????不是每個(gè)成員國(guó)都有同樣的機(jī)會(huì)進(jìn)行調(diào)整,。正如我日前在為《外交》雜志（Foreign Affairs） 撰寫(xiě)的文章(《少數(shù)人治理不當(dāng)：寡頭如何毀了希臘》‘Misrule of the Few: How the Oligarchs Ruined Greece’)所講的一樣,，加入歐盟并未改善弱小成員的經(jīng)濟(jì)體系。實(shí)際上可能使它們陷入了更糟的狀況,。

????希臘,、愛(ài)爾蘭,、葡萄牙和西班牙加入歐盟后開(kāi)放了邊境，將自身置于貿(mào)易,、移民和金融的新浪潮沖擊之下,。與其他成員國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)注定會(huì)帶來(lái)“創(chuàng)造性破壞”，即那些不能進(jìn)行國(guó)際化競(jìng)爭(zhēng),、效率低下的企業(yè)將關(guān)門(mén)歇業(yè)。為了避免短期困境,，這些外圍經(jīng)濟(jì)體將獲得大筆歐盟資金補(bǔ)償,。這些資金本應(yīng)用于國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)的重組。但事情發(fā)展完全出人意料,。

????這些資金增強(qiáng)了資金管理者的實(shí)力。大多數(shù)歐盟外圍經(jīng)濟(jì)體中缺乏強(qiáng)有力的行政機(jī)構(gòu),，有的只是國(guó)內(nèi)政治階層,。在制衡機(jī)制較差的小國(guó)中，這種影響是徹底的,。這些資金就像是“天然的資源詛咒”,。由于這些資金不是通過(guò)稅收得來(lái)的,，要求國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)其支出負(fù)責(zé)似乎是多此一舉,。

????歐元區(qū)一創(chuàng)立，這種狀況就惡化了,。隨著歐洲央行（ECB）將視線轉(zhuǎn)向他處,，西班牙、葡萄牙,、愛(ài)爾蘭和希臘不僅通過(guò)廉價(jià)易得的信貸創(chuàng)造出了資產(chǎn)泡沫（其他成員國(guó)也出現(xiàn)這種情況）,，還創(chuàng)建了受政治驅(qū)使的不透明銀行體系,。因此，廉價(jià)信貸阻礙了改革,，并且損害了所有外圍經(jīng)濟(jì)體的制度,。

????歐元區(qū)成員國(guó)將這些資金用于無(wú)度的投資，使得任人唯親更加有利可圖,，為政治腐敗提供新的溫床,，強(qiáng)化了本已存在的等級(jí)制度,。如果歐元區(qū)所有成員國(guó)都同樣強(qiáng)大，如果它們都曾擁有出色且獨(dú)立的銀行監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu),、有力的司法體系和強(qiáng)大的內(nèi)部問(wèn)責(zé)機(jī)制，或許這些事情就不會(huì)發(fā)生,。但是,，它們的確發(fā)生了。

????西班牙銀行Bankia in Spain,、愛(ài)爾蘭銀行Allied Irish in Ireland和希臘銀行Proton in Greece的失敗就是明證,。特別是在希臘,，歐盟準(zhǔn)備救援，但希臘政治體系一直受一小撮寡頭左右,，他們非法占據(jù)電視頻道25年,。通過(guò)逃避有效的監(jiān)管，為達(dá)到其自身目的而掌控新聞與評(píng)論,，他們?cè)谡魏蜕虡I(yè)生活中占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位，削弱了政治階層的整體可信度,。歐洲央行,、國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（International Monetary Fund）和歐盟委員會(huì)（European Commission）的拯救協(xié)議并沒(méi)有觸及他們的特權(quán),。

????在一些歐元區(qū)成員國(guó)中，歐元的主要作用就是導(dǎo)致了經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰,、不平等加劇和腐敗泛濫,。這并非孤立的國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)失敗的結(jié)果，而是造成外圍經(jīng)濟(jì)體整體轟然失敗的歐洲集體決策的產(chǎn)物,。對(duì)于“更緊密聯(lián)盟”的不懈追求使得歐盟機(jī)構(gòu)忽視了這一聯(lián)盟的質(zhì)量問(wèn)題。現(xiàn)在,，是時(shí)候做出改變了,。除非歐洲能夠從歐元區(qū)深處消除這些不公平，否則危機(jī)不會(huì)結(jié)束,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????本文作者帕爾沃斯?埃萊夫塞里亞迪斯是牛津大學(xué)（Oxford University）曼斯菲爾德學(xué)院（Mansfield College）的法律副教授和研究員。

????Not everyone had the same chance to adjust. As I argue in my recent article for Foreign Affairs (‘Misrule of the Few: How the Oligarchs Ruined Greece’, ) membership in the European Union has not improved the institutions of the weaker members. It has actually made them worse.

????When they joined the EU, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain opened their borders and exposed themselves to new waves of trade, immigration and finance. Competition with other member states was meant to bring about ‘creative destruction,’ whereby inefficient firms – i.e. those who could not compete internationally – would go out of business. In order to avoid short-term hardships, the peripheral economies were set to receive large sums of EU funds by way of compensation. These funds were supposed to be invested in restructuring the domestic economies. But this happened very imperfectly.

????The funds strengthened those who administered them. In the absence of a strong civil service in most of the peripheral EU members, these were simply the local political classes. In small societies with weak checks and balances, the effect was transformative. This money operated as a ‘natural resources curse’. Since the money was not the result of taxation, domestic accountability for its spending was seen to be an unnecessary luxury.

????This situation was made worse once the Eurozone was created. With the ECB looking away, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece built not only asset bubbles with cheap and easy credit (which happened elsewhere) but also opaque and politically driven banking systems. As a result, cheap credit impeded reform and damaged institutions in all the countries of the periphery.

????Membership in the Eurozone directed funds to wasteful investment, made cronyism exceptionally profitable, provided new incentives for political corruption and strengthened already existing hierarchies. If all the members of the Eurozone were equally strong, if they all had, for example, an outstanding and independent banking regulator, a powerful judiciary and strong internal mechanisms of accountability, perhaps these things would not have happened. Yet, they did happen.

????The examples of the failed banks, Bankia in Spain, Allied Irish in Ireland, and Proton in Greece speak for themselves. In Greece, in particular, the EU has stood by while the political system has been undermined by a small group of oligarchs who have illegally occupied television frequencies for 25 years. By escaping any effective regulation and controlling news and commentary for their own purposes, they have dominated political and business life and undermined the credibility of the political class in its entirety. The bailout deal with the ECB, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission has not touched their privileges.

????In some of the members of the Eurozone the main legacy of the Euro is economic implosion, rising inequality and widespread corruption. This is not the result of isolated domestic failures. It is a result of collective European decision-making that misfired spectacularly throughout the periphery. The relentless pursuit of an ‘ever closer union’ made EU institutions neglect the question of the quality of this union. It is time to change course. Unless Europe addresses the deep unfairness at the heart of the Eurozone, the crisis is not going to end.

????PavlosEleftheriadis is Associate Professor of Law and a Fellow of Mansfield College at Oxford University.