此，尤其是在中國認為具有戰(zhàn)略意義的一些產(chǎn)業(yè)上,，其中又以信息技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)為代表,。此外，能源效率與環(huán)境技術(shù),、生物科技,、高端設(shè)備制造、新材料和非傳統(tǒng)能源車輛等產(chǎn)業(yè)也是中美貿(mào)易交鋒的焦點,。

任何對中美貿(mào)易問題感興趣的人,，都應(yīng)該閱讀一下美國貿(mào)易代表處的這份洋洋灑灑的《中國履行世貿(mào)組織規(guī)定情況報告》，這也是美國連續(xù)第15年針對中國履行WTO義務(wù)情況發(fā)布報告了,。該報告指出,，美國已經(jīng)針對中國提起了20次違反WTO規(guī)則的訴訟，比對任何其他WTO成員國都超出了一倍以上,。

看到如此冗長的指責(zé)和抱怨，難怪在上周海湖莊園的“習(xí)特會”前,，特朗普要針對貿(mào)易問題發(fā)表一份義正言辭的推文了,。

雖然“習(xí)特會”并未宣布任何重大成果，不過中美領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都對此次會面感到樂觀,，特朗普還表示,，此次與習(xí)近平的會面取得了“重大進展”。

預(yù)計在接下來的100天里,，中美之間會迅速啟動一系列旨在縮減美國對華貿(mào)易赤字的談判,。我們現(xiàn)在尚不清楚這些談判將解決哪些問題，但雙方的建設(shè)性對話至少會推動美國最關(guān)心的部分議題取得進展,。

美國談判代表要做的第一件事,，就是為中美雙邊對話設(shè)定優(yōu)先議題。近年來,，中國政府瞄準其產(chǎn)業(yè)政策目標(biāo)制訂了一系列措施和規(guī)劃,，這些措施也給中美貿(mào)易帶來了一些問題,，然而多年來的中美雙邊談判只是在這些問題上取得了部分成果。在接下來的100天里,，中美雙方必須設(shè)定明確的目標(biāo)和跟進路徑,。在中美貿(mào)易問題上，能夠迅速得到解決的問題可能少之又少,。美國要想在貿(mào)易談判上取得成功,，起碼要明白它希望中方對哪些政策措施做出改變，并且要為此付出鍥而不舍地努力,，以推動這些改變的實現(xiàn),。

第二，美國要想方設(shè)法保持在亞洲的重要地位,。近年來,，中國通過成立亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行等手段，在亞洲的基建領(lǐng)域非?；钴S,。與此同時，中國也在通過輻射多個層面的“一帶一路”戰(zhàn)略擴大其經(jīng)濟文化影響,。另外,，中國還通過由其主導(dǎo)的區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟伙伴關(guān)系（RCEP）及其貿(mào)易優(yōu)勢，推動亞太地區(qū)建立自由貿(mào)易區(qū),。而美國在亞洲尚無明顯的經(jīng)濟戰(zhàn)略,。

美國曾經(jīng)通過泛太平洋伙伴關(guān)系（TPP），與亞太地區(qū)的11個國家和地區(qū)就經(jīng)貿(mào)與投資問題達成過共識,，但這已經(jīng)是過去的事情了,。隨著美國退出TPP，作為亞太各國最重要的貿(mào)易伙伴的中國很可能將取而代之,，成為亞洲貿(mào)易規(guī)則的制定者,。盡管中國國家主席習(xí)近平曾在今年年初的達沃斯論壇上呼吁自由貿(mào)易，但中國現(xiàn)行的貿(mào)易政策與做法離真正的自由市場還有很大差距,。

特朗普政府需要認真思考的是,，美國如何才能與前TPP伙伴和有意加入TPP的其他國家重新建立互動，在自由市場的框架下勾勒出亞太經(jīng)貿(mào)合作的新藍圖,。只有如此,，美國才有希望重塑對亞太經(jīng)濟的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位。

如果說有哪些做法是美國在對華貿(mào)易談判中需要避免的,，那就是不要因為想讓中國在安全和外交政策事務(wù)上負起更多責(zé)任,，就對中國操縱貿(mào)易的做法睜一只眼閉一只眼。從特朗普本周發(fā)布的推特上（“如果中國協(xié)助解決朝鮮問題,，就能與美國簽定更有利的貿(mào)易協(xié)定”）可以看出,，這種可能是確實存在的,。

貿(mào)易和朝核問題是不應(yīng)該攪在一起的。中國之所以應(yīng)該約束平壤,，是因為朝鮮無核化也符合中國自身的安全需求,。而美國拿自己的商業(yè)利益做交易是毫無道理的。如果美國的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)在中國市場上有競爭力,，那么它們應(yīng)該受到中國的歡迎,，而不是成為拉攏中國解決朝鮮問題的犧牲品。另外美國也不應(yīng)毫無怨言地接受在中國的不當(dāng)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策下生產(chǎn)并出口的大量產(chǎn)品,，因為這不僅會損害美國的相關(guān)產(chǎn)業(yè),，也會導(dǎo)致美國大量工人的失業(yè)。

