????審計(jì)事務(wù)所的審計(jì)意見(jiàn)似乎是憑空捏造的,。

????根據(jù)美國(guó)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)上個(gè)月公布的一項(xiàng)報(bào)告，至少可以說(shuō),，有超過(guò)四分之一的審計(jì)結(jié)果是這樣的,。該報(bào)告稱(chēng)，一家審計(jì)事務(wù)所對(duì)公司賬目的簽字保證,，有超過(guò)25%的可能性是不可靠的,，因?yàn)閷徲?jì)師并沒(méi)有執(zhí)行提供這些保證所需要的工作,。所以,，除非你喜歡用1/4的“輪盤(pán)賭”賠率來(lái)押注財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的真實(shí)性,，親愛(ài)的投資者們，請(qǐng)不要相信一家公司公布的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),，因?yàn)閷徲?jì)事務(wù)所捏造事實(shí)的可能性,，超出了我們的想象。

????上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)的調(diào)查結(jié)果,，基于2012年和2013年進(jìn)行的數(shù)百次詳細(xì)審查,。委員會(huì)還表示，對(duì)2014年審計(jì)結(jié)果的審查,，同樣發(fā)現(xiàn)了類(lèi)似的問(wèn)題,。

????審計(jì)事務(wù)所在哪些方面特別容易犯錯(cuò),？據(jù)委員會(huì)的研究顯示，審計(jì)事務(wù)所并沒(méi)有按照理應(yīng)采取的步驟,，確定欺詐和其他重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn),，沒(méi)有評(píng)估“財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表披露數(shù)據(jù)的準(zhǔn)確性與完整性”，未充分檢查“公司提供的信息的準(zhǔn)確性和完整性,?！倍绻粚?duì)這些方面進(jìn)行適當(dāng)?shù)膶彶椋銦o(wú)法通過(guò)審計(jì)發(fā)現(xiàn)重大錯(cuò)報(bào),。

????審計(jì)質(zhì)量似乎變得越來(lái)越差,。《今日會(huì)計(jì)》報(bào)道稱(chēng)：“亞特蘭大估值與訴訟咨詢(xún)公司Acuitas在10月15日發(fā)布了一份分析報(bào)告,，對(duì)上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)近期的審查結(jié)果進(jìn)行了分析。這項(xiàng)分析發(fā)現(xiàn),，在2013年審查的所有審計(jì)結(jié)果中,，有43%存在不足，而在2009年,，這一比例僅有16%,。

????此外，操縱盈余的情況,，也比我們想象的更加普遍,。就在上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)察委員會(huì)的報(bào)告發(fā)布前不久，另一份名為《盈余管理蔓延的證據(jù)》的相關(guān)研究也備受關(guān)注,。這項(xiàng)研究的作者之一,、羅格斯商學(xué)院教授思米·柯迪亞曾告訴我，她的研究顯示,，如果一家公司在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中作弊被抓,，其他公司會(huì)“知道作弊的代價(jià)”。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),，如果“代價(jià)并不嚴(yán)重”,，其他公司便會(huì)開(kāi)始以相同的方式作弊。如果處罰非常嚴(yán)重,，其他公司便會(huì)受到震懾,，打消效仿的念頭?？碌蟻啽硎?，最近的研究專(zhuān)門(mén)調(diào)查了其他公司爭(zhēng)相模仿已公開(kāi)的財(cái)務(wù)作弊信息這種行為。她將其稱(chēng)為“公開(kāi)蔓延”。這項(xiàng)研究表明,，強(qiáng)有力的監(jiān)管執(zhí)法是多么重要,。

????在傳播利潤(rùn)操縱方面，董事會(huì)也扮演了不光彩的角色,?？碌蟻啽硎荆推渌髡邔?duì)公開(kāi)蔓延所作的研究,，是對(duì)2010年一項(xiàng)研究結(jié)果的補(bǔ)充,。這項(xiàng)名為《董事會(huì)聯(lián)動(dòng)與盈余管理蔓延》的研究，探討了一家公司作弊且尚未被發(fā)現(xiàn)時(shí)的情形,?？碌蟻啽硎荆瑢?duì)眾多案例的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),，如果不同公司的董事會(huì)有相同的成員,，作弊可能會(huì)從一家公司蔓延到另一家公司。2010年的研究指出,，“如果共同的董事在易受影響的公司擔(dān)任領(lǐng)導(dǎo)職位（如董事長(zhǎng)或?qū)徲?jì)委員會(huì)主席）或與會(huì)計(jì)相關(guān)的職位（審計(jì)委員會(huì)成員）,，這種蔓延會(huì)更加嚴(yán)重?！?/p>

