????看起來(lái)，債券市場(chǎng)對(duì)西班牙的寬限和容忍已經(jīng)到了頭,。由于擔(dān)心馬德里政府可能不久將需要據(jù)信約3,000億歐元的巨額主權(quán)救助,，周一西班牙主權(quán)債券的收益率大大突破了7%的關(guān)鍵水平，最高升至7.57%,。歐美股市聞聲下挫,，標(biāo)普指數(shù)（S&P）當(dāng)日跌幅達(dá)到了2.5%,。

????不久之前，歐元區(qū)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人剛剛批準(zhǔn)了一項(xiàng)1,000億歐元的救助計(jì)劃,，用于拯救岌岌可危的西班牙銀行業(yè),。但此后事情并沒(méi)有向好的方面轉(zhuǎn)變，反而越來(lái)越糟,。

????令人難以接受的一個(gè)意外結(jié)果是,，銀行業(yè)救助計(jì)劃似乎加快了西班牙需要全面主權(quán)救助這一天的到來(lái)，因?yàn)榫戎?jì)劃打消了投資者對(duì)于任何類(lèi)型西班牙債券的需求,。它不僅影響到了主權(quán)債券,，也將西班牙17個(gè)自治區(qū)關(guān)在了債券市場(chǎng)外面，迫使它們向馬德里政府尋求救助,。如果西班牙不能很快從歐元區(qū)伙伴國(guó)那里獲得亟需的全面救助,，歐元很可能就此壽終正寢。

????市場(chǎng)遲早會(huì)看穿馬德里的把戲,。在1,000億歐元的銀行業(yè)救助計(jì)劃中,，西班牙政府事實(shí)上是把銀行損失社會(huì)化，將損失從銀行賬面轉(zhuǎn)到了政府的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上,。如果這還不夠糟糕,，它還迫使這些銀行的次級(jí)債券持有人接受投資減值，卻保優(yōu)先債券持有人全身而退,。

????沒(méi)錯(cuò),，公司破產(chǎn)時(shí)股票和次級(jí)債券持有人在償付名單中排在最末。但這里的情況不同,。西班牙銀行業(yè)次級(jí)債券的持有人大多（占三分之二）是小投資者,，而且往往都是聽(tīng)了個(gè)人理財(cái)顧問(wèn)的建議，才買(mǎi)下這些被認(rèn)為是安全的債券,。隨著今年西班牙股市下跌三分之一,，西班牙投資者損失慘重。而且,，此時(shí)正值西班牙失業(yè)率達(dá)到類(lèi)似大蕭條時(shí)期的25%之際,。

????不過(guò)，把這些損失推給小投資者,，西班牙政府可是打錯(cuò)了算盤(pán),，西班牙的地方和自治區(qū)債券市場(chǎng)基本上都受本地投資者的支持。西班牙投資者在銀行救助計(jì)劃中被西班牙政府坑了一道后,，躲著政府債券的行為可以理解,。國(guó)際投資者和大型養(yǎng)老基金離開(kāi)西班牙市場(chǎng)已近一年，市場(chǎng)中事實(shí)上已沒(méi)有什么投資者可以來(lái)買(mǎi)下所有這些西班牙當(dāng)?shù)貍?/p>

????西班牙努力穩(wěn)定局面，自治區(qū)已創(chuàng)建自己的180億歐元救助機(jī)制,。但180億歐元將通過(guò)出售更多主權(quán)債券來(lái)提供資金,，當(dāng)前7.57%的收益率可能難以承受。

????這也許是為什么市場(chǎng)預(yù)計(jì)西班牙將很快需要?dú)W盟全面救助的原因,。目前,，西班牙政府負(fù)責(zé)償付自治區(qū)和自身的債務(wù)。但西班牙的債務(wù)/GDP比率沒(méi)有準(zhǔn)確反映其主權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況,，因?yàn)樗鼪](méi)有將自治區(qū)的幾十億歐元表外項(xiàng)目計(jì)算在內(nèi),。由于這些債務(wù)事實(shí)上得到西班牙政府的支持，市場(chǎng)估計(jì)馬德里將需要接過(guò)這些債務(wù)的償還責(zé)任,。據(jù)西班牙銀行（Bank of Spain）稱(chēng),，如果加上這些表外項(xiàng)目，西班牙的債務(wù)/GDP比率將從68.5%增至87%,。如果再加上1,000億歐元的銀行業(yè)救助方案,，這一比率將躍升至96%左右。

????西班牙政府無(wú)法長(zhǎng)時(shí)間承擔(dān)7.57%的融資利率,，更別提還要為17個(gè)自治區(qū)提供支持,。該國(guó)已經(jīng)讓歐洲央行（European Central Bank）購(gòu)買(mǎi)其主權(quán)債券來(lái)降低利率，但利率水平仍然太高,。歐洲債券交易員們告訴《財(cái)富》雜志（ Fortune）,， 他們預(yù)計(jì)歐洲央行將通過(guò)實(shí)施新一輪量化寬松措施，努力平息這種混亂局面,，在歐洲被稱(chēng)為長(zhǎng)期再融資計(jì)劃（LTRO）的量化寬松基本上就是“開(kāi)動(dòng)印鈔機(jī)”的花哨說(shuō)法,。希望銀行體系中所有這些額外的資金都將提振投資和借貸,，降低債券收益率并紓解西班牙政府的壓力,。

