戴維?希羅:執(zhí)掌奧克馬克國(guó)際基金的逆向投資者
????戴維?希羅的逆向投資之道有多與眾不同,?最近,這位基金經(jīng)理正避開(kāi)炙手可熱的新興市場(chǎng),,而青睞看似病入膏肓的(歐洲銀行)或是奄奄一息的(日本公司)的股票,。從希羅的戰(zhàn)績(jī)中可以了解他的瘋狂程度。 ????自?shī)W克馬克國(guó)際基金(Oakmark International Fund)于1992年成立以來(lái),,希羅一直負(fù)責(zé)管理其80億美元的資金,,過(guò)去十年的年回報(bào)率為9%,高于98%的同業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手,。他的戰(zhàn)績(jī)最近進(jìn)一步提升:奧克馬克國(guó)際基金最近被晨星(Morningstar)評(píng)選為所屬類(lèi)別中近一年,、三年以及五年以來(lái)的最佳基金。去年,,晨星還提名希羅為“十年最佳國(guó)際股票基金經(jīng)理”,。 ????這樣的成績(jī)對(duì)于一個(gè)原本打算成為專(zhuān)業(yè)學(xué)者的人來(lái)說(shuō),還算不錯(cuò),。希羅在25歲時(shí)放棄攻讀美國(guó)威斯康星大學(xué)麥迪遜分校的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位,,開(kāi)始管理機(jī)構(gòu)資金。他表示:“我當(dāng)時(shí)想,,‘不發(fā)表即滅亡’的學(xué)術(shù)生涯真讓人受不了”,。他曾料想自己會(huì)在某個(gè)時(shí)候重返校園,,但這一直沒(méi)有成真。 ????希羅的標(biāo)志性風(fēng)格是遠(yuǎn)離他人熱捧的領(lǐng)域,,并投資于他人不看好的領(lǐng)域,。在2007年股市呈現(xiàn)一派繁榮景象時(shí),他警告基金持有者,,稱(chēng)認(rèn)為他能不斷取得巨大收益的想法十分荒謬?,F(xiàn)在,他則告訴投資者們,,不會(huì)出現(xiàn)另一個(gè)“失落的十年”,。 ????我們?cè)儐?wèn)這位現(xiàn)年50歲、住在芝加哥的價(jià)值投資者,,在眼下動(dòng)蕩的環(huán)境中,,他覺(jué)得何處存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和潛力。 ????問(wèn):讓我們先談一下新聞,。大宗商品價(jià)格通脹正導(dǎo)致埃及等國(guó)家的不安局面,。你對(duì)此怎么看? ????答:大宗商品價(jià)格波動(dòng),、政局不穩(wěn),、貨幣問(wèn)題無(wú)疑存在——這些問(wèn)題在過(guò)去一直存在,在將來(lái)也將繼續(xù)存在,。這是不利的一面,。但積極的一面是,,全球GDP正以每年大約4.5%至5%的速度增長(zhǎng),。對(duì)于生存其中的公司來(lái)說(shuō),現(xiàn)在這個(gè)環(huán)境還不錯(cuò),。我們認(rèn)為,,這些宏觀現(xiàn)象中的大部分在實(shí)質(zhì)上都是周期性或者短期的,而非結(jié)構(gòu)性的,。因此,,實(shí)際上我很喜歡這一點(diǎn)。環(huán)境越不穩(wěn)定而且波動(dòng)越大,,我覺(jué)得越好,。這提供了更多長(zhǎng)期投資的機(jī)會(huì)。 ????這就是盡管歐洲尚未完全從債務(wù)危機(jī)中復(fù)蘇,,但你將三分之二的資金投資于該地區(qū)的原因,? ????如果你看一下在這次短暫主權(quán)債務(wù)風(fēng)暴中遭受重創(chuàng)的一些金融機(jī)構(gòu),例如西班牙國(guó)家銀行(Banco Santander)和法國(guó)巴黎銀行(BNP Paribas),,就能發(fā)現(xiàn)它們實(shí)際上并沒(méi)有主權(quán)債務(wù)的問(wèn)題,。即便是瑞士私人銀行瑞信(Credit Suisse)和瑞銀(UBS),,也看起來(lái)更像是資產(chǎn)管理公司。它們的凈資金流入保持正向,,現(xiàn)在這些具有良好盈利流的公司正以7,、8倍的市盈率進(jìn)行交易。法國(guó)巴黎銀行和西班牙國(guó)家銀行就是“與垃圾一起被扔掉的寶石”,。 ????西班牙國(guó)家銀行是一家西班牙銀行,,其70%的經(jīng)營(yíng)收益來(lái)自西班牙以外國(guó)家。超過(guò)一半的經(jīng)營(yíng)收益來(lái)自新興世界,。但市場(chǎng)只將其視為“大型西班牙銀行”,。市場(chǎng)人士的觀點(diǎn)是:“脆弱的金融領(lǐng)域:賣(mài)出?!倍覀兙涂梢詮倪@一短期的浮躁中獲益,。上述金融機(jī)構(gòu)是優(yōu)質(zhì)機(jī)構(gòu):資本較為雄厚,貸款虧損較少,,成本收益比率較低,。它們的業(yè)務(wù)開(kāi)展情況良好,并且有能力從中挖掘利潤(rùn),。 ????在金融業(yè)中,,愛(ài)爾蘭銀行是你持有的跌幅最大的股票之一??磥?lái)愛(ài)爾蘭經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況依然十分糟糕,。樂(lè)觀情景是什么? ????如果你向后看,,這的確糟糕透頂,。但如果展望未來(lái),只有一家銀行不會(huì)受到愛(ài)爾蘭政府控制,。我們認(rèn)為愛(ài)爾蘭不會(huì)崩潰,,而愛(ài)爾蘭銀行將能從這場(chǎng)危機(jī)中存活下來(lái)。現(xiàn)在來(lái)看,,我們一度犯下了一個(gè)嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)誤,。當(dāng)我們持有這只股票并看到其上漲時(shí),原本應(yīng)當(dāng)拋出,。但我們沒(méi)有這么做,。但隨后我們?cè)谒碌鴷r(shí)再次買(mǎi)入,并且在其下跌過(guò)多之前大量拋售,。這只股票的走勢(shì)反復(fù)不定,,使我們實(shí)際上得以在低迷時(shí)期賺了一些錢(qián)。 ????在你的前五大持股中,包括豐田(Toyota)和佳能(Canon)在內(nèi)的四只股票都是日本公司,。買(mǎi)入的原因是什么,? ????讓我告訴你一個(gè)有趣的故事。當(dāng)我于上世紀(jì)80年代在威斯康辛州投資委員會(huì)工作時(shí),,日本占國(guó)際指數(shù)的60%,,而我對(duì)日本的投資為零。其他人常常說(shuō),,“這么做非常冒險(xiǎn)”,。我卻說(shuō),“對(duì)市盈率達(dá)到60或70倍的日本公司進(jìn)行投資,,才是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)十足,。”那時(shí)日本股票的平均回報(bào)率為5%,。在我看來(lái),,其中毫無(wú)價(jià)值可言。 ????自那以后,,日本公司的市凈率由4至5倍下降至1倍以下,,而股本收益率開(kāi)始攀升。它們的市凈率按理不應(yīng)降至這一水平,,但你開(kāi)始發(fā)現(xiàn)股本收益率達(dá)到15%至20%的某些公司,,例如佳能。我們認(rèn)為,,低價(jià)并不意味著被低估,。你必須尋覓滿(mǎn)足以下條件的公司:(a) 它正以低價(jià)被拋售,但是(b) 它致力于創(chuàng)造價(jià)值,,以超額現(xiàn)金開(kāi)展某些活動(dòng),,構(gòu)建每股賬面價(jià)值,并且取得良好的股本回報(bào)率,。