????太平洋投資管理公司（PIMCO）創(chuàng)始人比爾?格羅斯在考慮了數(shù)年之后,，才投身交易所交易基金（ETF）業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域,。或許,，當(dāng)初他并沒(méi)有意識(shí)到自己會(huì)在這一行干得有聲有色,。

????自從2012年3月份推出以來(lái),，格羅斯旗下的PIMCO總回報(bào)ETF（Total Return ETF）已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)了5.9%的年化投資回報(bào)率，這大約是PIMCO總回報(bào)共同基金（Total Return mutual fund）年化投資回報(bào)率的兩倍,，而很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間以來(lái),，PIMCO總回報(bào)共同基金一直是世界上最受歡迎的基金之一,，而且是PIMCO總回報(bào)ETF旨在效仿的一只基金。

????對(duì)此有幾種可能的解釋,。其一,，出于某種原因,，格羅斯就是更加擅長(zhǎng)管理一支ETF中的債券，而不是一支共同基金中的債券,。誰(shuí)知道呢？另一種可能性是,，格羅斯一直在采用某種不光彩的手段,。而美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)（Securities and Exchange Commission,，簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)SEC）擔(dān)心的似乎正是后一種可能。

????據(jù)《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》（The Wall Street Journal）報(bào)道，SEC正在調(diào)查PIMCO是否人為抬高了這只ETF投資組合中債券的價(jià)格,，以此推高旗下新產(chǎn)品的投資業(yè)績(jī)。就在PIMCO推出這支ETF的時(shí)間前后,，這支ETF的交易員們買(mǎi)入了一批抵押債券,，以及其他“零星”（也就是小額發(fā)行的）債券。與其他證券相比,，這些債券較難交易,，因此PIMCO的ETF能夠以較低價(jià)格買(mǎi)入,。《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》報(bào)道說(shuō),，PIMCO為這批債券支付了48萬(wàn)美元,，而這批債券最終會(huì)償還50萬(wàn)美元,，外加利息。

????PIMCO在買(mǎi)入之后,，便立刻聘請(qǐng)了一位外部顧問(wèn)來(lái)評(píng)估這些債券的應(yīng)有價(jià)值,。當(dāng)時(shí)這位外部顧問(wèn)表示，這些債券價(jià)值50萬(wàn)美元,。畢竟,，該基金在招募說(shuō)明書(shū)摘要上列出的對(duì)應(yīng)價(jià)值就是這個(gè)數(shù)字。于是,，PIMCO立即把這些債券的價(jià)值增記為50萬(wàn)美元,，從而瞬時(shí)獲利2萬(wàn)美元，盡管它明知,，出售這些債券最多僅可套現(xiàn)48萬(wàn)美元。這就是他們剛剛支付的價(jià)格,。

????為什么讓一位外部顧問(wèn)——而不是交易員——來(lái)對(duì)這些債券進(jìn)行估價(jià)呢,？別忘了，交易員每天都在買(mǎi)入和賣(mài)出債券,。他們應(yīng)該很清楚這些債券價(jià)值多少,。

????雖然這聽(tīng)起來(lái)合乎邏輯，但華爾街在過(guò)去讓交易員給投資組合和投資進(jìn)行估價(jià)的做法曾經(jīng)出現(xiàn)過(guò)問(wèn)題,。交易員在他們的交易賬簿上增記投資價(jià)值,，以此來(lái)掩蓋他們的虧損，這種做法由來(lái)已久,。還記得摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）那位綽號(hào)為“倫敦鯨”（London Whale）的交易員嗎,？

????因此，華爾街現(xiàn)在都把這項(xiàng)任務(wù)交給外部顧問(wèn)來(lái)完成——這聽(tīng)起來(lái)是個(gè)更加可靠的做法,，但實(shí)際上有時(shí)會(huì)讓監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)感到擔(dān)憂(yōu)。

????據(jù)《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》報(bào)道,，PIMCO之所以能夠折價(jià)買(mǎi)入那些債券,，是因?yàn)檫@些債券的流動(dòng)性很差。這些債券本身沒(méi)有任何問(wèn)題,。借方仍在按時(shí)償付。只要你一直持有這些債券,，你最終很可能會(huì)兌現(xiàn)50萬(wàn)美元。這些債券只是很難交易,，因?yàn)樗鼈兊臄?shù)量過(guò)于零星,。

????要想解決這個(gè)流動(dòng)性很差的問(wèn)題,，一個(gè)辦法是把它們組合到——比如說(shuō)——一支ETF之中。而這正是PIMCO采用的辦法?，F(xiàn)在，你就可以很容易地買(mǎi)入和賣(mài)出這些債券的部分,。不過(guò),，既然它們易于交易，為什么它們不應(yīng)該按照它們?cè)緫?yīng)該具有的價(jià)值——50萬(wàn)美元——來(lái)進(jìn)行估價(jià)呢,？

