MBA高薪神話(huà):穿越數(shù)據(jù)迷霧
????專(zhuān)業(yè)學(xué)校一度風(fēng)光無(wú)限,。但面臨殘酷的就業(yè)市場(chǎng),,畢業(yè)即失業(yè)的學(xué)生們終于忍無(wú)可忍,,有人甚至起訴他們的母校,,稱(chēng)學(xué)校承諾畢業(yè)生可以找到穩(wěn)定的工作,,六位數(shù)的薪水更是手到擒來(lái),他們信以為真,結(jié)果欠下了巨額債務(wù),。 ????而商學(xué)院的承諾更是受到嚴(yán)厲的譴責(zé),,因?yàn)樯虒W(xué)院畢業(yè)生本希望既能接受良好的教育,又能快速獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)回報(bào),。商學(xué)院采用的就業(yè)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)申報(bào)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)非常嚴(yán)格,,甚至有會(huì)計(jì)人員的參與(部分法學(xué)院也正在考慮采用該機(jī)制),這是理想的商學(xué)院風(fēng)格,。但即便如此嚴(yán)格的就業(yè)統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)也會(huì)存在瑕疵,。有意攻讀MBA的學(xué)生可得注意:學(xué)校就業(yè)報(bào)告里給出的六位數(shù)薪水,并不能保證在畢業(yè)時(shí)就一定能兌現(xiàn),。 ????商學(xué)院當(dāng)前實(shí)行的機(jī)制開(kāi)始于1994年,。當(dāng)時(shí),MBA就業(yè)服務(wù)委員會(huì)(MBA Career Services Council)開(kāi)始制定一系列報(bào)告標(biāo)準(zhǔn),,目的是統(tǒng)一一流學(xué)校的就業(yè)報(bào)告一,。該委員會(huì)是針對(duì)MBA就業(yè)服務(wù)專(zhuān)業(yè)人員與招聘人員的專(zhuān)業(yè)組織。 ????麻省理工大學(xué)斯隆商學(xué)院(MIT's Sloan School of Business)就業(yè)服務(wù)中心主任杰基?威爾伯當(dāng)時(shí)就在MBA就業(yè)服務(wù)委員會(huì)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會(huì)擔(dān)任聯(lián)合主席,,她說(shuō):“我們聚在一起,,進(jìn)行了長(zhǎng)時(shí)間的討論?!边@些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)在1999年被MBA就業(yè)服務(wù)委員會(huì)正式采用,。2006年,委員會(huì)一致通過(guò)了一系列審計(jì)流程,。最終形成了一套廣泛的,、可行的統(tǒng)一規(guī)定。 ????威爾伯稱(chēng),,關(guān)于就業(yè)報(bào)告標(biāo)準(zhǔn),,商學(xué)院在許多方面都走在前列。她希望其他類(lèi)型的學(xué)校也能以商學(xué)院為榜樣,,實(shí)行更加嚴(yán)格的報(bào)告標(biāo)準(zhǔn),。 ????威爾伯表示:“鑒于教育成本不斷攀升,所有教育機(jī)構(gòu)都應(yīng)該采取更加嚴(yán)格的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),。學(xué)生家長(zhǎng)要求掌握更準(zhǔn)確的信息,,來(lái)衡量他們的投資回報(bào)?!碑?dāng)然,,其中也包括本科生教育。 ????然而今年夏天美國(guó)佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)(University of Florida)爆出的丑聞則顯示,,即便一些商學(xué)院也必須自我檢點(diǎn),。佛羅里達(dá)州的《甘斯維爾太陽(yáng)報(bào)》(Gainsville Sun)報(bào)道稱(chēng),對(duì)佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)進(jìn)行的一次校內(nèi)調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn),學(xué)校在2009年向《美國(guó)新聞與世界報(bào)道》(US News and World Report)提供的就業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)并不準(zhǔn)確(當(dāng)年,,學(xué)校并未向MBA就業(yè)服務(wù)委員會(huì)提交其就業(yè)記錄,,但威爾伯稱(chēng),如果進(jìn)行審計(jì),,應(yīng)該能發(fā)現(xiàn)其中的出入),。報(bào)道稱(chēng),部分正在求職的學(xué)生被作為已就業(yè)學(xué)生,,另外還有一些尚在求職的學(xué)生則干脆被全部刪除,,無(wú)法在就業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)中得以體現(xiàn)。不過(guò)學(xué)校對(duì)該則報(bào)道的結(jié)論予以強(qiáng)烈否認(rèn),。 ????學(xué)校偽造數(shù)據(jù)的理由 ????范德堡大學(xué)歐文管理學(xué)院(Vanderbilt University's Owen School of Management)就業(yè)服務(wù)中心執(zhí)行主任里德?麥克納馬拉認(rèn)為,,學(xué)校有強(qiáng)烈的動(dòng)機(jī),提供“更體面”的就業(yè)報(bào)告,。因?yàn)?,即使統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)出現(xiàn)些微變化,也有可能導(dǎo)致學(xué)校排名的大幅波動(dòng),,而這將會(huì)直接影響學(xué)校的申請(qǐng)人數(shù)和資金支持,。 ????MBA就業(yè)服務(wù)委員會(huì)聯(lián)合主席兼范德堡大學(xué)就業(yè)服務(wù)中心高級(jí)副主任艾米麗?安德森稱(chēng),每年,,約有100所學(xué)校自愿接受隨機(jī)審計(jì)核查,,其中,每年約有25所學(xué)校被選中,,這意味著每所學(xué)校每四年便會(huì)接受一次隨機(jī)審計(jì)核查,。大部分就業(yè)服務(wù)中心主任均認(rèn)為,審計(jì)非常必要,。 ????面臨種種誘惑(暫且不論充足的生源),,學(xué)校在報(bào)告時(shí)可能有選擇地只統(tǒng)計(jì)獲得高薪職位的畢業(yè)生,盡管威爾伯表示MBA就業(yè)服務(wù)委員會(huì)要求每所學(xué)校在編制報(bào)告時(shí),,要統(tǒng)計(jì)每個(gè)班級(jí)85%的學(xué)生的就業(yè)情況,。部分會(huì)員學(xué)校甚至要求將該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)提高到最低95%。 ????但部分學(xué)校也可能在統(tǒng)計(jì)中額外塞進(jìn)一些學(xué)生,。例如,,某所學(xué)校招收了一名職業(yè)運(yùn)動(dòng)員,因此試圖將他的巨額薪酬分?jǐn)偟浇y(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)中,。報(bào)告中僅包括“MBA級(jí)”工作崗位(體育甚至專(zhuān)業(yè)運(yùn)動(dòng)員都不屬于MBA級(jí)工作崗位),,但對(duì)“MBA級(jí)”的定義卻模棱兩可。如果該定義被錯(cuò)誤解讀,,也可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生相反的結(jié)果,,使低薪酬工作被視為不屬于MBA級(jí)別,,進(jìn)而在統(tǒng)計(jì)時(shí)被排除在外。威爾伯稱(chēng),,關(guān)于上面提到的運(yùn)動(dòng)員的案例,審計(jì)過(guò)程應(yīng)該可以發(fā)現(xiàn)類(lèi)似的錯(cuò)誤,。 |
