????? 生物科技行業(yè)不會經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)快車道,，除非它通向垃圾堆。迅速獲得美國食品藥品監(jiān)督管理局（FDA）批準(zhǔn)或短期內(nèi)實現(xiàn)并購利益的承諾大多都是空頭支票。我們曾聽到過的類似承諾包括“這是退出前的最后一次融資”或者“二期臨床進展順利”,，目的是在我們知曉結(jié)果前籌集到資金,。2005年前后，這種后半程宣傳讓我們蒙受了兩次損失,，那就是Ivrea和Proprius,。它們的產(chǎn)品均已進入二期臨床，但受試驗方案等令人困惑的變量影響,，二者的結(jié)果都變得完全無法解讀。迅速進入三期臨床的道路至此戛然而止?，F(xiàn)在我們更愿意把重點放在可持續(xù)的價值創(chuàng)造上,，因為這個主題要可靠得多。

????? 通過吸收帶有各類風(fēng)險或處于各種臨床階段的資產(chǎn)來實現(xiàn)多元化往往會破壞價值（這個主題以前我也提到過）,。用處于二期臨床的授權(quán)資產(chǎn)和一個臨床前項目組建一家公司并不明智,，因為產(chǎn)品所處的階段與其價值并不對稱：二期臨床項目需要消耗資金并且預(yù)示著公司的未來，而臨床前資產(chǎn)的價值可能隨之上升,，也可能隨之下降,。

????此外，即使資產(chǎn)處于類似階段,，它的價值一般也會存在差異,。如果所加入的第二項資產(chǎn)沒有第一項資產(chǎn)那么吸引人，而僅僅是為了讓管理團隊派上用場,，那就會讓人覺得是濫用資金,；應(yīng)當(dāng)通過其他途徑來使用管理團隊（比如在其他所投資的公司擔(dān)任兼職）并將攤薄資產(chǎn)的門檻保持在非常高的水平。這是我們在5年多前得出的結(jié)論,，它促成了我們的投資模式,，即針對單一項目，以資產(chǎn)為中心,，比如Stromedix的單克隆抗體STX-100,。這一結(jié)論和醫(yī)藥行業(yè)的外部化趨勢造就了我們的Atlas Venture Development Corp。

????? 超薄虛擬模式（ultra-lean virtual model）非常好,，但有局限性,。比如，如果沒有自己的生物實驗室來進行特定工作,，就難以組建大型生物科技公司（不過也可以說在這方面我們還沒有真正犯過錯誤）,。給我們帶來教訓(xùn)的是虛擬模式在其他經(jīng)營領(lǐng)域的局限性。如果初創(chuàng)型公司的核心創(chuàng)業(yè)者很少,，那么在不停止或放緩研發(fā)的情況下進行融資或業(yè)務(wù)開發(fā)就會非常困難,。對于一個人員較少的管理團隊來說，配合多家醫(yī)藥公司或多名潛在投資人派來的大量專家進行全面盡職調(diào)查所牽扯的精力讓人難以置信,。迅速找到把精力集中在業(yè)務(wù)開發(fā)方面的辦法很關(guān)鍵,。如果能通過業(yè)內(nèi)人士組建一個強大的財團從而無須融資,，由此產(chǎn)生的益處也會讓人不敢相信。在那些較傾向于虛擬模式的投資中,，我們當(dāng)然很注意這一點,。

????5. 律師是必要的反派。我們還回顧了在法律,、知識產(chǎn)權(quán)和簽署協(xié)議方面的經(jīng)驗,，目的是看一看是否能從中吸取教訓(xùn)。要成功完成投資,，好的法律建議顯然非常重要,，特別是在防止不利態(tài)勢惡化方面。