當(dāng)我們首次(至少是自二十世紀(jì)80年代中旬以來(lái)首次)能夠?qū)か@這樣的公司時(shí),,我開(kāi)始進(jìn)行投資,。 ????你并未持有任何中國(guó)股票,,而你買(mǎi)入的唯一新興市場(chǎng)股票是韓國(guó)和墨西哥股票。為什么會(huì)這樣,? ????原因是價(jià)格對(duì)于我們來(lái)說(shuō)至關(guān)重要,。在上世紀(jì)90年代末,我們擁有20%至30%的新興市場(chǎng)敞口,,人們當(dāng)時(shí)覺(jué)得我們瘋了,。那個(gè)時(shí)候,新興市場(chǎng)股市剛剛經(jīng)歷了崩潰,股價(jià)極其便宜?,F(xiàn)如今,,這些市場(chǎng)極度狂熱,我們削減了相關(guān)投資,,原因是公司價(jià)值已在股價(jià)中得到體現(xiàn),。投資者必須將有吸引力的股票和有吸引力的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況區(qū)分開(kāi)來(lái),但他們卻將此混為一談,。我們目前對(duì)新興市場(chǎng)的投資可能是有史以來(lái)的最低水平,。 ????每個(gè)人都在嚷著,“中國(guó),,中國(guó),,中國(guó)!”確實(shí),,中國(guó)正以每年8%至10%的速度增長(zhǎng),,我喜歡這一情況。但是,,你覺(jué)得是應(yīng)當(dāng)通過(guò)買(mǎi)入某些中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)的股票來(lái)進(jìn)行投資,,但這些企業(yè)并不關(guān)心股東利益、透明度很低并且當(dāng)前的市盈率高達(dá)25倍,?還是應(yīng)當(dāng)買(mǎi)入某家公司的股票,,該公司的市值不足現(xiàn)金流的10倍,并且30%以上的利潤(rùn)來(lái)自新興市場(chǎng)和中國(guó),?達(dá)能(Danone),、帝亞吉?dú)W(Diageo)和雀巢(Nestlé)等公司就屬于后一種情況。它們有著極大的新興市場(chǎng)敞口,,這應(yīng)會(huì)給它們帶來(lái)顯著的增長(zhǎng),。 ????世界經(jīng)濟(jì)存在著嚴(yán)重的不平衡。美國(guó)仍然承受著巨大的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān),。幾乎每種衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)都顯示,,中國(guó)貨幣被低估。通脹是新興世界面臨的一大憂(yōu)慮,。今后最危險(xiǎn)的一點(diǎn)是什么,? ????最危險(xiǎn)的是全球保護(hù)主義,該問(wèn)題由于沒(méi)有在上一次危機(jī)中爆發(fā),,所以有些被人們忽略了 ,。阻止商品、服務(wù)以及資本的跨界自由流動(dòng)是十分危險(xiǎn)的,,因?yàn)橄胍故袌?chǎng)發(fā)揮作用,,你就必須令套利發(fā)揮作用,。你需要操盤(pán)手、投資者以及其他利用不平衡狀況的人,。 ????其次,,美國(guó)依然是世界上最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體。我的擔(dān)憂(yōu)是,,如果我們無(wú)法控制權(quán)力問(wèn)題以及支出問(wèn)題,,人們將會(huì)懼怕國(guó)債拍賣(mài),我們將會(huì)陷入一個(gè)惡性循環(huán),,該循環(huán)將會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)乃至全球經(jīng)濟(jì)造成打擊,。長(zhǎng)期利率將會(huì)大幅上升,從而進(jìn)一步摧毀房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng),。它將摧毀債券市場(chǎng),。它將引發(fā)大量害怕和恐慌,從而損害預(yù)期并打擊信心,。我相信我們將解決該問(wèn)題,,但如果我們無(wú)法解決,那么將付出慘重的代價(jià),。 ????現(xiàn)在最糟糕的領(lǐng)域是什么,? ????能源、自然資源,。人們看到新興市場(chǎng)的需求仍在增長(zhǎng),,并且認(rèn)為這將轉(zhuǎn)化為全球需求增長(zhǎng),而事實(shí)卻并非如此,。發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的某些此類(lèi)需求實(shí)際上正在下滑,。例如,拿原油需求來(lái)說(shuō),,目前每天的原油需求在8500-8600萬(wàn)桶左右,。過(guò)去十年中,每年的原油需求增長(zhǎng)基本不會(huì)超出1%或2%,。而如果看一下能源效率以及能源安全要求方面的情況,,以及人們對(duì)綠色科技的信任,就知道近期內(nèi)原油需求不會(huì)大幅增長(zhǎng),。 |
????How much of a contrarian is David Herro? These days the fund manager is eschewing scorching emerging markets in favor of the seemingly toxic (European banks) or moribund (Japanese companies). Herro's record suggests a method to his madness. ????He has managed the $8 billion Oakmark International Fund (OAKIX) since its founding in 1992, returning 9% annually over the past 10 years to trounce 98% of competitors. Herro's recent record is even stronger: Oakmark ranks No. 1 in its Morningstar category over the past one-, three-, and five-year periods. Last year Morningstar named Herro its International Stock Manager of the Decade. ????Not bad for someone who had planned to be an academic. Herro left the University of Wisconsin-Madison's economics doctorate program at 25 years old -- "I thought, 'This publish or perish is too much'" -- to get his start managing institutional money. He figured he'd return to school at some point, but he's never been back. ????Herro's trademark is avoiding what others love and going where others won't. When stock markets were prosperous in 2007, Herro warned his shareholders how ridiculous it would be to think he