????? 生物科技行業(yè)不會(huì)經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)快車道,，除非它通向垃圾堆,。迅速獲得美國(guó)食品藥品監(jiān)督管理局（FDA）批準(zhǔn)或短期內(nèi)實(shí)現(xiàn)并購(gòu)利益的承諾大多都是空頭支票,。我們?cè)?tīng)到過(guò)的類似承諾包括“這是退出前的最后一次融資”或者“二期臨床進(jìn)展順利”，目的是在我們知曉結(jié)果前籌集到資金,。2005年前后,，這種后半程宣傳讓我們蒙受了兩次損失，那就是Ivrea和Proprius,。它們的產(chǎn)品均已進(jìn)入二期臨床,，但受試驗(yàn)方案等令人困惑的變量影響，二者的結(jié)果都變得完全無(wú)法解讀,。迅速進(jìn)入三期臨床的道路至此戛然而止?，F(xiàn)在我們更愿意把重點(diǎn)放在可持續(xù)的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造上，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)主題要可靠得多,。

????? 通過(guò)吸收帶有各類風(fēng)險(xiǎn)或處于各種臨床階段的資產(chǎn)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)多元化往往會(huì)破壞價(jià)值（這個(gè)主題以前我也提到過(guò)）。用處于二期臨床的授權(quán)資產(chǎn)和一個(gè)臨床前項(xiàng)目組建一家公司并不明智,，因?yàn)楫a(chǎn)品所處的階段與其價(jià)值并不對(duì)稱：二期臨床項(xiàng)目需要消耗資金并且預(yù)示著公司的未來(lái),，而臨床前資產(chǎn)的價(jià)值可能隨之上升，也可能隨之下降,。

????此外,，即使資產(chǎn)處于類似階段，它的價(jià)值一般也會(huì)存在差異,。如果所加入的第二項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)沒(méi)有第一項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)那么吸引人,，而僅僅是為了讓管理團(tuán)隊(duì)派上用場(chǎng)，那就會(huì)讓人覺(jué)得是濫用資金,；應(yīng)當(dāng)通過(guò)其他途徑來(lái)使用管理團(tuán)隊(duì)（比如在其他所投資的公司擔(dān)任兼職）并將攤薄資產(chǎn)的門(mén)檻保持在非常高的水平,。這是我們?cè)?年多前得出的結(jié)論，它促成了我們的投資模式,，即針對(duì)單一項(xiàng)目,，以資產(chǎn)為中心，比如Stromedix的單克隆抗體STX-100,。這一結(jié)論和醫(yī)藥行業(yè)的外部化趨勢(shì)造就了我們的Atlas Venture Development Corp,。

????? 超薄虛擬模式（ultra-lean virtual model）非常好，但有局限性,。比如,，如果沒(méi)有自己的生物實(shí)驗(yàn)室來(lái)進(jìn)行特定工作，就難以組建大型生物科技公司（不過(guò)也可以說(shuō)在這方面我們還沒(méi)有真正犯過(guò)錯(cuò)誤）,。給我們帶來(lái)教訓(xùn)的是虛擬模式在其他經(jīng)營(yíng)領(lǐng)域的局限性,。如果初創(chuàng)型公司的核心創(chuàng)業(yè)者很少，那么在不停止或放緩研發(fā)的情況下進(jìn)行融資或業(yè)務(wù)開(kāi)發(fā)就會(huì)非常困難,。對(duì)于一個(gè)人員較少的管理團(tuán)隊(duì)來(lái)說(shuō),，配合多家醫(yī)藥公司或多名潛在投資人派來(lái)的大量專家進(jìn)行全面盡職調(diào)查所牽扯的精力讓人難以置信,。迅速找到把精力集中在業(yè)務(wù)開(kāi)發(fā)方面的辦法很關(guān)鍵。如果能通過(guò)業(yè)內(nèi)人士組建一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的財(cái)團(tuán)從而無(wú)須融資,，由此產(chǎn)生的益處也會(huì)讓人不敢相信,。在那些較傾向于虛擬模式的投資中，我們當(dāng)然很注意這一點(diǎn),。

????5. 律師是必要的反派,。我們還回顧了在法律、知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)和簽署協(xié)議方面的經(jīng)驗(yàn),，目的是看一看是否能從中吸取教訓(xùn),。要成功完成投資，好的法律建議顯然非常重要,，特別是在防止不利態(tài)勢(shì)惡化方面,。

