今年4月底的星期五,，沃倫·巴菲特接到美國(guó)銀行首席執(zhí)行官布萊恩·莫尼漢的電話,，問(wèn)他會(huì)不會(huì)支持西方石油公司對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手阿納達(dá)科的收購(gòu)。兩天后,，西方石油公司的首席執(zhí)行官維姬·霍魯布親自出馬飛往奧馬哈,，當(dāng)面請(qǐng)求全世界最著名的投資者出手。巴菲特只考慮了一小時(shí)便同意了,。

隨后的星期天,，伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司的首席執(zhí)行官巴菲特正式承諾，如果霍魯布能夠完成交易,，他將向西方石油公司提供100億美元資金,。當(dāng)然其中也有個(gè)復(fù)雜因素：阿納達(dá)科已經(jīng)承諾出售給石油巨頭雪佛龍，如果違約要賠償10億美元,。接下來(lái)發(fā)生的事對(duì)美國(guó)本土的產(chǎn)油區(qū)來(lái)說(shuō)堪稱巨變,，這里指的是從得克薩斯州到新墨西哥州面積達(dá)8.6萬(wàn)平方英里，著名的二疊紀(jì)盆地油田,。而且是瞬息萬(wàn)變,。

就在巴菲特和霍魯布會(huì)面一周半之后，每天在頭條新聞中你來(lái)我往的競(jìng)標(biāo)戰(zhàn)也宣告結(jié)束,。雪佛龍（今年《財(cái)富》美國(guó)500強(qiáng)排名第11位）離場(chǎng),，西方石油公司（《財(cái)富》美國(guó)500強(qiáng)第167位）宣布將以570億美元的總價(jià)收購(gòu)阿納達(dá)科石油公司（《財(cái)富》美國(guó)500強(qiáng)第237位），包括債務(wù)。這是20多年來(lái)美國(guó)石油和天然氣領(lǐng)域最大的合并案（上一次是?？松召?gòu)美孚）,，合并后的新公司將躋身《財(cái)富》美國(guó)100強(qiáng)。

之后在一次討論投資的采訪中,，巴菲特告訴CNBC,，“從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，這筆交易是押注未來(lái)的石油價(jià)格,。”但注意,，他沒(méi)有提是不是押注石油價(jià)格走高（他拒絕為本文向《財(cái)富》雜志發(fā)表評(píng)論）,。“也是賭二疊紀(jì)盆地油田如預(yù)期一樣厲害,?！?巴菲特在電視節(jié)目中補(bǔ)充說(shuō)。

沒(méi)錯(cuò),，二疊紀(jì)油田是目前美國(guó)已知原油儲(chǔ)量最大的地區(qū)之一,。其發(fā)現(xiàn)令美國(guó)躋身石油生產(chǎn)大國(guó)。此處頁(yè)巖沉積層很厚,，可以通過(guò)水力壓裂和泵送法開(kāi)采石油,，不僅吸引了雪佛龍、西方石油公司和阿納達(dá)科,，也吸引了其他數(shù)百家石油公司,，占下得克薩斯州西部（以及新墨西哥州一角）大片土地。廣泛采用“水力壓裂”技術(shù)后,，2018年美國(guó)原油日產(chǎn)量達(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的1100萬(wàn)桶,，也是冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來(lái)首次超過(guò)沙特阿拉伯和俄羅斯。從最新的月度數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)看,，僅二疊紀(jì)油田每天的原油產(chǎn)量就超過(guò)了阿聯(lián)酋,、加拿大或伊朗。一些人預(yù)計(jì),，明年還可能超過(guò)伊拉克,。如果西南地區(qū)變成獨(dú)立國(guó)家，將成世界第四大石油生產(chǎn)國(guó),?！岸B紀(jì)油田在頁(yè)巖領(lǐng)域絕對(duì)是巨無(wú)霸級(jí)別?！盜ntegrity Viking Funds公司的首席信息官邁克·莫雷表示,，他掌管的能源股基金業(yè)績(jī)頂尖。

On the last Friday in April, Warren Buffett got a call from Brian Moynihan, the CEO of Bank of America, asking if he would back Occidental Petroleum’s underdog bid for rival oil driller Anadarko. Two days later, Occidental CEO Vicki Hollub was making the pitch herself, having flown to Omaha to appeal directly to the world’s most famous investor. It took Buffett only an hour to say yes.