could keep posting enormous gains. Now he's telling investors not to expect another lost decade. ????We asked the Chicago-based, 50-year-old value investor where he sees risk and potential in a tumultuous world. ????Q. Let's start with the news. Commodity inflation is contributing to unrest in countries like Egypt and elsewhere. How do you deal with it? ????A.Commodity prices, political instability, monetary problems are certainly out there --they always have been out there, and in fact, they always will be out there. That's the negative. The positive is that global GDP is growing at roughly 4.5% to 5% a year. That's not a bad place for companies to exist in. We think most of these macro phenomena are cyclical or short term in nature and not structural. So actually I like it. The more instability and volatility, the better. It provides for more long-term investment opportunity. ????Is that why two-thirds of your holdings are in Europe, which is still recovering from the debt crisis? ????When you look at some of the financials that got hit really hard in this little sovereign-debt tornado -- companies like Banco Santander (STD) and BNP Paribas -- they don't actually have sovereign-debt problems. Even the Swiss private banks -- Credit Suisse (CS) and UBS (UBS) -- are more asset-management companies. Net inflows stayed positive, and now we have companies that are trading at seven, eight times earnings with good earnings streams. BNP and Santander are the babies that got thrown out with the bath water. ????Santander is a Spanish bank and earns 70% of its operating income from outside Spain. More than half comes from the emerging world. Yet the market sees "big Spanish bank." They think, "Fragile financial sector: Sell." We can take advantage of this short-term impatience. They are quality institutions: relatively well-capitalized, low loan losses, low cost/income ratios. They're good at what they do and were able to exploit it. ????Within the financials, Bank of Ireland has been one of your biggest losers. It looks like the economy is still an atrocious story over there. What is the bullish case? ????If you look in the rearview mirror, it's an atrocious story. If you are looking forward, there's only one bank that won't be controlled by the government. We don't think Ireland is going to go away, and the Bank of Ireland is the surviving bank. Now we made a big error. We owned it, it went up. We should have sold it. We didn't. But then we did buy it when it was down, and we sold a bunch of it before it fell too much. The stock has been so variable, it's enabled us to actually make a little money in the downturn. ????Four of your top five holdings, including Toyota (TM) and Canon (CAJ), are in Japan. Why are you buying? ????I'll tell you a funny story. When I worked at the State of Wisconsin Investment Board in the '80s, Japan was 60% of the international index, and I had 0% invested in Japan. They used to say, "This is very risky." And I said, "What's risky is investing in Japanese companies that are trading at 60 or 70 times earnings." The average return on equity was 5%. To me there was just no value. ????Since then the price-to-book ratio has gone from four or five to below one, and return on equity is starting to creep up. It's not where it should be, but you're starting to see certain companies, like Canon, for instance, whose return on equity is 15% to 20%. Low price does not mean undervalued in our