????由于投資者對法國的主權(quán)債務(wù)抱有信心,，法國素來又是德國在歐元區(qū)“北部堅定的同盟軍,，你可能會認(rèn)為法國將一直作為歐元的共同守護(hù)人。確實(shí),，目前10年期法國國債的利率僅為2%,，只比德國國債高一點(diǎn)點(diǎn),。瀏覽一下收支數(shù)據(jù)，法國沒有像葡萄牙,、愛爾蘭,、意大利、希臘和西班牙那樣被戲稱為”歐豬五國“（PIIGS）,，法國沒有承受很多壓力,。迄今為止，法國的債務(wù)和預(yù)算赤字趨勢沒有像歐豬五國那么嚴(yán)重,，甚至還趕不上英國和美國,。

????法國對于創(chuàng)立歐元、以及推動歐元初期的成功功不可沒,，這也強(qiáng)化了法國經(jīng)濟(jì)的光環(huán),。1989年，時任法國總統(tǒng)弗朗西斯·密特朗說服德國總理赫爾穆特·科爾支持這一貨幣聯(lián)盟以換取法國對德國統(tǒng)一的支持,。實(shí)際上,，法國、德國還有荷蘭的做法是將法國法郎和德國馬克納入一個貨幣聯(lián)盟,，將貨幣間匯率保持在一個狹窄區(qū)間內(nèi),，成為1999年歐元誕生的前奏。在21世紀(jì)第一個十年中期經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮增長之時,，法國基本上與德國并駕齊驅(qū),，成為歐元區(qū)（由17個經(jīng)濟(jì)欣欣向榮的成員國組成）兩大增長引擎。

????細(xì)細(xì)看來,，法國正在陷入不亞于經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的困境之中,。這個歐元區(qū)第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體（2012年GDP為2萬億歐元）面臨的競爭力下降問題，比歐元區(qū)其他任何成員國都要嚴(yán)峻,。 簡言之,，法國產(chǎn)品（汽車、鋼鐵,、服裝和電子產(chǎn)品）的成本遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于亞洲和歐洲鄰國的競爭性產(chǎn)品,；這些鄰國不僅包括德國，甚至還包括西班牙和意大利,。因此,，法國出口呈現(xiàn)急劇加速下降，制造業(yè)及配套服務(wù)業(yè)也顯著下滑,。

????法國產(chǎn)業(yè)事實(shí)上已經(jīng)瀕臨崩潰,，但分析師和專家們卻視而不見。他們認(rèn)為，歐元區(qū)已經(jīng)躲過一劫,，進(jìn)入了一個更加穩(wěn)定持續(xù)的全新經(jīng)濟(jì)階段,。事實(shí)上，如今對歐元存亡構(gòu)成最大威脅的不是希臘和西班牙,，而是法國,。法國是歐元所面臨問題的縮影：那些生產(chǎn)成本高昂并持續(xù)增長的國家無法通過調(diào)整本幣匯率來保持產(chǎn)品在國際市場上的競爭力。

????Given investors' confidence in its sovereign debt, and its image as Germany's principal partner in the sturdy, sensible "northern" eurozone, you'd think that France endures as the co-guardian of the endangered single currency. Indeed, the rate on France's ten-year government bonds stands at just 2%, just a few ticks above Germany's. From a quick look at the headline numbers, France doesn't appear nearly as stressed as the derisively titled "PIIGS," Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. So far, the trajectory of its debts and deficits isn't as distressing as the figures for the PIIGs, or even the U.K. and the U.S.

????France's vaunted role in the creation and initial success of the euro enhances its aura of solidity. It was President Francois Mitterrand who in 1989 persuaded Chancellor Helmut Kohl to back monetary union in exchange for France's support for German reunification. In fact, France and Germany, along with the Netherlands, dramatized their commitment by effectively uniting the franc and deutschemark in a currency union that held their exchange rates in a narrow band, and heralded the euro's birth in 1999. In the boom years of the mid-2000s, France virtually matched Germany as the twin growth engine of the thriving, 17-nation eurozone.

????A deeper look shows that France is mired in no less than an economic crisis. The eurozone's second-largest economy (2012 GDP: 2 trillion euros) is suffering more than any other member from a shocking deterioration in competitiveness. Put simply, France's products -- its cars, steel, clothing, electronics -- cost far too much to produce compared with competing goods both from Asia and its European neighbors, including not just Germany but even Spain and Italy. That's causing a sharp and accelerating fall in its exports, and a significant decline in manufacturing and the services that support it.

????The virtual implosion of French industry is overlooked by analysts and pundits who claim that the eurozone had dodged disaster and entered a new, durable period of stability. In fact, it's France -- not Greece or Spain -- that now poses the greatest threat to the euro's survival. France epitomizes the real problem with the single currency: The inability of nations with high and rising production costs to adjust their currencies so that their products remain competitive in world markets.