????顯然，在如何處理伊朗問題上,，克羅尼格的觀點(diǎn)比美國當(dāng)局更為激進(jìn),，他的文章也不應(yīng)解讀為替美國政府表態(tài)，雖然他曾位居美國國防部長顧問之職,。無論如何，如果說油價(jià)堅(jiān)挺,、伊朗的強(qiáng)硬舉動(dòng)和美國的強(qiáng)硬措辭傳遞了某種信息,，那就是伊朗問題短期內(nèi)不會(huì)消失,。

歷史油價(jià)

????假如對(duì)伊朗采取軍事行動(dòng),，需要思考的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理問題是：它將對(duì)油價(jià)產(chǎn)生什么影響？作為參照,，我們?cè)谙旅鎯蓮垐D中呈現(xiàn)了第一次和第二次海灣戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)前6個(gè)月和后爆發(fā)后6個(gè)月布倫特原油價(jià)格的走勢(shì),。第一次海灣戰(zhàn)爭中,，油價(jià)隨著戰(zhàn)爭的臨近而逐漸攀升，隨著進(jìn)攻開始,，油價(jià)將近漲了一倍,；但6個(gè)月之后,，油價(jià)已經(jīng)低于開戰(zhàn)前的水平,。而第二次海灣戰(zhàn)爭的狀況稍微有些不同,，因?yàn)轭A(yù)計(jì)戰(zhàn)爭可能持續(xù)較長時(shí)間,，開戰(zhàn)的消息反而令布倫特原油價(jià)格走低，但6個(gè)月后基本回到了開戰(zhàn)前水平,。

????目前,，至少根據(jù)主流報(bào)道,，沒有人嚴(yán)肅考慮過要入侵伊朗,，真正可能采取的行動(dòng),，如果有的話,，也只是戰(zhàn)略性打擊。因此,，將海灣戰(zhàn)爭與可能對(duì)伊朗采取的行動(dòng)相提并論或許并不準(zhǔn)確,。但反過來說，伊朗在全球石油供應(yīng)中的地位要（比伊拉克）重要得多,。具體來看,，伊朗是繼沙特和加拿大之后的全球原油儲(chǔ)量第三大國,，約占世界總量的10%。而且,，伊朗還是繼俄羅斯和沙特之后的第三大石油出口國。

????就在美伊雙方圍繞伊朗問題唇槍舌劍,、明爭暗斗的同時(shí),，有報(bào)道稱，沙特的產(chǎn)能已接近每天1,000萬桶,。這意味著不管是伊朗封閉霍爾木茲海峽（哪怕只是一段時(shí)間），還是美國對(duì)伊朗實(shí)施戰(zhàn)略性打擊,，導(dǎo)致伊朗部分產(chǎn)能關(guān)閉，沙特可供利用的閑置產(chǎn)能都非常有限,。有鑒于此,，我們不應(yīng)對(duì)油價(jià),、特別是布倫特原油價(jià)格的堅(jiān)挺感到驚訝。

????Obviously, Kroenig's view is more aggressive than the administration's in terms of how to deal with Iran, and his essay shouldn't be construed as carrying water for the administration, despite being a former advisor to the Secretary of Defense. Regardless, if the resilience of the price of oil, strong actions by the Iranians, and strong language by the Americans are telling us anything, it is that the Iranian issue is not going away in the short-term.

Historical oil prices

????In the scenario that military action is taken against Iran, the risk management question to ponder is: what will the impact on the price of oil be? As a proxy, in the two charts below, we evaluated how the price of Brent reacted in the six months leading to Gulf Wars I and II and the six months preceding. In Gulf War I, the price of oil ran up into the event and then almost doubled as the invasion ensued, but six months later was lower than the price at the start of the war. In Gulf War II, which was slightly different given the long anticipatory period, the price of Brent actually sold off on the news and six months later was basically at the same price.

????Currently, at least based on mainstream reports, an invasion of Iran is not being seriously contemplated, but rather the likely action, if any, would be a strategic strike, so it is perhaps somewhat inaccurate to compare the Gulf Wars to a potential action in Iran. Conversely, though, Iran is a much more critical player in the world oil supply. Specifically, after Saudi Arabia and Canada, Iran has the third most reserves globally, about 10% of the world's total. And Iran is the third largest oil exporter after Russia and Saudi Arabia.

????The heightened rhetoric relating to Iran comes at a time when Saudi Arabia is reportedly pumping close to capacity at 10 million barrels per day. This means that there is very little spare capacity in the event of either the Iranians closing, even if for a period of time, the Strait of Hormuz, or a strategic strike against Iran that shutters some of their production. Thus, we shouldn't be surprised by the resiliency in the price of oil, particularly Brent.