????因此,，西班牙生產(chǎn)的這種小裝置在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)上將毫無(wú)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,，除非西班牙貨幣對(duì)德國(guó)貨幣的匯率能降至西班牙單位勞動(dòng)力成本低于德國(guó)的水平。歐元誕生前,，這樣的貨幣貶值過(guò)程經(jīng)常會(huì)出現(xiàn),。但現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)不可能。

????為了搞清危機(jī)怎么會(huì)突然爆發(fā),，不妨先簡(jiǎn)單回顧一下歐元從救世主變?yōu)槠茐恼叩臍v程,。正是歐元的影響，致使歐元區(qū)強(qiáng)國(guó)和弱國(guó)之間的單位勞動(dòng)力成本差距較歐元誕生前進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大，而意大利,、希臘則喪失了之前藉以維持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的重要緩沖機(jī)制,。

弱國(guó)更弱

????為了簡(jiǎn)單一點(diǎn)，我們把歐元區(qū)分為兩部分,，一部分是“核心”強(qiáng)國(guó),，主要是德國(guó)、荷蘭和奧地利,，另一部分則是“南部”地區(qū),，包括意大利、西班牙,、希臘和葡萄牙,，以及地理上不屬于該區(qū)域但同樣深陷困境的愛(ài)爾蘭。即使是在1999年1月1日歐元誕生前,，南部國(guó)家的利率正處于大幅下降通道,。到2005年左右，消費(fèi)者和政府的借款利率不到5%,，低于十年前的12%,。信貸猛增，寬松的貨幣主要流向了那些無(wú)外國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的產(chǎn)業(yè),，即經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家所謂的“非外貿(mào)產(chǎn)業(yè)”,，包括從房地產(chǎn)、保險(xiǎn),、景觀設(shè)計(jì)到美發(fā)護(hù)發(fā)等眾多行業(yè),。

????因此，這些嚴(yán)格內(nèi)需型產(chǎn)業(yè)的薪資和價(jià)格飆升,。從90年代末到00年代末,，歐洲南部國(guó)家的價(jià)格增幅平均高出德國(guó)和其他核心國(guó)家1.5%。

????卡內(nèi)基基金會(huì)（Carnegie Endowment）駐華盛頓的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家烏里?達(dá)迪什稱：“偶們的單一貨幣政策對(duì)弱國(guó)而言太為寬松,，而對(duì)德國(guó)和北部國(guó)家而言又過(guò)緊,。”寬松的貨幣政策使得歐洲南部國(guó)家的消費(fèi)者和政府的借款利率遠(yuǎn)低于國(guó)內(nèi)通脹率,，鼓勵(lì)他們背負(fù)高額債務(wù)，其中主要來(lái)自國(guó)外借債,。

????薪資上漲是另一個(gè)棘手的問(wèn)題,。非外貿(mào)產(chǎn)業(yè)的繁榮發(fā)展導(dǎo)致勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)供不應(yīng)求，出口行業(yè)的薪資也水漲船高,，因?yàn)樗麄冎荒芘c建筑行業(yè)爭(zhēng)奪人手,。除了愛(ài)爾蘭，歐元區(qū)弱國(guó)大多并沒(méi)有采取什么措施來(lái)改善剛性的勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)。而且,，事實(shí)上這些國(guó)家的法律更多地服務(wù)于確保薪資的增速高于生產(chǎn)率的增速,。嚴(yán)格的勞動(dòng)法規(guī)和本國(guó)勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)需求的猛增兩相結(jié)合，導(dǎo)致截至2007年的十年間,，歐洲南部國(guó)家的薪資每年增幅高達(dá)5.9%,，比歐元區(qū)核心國(guó)家高出了2.7個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。

????但歐洲南部國(guó)家的薪資高增長(zhǎng)難以持續(xù),。單一貨幣政策對(duì)德國(guó)的影響正相反：在德國(guó),，利率太高，抑制了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),。德國(guó)的薪資增幅顯著低于希臘和西班牙,。這又回到了單位勞動(dòng)力成本。從2000年到2010年,，希臘薪資增長(zhǎng)了36%,，意大利和西班牙增長(zhǎng)了31%，愛(ài)爾蘭增長(zhǎng)了29%,。而德國(guó)的增幅只有4%,。因此，德國(guó)和其他核心國(guó)家獲得了巨大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì),，而南歐國(guó)家則淪落到靠借貸度日,。美國(guó)和中國(guó)（也與德國(guó)）一樣，兩者同樣也受益于美元和人民幣兌歐元匯率的下跌,。

????Spain can still sell its widgets abroad, but only if its currency declines versus the German money to the point where its wages are lower than German wages. That adjustment process was constantly happening in the pre-euro days. Now, it can't happen.

????To understand how the crisis struck so unexpectedly, let's briefly examine the euro's savior-to-spoiler history. It was the euro's influence that caused unit labor costs in the strong vs weak economies to diverge far faster than they did in the pre-euro days, and that simultaneously eliminated the crucial shock absorber that allowed an Italy or Greece to keep growing in the past.

The weak get weaker

????To simplify, we'll divide the eurozone into the two parts, the "core" stronger economies, chiefly Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, and the "southern" zone of Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, and one ailing nation that doesn't belong geographically, Ireland. Even before the euro was introduced on January 1, 1999, interest rates were falling sharply in for the southern countries. By the mid-2000s, consumers and governments were borrowing at less than 5%, compared to 12% a decade earlier. Credit exploded, and the easy money flowed mainly into industries that don't face foreign competition, what economists call the "non-traded sector," encompassing everything from real estate to insurance to landscaping and hair care.

????As a result, wages and prices in those strictly domestic industries soared. From the late 1990s to the late 2000s, prices rose an average of 1.5% faster in the southern countries than in the Germany and rest of the core.

????"The single monetary policy was too loose for the weaker countries, and too tight for Germany and the northern nations," says Uri Dadush, an economist at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, DC. The easy money allowed both consumers and governments in the southern nations to borrow at rates far lower than the pace of inflation inside their borders, encouraging both to pile on huge debt, chiefly from abroad.

????The march of wages was another daunting problem. The boom in the non-traded sector caused a tight labor market, and drove up pay for exporters who had to compete with the construction industry for workers. It didn't help that, with the exception of Ireland, the weaker countries did nothing to tame their extremely inflexible labor markets. The laws in those countries are virtually designed to raise wages faster than productivity growth. The combination of rigid labor laws and the explosion in domestic demand caused wages in the southern zone to jump 5.9% a year for the decade ending in 2007, 2.7 points faster than in core Europe.

????The southern zone's growth spurt was ephemeral. The blanket monetary policy had precisely the reverse effect on redoubtable Germany, where rates were too high, restraining growth. German wages didn't see nearly the increases that Greece or Spain experienced. That brings us back to unit labor costs. From 2000 to 2010, they rose 36% in Greece, 31% in Italy and Spain, and 29% in Ireland. For Germany, the figure was 4%. So Germany and the other core countries gained an enormous competitive edge while the south lived on borrowing, as did the U.S. and China, which also benefited from a fall in the dollar and yuan versus the euro.