That Sunday, the Berkshire Hathaway CEO promised $10 billion in financing to Occidental if Hollub could get the deal done. There was, of course, one complicating factor: Anadarko had already pledged to sell itself to oil giant Chevron and would owe the latter $1 billion if it broke their engagement. What followed was a remarkable coup d’état in America’s own oil-soaked Emirate—the famous Permian Basin that stretches 86,000 square miles from Texas to New Mexico—and it all happened in hyperspeed.

Just a week and a half after Buffett and Hollub’s meeting, a bidding war that had played out in daily headlines was over: Chevron (No. 11 on this year’s Fortune 500) walked, and Occidental (No. 167) announced it would buy Anadarko (No. 237) for a total price tag of $57 billion including debt. It’s the largest U.S. oil and gas merger in more than 20 years (since Exxon bought Mobil) and would catapult the combined company into the Fortune 100 elite.

Buffett, in an interview discussing his investment, told CNBC, “It’s a bet on oil prices over the long term more than anything else.” Yet notably, what he didn’t say was whether he was betting on oil prices to be higher. (He declined to comment to Fortune for this story.) “It’s also a bet on the fact that the Permian Basin is what it’s cracked up to be,” Buffett added during the TV segment, without elaborating.

Of course, what the Permian is—quite literally—cracked up to be is one of the biggest oil reserves America has ever known. And it has made the U.S. the top oil-producing country in the world. Its thick shale deposits, hydraulically fractured and pumped for oil, have attracted not only Chevron, Occidental, and Anadarko, but also hundreds of other drillers, which have claimed a big chunk of West Texas (as well as a corner of New Mexico). The “fracking” boom, as it’s known, is responsible for pushing U.S. crude production to a record of roughly 11 million barrels a day in 2018, surpassing Saudi Arabia and Russia for the first time since the end of the Cold War. As of the latest monthly data, the Permian alone produces more crude per day than the United Arab Emirates, Canada, or Iran; by next year, some expect it could also outpace Iraq, which would make the southwestern region the fourth-largest oil producer in the world, if it were its own country. “The Permian is the absolute 800-pound gorilla for shale,” says Mike Morey, CIO of Integrity Viking Funds, who runs a top-performing energy stock fund.

不僅在美國(guó),，在全球范圍內(nèi)二疊紀(jì)油田也是開(kāi)發(fā)成本最低的地區(qū)之一。跟成本高企的深水和海上鉆井不一樣,，原油價(jià)格只要保持在每桶50美元,，這里的石油公司就能賺錢。正因如此,，對(duì)于2014年以來(lái)苦苦掙扎的能源公司來(lái)說(shuō),，該地區(qū)無(wú)異于沙漠中的綠洲。2014年,，西得克薩斯州原油價(jià)格從107美元的峰值暴跌,，此后幾年里，石油價(jià)格再未接近三位數(shù),，還曾經(jīng)跌至每桶26美元的低位,。

今年以來(lái)，油價(jià)總體上漲,，2019年上漲了約35%,，至每桶62美元左右。不過(guò),，市場(chǎng)上很少有多頭認(rèn)為石油還能夠繼續(xù)上漲,。“如果沒(méi)有真正持續(xù)的地緣政治事件,，這里說(shuō)的不是影響市場(chǎng)的周期性波動(dòng),，那么極少有人相信大宗商品價(jià)格有上漲空間?！比R斯大學(xué)貝克公共政策研究所能源研究中心的資深能源經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家米歇爾·米紹·福斯表示,。

事實(shí)上，盡管5月對(duì)伊朗重啟制裁導(dǎo)致生產(chǎn)中斷,，利比亞和委內(nèi)瑞拉等歐佩克出口國(guó)發(fā)生動(dòng)蕩,，但二疊紀(jì)油田產(chǎn)量太高，可以迅速?gòu)浹a(bǔ)庫(kù)存,。摩根士丹利的股票分析師德文·麥克德莫特表示,，從2009年大衰退結(jié)束到2014年，石油行業(yè)模式已經(jīng)發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變,?！拔覀償[脫了十年的資源短缺，重點(diǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到石油供應(yīng)高峰,。之前總在想‘石油什么時(shí)候會(huì)耗盡,？’后來(lái)變成石油太多用不完,。”更重要的是,，二疊紀(jì)油田至少能夠確保接下來(lái)的20年里供應(yīng)充足,。

如今，經(jīng)歷了數(shù)輪顛簸的原油周期后,，各個(gè)公司都在考慮,，會(huì)不會(huì)價(jià)格平穩(wěn)就是最好的情況?！皹I(yè)界意識(shí)到,，不能再指望價(jià)格走高?！笨偛课挥谛菟诡D的能源投資銀行Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co.的總裁丹·皮克林表示,。他預(yù)計(jì)，在可預(yù)見(jiàn)的未來(lái),，油價(jià)將在每桶50至75美元之間波動(dòng)。他說(shuō),，畢竟還有一些政治力量存在,。一方面，如果價(jià)格跌至低點(diǎn)無(wú)利可圖,，石油卡特爾組織歐佩克將削減產(chǎn)量,；另一方面，特朗普將堅(jiān)決讓天然氣保持低價(jià),，以推動(dòng)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展,。“我認(rèn)為,，原油價(jià)格范圍已然確定,，掉到50美元?dú)W佩克會(huì)減產(chǎn)，漲到70美元特朗普就發(fā)推文,?！?皮克林補(bǔ)充說(shuō)。特朗普上任以來(lái),，關(guān)于石油和天然氣價(jià)格的推文越來(lái)越多,，2019年以來(lái)發(fā)了8條，僅4月就提了3次,，內(nèi)容大多是呼吁歐佩克增加供應(yīng),。

價(jià)格不太可能出現(xiàn)井噴，石油公司也只好努力適應(yīng),。過(guò)去大概6個(gè)月里,，美國(guó)能源公司削減資本支出，減少鉆井平臺(tái)數(shù)量，提高了盈利能力,，現(xiàn)金流狀況也有所改善,。“現(xiàn)在經(jīng)常有種‘把60美元當(dāng)100美元’的感覺(jué),?！眴碳{森·瓦霍恩說(shuō)，他曾經(jīng)在殼牌擔(dān)任鉆井工程師,，如今在吉尼斯阿特金森資產(chǎn)管理公司當(dāng)投資組合經(jīng)理,。

諷刺的是，油田之前過(guò)好日子時(shí)并不像表面一樣風(fēng)光,。瓦霍恩說(shuō),，前些年石油價(jià)格每桶100美元時(shí)，公司盈利水平也不怎么樣,。摩根士丹利表示,，從過(guò)去油價(jià)高企時(shí)到去年，美國(guó)石油天然氣勘探生產(chǎn)公司在資本支出和股息方面的支出總是超過(guò)現(xiàn)金流,。而且頁(yè)巖油革命開(kāi)始以來(lái),，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)（S&P 500）能源股指數(shù)表現(xiàn)一直不佳?！叭绻覀?cè)诿绹?guó)能源超新星（頁(yè)巖）誕生之際就觀察水晶球,，人們都會(huì)猜測(cè)能源股會(huì)走勢(shì)很好，但事實(shí)并非如此,?！蓖缎蠵iper Jaffray石油天然氣部門(mén)西蒙斯能源的董事總經(jīng)理兼高級(jí)研究分析師比爾·赫伯特表示。

多年來(lái),，能源行業(yè)令眾多投資者折戟,，許多人已經(jīng)放棄。但西方石油公司這筆交易可能重新燃起人們的興趣,。觀察巴菲特投入的100億美元能如何起作用會(huì)很有趣,。

The Permian is also one of the cheapest places to drill for oil, not only in the U.S., but in the world. Unlike costly deepwater and offshore rigs, drillers can make money on Permian oil as long as it trades for at least $50 a barrel. That’s made the region an oasis for energy companies that have struggled ever since 2014, when West Texas crude prices collapsed from a peak of $107. In the years since, prices have never come close to reaching triple digits and have dipped as low as $26 a barrel.

So far this year, prices have generally been on the upswing, and are up some 35% in 2019—to around $62 per barrel—despite concerns that a continuing trade war with China will slow demand. Still, it’s hard to find a bull who thinks that oil has reason to rise much more. “Short of a real sustained geopolitical event—not the periodic flashes that have been impacting the markets—I don’t know that anybody thinks that there’s an upside for commodity prices themselves,” says longtime energy economist Michelle Michot Foss, a fellow at the Center for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Indeed, even with production disruptions resulting from the reactivation of Iran sanctions in May—as well as turmoil in other OPEC exporters like Libya and Venezuela—the Permian has created such an abundance of supply that it can quickly make up for lost inventory. In the years between 2009, when the Great Recession ended, and 2014, there’s been a paradigm shift in the industry, says Devin McDermott, an equity analyst at Morgan Stanley: “We’ve gone from a decade of resource scarcity, and the focus on peak oil supply—‘when do we run out of oil?’—to more oil than we need.” What’s more, there’s enough still in the Permian ground to last at least the next 20 years.

Now, after generations of seesawing crude cycles, companies are wondering whether the best they can hope for, in terms of prices, is flat. “The industry is realizing they can’t count on higher prices,” says Dan Pickering, president of Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co., an energy investment bank headquartered in Houston. He expects oil to trade between $50 and $75 a barrel for the foreseeable future. After all, he says, there are also political forces at play—with, on the one hand, the OPEC oil cartel ready to slash output if prices fall to unprofitable lows, and on the other, President Trump determined to ensure gas stays cheap to fuel the U.S. economy. “My view is, we’ve determined the price range for crude: OPEC is cutting production at $50, and Trump is tweeting at $70,” adds Pickering. Since taking office, Trump has tweeted increasingly often about oil and gas prices—eight times so far in 2019, and three in April alone—generally calling on OPEC to pump more supply to market.

The price may not exactly be a gusher, but the drillers are figuring out how to live with it. In the past six months or so, U.S. energy companies have trimmed capital spending, and cut down on the number of rigs, boosting their profitability and allowing them to retain more of their cash flow. “We kind of use the phrase ‘$60 is the new $100,’?” says Jonathan Waghorn, a onetime Shell drilling engineer who is now a portfolio manager for Guinness Atkinson.

The irony is, the good ole days for the oil patch weren’t exactly that. Even when oil was $100 a barrel a few years ago, companies weren’t as profitable as they should have been, says Waghorn. In those heady days, and until last year, U.S. oil and gas exploration and production companies paid out more on capital expenditures and dividends than they had in cash flow, according to Morgan Stanley—and S&P 500 energy stocks have been consistent underperformers since the start of the shale oil revolution. “If we were looking into your crystal ball at this supernova birth [of shale] in the U.S., I think you would have surmised that these stocks would have done exceedingly well, but they haven’t,” says Bill Herbert, managing director and senior research analyst at Simmons Energy, the oil and gas investment banking arm of Piper Jaffray.

For years, the sector burned so many investors that many abandoned it. But the Occidental deal may have reignited interest. It’s funny what $10 billion from Warren Buffett will do.

回過(guò)頭來(lái)看看西方石油公司為何賭上全部身家，用盡所有籌碼也要收購(gòu)阿納達(dá)科,，以及為何大規(guī)模踏足二疊紀(jì)油田,。過(guò)去幾個(gè)月里，西方石油超過(guò)了規(guī)模大得多的雪佛龍,，成為二疊紀(jì)油田最大的石油公司,，但優(yōu)勢(shì)很難保持。因?yàn)檠┓瘕垖?duì)二疊紀(jì)油田的雄心也不斷增加,，最近承諾到2020年增加53%的產(chǎn)量,。

這是雪佛龍也想收購(gòu)阿納達(dá)科的原因,。一旦兩家石油公司聯(lián)姻，會(huì)形成一些獨(dú)特的優(yōu)勢(shì),。兩家公司在二疊紀(jì)油田控制的地盤(pán)沿著舊的得州太平洋鐵路線延伸,，意味著合并之后會(huì)像巨大的棋盤(pán)一樣連起來(lái)，進(jìn)一步降低成本,。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手西方石油將被淘汰出局,。

西方石油自己可能也已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)，想要繼續(xù)保持該地區(qū)領(lǐng)先地位不太可能,。所以西方石油一直垂涎阿納達(dá)科,，而且兩家就潛在交易已經(jīng)談判近兩年。當(dāng)4月中旬雪佛龍宣布同意以500億美元收購(gòu)阿納達(dá)科連同債務(wù)時(shí),，西方石油立刻發(fā)現(xiàn)身處困境,，想要收購(gòu)阿納達(dá)科，就得以某種方式拆散雪佛龍的交易,，還要處理10億美元賠償?shù)膯?wèn)題,。

在二疊紀(jì)油田，往“干油井”投錢幾乎沒(méi)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn),，因?yàn)榇蠹叶贾馈皥?jiān)硬巖石”里有石油,，也就是廣為人知的頁(yè)巖層?？拷鞲鐬澈０兜牡乩砦恢靡材軌虼_保將原油方便地運(yùn)至市場(chǎng)，尤其現(xiàn)在新管道已經(jīng)開(kāi)通,?！皬暮芏喾矫鎭?lái)看，這對(duì)石油公司來(lái)說(shuō)非常理想,?！备Ｋ拐f(shuō)?！笆凸緩挠吞锏绞袌?chǎng)搭起了完整價(jià)值鏈,，在美國(guó)沿海有出口權(quán)。近30年到40年里都沒(méi)有過(guò)這么好的條件,?！?/p>

吞下阿納達(dá)科之后，西方石油在黃金地帶的地位將進(jìn)一步鞏固,。話雖如此,，代價(jià)也十分巨大，收購(gòu)價(jià)比雪佛龍的出價(jià)每股多了11美元,。巴菲特援助100億美元換得了西方石油10萬(wàn)股優(yōu)先股,，年息8%,。并非所有人都認(rèn)為價(jià)格合理。西方石油宣布收購(gòu)阿納達(dá)科之后的三周里,，股價(jià)暴跌了13%,，股東紛紛批評(píng)收購(gòu)成本高，而且讓巴菲特占了大便宜,。持有西方石油2.8%股份的普信集團(tuán)在5月的股東大會(huì)上威脅要罷免公司董事會(huì)（未成功）,，還抱怨稱管理層應(yīng)該讓股東就收購(gòu)?fù)镀北頉Q。

“我們認(rèn)為二疊紀(jì)油田是西方石油的核心資產(chǎn),?！?普信集團(tuán)的首席投資官約翰·林漢說(shuō)。他補(bǔ)充稱,，西方石油在二疊紀(jì)油田的資產(chǎn)是他當(dāng)初投資的“核心原因”,。奇怪的是，阿納達(dá)科的交易反而沖淡了該優(yōu)勢(shì),。他表示,，盡管合并后的新公司在二疊紀(jì)油田占的地盤(pán)更大，但生產(chǎn)不再那么集中,，因?yàn)榘⒓{達(dá)科在其他地區(qū)的產(chǎn)量占比更高,。“這不是比誰(shuí)規(guī)模最大,?！绷譂h說(shuō)?！氨鹊氖钦l(shuí)總回報(bào)更高,。”

“我們了解二疊紀(jì)油田,。這是我們公司的基礎(chǔ),。”西方石油公司的首席執(zhí)行官維姬·霍魯布在《財(cái)富》雜志上發(fā)表聲明說(shuō),?！暗娣e大小對(duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)并不重要。最重要的不是規(guī)模達(dá)到最大,，而是實(shí)力最強(qiáng),。我認(rèn)為這點(diǎn)已經(jīng)證明?！标P(guān)于繞過(guò)股東投票環(huán)節(jié),，霍魯布在最近的財(cái)報(bào)電話會(huì)議中表示，此舉是為了“增加實(shí)現(xiàn)的可能性”,，因?yàn)檠┓瘕埖氖召?gòu)協(xié)議不需要投票,?！斑@場(chǎng)比賽并不公平?！彼f(shuō),。

Which brings us back to Occidental’s all-in, table-clearing bid for Anadarko, and the hunt for scale in the Permian. In the past few months, Occidental nudged past the much-larger Chevron to become the top Permian oil producer, but it was going to be hard to stay there: Chevron was rapidly upping its Permian ambitions, and had recently promised to grow its production there 53% by 2020.

That’s why Chevron wanted Anadarko, too. The notion of marriage between the two oil producers promised some unique advantages: The parcels each company controls in the Permian run along the old Texas & Pacific rail line, meaning a merger would have united the land like a massive checkerboard, lowering costs further. Rival Occidental would be boxed out.

On its own, Occidental would likely find it nearly impossible to hang on as the region’s top producer. That’s why it, too, had been coveting Anadarko—and indeed had been in talks with the company over a potential deal for almost two years. When Chevron announced its agreement to purchase Anadarko in mid-April for $50 billion including debt, Occidental found itself between tight rock and a hard place: If it wanted Anadarko, it would have to somehow break up the Chevron deal and cover its billion-dollar dowry.

In the Permian Basin, there’s virtually no risk of wasting money on “dry” wells because everyone knows that oil is in that “tight rock,” as the shale formations are known. The proximity to the Gulf Coast also makes it convenient for companies to get the crude to market—especially now with new pipelines opening up. “This is really just an ideal situation for companies in a great number of respects,” Foss says. “They’ve got a complete value chain from field to market, and with coastal access for exports right in the United States. They haven’t had that for 30 to 40 years.”

By gobbling up Anadarko, Occidental would get to solidify its position in this golden region even more. That said, it’s paying a mighty big premium—$11 more per share than what Chevron offered. And in exchange for his $10 billion, Buffett has received 100,000 preferred shares in Occidental , with an 8% annual dividend. Not everyone thinks the price is justified. Occidental’s stock plummeted 13% in the three weeks after it went public with the Ana?darko bid, with its own shareholders criticizing the high cost of the purchase and the fact that Buffett got the sweeter end of the deal. T. Rowe Price, which holds 2.8% of Occidental shares, had (unsuccessfully) threatened to oust the company’s board of directors at its May shareholder meeting, complaining that management should have let shareholders vote on the merger.

“We view the Permian as Occidental’s crown jewel,” says John Linehan, chief investment officer of equity at T. Rowe Price, adding that Occidental’s assets here were the “core reason” he invested in the company in the first place. But the Anadarko deal, oddly enough, dilutes that rationale. While the combined company will have more acreage in the Permian Basin, he says, its overall production will be less concentrated there, because Anadarko has a larger share of its output outside the region. “This isn’t the race to be the biggest,” says Linehan. “It’s the race to have the best total returns.”

“We know the Permian. It’s the foundation of our company,” says Occidental CEO Vicki Hollub in a statement to Fortune. “But it’s not size that matters to us. What really matters to us is not to be the biggest but to be the best. And I think we’ve proven that.” With regard to bypassing a shareholder vote on the deal, Hollub said on a recent earnings call that the company did so to ensure that it “had a reasonable chance to make this happen,” as the Chevron agreement did not require a vote. “We weren’t playing on a level playing field,” she said.

另一方面,，即便雪佛龍收購(gòu)阿納達(dá)科失敗也影響不大,。“海里的魚(yú)還有很多,?！蓖顿Y組合經(jīng)理瓦霍恩表示?！鞍⒓{達(dá)科沒(méi)有什么特別之處,。”事實(shí)上,，隨著大石油集團(tuán)在收購(gòu)意愿方面有所顯露,，二疊紀(jì)油田有不少石油公司都可成為潛在的收購(gòu)目標(biāo)。分析師們正關(guān)注先鋒自然資源,、諾貝爾能源,、阿帕奇公司、康休資源,、歐芹能源和響尾蛇能源等收購(gòu)候選目標(biāo),。“有可能只要再出現(xiàn)一筆收購(gòu),，就會(huì)開(kāi)啟大規(guī)模整合浪潮,?！逼た肆直硎?。“如果?？松?、殼牌、英國(guó)石油公司或道達(dá)爾再做筆大交易,，市場(chǎng)上就會(huì)有不少公司匆忙尋找目標(biāo),，還會(huì)有很多人擔(dān)心錯(cuò)過(guò)機(jī)會(huì)?！?

新興的水力壓裂行業(yè)也出現(xiàn)并購(gòu)浪潮的跡象,，讓投資銀行家皮克林想起了20世紀(jì)90年代末的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)繁榮,。當(dāng)時(shí)，投資者拼命追逐高增長(zhǎng),，就算公司沒(méi)有利潤(rùn)也敢投資,，最后市場(chǎng)崩盤(pán)，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司只能整合,?！艾F(xiàn)在的油田也一樣?！?皮克林說(shuō),。

總的來(lái)說(shuō)，隨著各個(gè)公司收縮鉆探業(yè)務(wù),，美國(guó)石油產(chǎn)量增長(zhǎng)總體上將放緩,。關(guān)鍵技巧在于，即便到最后石油價(jià)格恢復(fù)上漲,，也不要太積極提高產(chǎn)量,，以免價(jià)格再次暴跌?！跋Ｍ@一次業(yè)界能吸取教訓(xùn),。”Integrity Viking基金的邁克·莫雷說(shuō),。

畢竟,，二疊紀(jì)油田的石油公司自身也可能有動(dòng)力控制供應(yīng)和價(jià)格。因?yàn)楸绕鹈绹?guó)以外的石油公司,，本土石油公司靠?jī)r(jià)格更低的石油賺錢更容易,。油價(jià)低的時(shí)候，面臨的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也更小,。Cushing Asset Management公司的投資組合經(jīng)理兼聯(lián)席首席信息官約翰·穆斯格雷夫表示,，如果油價(jià)漲至每桶80美元，國(guó)外很多競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手也會(huì)開(kāi)動(dòng)鉆井,?！皬睦碚撋现v，幾乎不會(huì)希望原油價(jià)格飛漲,?！?

至于巴菲特，他手上持有優(yōu)先股,，所以不管油價(jià)如何他都能賺錢,。這可能才是多年來(lái)油田里最賺錢的一招。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文另一版本登載于《財(cái)富》雜志2019年6月刊,，標(biāo)題為《得克薩斯州女王持有的籌碼》,。

譯者：Feb

Chevron, on the other hand, is no worse for wear without Anadarko. “There are plenty more fish in the sea,” says portfolio manager Waghorn. “There’s no particular reason that Anadarko should stand out.” In fact, now that the major oil conglomerate has tipped its hand in terms of its acquisition appetite, a slew of Permian producers look like potential targets. Analysts are eyeing Pioneer Natural Resources, Noble Energy, Apache Corp., Concho Resources, Parsley Energy, and Diamondback Energy, among others, as takeout candidates. “I think we’re probably one deal away from a big consolidation wave,” says Pickering. “If we see Exxon, Shell, BP, or Total do another big transaction, I think there will be a huge rush to find your dance partner, and there will be a significant amount of fear of missing out.”

The signs of an imminent M&A wave in the still-nascent fracking industry remind Pickering, the investment banker, of the dotcom boom of the late ’90s. Back then, investors chased high growth, throwing money at com?panies despite their lack of profits—before the market crash ultimately forced a consolidation of Internet ?startups. “That’s happening in the oil patch now,” Pickering says.

Inevitably, U.S. oil production growth, on the whole, will slow, as companies pull back on drilling. The trick for them, if oil prices do ultimately rise, will be not ramping production back up too aggressively, such that prices collapse again. “Hopefully this time the industry learns its lesson,” says Integrity Viking’s Mike Morey.

After all, Permian producers themselves may have an incentive to keep supply—and prices—in check. Because they can make money on cheaper oil than many drillers outside the U.S. can, they face less competition when prices are low. If the price of oil were to rise to $80 a barrel, more foreign competitors would start pumping too, says John Musgrave, ?portfolio manager and co-CIO of Cushing Asset Management. “Theoretically, you almost wouldn’t want crude oil prices to skyrocket higher.”

As for Buffett, he’s going to make money no matter where oil prices go, thanks to his preferred shares. That may be the most profitable move in the oil patch in years.

This article appears in the June 2019 issue of Fortune with the headline “The Queen of Texas Hold ‘Em.”