????2. 盈利率問題。多數(shù)快速成長(zhǎng)的公司早期并不盈利,，而沒有盈利，就無法計(jì)算市盈率,。沒有市盈率時(shí),，風(fēng)投通常參考市銷率。公眾投資者也會(huì)這么做,，而且有很多證據(jù)表明他們并不認(rèn)為早期盈利企業(yè)更值錢,。雖然如此，公眾投資者最終還是希望看到盈利,，特別的,，他們?cè)敢鉃殚L(zhǎng)期盈利率擴(kuò)大的公司付出高價(jià)。然而證明盈利率擴(kuò)張是需要時(shí)間的,，通常比風(fēng)投積極參與公司的時(shí)間要長(zhǎng),。Zynga和Groupon 都顯示了某種形式的盈利能力，但盈利率擴(kuò)張能力并沒有得到驗(yàn)證,，所以公眾投資者不愿給公司開出高價(jià),。

????3. 商業(yè)模式之惑。風(fēng)投支持的公司中最快速成長(zhǎng)的那些通常都會(huì)有新的商業(yè)模式,。Groupon的運(yùn)營(yíng)方式太新,，以至于它試圖創(chuàng)造一項(xiàng)全新的指標(biāo)，來幫助投資者理解公司內(nèi)部如何度量業(yè)績(jī),。Zynga則是首家成功利用Facebook平臺(tái)的大型公司,。雖然創(chuàng)新模式幫助Zynga 和Groupon獲得了巨大的增長(zhǎng)率,，他們卻找不到可以用來指引公眾投資者的類似或可比公司。如果沒有好的參照物,，即使是最令人興奮的公司,，公眾投資者對(duì)其估值也無所適從。結(jié)果就是,，早期上市公司的估值乘數(shù)可能大起大落,，直至其商業(yè)模式被證明行之有效。

????當(dāng)然,，并不是所有對(duì)處于上市前階段的公司的晚期風(fēng)投都表現(xiàn)不佳,。雖然對(duì)Zynga和Groupon 的最后幾輪風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資不如人意，仍然有幾家獲得風(fēng)投支持的新上市公司給出了良好的回報(bào),。

????比如,，雖然在未上市前并沒有獲得風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資界的狂熱吹捧，點(diǎn)評(píng)網(wǎng)站Yelp (YELP), 商務(wù)社交網(wǎng)站LinkedIn (LNKD) 和Splunk (SPLK)的后期風(fēng)投都有上佳表現(xiàn),。因此,，風(fēng)投和其它投資者在參與上市前的高價(jià)投資輪次時(shí)，需要考慮什么樣的公司會(huì)在華爾街大賣,，而不僅僅是在沙嶺路（硅谷的一條公路,，以風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司聚集聞名——編者注）大賣。

????格倫?所羅門是紀(jì)源資本（GGV Capital）的合伙人,，紀(jì)源資本是擴(kuò)張階段的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司,，在加州門洛帕克和上海設(shè)有辦事處。 他在www.sandhillrdmeetswallst.com撰寫博客

????2. Profit Margin Picture. Most high growth companies aren't profitable early on, and without earnings, there isn't a P/E ratio to measure. In the absence of a P/E, VCs tend to look at price to sales ratios. Public investors do this as well, and there is good evidence to suggest that public investors don't necessarily pay more for profitable companies early on. (See my previous post on profitable vs. unprofitable IPOs.) That said, eventually public investors want to see profits and, more specifically, they'll pay up for a company that can show profit margins expanding over time. Often it takes a while to prove that profit margins can expand, usually long after VCs are actively engaged with a company. Both Zynga and Groupon show certain forms of profitability, but margin expansion doesn't seem proven, so public investors have been less willing ascribe high prices to these companies.

????3. Proven versus Unproven Models. Often times, the fastest growing VC-backed companies operate with new models. Groupon's approach is so new that it tried to invent a metric to help investors understand how it gauges results internally. Zynga is the first large company to leverage the Facebook platform successfully. While their innovative models helped catapult Zynga and Groupon's growth rates, these companies don't have analogous or comparable companies they can point public investors toward. In the absence of good comparable companies, public investors often become uncertain how to value even the most exciting companies. As a result, valuation multiples can swing wildly in the early days of a public company's life until models become more proven.

????Not all late VC rounds in pre-IPO companies under-perform. While Zynga and Groupon haven't been strong performers for the investors in the last rounds of venture capital in those companies, there are several newly public venture-backed companies that have delivered for their VCs.

????For example, the last VC rounds in Yelp (YELP), LinkedIn (LNKD) and Splunk (SPLK), although less heralded by VCs during their times as private companies, have all performed very well. VCs and other investors in high priced pre-IPO rounds need to think more about what will sell on Wall Street, not just on Sand Hill Road.

????Glenn Solomon is a partner with GGV Capital, an expansion stage venture capital firm with offices in Menlo Park and Shanghai. He blogs at www.sandhillrdmeetswallst.com.