????但歐洲央行能做的也相當(dāng)有限。它不能永遠(yuǎn)為西班牙債務(wù)提供融資,，就像馬德里政府不能永遠(yuǎn)都為各個(gè)自治區(qū)提供債務(wù)融資一樣,。如果西班牙不能很快重啟債券市場(chǎng)，吸引私有投資者,，它很快就會(huì)面臨違約,。

????債券市場(chǎng)當(dāng)然是在尋找一個(gè)解決歐元問(wèn)題的長(zhǎng)期有效方案，但歐元區(qū)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上行動(dòng)遲緩,。與此同時(shí),，對(duì)西班牙進(jìn)行大規(guī)模且強(qiáng)有力的主權(quán)救助將有助于穩(wěn)定這些市場(chǎng)——至少短期內(nèi)如此。這樣的救助將基本耗盡歐洲救助基金中的剩余資金,，迫使歐元區(qū)成員國(guó)要么提供更多資金（這種可能性不大）,，要么最終攜手組建一個(gè)更緊密且更穩(wěn)定的聯(lián)盟。無(wú)論哪種方式，看來(lái)歐元都與西班牙坐在同一條船上,。

????譯者：早稻米

????It looks like the bond markets are done cutting Spain financial slack. Bond yields for Spanish sovereign debt broke well past the critical 7% mark Monday, hitting as high as 7.57%, on concerns that the government in Madrid will soon need a big sovereign bailout, thought to be around 300 billion euros. European and US stock markets fell on the news, with the S&P down 2.5% on the day.

????This all comes days after eurozone leaders approved a 100 billion euro bailout of Spain's crippled banking sector. But instead of things getting better, they have clearly just gotten worse.

????In a bitter twist of irony, it seems that the bank bailout may have actually hastened the need for a possible full sovereign bailout as it has crushed investor demand for any kind of Spanish debt. This not only affected the sovereign but has also locked the nation's 17 states or "regions" out of the bond market as well, forcing them to look to Madrid for a bailout of their own. If Spain doesn't receive a comprehensive and fair bailout from its eurozone partners soon, the euro could very well end here.

????It was only a matter of time before the markets caught on to Madrid's shell game. In its 100 billion euro bank bailout, the Spanish government essentially socialized bank losses by simply transferring those losses from the banks to the government's balance sheet. If that wasn't bad enough, it also forced the banks' subordinated bondholders to take a hit on the value of their investment, but allowed the senior debt holders to walk away with full value.

????In a corporate bankruptcy, it is true that equity holders and subordinated debt holders are at the bottom of the payout heap. But this is different. The subordinated bondholders in the nation's banks were mostly (around two-thirds) made up of small-time investors who bought that debt thinking it was safe, often on the advice of their personal financial advisors. With the Spanish stock market down by a third this year, the Spanish investor has really taken a hit. This comes on top of the nation's depression-like 25% unemployment rate.

????But in pushing the losses on the little guy, the Spanish government basically shot itself in the foot. That's because the local and regional bond markets in Spain are largely supported by local investors. After getting burned by the national government in the bank bailout, Spanish investors have understandably shunned government debt. With international investors and big pension funds out of the Spanish market for nearly a year, there is really no one left to buy up all that local Spanish debt.

????Spain has tried to calm the situation with its regions by creating its own 18-billion euro bailout mechanism. But those 18 billion euros will be financed by selling more sovereign debt, which, at 7.57% would be prohibitively expensive.

????That is partly why the market anticipates Spain will soon need a full on bailout from the EU. The national government is now responsible for covering the debts of its regions, as well as its own. It turns out that Spain's official debt-to-GDP ratio didn't give an accurate picture of the country's sovereign risk. That's because it didn't take into account the billions of euros of off-balance sheet items from its regions. Since those debts were implicitly backed by the national government, the market now believes that Madrid will need to take over the payments. Add in those off-balance sheet items and the nation's debt-to-GDP ratio jumps from 68.5% to 87%, according to the Bank of Spain. Top it off with the 100 billion euros bank bailout and the ratio jumps to around 96%.

????The national government cannot afford to finance its own debt at 7.57% for very long, let alone support its 17 regions as well. It already has the European Central Bank buying its debt to keep rates low but they are still too high. Traders in European debt tell Fortune that they believe the ECB will try to calm the melee by instituting another round of quantitative easing, which is known as LTRO in Europe, but which is still essentially just a fancy way of saying: "printing more money." The hope is that all this extra money in the system will boost investment and lending, lowering bond yields and taking the pressure off the national government.

????But there is a limit to what the ECB can do here. It simply cannot finance Spain's debt forever, just as Madrid cannot finance the debt of its regions forever. If Spain is unable to reopen its bond markets to private investors quickly, then it will soon be facing default.

????The bond markets are clearly looking for a real long term solution to the euro question, but eurozone leaders are slow in getting there. In the meantime, a large and powerful sovereign bailout of Spain would help stabilize the markets – at least in the short term. Such a bailout would essentially exhaust what's left of the European bailout fund, forcing eurozone members to either put up more money, which probably won't happen, or to finally work to form a closer and more stable union. Either way, it appears as if the euro stops here with Spain.