6月16日亞馬遜宣布收購(gòu)全食超市,，對(duì)于電子商務(wù)的這次“示警”，人們已經(jīng)期待了好幾年,。不過(guò),，這筆價(jià)值137億美元的交易仍在美國(guó)造成了巨大影響，它代表著已經(jīng)把整個(gè)零售行業(yè)鬧了個(gè)底朝天的數(shù)字顛覆下一階段的動(dòng)向,。但中國(guó)沒(méi)出現(xiàn)這樣的情況,，因?yàn)檫@種革新早已在中國(guó)出現(xiàn),。我們的考察表明,，有許多相關(guān)教訓(xùn)有待其他人學(xué)習(xí)，而且要快速學(xué)習(xí),。

2012年底,，兩家最成功的中國(guó)企業(yè)就國(guó)內(nèi)零售行業(yè)的未來(lái)公開(kāi)打賭。在電視觀眾面前,，以購(gòu)物中心為根基的地產(chǎn)行家王健林跟處于上升態(tài)勢(shì)的電商巨擘阿里巴巴首席執(zhí)行官馬云打賭說(shuō),，網(wǎng)上購(gòu)物絕不會(huì)取代實(shí)體店。王健林還打賭說(shuō),，10年內(nèi)在線(xiàn)消費(fèi)占零售總額的比重仍不會(huì)超過(guò)50%,，賭注是1億元人民幣（當(dāng)時(shí)約合1600萬(wàn)美元）。

五年后,，要贏下賭局的似乎還是王健林,。沒(méi)錯(cuò),，中國(guó)三大數(shù)字巨頭，也就是百度,、阿里巴巴和騰訊（合稱(chēng)BAT）,，已經(jīng)開(kāi)始侵蝕實(shí)體店的市場(chǎng)份額。在中國(guó)國(guó)家防火墻阻攔了外部競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的情況下,，這些科技顛覆者在10年間由默默無(wú)聞變?yōu)樾袠I(yè)主導(dǎo),。阿里巴巴和騰訊以電商為重點(diǎn)，百度則主宰了搜索市場(chǎng),。如今,，它們均躋身中國(guó)最有價(jià)值的五大品牌之列，合計(jì)品牌價(jià)值接近2000億美元,。

沒(méi)錯(cuò),，在線(xiàn)銷(xiāo)售占中國(guó)零售總額的比重仍只有15%，雖遠(yuǎn)高于2012年,，但很難算得上巨變,。盡管存在“末日預(yù)言”，但中國(guó)的實(shí)體零售并未走上消亡之路,。購(gòu)物者仍需要實(shí)體店,，仍需要在這里感觸商品、社交和問(wèn)問(wèn)題,，進(jìn)而獲得網(wǎng)購(gòu)無(wú)法復(fù)制的經(jīng)驗(yàn),。那么，零售商和地產(chǎn)公司該長(zhǎng)出一口氣了嗎,？

實(shí)際情況證明他們不該,，而且看到其中緣由的業(yè)內(nèi)人士寥寥無(wú)幾。

中國(guó)零售業(yè)的真正威脅或許不是網(wǎng)購(gòu),，而是中國(guó)電商巨擘越來(lái)越有可能把注意力轉(zhuǎn)向改善實(shí)體零售上,。

手握儲(chǔ)備資金，持有的消費(fèi)者數(shù)據(jù)體量巨大而且不斷增長(zhǎng),，這讓阿里巴巴和騰訊既有能力又有動(dòng)力來(lái)重新定義傳統(tǒng)的實(shí)體店購(gòu)物,。當(dāng)他們這樣做時(shí)，零售生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的現(xiàn)有成員,，包括倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)型超市,、購(gòu)物中心、房地產(chǎn)中介和開(kāi)發(fā)商,，也許都將面對(duì)前所未有的顛覆,。

這就是四個(gè)月來(lái)億康先達(dá)走訪零售房地產(chǎn)龍頭高管以及業(yè)內(nèi)人士得出的主要結(jié)論。我們的解讀是,，線(xiàn)上到線(xiàn)下（O2O）革命帶來(lái)的沖擊被遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低估,，而且?guī)缀鯐?huì)實(shí)實(shí)在在地打傳統(tǒng)零售企業(yè)一個(gè)措手不及,。

要擺脫這種狹隘思維，零售商和開(kāi)發(fā)商必須立即“換擋”,，不光是戰(zhàn)略上,，還要從人才角度進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)術(shù)調(diào)整。迫切需要的是擁有強(qiáng)大數(shù)字技能的經(jīng)理和高管,，他們要明白轉(zhuǎn)型的范疇和規(guī)模,，從而彌補(bǔ)目前大型零售企業(yè)的一大空白。沒(méi)有這些關(guān)鍵人員,，今后傳統(tǒng)零售商就很難蓬勃發(fā)展,。有些公司或許根本就生存不下去,。

已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)的“新零售”模式

阿里巴巴的馬云從2016年開(kāi)始倡導(dǎo)“新零售”概念,，用他的話(huà)來(lái)說(shuō)就是“在一條價(jià)值鏈上對(duì)線(xiàn)上、線(xiàn)下,、物流以及數(shù)據(jù)的整合”?？紤]到阿里巴巴已經(jīng)占中國(guó)零售總額（包括75%的在線(xiàn)銷(xiāo)售）的十分之一以上,，年收入增幅高達(dá)50%,，這番話(huà)的意義著實(shí)難以估量,。

阿里巴巴已經(jīng)在迅速采取行動(dòng)——在一年多一點(diǎn)兒的時(shí)間里，該公司已經(jīng)從開(kāi)設(shè)第一家實(shí)體店發(fā)展到了斥資26億美元收購(gòu)大型百貨連鎖銀泰商業(yè),。而這還僅僅是個(gè)開(kāi)始。

今年2月,，阿里巴巴宣布和百聯(lián)集團(tuán)建立戰(zhàn)略合作關(guān)系。百聯(lián)是國(guó)有企業(yè),，擁有超市,、購(gòu)物中心和連鎖百貨商場(chǎng),，在上海和東部沿海地區(qū)有大量未充分利用的零售場(chǎng)所。雙方將共享線(xiàn)下零售分支機(jī)構(gòu),、銷(xiāo)售規(guī)劃能力以及物流和技術(shù)。他們已經(jīng)開(kāi)始共同設(shè)計(jì)新的零售店，并將大數(shù)據(jù)和人工智能納入零售技術(shù)的開(kāi)發(fā)之中,。

阿里巴巴還收購(gòu)了百聯(lián)旗下聯(lián)華超市18%的股份，后者擁有約3600家超市和連鎖店,，業(yè)務(wù)遍及全國(guó),，其中包括知名的“華聯(lián)”品牌,。通過(guò)運(yùn)用大數(shù)據(jù)，阿里巴巴志在重塑零售行業(yè),，也就是結(jié)合線(xiàn)上與線(xiàn)下,，從而打造新的單一渠道O2O體驗(yàn),。這種體驗(yàn)似乎會(huì)讓電商對(duì)抗實(shí)體店的觀念顯得過(guò)時(shí),，甚至是完全無(wú)足輕重,。傳統(tǒng)零售店的支點(diǎn)會(huì)讓阿里巴巴和其他數(shù)字顛覆者積累更為精細(xì)的消費(fèi)者行為數(shù)據(jù),，從而通過(guò)有利的反饋來(lái)鞏固他們的在線(xiàn)領(lǐng)域主導(dǎo)地位,。

阿里巴巴首席執(zhí)行官?gòu)堄略鴮?duì)記者表示：“我們希望看到化學(xué)反應(yīng),。如果可以培育出別人從未見(jiàn)過(guò)的商業(yè)模式,，那我們就走上了正確的道路,?！睂?duì)此，一家倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)型零售商的CEO評(píng)論說(shuō)：“它正在改變整個(gè)格局……這是個(gè)你必須應(yīng)對(duì)的現(xiàn)實(shí)?！币患覈?guó)有開(kāi)發(fā)商的高管具有前瞻性思維，他在接受我們采訪時(shí)指出,，傳統(tǒng)零售商迫切需要找到合作途徑,，“實(shí)體商業(yè)想和騰訊等互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)合作的原因是如果自行其是，我們就注定會(huì)失敗”。

如果得到正確執(zhí)行，阿里巴巴的“新零售”愿景不僅打算重塑?chē)?guó)內(nèi)購(gòu)物領(lǐng)域,，還會(huì)讓中國(guó)在零售創(chuàng)新方面一躍超過(guò)美國(guó)和歐洲。中國(guó)已經(jīng)在融合社交媒體,、網(wǎng)絡(luò)搜索和電商方面走在了前面,，騰訊等社交平臺(tái)已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)支付和購(gòu)物功能的無(wú)縫銜接，把所有這些都放在一個(gè)有圍墻的花園中。

就在亞馬遜通過(guò)Amazon Go等業(yè)務(wù)在美國(guó)試水實(shí)體銷(xiāo)售之際，阿里巴巴的規(guī)模和發(fā)展速度已經(jīng)達(dá)到了前所未有的水平,。阿里巴巴和騰訊等公司共同進(jìn)入實(shí)體零售領(lǐng)域可能會(huì)讓目前電商對(duì)零售的顛覆顯得微不足道,。在中國(guó),，這些巨頭處于準(zhǔn)受保護(hù)狀態(tài),，跨國(guó)公司則無(wú)法立足，這更讓此種趨勢(shì)變得顯而易見(jiàn),。

