????1952年最初提出歐盟設(shè)想的時候，它只是一個經(jīng)濟聯(lián)盟,，希望在整個歐洲大陸實現(xiàn)商品和服務(wù)的自由流動,。但在過去60年里，歐盟已經(jīng)成長為一個準(zhǔn)政治聯(lián)邦,，有些歐盟法律已經(jīng)凌駕于國家法律之上,。1999年歐元的推出使這個問題進(jìn)一步復(fù)雜化——加入歐元區(qū)的歐盟成員國只同意將貨幣政策交給歐盟打理，但財政政策仍牢牢地掌握在成員國自己手里,。.

????歐元區(qū)成員國承諾預(yù)算赤字不超過GDP的3%,。只要在這個范圍內(nèi)，這些國家就認(rèn)為開支仍算合理,。不幸的是,，由于沒有嚴(yán)厲的懲罰措施，過去10年來幾乎被所有成員國都曾在某個時候逾越這一紅線,，當(dāng)中也包括德國,。希臘和外圍成員國發(fā)行債券，為大型項目籌資,，支撐日益龐大的國家公務(wù)人員群體,。德國和北歐國家利用自身經(jīng)濟優(yōu)勢，將大量的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)銷售到外圍國家,。

????但是,，一旦希臘不能借到足夠的資金保持這個循環(huán)繼續(xù)進(jìn)行，從歐元區(qū)外圍國家到核心成員國的這一財富轉(zhuǎn)移就被打破了,。希臘的經(jīng)濟還沒有進(jìn)化到這樣一個程度：既擁有高估值貨幣,，同時又能保持經(jīng)濟增長。它需要舉債來填補這些空缺,。所有其他外圍國家也不同程度地處于類似的境況,。

????這種失衡只會不斷加劇，直到整個歐元區(qū)土崩瓦解,。希臘退出歐元將摧毀人們對這個共同貨幣的信心,，導(dǎo)致歐洲大量的銀行倒閉。另外一些國家也會退出,，留下來的國家將構(gòu)成核心歐洲,，其貨幣之堅挺甚至將導(dǎo)致連德國在內(nèi)的產(chǎn)品也將在全球市場上失去競爭力。最后,，這個集團也會崩潰,，歐元也將不復(fù)存在。

????現(xiàn)在明白了為什么沒人希望希臘退出——這些核心國家將失去出口優(yōu)勢,，而外圍國家的生活水平也將驟降,，苦不堪言。解決的方案是匯集債務(wù)，構(gòu)建一個財政聯(lián)盟,，但各國政府——無論是極左翼,，還是極右翼——似乎都不愿放棄手中的權(quán)力來讓這個解決方案更加切實可行。

????因此,，整個歐盟最大的問題是政治架構(gòu),。歐盟仍在遵照為一個無共同貨幣的小規(guī)模聯(lián)盟所設(shè)計的規(guī)章進(jìn)行治理。如今的歐盟擁有27個成員國,，眾口難調(diào),，在歐盟要做成任何一件事情幾乎都難于上青天。雖然即將于2014年生效的《里斯本條約》（Treaty of Lisbon）能夠解決一些問題,，但仍不足以讓這些成員國具備抵御經(jīng)濟威脅,、及時果斷地做出反應(yīng)的能力。

????那么,，歐洲未來的出路在何方? 歐洲或許需要老的歐盟倒臺,，給一個更加可行的聯(lián)盟讓路——如果這是歐洲人真正期望的。但歐盟的倒臺不必以一種暴力的方式進(jìn)行,，而是以一種有序的方式完成,，類似于18世紀(jì)90年代美國從一個松散連接的聯(lián)盟轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐粋€更強大的聯(lián)邦。它需要召集會議制定出需協(xié)商的細(xì)節(jié),，但需要達(dá)成共識的是,，沒有一個成員國將以此進(jìn)行要挾。如果某個成員國不認(rèn)同財政權(quán)統(tǒng)一,，就不應(yīng)該留在新歐盟里,。如果不想成為歐元區(qū)的一員，就請自行離開,。

????如果歐盟成員國希望繼續(xù)保住這一共同貨幣,，現(xiàn)在就得放棄自己的國家身份，接受歐洲身份,。構(gòu)建新的政治架構(gòu)和可行的投票權(quán)將確保歐元得到拯救,，而且組建一個經(jīng)濟強大的一體化歐洲的夢想也終于可以變成現(xiàn)實。

????譯者：早稻米

????When the EU was first envisioned in 1952, it was to be solely an economic union to allow the free movement of goods and services throughout the continent. But in the past 60 years it has grown into a sort of quasi-political confederation where some EU laws now supersede national laws. The introduction of the euro in 1999 complicated matters -- the EU countries that chose to join the common currency were only willing to give up control of their monetary policy to the EU, but not their fiscal policy.

????Instead, eurozone members promised to not run budget deficits that exceeded 3% of their GDP. This way, the governments would still be able to spend as they saw fit. Unfortunately, without strong penalties, this rule was broken by nearly all the members of the euro at some point in the last decade, including Germany. Greece and the peripheral nations issued debt to fund grand projects and support and ever growing civil servant population. Germany and the northern nations used their economic advantages to flood the peripheral nations with their goods and services.

????But this transfer of wealth from the periphery to the core of the eurozone broke down when Greece was unable to borrow enough money to keep the cycle going. Greece's economy had simply not evolved enough to the point where it could have both a strong currency and economic growth. It needed debt to fill in the gaps. This, to varying degrees, is basically the same scenario in all the other peripheral countries.

????This imbalance will only continue to grow until the entire eurozone disintegrates. A Greek exit would destroy confidence in the common currency and lead to a number of bank failures across Europe. Other nations will be tossed out and what will remain will be a core Europe with a currency that is so strong that even German goods would be uncompetitive on the world markets. That group would collapse and the euro would be no more.

????It is clear now why no one wants Greece to leave -- the core countries would lose their exporting advantage while the periphery would suffer a painful decline in living standards. The solution would be the pooling of debt and the creation of a fiscal union, but national governments - whether they be far left or far right – seem unwilling to give up enough power to make this solution viable.

????Therein lays the biggest problem of the entire EU– its political structure. The EU is still governed by rules that were designed for a much smaller union without a common currency. Today, with 27 members, getting anything done in the EU is nearly impossible. While the Treaty of Lisbon, which goes into force in 2014, solves some of these problems, it still doesn't go far enough to allow member states to be able to prevent and respond to economic threats in a timely and decisive manner.

????So what's next for Europe? Europe may need the old EU to fall to make way for a more viable union – if that's what Europeans truly want. But the fall of the EU doesn't have to come about in a violent way; rather, it could be done in an orderly manner, similar to how the United States went from being a loosely knit confederation to a stronger federation in the 1790s. The calling of a conference to hammer out these details would need to be conferred but it should be understood that no one member will be able to hold the group hostage. If one member doesn't like the pooling of fiscal powers, it should be out of the new EU. If it doesn't want to be a member of the euro, it should also be out.

????The time has come for the members of the EU to give up their national identities for one that is truly European if they want to continue having a common currency. Building new political structures and workable voting rights will ensure that not only can the euro be saved, but also that the dream of a strong united Europe as an economic force can finally become reality.