????Professional schools have had better years. Facing a brutal job market, underemployed graduates have begun to speak up, some even suing their former institutions, claiming they were duped into acquiring massive debt loads based on the promise of a secure, six-figure-salary job. ????That promise is particularly critical at business schools, where graduates expect a quick financial payoff as well as an education. At these programs, the standards for reporting employment statistics, in true B-school fashion, are rigorous and involve accountants (a system some law schools are considering). But even those career statistics can have their flaws. Prospective students take heed: The six-figure school-reported numbers are not a guarantee of a sweet paycheck come graduation day. ????The current system has its roots in 1994, when the MBA Career Services Council (CSC), the professional association for MBA career services professionals and recruiters, started developing a set of reporting standards to allow for uniform career reporting across the top schools. ????"We all sat around in a room and we hashed it out," says Jackie Wilbur, career services director at MIT's Sloan School of Business who was co-chair of the MBA Career Services Council's standards committee at the time. Those standards were officially adopted by the CSC in 1999. In 2006, it established a set of agreed upon procedures to allow for auditing. The result was a uniform set of extensive, enforceable rules. ????In many ways, B-schools have led the charge in employment reporting standards, Wilbur says. She expects other types of programs will likely follow suit and double down on reporting standards. ????"Given the rising cost of education, every piece of the equation of the educational offering is going to have to go more and more this way," Wilbur says -- including undergrad programs. "Parents are going to demand better information about return on investment." ????But a scandal this summer at the University of Florida revealed that even some B-schools still have to clean up their act. Florida's Gainsville Sun reported that an internal university investigation found the school had provided US News and World Report with inaccurate employment data in 2009 (it did not submit its records to the CSC that year, though Wilbur says an audit would have picked up the discrepancies). The school vehemently denied the conclusions of the report, which found that several students were listed as employed when they were seeking employment, and that other students seeking employment were omitted from the data altogether. ????A host of reasons to fudge the data ????Schools have a strong incentive to deliver good employment reports, says Read McNamara, executive director of career services at the Vanderbilt University's Owen School of Management, as even tiny changes in the stats can lead to big changes in a school's ranking, which, in turn, can directly affect application numbers and funding. ????Emily Anderson, co-chair of the CSC and Vanderbilt's senior associate director of career services, says that each year about 100 schools volunteer for random auditing checks. Of those, about 25 are selected each year, meaning schools can expect to be audited about once every four years. Most career services directors agree that the audits are necessary. ????Among the chief temptations: not including enough students -- schools may selectively include only graduates with high-paying jobs, though Wilbur says the CSC requires a school to report responses from 85% of each class for each report. Some member schools are requesting that the standard be raised to a minimum of 95%. ????A school may also include too many students. One program, which had enrolled a professional athlete, attempted to report his outsize salary in their average. Only "MBA-level" jobs are included in the report (sports aren't considered MBA level, even the pros), but that can be a tricky definition. Misreading of that definition can also run the other way, and can result in some lower paying jobs being deemed as not MBA level and discarded from the stats. Wilbur notes that, as in the case of the athlete, the auditing process should catch these types of errors. |
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