????? 專利對生物科技行業(yè)來說很關(guān)鍵,，所以要在投資前對知識產(chǎn)權(quán)進行深入的盡職調(diào)查,，不可草率。它幫助我們避免了一些投資失誤,。我們在知識產(chǎn)權(quán)方面只出過一次大的紕漏,，它改變了一家公司的發(fā)展軌跡。那是2004年,，Dynogen還有幾個月就可完成規(guī)模為5,000萬美元（約3.11625億元人民幣）的第二輪融資（未分批進行?。@時出現(xiàn)了一項意料之外的專利,，使該公司的主打產(chǎn)品——用于治療膀胱過動癥的復(fù)方制劑DDP200項目受到了影響,。從某種角度來說我們還是幸運的。但在投資前,，知識產(chǎn)權(quán)盡職調(diào)查應(yīng)排在首位,。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，擁有最佳知識產(chǎn)權(quán)實踐策略的生物科技公司通常每過幾年就會聘用外部公司來進行知識產(chǎn)權(quán)審計,，以確保自身經(jīng)營沒有缺陷,。

????? 對關(guān)鍵投資，投資者應(yīng)詳細(xì)閱讀合同,。和上述盡職調(diào)查類似,，盲目相信董事會其他成員已經(jīng)讀過關(guān)鍵的投資文件，這不是什么好的策略,。事后才發(fā)現(xiàn)意外之處會讓人很痛苦,。我們曾多次遇到這種情況，結(jié)果也讓人不舒服,。

????? Quick flips in biotech don't happen often, unless it's a flip to the trashcan. Promises of quick FDA approvals or near term M&A interest are most often empty claims. We've all heard the "this is the last financing before an exit" pitch, or "the ongoing Phase 2 is going well" in order to close a financing before opening the envelope. This latter pitch burnt us twice in the mid-2000s: Ivrea and Proprius both had inherited ongoing Phase 2s, both of which readout as completely uninterpretable due to protocol issues among other confounding variables. So much for the quick path to Phase 3. We'd prefer to focus on sustainable value creation as the thesis is much more credible.

????? Company diversification by adding assets across risk or clinical stage often destroys value (another theme I've mentioned before). Forming a company with a Phase 2 in-licensed asset and a preclinical program isn't smart due to the stage and value asymmetry: the Phase 2 program consumes the capital and dictates the future of the company, dragging the preclinical asset either up or down.

????Furthermore, even if the assets are of similar stage, they typically aren't of similar merit. Adding a second asset to a story that's not quite as compelling to the first just to make use of a management team feels like the wrong use of capital; figure out other ways of leveraging a team (e.g., part-time roles at other portfolio companies) and keep the bar for asset dilution very high. These observations 5+ years ago led to our asset-centric investment model around single program entities, like Stromedix's STX-100 focus. Our AVDC initiative was born out of this observation in conjunction with Pharma's externalization trend.

????? Ultra-lean virtual models are great, but they have their limitations. For instance, big biology plays are hard to do without your own wet lab to do the bespoke work (though it’s fair to say we haven't really gotten that wrong yet). Where we've felt some pain is around the constraints of the virtual model on other operational elements: when you have only a few key entrepreneurs in a startup, it’s very hard to go on the road for fundraising or BD without stalling or slowing the work on the R&D front. It can be incredibly distracting for a lean team to enter full due diligence with an army of experts from multiple pharmas or potential investors. Figuring out how to focus the BD campaign quickly is essential, and if one can avoid fundraising by having a strong insider syndicate that's incredibly helpful. This is certainly something we are mindful of in our more virtual plays.

????5. Lawyers are a necessary evil. We also looked at our legal, IP and deal-making experiences to see if there were lessons here. Getting good legal advice is clearly very important to successfully navigating deals, especially in preventing bad outcomes from becoming worse.

????? Patents are critical to biotech, so don't skimp on doing deep IP diligence before investing. This has helped prevent us from doing some bad deals. We've only really had one big IP blow-up that changed a company's trajectory: within months of the Dynogen $50 million Series B closing in 2004 (no tranching!), a unexpected patent appeared that impaired the lead DDP200 program. So in some ways we've been lucky. But IP diligence goes beyond doing work before an investment; we've found that biotechs with best practice IP strategies often have an IP audit by an outside firm every couple years to ensure they are on strong ground.

????? For critical deals, investors should read the contract details. Similar to the diligence point above, trusting that others in the boardroom have read the critical deal documents isn't always a great strategy. Having a surprise appear after the fact can be a painful realization. We had this happen multiple times with uncomfortable outcomes.