view. You have to look for companies that (a) are selling cheap but (b) are committed to value creation, to doing something with their excess cash, to building book value per share, and to getting a good return on equity. And we're able to find that for the first time ever -- at least since the mid-1980s, when I started investing. ????You don't hold any Chinese stocks, and the only emerging stocks you have are in South Korea and Mexico. What's going on? ????What's going on is that price is very important to us. In the late '90s we had 20% to 30% emerging-markets exposure, and people thought we were crazy. There had just been a crash, and prices were dirt cheap. Today there's hype and over-euphoria, and we cut our investments because they're reflected in the price. One has to distinguish between attractive equities and an attractive macroeconomic situation. And investors have confused this. We're at our lowest level in emerging markets probably since forever. ????Everyone says, "China, China, China!" I love the fact that China is growing 8% to 10% a year. Do you play that by buying some state-owned enterprise that doesn't care about the shareholders, has no transparency, and is trading at 25 times earnings? Or do you play that by buying into a business that trades at less than 10 times cash flow and makes more than 30% of its profits from emerging markets and China? That's the case for companies like Danone, Diageo (DEO), and Nestlé. They have very good exposure to emerging markets, and that should give them decent growth. ????There are big imbalances in the world. The U.S. is still under a big load of debt. China's currency is undervalued by nearly every measure. Inflation is a concern in the emerging world. What is the most dangerous thing going forward? ????This has been minimized a little bit because it didn't really happen last crisis, and that's global protectionism. Preventing the free flow of goods and services and capital across international boundaries. That is a danger because in order for markets to work, you need arbitrage to work. You need traders and investors and whoever to exploit imbalances. ????Secondly, the U.S. is still the largest economy in the world. My fear is that if we don't come to grips with our entitlement problem and our spending problem, people are going to dread Treasury auctions and we're going to get into a nasty cycle that is going to hurt the U.S. economy, and therefore, the global economy. Long-term interest rates would shoot up, which would kill housing even more. It would kill the bond markets. It would cause a lot of fear and fright, which would hurt expectations, which would hurt confidence. I do believe we're going to figure this out, but if we don't, there's going to be hell to pay. ????Where's the worst place to be now? ????Energy, natural resources. People still see growth in demand in emerging markets, and they think that translates to global growth in demand when in fact it doesn't. The developed world is actually declining in demand in some of these things. Look at the demand for oil, for instance -- it's right around 85, 86 million barrels a day. It basically has not grown more than 1% or 2% a year, if that, over the past decade. And when you look at what's happening in terms of energy efficiency and people wanting energy security, and then people believing in this green technology, it suggests oil demand isn't going to grow a lot in the near future. |