勿庸置疑,，隨著朝鮮持續(xù)研發(fā)能打到美國本土的遠程彈道導(dǎo)彈以及核彈頭,，美國的國家安全及盟友的安全都受到了巨大威脅。但除了朝鮮問題之外,，美國還有另一個生死攸關(guān)的重大國家利益,，那就是要保持一個強大的工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)。無論是現(xiàn)在還是未來,，這樣一個強大的工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)都是保障美國國家安全的基石,。將美國經(jīng)濟的命運交由另一個國家的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策來操控，這無論如何是不可接受的,。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：樸成奎

本文作者Alan Wolff是法律事務(wù)所Dentons LLP的高級法律顧問,。在共和黨和民主黨執(zhí)政期間，他都曾任美國政府的高級貿(mào)易談判代表,。

U.S. concerns include theft of trade secrets, counterfeiting, inadequate protection of intellectual property, online piracy, industrial policies that promote domestic goods at the expense of U.S. products, subsidies, discriminatory product standards, the dumping of excess capacity, and restricted access for American services, according to a report that the US Trade Representative released last month, which included a 20 page chapter detailing America’s trade problems with China.

The report is not surprising, since China’s industrial policy measures and plans adversely affect American companies and workers now and will do so in the future, especially for industries China considers strategic, especially in information technology, but also including energy efficient and environmental technologies, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new materials, and non-traditional energy vehicles.

Anyone interested in America’s trade relations with China should also read the lengthy 15th annual USTR Report on China's Compliance with the rules of the World Trade Organization . It notes that the U.S. has brought 20 WTO cases against China — more than double the cases brought against any other WTO member country.

Given the litany of well-documented complaints, it was no surprise that President Trump tweeted a stern message last month before meeting China’s, Xi Jinping, at Mar-A-Lago on last week.

Although there was no substantive outcome announced from the meeting, both leaders were very positive about it, with Trump saying that “tremendous progress” has been made.

China and the US are expected to engage in a series of speeded-up talks on trade over the next 100 days aimed at reducing the U.S. trade deficit with China. It is unclear what those talks will address, but constructive engagement holds at least some potential for progress on issues of concern.

The first thing U.S. negotiators must do is set priorities for the bilateral talks. The Chinese government has announced numerous measures in pursuit of its industrial policy objectives. Years of bilateral discussions have yielded only partial results regarding the problems that its policies create for U.S. trade. Specific goals need to be set during the 100-day process, with clear paths forward for follow-up. There may be very few quick fixes. The only way that the United States can succeed in this effort is to be well-informed about the policies and measures it wants to see changed and to engage in an unflagging effort to obtain those changes.

Second, the U.S. has to find a way to remain relevant in Asia. China is very active in financing infrastructure in the region through its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); it is extending its economic and cultural influence through its multifaceted One Belt One Road initiative, a conceptual framework for reaching out from China over land and water to build infrastructure and strengthen trading relationships; and is seeking trade advantages through its leadership in a 16-nation negotiation for a free trade area, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The U.S. has no apparent economic strategy of its own for Asia.

The U.S. and 11 other countries had reached a consensus in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that included updated rules designed to cover the region’s trade and investment, but that is now gone. With U.S. withdrawal from TPP, the rules for trade in Asia are likely to be set instead by China, the dominant economic partner in the region. Despite Chinese Premier Xi Jinping’s liberal trade sentiments expressed at Davos earlier this year, China’s current policies and measures are all too often far from being free-market oriented.

The Trump Administration needs to consider how it can re-engage with its former TPP partners, and other nations that had expressed an interest in joining TPP, to offer an alternative vision that is market-based. The means has to be found to have American economic leadership restored in the region.

What should not be done is for the U.S. to turn a blind eye to trade-distorting practices in order to induce China to act as a responsible stakeholder on security and foreign policy issues. This is a current issue because of the President’s tweet this week:

These two issues should not be linked. China should be motivated to rein in Pyongyang to serve its own security needs. Trading off U.S. commercial interests makes no sense. If the U.S. has competitive goods and services, they should be welcomed by China, and not sacrificed to get China’s cooperation with respect to North Korea. Nor should the U.S. accept without complaint products created through misdirected industrial policies shipped to the United States in quantities that cause injury to U.S. industries and resulting in substantial loss of U.S. jobs.

No one can doubt that U.S. national security is at risk with North Korea continuing on its path to develop longer-range missiles that can reach the United States, as well as our allies, with nuclear warheads. But this country also has a vital national interest in maintaining a strong industrial base. This is essential to serve America’s national security now and in the future. Having the shape of the U.S. economy determined by others’ industrial policies is not acceptable.

Alan Wolff is a Senior Counsel at the law firm Dentons LLP. He is a former senior trade negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations.