如果你是一個(gè)市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,，你的領(lǐng)域出現(xiàn)了某種具有潛在顛覆性的創(chuàng)新，你得多快做出反應(yīng),，才能避免被掀下市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的寶座,？作為一個(gè)業(yè)余攝影師的筆者，今天就來(lái)探討一下相機(jī)巨頭尼康和佳能的命運(yùn),。

我的第一部佳能相機(jī)是一臺(tái)型號(hào)為AT-1的乞丐版膠片機(jī),，它是很多年前我的成年禮物。不過(guò)佳能主打的客戶(hù)群一向是專(zhuān)業(yè)攝影師群體,，他們不惜一擲千金購(gòu)買(mǎi)那種炮筒鏡頭的大塊頭專(zhuān)業(yè)相機(jī),。尼康和佳能并稱(chēng)相機(jī)界雙雄，地位相當(dāng)于可樂(lè)界的百事和可口可樂(lè),。只不過(guò)幾十年來(lái),，這兩家公司都把主要精力放在了單反市場(chǎng)上。

根據(jù)哈佛教授克萊頓·克里斯蒂森教授的“顛覆理論”,，隨著市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者持續(xù)提升產(chǎn)品性能,，它的產(chǎn)品往往會(huì)超過(guò)一些消費(fèi)者的實(shí)際需求，造成性能過(guò)剩,。而新進(jìn)者往往能以較低的價(jià)格和中端的配置滿(mǎn)足這些被忽視的用戶(hù)的需求,。根據(jù)克里斯蒂森2015年發(fā)表的一篇關(guān)于“顛覆理論”的論文，坐在市場(chǎng)頂端的守成者往往會(huì)滿(mǎn)足于自己的品質(zhì)優(yōu)勢(shì),，而“不去積極地做出回應(yīng)”,。（當(dāng)然，近年來(lái)克里斯蒂森的“顛覆理論”也遭到了一些合理批評(píng),。）

雖然相機(jī)市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了數(shù)碼時(shí)代,，但佳能和尼康的優(yōu)勢(shì)仍在，因?yàn)槟z片機(jī)時(shí)代的相機(jī)鏡頭仍能用在新款的數(shù)碼單反相機(jī)上,。而與此同時(shí),，智能手機(jī)的崛起幾乎已徹底摧毀了消費(fèi)級(jí)的傻瓜相機(jī)市場(chǎng)。另外從大約10年前開(kāi)始,，已經(jīng)有一些競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者決定采取新的策略與佳能和尼康競(jìng)爭(zhēng),。

單反相機(jī)又叫“單鏡頭反光式取景照相機(jī)”，是指使用單鏡頭,，并且光線通過(guò)此鏡頭照射到反光鏡上,，通過(guò)反光取景的相機(jī)。這些競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者沒(méi)有搞出自己的單反,，像松下,、奧林巴斯等廠商推出的相機(jī)都是只依賴(lài)數(shù)字傳感器技術(shù)。這些“無(wú)反”相機(jī)的尺寸和重量都小于傳統(tǒng)的單反相機(jī),，它們的鏡頭也是可以互換的,，不過(guò)其成像質(zhì)量仍然無(wú)法與單反相機(jī)媲美,，但價(jià)格卻相對(duì)低廉很多。沒(méi)過(guò)多久,，索尼、三星和富士也相繼推出了更好的無(wú)反相機(jī),。

面對(duì)無(wú)反相機(jī)的來(lái)勢(shì)洶洶,，佳能和尼康一開(kāi)始基本上是無(wú)視的，他們依然在努力改進(jìn)巨大的單反相機(jī),，并添加了更多的感光元件以捕捉更多的像素,。不過(guò)隨著無(wú)反相機(jī)銷(xiāo)量的增長(zhǎng)，尼康終于按捺不住推出了自家的無(wú)反相機(jī),，佳能也迅速跟進(jìn),，然而二者的產(chǎn)品反響只是平平。很顯然,，作為市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的佳能和尼康都不希望他們的專(zhuān)業(yè)用戶(hù)群放棄購(gòu)買(mǎi)高價(jià)格的單反,，轉(zhuǎn)而購(gòu)買(mǎi)低利潤(rùn)的無(wú)反。

正如克里斯蒂森所預(yù)測(cè)的那樣,，只要銷(xiāo)量上去了,，無(wú)反相機(jī)技術(shù)水平的增長(zhǎng)是自然而然的事。近年來(lái),，索尼,、富士和奧林巴斯都吸引了越來(lái)越多的“真正”的攝影師前來(lái)投奔。去年,，日本的單反相機(jī)銷(xiāo)量下跌了10%,，而無(wú)反相機(jī)的銷(xiāo)量上升了29%。現(xiàn)在佳能和尼康終于意識(shí)到了無(wú)反相機(jī)的威脅,，開(kāi)始認(rèn)真考慮研發(fā)專(zhuān)業(yè)級(jí)的無(wú)反相機(jī)了,。幾周前，佳能公司的一名高管向《日經(jīng)亞洲評(píng)論報(bào)》表示,，該公司必須“積極推出面向增長(zhǎng)市場(chǎng)的產(chǎn)品,，哪怕會(huì)帶來(lái)一些產(chǎn)品撞車(chē)的問(wèn)題?！奔涯艿男庐a(chǎn)品預(yù)計(jì)今年下半年就將推出,，問(wèn)題是，他們是否已經(jīng)觀望得太久了,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：樸成奎?

How long should a market leader let a potentially disruptive innovation go before reacting? Amateur photog Aaron in for Adam today, contemplating the fate of camera titans Nikon and Canon.

I got my first Canon camera, a no-frills film model known as the AT-1, as a gift for my bar mitzvah many years ago, but the company’s major market has always been professional photographers who spend thousands of dollars on the hefty bodies and gigantic lenses that bring in the big bucks. Nikon was the Pepsi to Canon’s Coke, or maybe the other way around, but the two companies had a lock on the high-end market of single-lens reflex, or SLR, cameras for decades.

In Harvard professor Clayton Christensen’s well-trodden disruption theory, as a market leader continues to improve its product, it goes beyond meeting the needs of what some customers actually want. New entrants with a new technology arrive, usually at a lower price and with fewer capabilities, aiming to meet the need of those overlooked customers. The incumbents, satisfied that their advantage in quality is what matters most “tend not to respond vigorously,” Christensen wrote in a 2015 article explaining and defending his theory (which has come in for some legitimate criticism over the years).

Even when the camera market went digital, the advantages of owning a Canon or Nikon remained, as new digital SLR models were compatible with lenses from the prior analog film models. At the same time, the rise of smartphones has nearly destroyed the market for pocket-size consumers cameras. So starting almost exactly 10 years ago, some competitors decided to try a new tactic to compete.

Instead of selling their own SLRs, which use a mirror and prism mechanism to allow a scene to be viewed by the photographer and recorded on film, Panasonic, Olympus, and others started selling smaller cameras that relied just on digital sensors. Without the mirror and prism contraption, these “mirrorless” cameras could be much smaller and lighter than traditional SLRs. They still came with interchangeable lenses, but the picture quality couldn’t match the SLRs. Prices were much lower, however. Soon, Sony, Samsung and Fujifilm were making even better mirrorless cameras.

Canon and Nikon largely ignored the trend. They were still making hay with their gigantic SLR models, adding ever more sensitive sensors to capture even more pixels. But as sales of mirrorless cameras increased, first Nikon and eventually Canon introduced their own models, to mainly mediocre reviews. The market leaders appeared not to want to tempt any of their pro audience away from buying higher-priced SLRs.

Just as Christensen’s predicted, the cheaper technology improved and lately Sony, Fuji, and Olympus have been tempting a growing number of “real” photographers to defect. In Japan last year, sales of SLR models dropped 10% and mirrorless sales increased 29%. Now Canon and Nikon are waking up to the threat and planning serious, professional-grade mirrorless models. A top Canon exec told the Nikkei Asian Review a few weeks ago that the company must “actively roll out products for a growth market even if there is some cannibalization.” The new models should arrive in the second half of this year, but the question now is whether they waited too long.?