鴕鳥(niǎo)心態(tài)

如果阿里巴巴把注意力轉(zhuǎn)向房地產(chǎn),，能夠獲得優(yōu)質(zhì)資產(chǎn)并通過(guò)以數(shù)據(jù)為核心的方式設(shè)計(jì)出自己獨(dú)有的實(shí)體購(gòu)物體驗(yàn)，傳統(tǒng)開(kāi)發(fā)商就會(huì)消失,。隨著阿里巴巴和騰訊用自己的算法來(lái)確立針對(duì)目標(biāo)人群的最佳店鋪組合方式,，商業(yè)地產(chǎn)中介可能會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己正在被迅速邊緣化。隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)通過(guò)大數(shù)據(jù)和機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)讓店內(nèi)體驗(yàn)變得更為個(gè)性化而且更加便利,，傳統(tǒng)零售企業(yè)的購(gòu)物者或許會(huì)迅速流失,。與此同時(shí)，如果購(gòu)物中心從銷(xiāo)售場(chǎng)所轉(zhuǎn)型為網(wǎng)上銷(xiāo)售的體驗(yàn)式展廳,，基于店內(nèi)銷(xiāo)售額分成的整個(gè)業(yè)主-商戶(hù)模式就有可能改寫(xiě),，它所顛覆的就不僅僅是實(shí)體店或者零售連鎖企業(yè)，而是中國(guó)的整個(gè)零售房地產(chǎn)行業(yè),。

對(duì)于這些生死攸關(guān)的問(wèn)題,，傳統(tǒng)零售商迄今為止的普遍反應(yīng)仍局限于略感不安到毫不在乎之間。在電商的步步緊逼下,，一些開(kāi)發(fā)商發(fā)現(xiàn)銷(xiāo)售額不斷滑坡后已經(jīng)積極采取了措施,，將購(gòu)物中心重新打造成更接近“體驗(yàn)中心”的場(chǎng)所,，后者不光是銷(xiāo)售商品，還供人們?yōu)g覽,、閑逛并進(jìn)行嘗試。其他開(kāi)發(fā)商則加大了在奢侈品市場(chǎng)的投入,，實(shí)際情況證明這在一定程度可以抵御來(lái)自網(wǎng)絡(luò)的沖擊,。然而，幾乎沒(méi)有開(kāi)發(fā)商采取真正必要的措施,，以便在這個(gè)線(xiàn)上-線(xiàn)下快速融合的世界保持競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,?？紤]此類(lèi)融合對(duì)人才的戰(zhàn)略性影響的開(kāi)發(fā)商更是少之又少,。

我們的許多采訪對(duì)象似乎都對(duì)不斷迫近的危機(jī)掉以輕心,，其中包括大陸,、新加坡和香港龍頭房地產(chǎn)開(kāi)發(fā)公司的高層,。他們把在線(xiàn)零售商市場(chǎng)份額有限以及爭(zhēng)取顧客的高成本視為電商威脅不大的證據(jù),。人們總會(huì)需要實(shí)體店以及實(shí)體店購(gòu)物體驗(yàn)無(wú)可取代的想法令人感到欣慰,，而許多對(duì)此念念不忘的人都低估了今后線(xiàn)下領(lǐng)域面臨的潛在顛覆。一位房地產(chǎn)咨詢(xún)公司高層告訴我們：“零售業(yè)已經(jīng)度過(guò)了最艱難時(shí)刻。網(wǎng)購(gòu)什么的也消停了一些,?！眹?guó)內(nèi)大賣(mài)場(chǎng)龍頭之一的一位主要負(fù)責(zé)人甚至堅(jiān)持說(shuō)：“說(shuō)到底,，我相信在線(xiàn)零售絕對(duì)無(wú)法自行盈利?！?/p>

零售業(yè)的對(duì)策

中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)零售商怎樣才能避免被今天的顛覆者吞噬呢？對(duì)整個(gè)行業(yè)的觀察讓我們了解到了哪些辦法也許有用,，哪些可能不會(huì)奏效。

王健林的大連萬(wàn)達(dá)集團(tuán)顯露出了零售業(yè)界的傲慢，這有些警戒意味。10年來(lái),，這家房地產(chǎn)開(kāi)發(fā)公司實(shí)現(xiàn)了高速擴(kuò)展，在國(guó)內(nèi)各地建起了數(shù)百家整齊劃一的百貨商場(chǎng)和購(gòu)物中心,，隨后又迅速關(guān)閉了幾百家。在自身規(guī)模和可觀機(jī)構(gòu)資源的鼓舞下,，萬(wàn)達(dá)基本上不把電商革命放在眼里,。它覺(jué)得消費(fèi)者離不開(kāi)自己，因而未能通過(guò)改造自己的店鋪或使其個(gè)性化來(lái)提升客流,。萬(wàn)達(dá)的購(gòu)物者成批流失,，都轉(zhuǎn)移到了更高檔的購(gòu)物場(chǎng)所或在線(xiàn)零售商那里。

其他開(kāi)發(fā)商,，特別是東部沿海擁有高檔物業(yè)的那些,，則更積極地把旗下購(gòu)物中心改造成更具“體驗(yàn)性”的場(chǎng)所。他們的思路是為消費(fèi)者提供一個(gè)實(shí)體空間,，以便他們進(jìn)行線(xiàn)上不可能完成的事,，從到餐館吃飯、觀看現(xiàn)場(chǎng)表演,，到和其他購(gòu)物者交際,，再到在展廳內(nèi)嘗試最新產(chǎn)品。一家大型國(guó)有開(kāi)發(fā)商的一位高管甚至預(yù)計(jì)：“在未來(lái),，‘某某購(gòu)物中心’也許會(huì)去掉購(gòu)物這兩個(gè)字,，因?yàn)槿藗兊竭@里是為了交際、開(kāi)心和娛樂(lè),，不一定要買(mǎi)東西,。”

顧客忠誠(chéng)度項(xiàng)目,，包括為到店顧客提供積分和消費(fèi)返還,，也成了讓人們進(jìn)入實(shí)體店而不是在線(xiàn)購(gòu)物的手段。凱德集團(tuán)的“凱德購(gòu)物星”就是一例,，這是該公司覆蓋整個(gè)亞洲的跨店面,、跨購(gòu)物中心無(wú)卡獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)活動(dòng),。

在零售競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇情況下的生存和發(fā)展也許要依靠來(lái)自酒店業(yè)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。這就要求零售商認(rèn)識(shí)到消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買(mǎi)的不僅僅是商品,，還包括有特色,、有品牌的體驗(yàn)。最好的酒店通過(guò)獨(dú)特的風(fēng)格和服務(wù)來(lái)獲得忠實(shí)顧客,，他們第一次和客人打交道就能體現(xiàn)出這一點(diǎn),，與之相同的是，進(jìn)取型購(gòu)物中心必須更好地定義并提供超越其他任何店鋪的品牌化體驗(yàn),。在這方面,，嘉里集團(tuán)和新鴻基等國(guó)際性開(kāi)發(fā)商行動(dòng)較快，已經(jīng)把酒店元素融入了他們的物業(yè)管理方法中,。門(mén)房式服務(wù),，再加上對(duì)所有跟消費(fèi)者互動(dòng)的環(huán)節(jié)進(jìn)行以消費(fèi)體驗(yàn)為重點(diǎn)的培訓(xùn)，使得他們的店面受到人們的青睞,。正如香港一家大型高檔購(gòu)物中心開(kāi)發(fā)商所說(shuō)：“你需要人們?cè)谫?gòu)物中心消磨時(shí)光,。購(gòu)物經(jīng)歷本身并不是那么重要?！?/p>

數(shù)據(jù)很重要

沒(méi)錯(cuò),，光憑這些措施來(lái)削弱顛覆者的力量和優(yōu)勢(shì)也許效果甚微。最終形成差距的是數(shù)據(jù),，而不是就餐方面的選擇或獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)積分,。

就捕捉消費(fèi)者信息并將其用于打造個(gè)性化的流暢購(gòu)物體驗(yàn)而言，從實(shí)體店起步的零售商往往遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于網(wǎng)店,。但進(jìn)取型零售商正在迅速升級(jí),。在亞洲和歐洲擁有逾1.3萬(wàn)家保健和美容商店的屈臣氏集團(tuán)最近表示，將投入7000萬(wàn)美元,，以便將企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)平臺(tái)納入自身運(yùn)營(yíng)體系,。該平臺(tái)將為整個(gè)屈臣氏提供統(tǒng)一的消費(fèi)者數(shù)據(jù)并通過(guò)機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)來(lái)處理大數(shù)據(jù)并改善消費(fèi)體驗(yàn)。

和在線(xiàn)零售商進(jìn)行創(chuàng)造性合作從而共享數(shù)據(jù)和技術(shù)也有可能帶來(lái)成果……至少理論上如此,。問(wèn)題來(lái)自于大多數(shù)合作的不對(duì)稱(chēng)性——電商巨頭的目標(biāo)是資源和數(shù)據(jù),，他們往往掌握所有的籌碼。這讓傳統(tǒng)零售商處于被動(dòng)位置,，毫無(wú)能力,，缺乏意愿，或者對(duì)合作伙伴過(guò)于小心,。一家高檔購(gòu)物中心開(kāi)發(fā)商解釋說(shuō)：“當(dāng)然,，他們[阿里巴巴]總是承諾也可以跟我們分享一些東西，但到了最后他們也許不會(huì)這樣做?！?/p>

舉例來(lái)說(shuō),，阿里巴巴最近接觸了國(guó)內(nèi)一家大型連鎖大賣(mài)場(chǎng)經(jīng)營(yíng)商，商討數(shù)據(jù)共享事宜,。阿里巴巴打算提供某個(gè)規(guī)劃中大賣(mài)場(chǎng)周邊五公里范圍內(nèi)的詳細(xì)購(gòu)物行為,，從性別到季節(jié)性偏好,，無(wú)所不包,。作為交換，阿里巴巴要求大賣(mài)場(chǎng)方面拿出他們的一部分消費(fèi)者數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)進(jìn)行分享,。后者拒絕了此事,，原因是該公司CEO無(wú)法衡量付出和所得是否匹配。

通過(guò)自己支持的生鮮電商盒馬鮮生,，阿里巴巴已經(jīng)在展示此類(lèi)線(xiàn)上-線(xiàn)下混合體的真正潛力,。盒馬鮮生已經(jīng)在上海和北京開(kāi)了近10家店。在這里,，購(gòu)物者看到的是從100個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū)精挑細(xì)選的3000種商品,，而且以高檔飲食為重點(diǎn)。消費(fèi)者可以用手機(jī)app在線(xiàn)下單,，五公里以?xún)?nèi)30分鐘送達(dá),。他們還可以在店內(nèi)購(gòu)物，從而真正詮釋阿里巴巴的O2O愿景,。數(shù)字價(jià)格標(biāo)簽實(shí)時(shí)更新,，購(gòu)物者可以?huà)呙钘l形碼，通過(guò)盒馬app進(jìn)行支付,，所購(gòu)商品免費(fèi)送貨,。為突出“體驗(yàn)”元素，盒馬鮮生還會(huì)專(zhuān)門(mén)組織消費(fèi)者活動(dòng),，甚至設(shè)立了開(kāi)放式廚房,，可現(xiàn)場(chǎng)烹飪?nèi)藗冑?gòu)買(mǎi)的食材。

同時(shí),，手機(jī)app會(huì)詳細(xì)記錄購(gòu)物者的全部行為,，如所購(gòu)商品和店內(nèi)行進(jìn)路線(xiàn)。這些數(shù)據(jù)甚至有可能比每單價(jià)值等傳統(tǒng)行為指標(biāo)更有價(jià)值,。通過(guò)借線(xiàn)上技術(shù)在線(xiàn)下收集和應(yīng)用大數(shù)據(jù),，阿里巴巴最終可以簡(jiǎn)化并定制購(gòu)物體驗(yàn)，從而獲得相對(duì)于傳統(tǒng)零售商的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì),，而且這種優(yōu)勢(shì)只會(huì)繼續(xù)擴(kuò)大,。

領(lǐng)導(dǎo)零售革命

電商的發(fā)展已經(jīng)讓一些零售商無(wú)法繼續(xù)自滿(mǎn)下去。進(jìn)取型零售商正在聘請(qǐng)具備數(shù)字能力、經(jīng)歷豐富,、對(duì)新點(diǎn)子持開(kāi)放態(tài)度而且有著較高戰(zhàn)略定位的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,。在億康先達(dá)，我們認(rèn)為培育和留住數(shù)字人才的最重要因素是企業(yè)文化,。公司及其負(fù)責(zé)人應(yīng)有意識(shí)地建立鼓勵(lì)試驗(yàn),、學(xué)習(xí)、速度和適應(yīng)性的文化,。

在傳統(tǒng)下線(xiàn)企業(yè)中,，形成適于數(shù)字時(shí)代的文化并不容易。這需要以消費(fèi)者為中心,，開(kāi)放,、合作、持續(xù)學(xué)習(xí)以及“快速試錯(cuò)”的意愿,，還需要高層既看到潛在威脅,，也看到明確威脅，就算這會(huì)讓他們深感不安,。這樣的數(shù)字人才一定要能就公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)模式提出疑問(wèn)并展開(kāi)辯論,，并且激發(fā)創(chuàng)造性思維，從而和純粹的科技公司攜手開(kāi)展創(chuàng)造與合作,。

能對(duì)這種自下而上的數(shù)字思維進(jìn)行充分整合,，或者說(shuō)把恰當(dāng)?shù)目萍冀坏角‘?dāng)?shù)墓芾碚呤种械墓緦⒃诮窈髱啄攴睒s發(fā)展。相反,，零售生態(tài)系統(tǒng)中諸多一成不變地從事經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的參與者或許會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)去中介化趨勢(shì)在自己身上體現(xiàn)的越來(lái)越明顯,。王健林那個(gè)著名的“中國(guó)零售行業(yè)未來(lái)”賭局才過(guò)了五年，實(shí)際情況證明在線(xiàn)零售商和實(shí)體店的真正爭(zhēng)奪根本還沒(méi)有開(kāi)始,。相反,，目前展開(kāi)爭(zhēng)奪的是舊零售和新零售。這次,，王健林以及他代表的傳統(tǒng)零售模式的運(yùn)氣也許就會(huì)耗盡,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

The June 16 announcement that Amazon was buying Whole Foods was the e-commerce shot across the bow that everyone has anticipated for years. Still, the $13.7 billion deal came as a huge shock in the United States; it represented the next stage of the digital disruption that has upended all of retail. But it didn't in China, where this revolution is well underway. Our work there shows that there are many relevant lessons that others need to learn—and learn fast.

In late 2012, two of China’s most successful entrepreneurs made a very public bet on the country’s retail future. In front of a TV audience, Wang Jianlin, the real-estate maven who built his fortune in shopping malls, wagered Jack Ma, president of ascendant e-commerce giant Alibaba, that online shopping would never replace physical stores. Putting up 100 million RMB (about $16 million at the time) of his own cash, Wang bet that in 10 years online consumption would still account for less than half of all retail.

Five years out, it seems the good money is still on Wang. Yes, China’s big three digital titans—Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT for short)—have eroded brick-and-mortar market share. Protected behind the Great Firewall from outside competition, these tech disruptors— Alibaba and Tencent focus primarily on e-commerce, while Baidu dominates search—have rocketed over the last decade from obscurity to dominance. They now rank among China’s top 5 most valuable brands , with a collective brand value approaching $200 billion.

Yet, online sales in China still account for just 15% of all retail , a significant bump from 2012 but hardly a sea change. Despite doomsday warnings, retail in China is not dying. Shoppers continue to demand physical stores—to touch and feel, socialize, ask questions, and have an experience that can’t be replicated online. Is it time for retailers and real estate players to breathe a sigh of relief?

No, it turns out—and for reasons that few insiders see coming.

The true threat to retail in China may not be online shopping. It’s the increasing likelihood that the country’s e-commerce giants will turn their attention to doing bricks-and-mortar—better.

Armed with capital reserves, government protections and growing troves of consumer data , Alibaba and Tencent have both the means and the motive to redefine traditional in-store shopping. And when they do, existing players in the retail ecosystem—from big box retailers to malls, real estate agencies and developers—may face unprecedented disruption.

This was the primary conclusion from extended interviews Egon Zehnder conducted with leading retail real estate executives and industry insiders over the past four months. Our takeaway: the impact of the online-to-offline (or “O2O”) revolution is being highly underestimated and stands to take legacy retailers almost completely by surprise.

To overcome this blinkered thinking, retailers and developers must immediately change gears—strategically, but also, critically, from a talent perspective. Urgently needed are managers and executives with a strong digital skill set—an understanding of the scope and scale of transformation that’s sorely lacking among today’s retail giants. Without these key people, traditional players will find it challenging to thrive in the years ahead. Some may not survive at all.

The “New Retail” model that’s already here

Starting in 2016, Alibaba’s Jack Ma advocated the concept of “New Retail”—in his words, “the integration of online, offline, logistics and data across a single value chain.” Considering that Alibaba already accounts for more than one-tenth of China’s total retail sales (including 75% of online sales), with revenues surging at an astounding 50% annual clip, the implications of this overture are hard to overstate.

Already, the company is moving fast: In little over a year , Alibaba has gone from

opening its first physical store to acquiring a major department store chain, Intime Retail, for $2.6 billion. Yet this is just the beginning.

In February, Alibaba announced a strategic alliance with Bailian Group, the state-owned supermarket, mall and department store chain, which boasts massive amounts of underused retail space in Shanghai and on the eastern seaboard. The new partners will share offline retail branches, merchandising capability, logistics and technology. They are already designing new retail outlets together and developing retail technologies incorporating big data and artificial intelligence.

Alibaba has also acquired an 18% stake in Bailian’s Lianhua division—some 3,600 supermarkets and chain stores spread across the country, including the well-known Hualian brand. By enlisting big data, Alibaba aspires to do nothing less than reinvent retail—merging online and offline to form a new unichannel “O2O” experience where the notion of ecommerce versus brick-and-mortar seems quaint, if not wholly irrelevant. A pivot to the traditional retail space will enable Alibaba and other digital disruptors to accumulate even more fine-grained data on consumer behavior, which reinforces their online dominance in a positive feedback loop.

“We hope to see chemical reactions. If we can incubate a type of business model that others have never seen, then we are on the right track,” Daniel Zhang, Alibaba’s CEO, explained to a reporter. Commenting on this, the CEO of one big-box retailer said, “It is changing the whole landscape … It’s a reality which you have to deal with.” Another forward-thinking executive at a state developer who we interviewed pointed out the urgent need for legacy retailers to find ways to cooperate, noting “The reason why brick-and-mortar commerce would want to cooperate with Internet players like Tencent is that standing alone they’re doomed to fail.”

Executed properly, Alibaba’s “New Retail” vision promises not just to remake shopping inside the country, but to leapfrog China ahead of the U.S. and Europe in terms of retail innovation. China is already at the vanguard when it comes to blurring lines between social media, search and e-commerce, with social platforms like Tencent integrating seamless payment and shopping functions, all inside one walled garden.

While Amazon is making tentative inroads into brick-and-mortar in the U.S. through Amazon Go and other offerings, Alibaba’s scale and speed is without precedent. A concerted foray by the likes of Alibaba and Tencent into brick-and-mortar could make the current retail disruptions caused by ecommerce look trifling by comparison. In China, the giants’ quasi-protected status and the inability of international players to gain a foothold only accentuates this trend.

Heads in the sand

If Alibaba turns its attention to real estate—and is able to gain access to prime assets and design its own unique physical shopping experience using a data-centered approach—traditional developers will be displaced. As it and Tencent harness their own algorithms to identify the perfect blend of stores for their target demographic, commercial real estate agencies could quickly find themselves marginalized. With online players applying big data and machine learning to make in-store experiences more personalized and more convenient, legacy retailers may quickly hemorrhage shoppers. Meanwhile, if malls transition from points of sale to experiential showrooms for sales made online, the whole owner-tenant model—based on a percentage of in-store sales—could be rewritten, disrupting not just individual stores or chains, but the entire retail real estate industry in China.

So far, the prevailing response from legacy retailers to these existential questions has ranged from mild trepidation to outright indifference. Some developers, seeing declining sales in the face of e-commerce encroachment, have worked actively to retrofit their malls more as “experiential centers”—places to browse, linger and try on, not merely to shop. Others are doubling down on the luxury market, which has proved to some degree resistant to online encroachment. Few, however are taking the hard steps needed to stay competitive in a world where online and offline are fast converging. And fewer still are considering the strategic talent implications of this convergence.

Many of our interviewees, including executives from leading real estate and development companies in China, Singapore and Hong Kong, seemed complacent about the looming crisis. They point to the limited market share of online players, as well as the high cost of customer acquisition, as evidence of the finite threat posed by e-commerce. Clinging to the comforting idea that people will always need stores and nothing will replace the physical experience of shopping, many underestimate the potential for further offline disruption. “The worst time for retail is over. The online thing is also a bit over,” one real estate consultancy executive told us. A leading executive at one of China’s largest hypermarkets went so far as to insist, “I am convinced that in the end, online will never be feasible on its own to make any profit.”

A response for retail

How can China’s retail incumbents avoid being devoured by today’s disruptors? A look across the industry offers some insight on which solutions may work and which definitely will not.

Wang Jianlin’s own Dalian Wanda Group offers a cautionary tale of retail hubris. After opening hundreds of cookie-cutter department stores and malls around the country in a frenzy of expansion over the last decade, the property developer has closed hundreds in quick succession. Buoyed by its size and considerable institutional resources, Wanda largely ignored the online commerce revolution. Assuming that its consumers were a captive audience, the developer failed to upgrade or customize its properties to drive traffic. Shoppers bolted en masse—moving on to more upscale settings or online alternatives.

Other developers, especially those behind high-end properties on the eastern seaboard, have moved more aggressively to transform their malls into more“experiential” centers. The underlying rationale is to provide consumers with a physical space where they can do all the things impossible online—from eating in restaurants and seeing live entertainment to socializing with fellow shoppers and trying out the latest products in a showroom setting. One senior executive from a large state-owned developer has gone so far as to suggest, “Perhaps in the future, the word "shopping" could be removed from the name “shopping mall,” as people will come to the malls for socializing, for fun, for entertainment—not necessarily for shopping.”