????當(dāng)然,，審計(jì)事務(wù)所也有老板：聘用（和解雇，但并不常見(jiàn)）他們的審計(jì)委員會(huì),。審計(jì)委員會(huì)應(yīng)該確保,，其聘用的審計(jì)事務(wù)所將嚴(yán)格履行職責(zé)。上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)10月發(fā)布的報(bào)告提出了一些審計(jì)委員會(huì)應(yīng)該詢(xún)問(wèn)審計(jì)事務(wù)所的問(wèn)題,。然而根據(jù)2010年和最近的學(xué)術(shù)研究,，我只能很遺憾地告訴投資者們，這些問(wèn)題的效果恐怕無(wú)異于讓狐貍看守雞窩,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????本文作者于1999年創(chuàng)立了獨(dú)立董事會(huì)培訓(xùn)和咨詢(xún)機(jī)構(gòu)價(jià)值聯(lián)盟和公司治理聯(lián)盟,，并擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官。她自2010年4月起成為《財(cái)富》雜志的固定撰稿人,，并著有兩本有關(guān)公司治理與估值的書(shū)《經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值管理：應(yīng)用與技巧》和《價(jià)值主導(dǎo)的組織》。

????譯者：劉進(jìn)龍/汪皓

????審校：任文科

????Audit firms seem to be spinning opinions out of thin air.

????At least that’s the case in more than one in four audits, according to a report issued on?Ocober 15?by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). According to the report, an audit firm’s blessing of company financials isn’t reliable more than 25% of the time because the auditors never performed the work necessary to provide their signoff. So unless you like the 1-in-4 odds in financial statement roulette, no, Ms. Investor, you cannot put your faith in the company’s reported accounting because more often than we’d like, audit firms seem to be making stuff up.

????The PCAOB’s findings are based on hundreds of detailed inspections it conducted in 2012 and 2013. The PCAOB also said it is finding similar issues based on its review of 2014 audits.

????Where in particular are audit firms dropping the ball? According to the PCAOB study, firms didn’t do what they were supposed to do to identify fraud and other significant risks, they didn’t evaluate “the accuracy and completeness of financial statement disclosures,” and they didn’t adequately test “the accuracy and completeness of information produced by the company.” Material misstatements can go undetected when these areas are not properly reviewed.

????Audit quality seems to be getting worse. Accounting Today reported that “the Atlanta-based valuation and litigation consultancy firm Acuitas released an analysis Thursday of recent PCAOB inspections and found that 43 percent of all audits inspected by the PCAOB in 2013 had deficiencies, compared to 16 percent in 2009.”

????Earnings manipulation is also more prevalent than we might think. The PCAOB report comes on the heels of a recent study titled, “Evidence on Contagion in Earnings Management.” One of the authors, Rutgers Business School professor Simi Kedia, told me that her research showed that if a company is cheating on its financial reporting and gets caught, other firms will “l(fā)earn about how costly it is to cheat.” If it’s “not so bad,” she says her research shows, other firms will start cheating in the very same way. If, however, the penalties are severe, other companies are deterred from following suit. This recent research specifically reviewed instances of copycat behavior that followed public information about the cheating, Kedia told me, calling it “public contagion.” The research shows how important strong regulatory enforcement can be.

????Boards of directors also can have a role in spreading earnings manipulation. Kedia says the work she and her co-authors did on public contagion complements research done in 2010. That study, titled “Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion” looked at situations where a company is cheating and hasn’t been caught yet. In those instances, if boards share similar members, that research shows that cheating may spread from company to company, Kedia says. The research from the 2010 study states that “the contagion is stronger when the shared director has a leadership position (e.g. board chair or audit committee chair) or an accounting-relevant position (audit committee member) in the susceptible firm.”

????Of course, audit firms are supposed to have bosses: The audit committees that hire (and less frequently, fire) them. Audit committees should be ensuring that the audit firms they hire do their jobs properly, and so the PCAOB report issued Thursday provides audit committees with some questions they should ask their audit firms. But given the 2010 and more recent academic research, I’m sorry to say, Mr. Investor, that could be just about as effective as asking the fox to watch the hen house.

????Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://www.thevaluealliance.com), an independent board education and advisory firm she founded in 1999. She has been a regular contributor to Fortune since April 2010 and is the author of two books on corporate governance and valuation, Economic Value Management: Applications and Techniques and Value-led Organizations.