????伯克希爾哈撒韋（Berkshire Hathaway）上周六公布,，2011年每股賬面價(jià)值增長了4.6%——這樣的增幅雖不算大,，但對(duì)于公司董事長沃倫?巴菲特而言已經(jīng)夠了，因?yàn)樗呀?jīng)達(dá)到了每年超越標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)總回報(bào)率的目標(biāo),。2011年標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)僅上漲了2.1%,。

????這是巴菲特掌管伯克希爾哈撒韋47年來公司每股賬面價(jià)值增幅跑贏標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)的第39個(gè)年頭。

????盡管如此,，在這第四十七年,，巴菲特長期以來保持的一項(xiàng)驕人紀(jì)錄卻畫上了句號(hào)。此前,，公司每股賬面價(jià)值平均年增長超過20%，但今年增幅只有19.8%,，首次跌至20%以下,。

????巴菲特當(dāng)然也想讓每股賬面價(jià)值的增幅保持在20%以上，但這么多年來,，他知道這個(gè)紀(jì)錄終有結(jié)束的一天,。他曾多次警告伯克希爾的股東們，公司龐大的資本基礎(chǔ)將不可避免地放緩每股賬面價(jià)值的增長,。截至2011年底,，公司的資本基礎(chǔ)已經(jīng)高達(dá)1,650億美元。

????巴菲特在向股東匯報(bào)業(yè)績時(shí)通常采用每股賬面價(jià)值,，因?yàn)檫@一方法能反映伯克希爾已實(shí)現(xiàn)和未實(shí)現(xiàn)的所有資本損益,。由于伯克希爾持有龐大的普通股組合（截至年底770億美元），并積累了巨大的未實(shí)現(xiàn)收益,，它們的變動(dòng)對(duì)業(yè)績影響重大,。

????若采用最常見的會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)（不反映未實(shí)現(xiàn)利潤,，只反映未實(shí)現(xiàn)損失），2011年伯克希爾A類股每股收益6,215美元,，低于2010年的7,928美元,。

????凈利潤下降（以及每股賬面價(jià)值增幅相對(duì)溫和）的一個(gè)重要原因是2011年伯克希爾核心的保險(xiǎn)業(yè)務(wù)經(jīng)歷了困難的一年。巨災(zāi)險(xiǎn)損失高達(dá)26億美元,，而且定價(jià)不高,。

????總體而言，伯克希爾的保險(xiǎn)業(yè)務(wù)2011年僅實(shí)現(xiàn)保險(xiǎn)利潤2.48億美元,，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于2010年,，當(dāng)時(shí)的數(shù)字略高于20億美元。保單額龐大的再保險(xiǎn)業(yè)務(wù)在新西蘭和日本地震中損失高達(dá)8億美元,，2011年虧損了7.14億美元,。

????但在致股東的公開信中，巴菲特重點(diǎn)關(guān)注的不是這一年的利潤水平,，而是2011年是伯克希爾保險(xiǎn)業(yè)務(wù)連續(xù)第九年實(shí)現(xiàn)保險(xiǎn)利潤,。與之形成鮮明對(duì)比的是保險(xiǎn)界大部分公司都出現(xiàn)了保險(xiǎn)損失。

????在伯克希爾實(shí)現(xiàn)保險(xiǎn)利潤的九年里,，公司“浮存金”（即不屬于伯克希爾,，但可用于投資并享受收益的資金）已從410億美元增至700億美元。巴菲特在致股東的公開信中稱,，他預(yù)計(jì)浮存金在這個(gè)基礎(chǔ)上不會(huì)出現(xiàn)太大的增長,，因?yàn)檫@一數(shù)額與伯克希爾的保費(fèi)收入相比已經(jīng)顯得特別龐大。

????Berkshire Hathaway reported today that its book value per share rose 4.6% in 2011—hardly a mighty leap but enough for the company's chairman, Warren Buffett, to meet his annual goal of beating the total return of the S&P 500 index, which rose only 2.1%.

????That was the 39th year out of the 47 years in which Buffett has run Berkshire that the company's performance was better than the S&P's.

????Even so, this 47th year brought an end to Buffett's remarkable long-term record of averaging a better-than-20% annual gain in Berkshire's book value per share. For the first time, the average dropped into the teens, hitting 19.8%.

????Much as Buffett would have liked to maintain an average above 20%, he had for years known it would slip away. He has repeatedly warned Berkshire's shareholders that the company's huge capital base--$165 billion at the end of 2011--would inevitably slow gains in per-share book value.

????Per-share book value changes are the customary way that Buffett reports shareholder results because this method incorporates all of Berkshire's capital gains and losses whether these are realized or unrealized. Because Berkshire (BRKA) holds such a giant portfolio of common stocks ($77 billion at yearend) and has accumulated large unrealized gains, changes in their level can be important to results.

????Under the more commonly used financial standard of earnings (which reflect no unrealized gains and only certain unrealized losses), Berkshire reported Class A per-share results for 2011 of $6,215 versus $7,928 in 2010.

????An important reason for the decline in earnings (and also for the relatively modest gain in book value per share) is that 2011 was a difficult year for Berkshire's core insurance business. Catastrophe losses were high--$2.6 billion in total--and pricing was not generous.

????Overall, Berkshire's insurance businesses had an underwriting profit in 2011 of only $248 million against just over $2 billion in 2010. The company's reinsurance business, which writes very large policies and suffered $800 million of losses from earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan, was in the red, showing losses of $714 million.

????In his chairman's letter, Buffett focused not on the level of profits in this one year, but on the fact that 2011 was the ninth consecutive year in which Berkshire's insurance operations produced an underwriting profit. In most other corners of the insurance world, by sharp contrast, underwriting losses are common.

????In Berkshire's nine years of underwriting profits, its "float" -- money that doesn't belong to Berkshire, but that it gets to invest for its own benefit -- has grown from $41 billion to $70 billion. Buffett said in his letter that he does not expect float to grow much beyond that, because the amount is already outsized in relation to Berkshire's premium volume.