Loyalty programs, which reward in-store customers with points and rebates, are also being embraced as ways to get shoppers to buy in malls, rather than online. Examples include Capitaland’s Capitstar initiative , a multi-store, multi-mall cardless reward program rolled out across Asia.

Surviving and thriving in the face of increased retail competition may depend on taking a cue from the hospitality sector. This requires acknowledging that customers shop not merely for a product but for a distinct and branded experience. Just as the best hotels create loyalty with a unique style and service offering evident from the very first guest interaction, so must progressive malls better define and deliver a branded experience that transcends any one store. In this respect, international developers such as the Kerry Group and Sun Hung Kai are more quickly moving to incorporate a hospitality element to their property management approach. Concierge-like services and customer experience-focused training for every customer interaction point make their properties preferred venues. As noted by a major high-end mall developer based in Hong Kong, “You need to have people to come to spend time in the mall. It’s not so much about just the transactional experience.”

Data makes the difference

Yet, these steps alone may do little to mitigate the power and advantages of the disruptors. Ultimately, data—not dining options or bonus points—will make the difference.

Brick-and-mortar-first retailers have traditionally lagged far behind online counterparts when it comes to capturing and applying consumer information to create personalized and streamlined shopping experiences. But progressive retailers are quickly leveling up. The A.S. Watson group, which boasts more than 13,000 health and beauty stores across Asia and Europe, recently committed $70 million to integrate an enterprise data platform into its operations. The system provides unified customer data across the organization and uses machine learning to process big data and enhance customer experiences.

Creative partnerships to share data and technology with online players can also yield results … at least, in theory. Problems arise because of the asymmetrical nature of most relationships: e-commerce giants, armed with resources and data, often hold all the cards. This can leave traditional retailers in a vulnerable position; unable, unwilling or too cautious to partner. As one high-end mall developer explained, “Of course, they [Alibaba] will always promise they will share back something else, but in the end maybe they won’t do it.”

A large hypermarket chain in China, for instance, was recently approached by Alibaba about a data-sharing scheme. Alibaba offered to provide detailed buying behavior about customers in a 5-kilometer radius of a planned hypermarket—everything from gender to seasonal preferences. In exchange, the hypermarket was asked to share aspects of its own customer database. It declined the offer, because the CEO couldn’t assess whether what it was giving up was worth what it would get.

Alibaba is already showing the real potential of this kind of online-offline hybrid with HEMA, the new Alibaba-backed grocery store, which already has nearly 10 locations in Shanghai and Beijing. Inside, shoppers find a carefully curated selection of 3,000 products from 100 countries, with an emphasis on high-end dining. Consumers can order online through their mobile app and get delivery within 30 minutes, within a 5-kilometer radius. Or, in a true expression of the O2O vision, they can shop in-store. Digital price tags are updated in real time, and shoppers can scan bar codes, pay via the HEMA app and have purchases delivered for free. To emphasize the “experiential” element, HEMA stores also organize special customer events and even offer a dedicated “food booth” zone where shoppers can have their groceries cooked for them.

Meanwhile, detailed shopping behavior , on everything from purchases to movement around the store, is captured via the mobile app. This data gold may be even more valuable than traditional performance indicators like value per order. By bringing online technology for the collection and application of big data into the offline world, Alibaba can ultimately simplify and personalize the shopping experience—creating a competitive edge over traditional retailers which will only intensify.

Leadership in the retail revolution

The growth of e-commerce has already jolted some players out of complacency. Progressive retailers are recruiting leaders boasting digital savviness, breadth of exposure, openness to new ideas and higher strategic orientation. At Egon Zehnder, we believe that the most important factor in nurturing and retaining digital talent is organizational culture. Companies and their leaders should consciously build cultures that encourage experimentation and learning, speed and adaptability.

In a traditional offline business, shaping a digitally-ready culture is no small task. It requires customer focus, openness, collaboration, constant learning and the willingness to “fail fast”. It also requires executives to accept both latent and visible threats, even if they cause profound discomfort. This digital talent must be able to question and debate the company’s business model and empower consideration of creative ways to co-create and cooperate with pure-play technology players.

Players who can fully integrate this bottom-up digital ethos—using the right technology in the hands of the right leadership—will thrive in the years ahead. By contrast, the great many players in the retail ecosystem who stick to business as usual may find themselves increasingly disintermediated. A mere five years after Wang Jianlin placed his famous bet on China’s retail future, it turns out the real battle isn’t between online and brick-and-mortar at all. Instead, it’s between old retail and New Retail. And this time around, the luck of Wang—and the legacy retail model he embodies—may be running out.