????更大的問(wèn)題在于，ETF正在迅速發(fā)展,，而且變得越來(lái)越復(fù)雜,。ETF看起來(lái)很像是股票或債券，或者任何一種普通投資者通常會(huì)把錢(qián)投放在其中的金融產(chǎn)品,。但事實(shí)并非如此,。ETF屬于金融衍生品,，是為了跟蹤其他證券的投資表現(xiàn)而構(gòu)建起來(lái)的投資產(chǎn)品。但ETF并非總是能夠準(zhǔn)確反映出它所追蹤的證券的表現(xiàn),。大多數(shù)情況下，ETF的投資表現(xiàn)會(huì)比它們應(yīng)該復(fù)制其表現(xiàn)的金融產(chǎn)品略差一些,。ETF的表現(xiàn)偶爾也會(huì)超過(guò)這些金融產(chǎn)品的表現(xiàn),。不過(guò)這種情況很少見(jiàn)，這也是有些人對(duì)ETF持懷疑態(tài)度的原因所在,。

????幾年前,，當(dāng)PIMCO遲遲沒(méi)有推出這支ETF基金的時(shí)候,，有些人認(rèn)為這與信息披露問(wèn)題有關(guān)。共同基金會(huì)在每月報(bào)告各自的持倉(cāng)情況以及投資業(yè)績(jī),。但ETF必須每天報(bào)告這些信息,。當(dāng)時(shí)人們以為格羅斯沒(méi)有興趣讓所有人都知道他每天在進(jìn)行什么交易。

????但真正的問(wèn)題也可能是格羅斯了解ETF,。當(dāng)時(shí)他掌管著全球最大的共同基金,，該基金旗下管理的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模超過(guò)2,000億美元,，而他不希望任何基金能與其相媲美,，即便是自家公司旗下的另一支基金?；蛟S,，格羅斯不想推出一支ETF的原因正是因?yàn)樗雷约骸胺浅！鄙糜诠芾鞥TF,，而這最終會(huì)給他帶來(lái)麻煩。現(xiàn)在的結(jié)果就是這樣,。

????It took years for PIMCO’s Bill Gross to jump into the ETF business. Perhaps he didn’t realize how good he would be at it.

????Since launching in March 2012, Gross’ PIMCO Total Return ETF has had an annualized return of 5.9%, about double the return of the Total Return mutual fund, which for a long time has been one of the most popular in the world and is the fund that the ETF was built to mimic.

????There are a few potential explanations for this. One, Gross is, for some reason, just better at managing bonds in an ETF than a mutual fund. Who knew? Another possibility is that Gross has been cheating. The Securities and Exchange Commission is, apparently, concerned about the latter.

????According to The Wall Street Journal, the SEC is looking into whether PIMCO inflated the price of bonds in its ETF portfolio in order to boost the performance of its new product. Around the time of the launch of the fund, the traders for the PIMCO ETF bought a bunch of mortgage bonds, and other “odd lot” (meaning small issue) bonds. The bonds were harder to trade than others, so PIMCO’s ETF was able to buy them at a discount. The WSJ says PIMCO paid $480,000 for a bunch of bonds for the fund that would pay back $500,000 plus interest.

????Immediately after PIMCO bought the bonds, it brought in an outside consultant to evaluate how much the bonds should be worth. The outside consultant said they were worth $500,000. After all, that’s what the cover of the prospectus said the bonds were worth. And so PIMCO immediately wrote up the value of the bonds to $500,000, taking a $20,000 gain, even though it knew the most it could sell them for was $480,000. After all, that’s what they had just paid.

????Why have an outside consultant—and not traders—evaluate the bonds? Why not have the traders value the bonds? After all, traders are buying and selling bonds every day. They should know what they are worth.

????While that sounds logical, Wall Street has had problems letting traders value portfolios and investments in the past. There is a long history of traders hiding their losses by writing up the value of the investments in their trading book. Remember the London Whale.

????And so Wall Street hands the job over to outside consultants—which sounds better, but can apparently get regulators concerned at times.

????The bonds that PIMCO bought were trading at a discount because they were illiquid, according to the WSJ. There was nothing wrong with the bonds. The borrowers were still paying on time. As long as you held onto them, you were likely to get $500,000. They were just hard to trade, because they were in weird-sized bunches.

????One way to solve the illiquidity problem was to group them together into, say, an ETF. And that’s what PIMCO did. Now, you could easily buy and sell portions of those bonds. And now that they were easy to trade, why shouldn’t they be worth what they were supposed to be worth—$500,000?

????The bigger problem is that ETFs are growing rapidly and getting more and more complicated. ETFs look like stocks or bonds, or any other thing else average investors normally put their money in. But they are not. They are derivatives, investments structured to perform like something else. But they don’t always behave that way. Most of the time, they do a little bit worse than the thing they are supposed to mimic. Sometimes, but not often, they do better. And that’s odd, and explains why some people are suspicious of ETFs.

????A few years ago, when PIMCO was dragging its feet about launching the ETF fund, some people thought it had to do with disclosure issues. Mutual funds report their holdings and performance every month. But ETFs have to report daily. People thought that Gross had no interest in letting everyone know what he was doing on a daily basis.

????But the real problem may have been that Gross knew something about ETFs. He had the largest mutual fund at the time, with over $200 billion in assets, and he didn’t want anything to rival that, even if it was another PIMCO fund. Perhaps Gross didn’t want to launch an ETF because he knew he would be too good at it, and that eventually would cause him problems. Either way, it has.