????? 專利對(duì)生物科技行業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)很關(guān)鍵，所以要在投資前對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)進(jìn)行深入的盡職調(diào)查,，不可草率,。它幫助我們避免了一些投資失誤。我們?cè)谥R(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)方面只出過(guò)一次大的紕漏,，它改變了一家公司的發(fā)展軌跡,。那是2004年，Dynogen還有幾個(gè)月就可完成規(guī)模為5,000萬(wàn)美元（約3.11625億元人民幣）的第二輪融資（未分批進(jìn)行?。?，這時(shí)出現(xiàn)了一項(xiàng)意料之外的專利，使該公司的主打產(chǎn)品——用于治療膀胱過(guò)動(dòng)癥的復(fù)方制劑DDP200項(xiàng)目受到了影響,。從某種角度來(lái)說(shuō)我們還是幸運(yùn)的,。但在投資前，知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)盡職調(diào)查應(yīng)排在首位,。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),，擁有最佳知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)實(shí)踐策略的生物科技公司通常每過(guò)幾年就會(huì)聘用外部公司來(lái)進(jìn)行知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)審計(jì)，以確保自身經(jīng)營(yíng)沒(méi)有缺陷,。

????? 對(duì)關(guān)鍵投資,，投資者應(yīng)詳細(xì)閱讀合同。和上述盡職調(diào)查類似,，盲目相信董事會(huì)其他成員已經(jīng)讀過(guò)關(guān)鍵的投資文件,，這不是什么好的策略。事后才發(fā)現(xiàn)意外之處會(huì)讓人很痛苦,。我們?cè)啻斡龅竭@種情況,，結(jié)果也讓人不舒服。

????? Quick flips in biotech don't happen often, unless it's a flip to the trashcan. Promises of quick FDA approvals or near term M&A interest are most often empty claims. We've all heard the "this is the last financing before an exit" pitch, or "the ongoing Phase 2 is going well" in order to close a financing before opening the envelope. This latter pitch burnt us twice in the mid-2000s: Ivrea and Proprius both had inherited ongoing Phase 2s, both of which readout as completely uninterpretable due to protocol issues among other confounding variables. So much for the quick path to Phase 3. We'd prefer to focus on sustainable value creation as the thesis is much more credible.

????? Company diversification by adding assets across risk or clinical stage often destroys value (another theme I've mentioned before). Forming a company with a Phase 2 in-licensed asset and a preclinical program isn't smart due to the stage and value asymmetry: the Phase 2 program consumes the capital and dictates the future of the company, dragging the preclinical asset either up or down.

????Furthermore, even if the assets are of similar stage, they typically aren't of similar merit. Adding a second asset to a story that's not quite as compelling to the first just to make use of a management team feels like the wrong use of capital; figure out other ways of leveraging a team (e.g., part-time roles at other portfolio companies) and keep the bar for asset dilution very high. These observations 5+ years ago led to our asset-centric investment model around single program entities, like Stromedix's STX-100 focus. Our AVDC initiative was born out of this observation in conjunction with Pharma's externalization trend.

????? Ultra-lean virtual models are great, but they have their limitations. For instance, big biology plays are hard to do without your own wet lab to do the bespoke work (though it’s fair to say we haven't really gotten that wrong yet). Where we've felt some pain is around the constraints of the virtual model on other operational elements: when you have only a few key entrepreneurs in a startup, it’s very hard to go on the road for fundraising or BD without stalling or slowing the work on the R&D front. It can be incredibly distracting for a lean team to enter full due diligence with an army of experts from multiple pharmas or potential investors. Figuring out how to focus the BD campaign quickly is essential, and if one can avoid fundraising by having a strong insider syndicate that's incredibly helpful. This is certainly something we are mindful of in our more virtual plays.

????5. Lawyers are a necessary evil. We also looked at our legal, IP and deal-making experiences to see if there were lessons here. Getting good legal advice is clearly very important to successfully navigating deals, especially in preventing bad outcomes from becoming worse.

????? Patents are critical to biotech, so don't skimp on doing deep IP diligence before investing. This has helped prevent us from doing some bad deals. We've only really had one big IP blow-up that changed a company's trajectory: within months of the Dynogen $50 million Series B closing in 2004 (no tranching!), a unexpected patent appeared that impaired the lead DDP200 program. So in some ways we've been lucky. But IP diligence goes beyond doing work before an investment; we've found that biotechs with best practice IP strategies often have an IP audit by an outside firm every couple years to ensure they are on strong ground.

????? For critical deals, investors should read the contract details. Similar to the diligence point above, trusting that others in the boardroom have read the critical deal documents isn't always a great strategy. Having a surprise appear after the fact can be a painful realization. We had this happen multiple times with uncomfortable outcomes.