華爾街經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)及其游說(shuō)團(tuán)體正在講述一個(gè)可怕的謊言，大意如此：

“美國(guó)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)是不值得我們服務(wù)的,，除非我們狠狠地收取一筆費(fèi)用,，并且銷(xiāo)售一些他們不需要的產(chǎn)品?！?/p>

以上可能并非他們的原話,，但正是這個(gè)意思。這種信息令我極度惡心,，而且我也有資格對(duì)其進(jìn)行專業(yè)解讀,。正如我在拙著《華爾街后臺(tái)》（Backstage Wall Street）中所言，向投資者銷(xiāo)售投資產(chǎn)品這種業(yè)務(wù)模式,，無(wú)可救藥地充斥著各種利益沖突,。

在我職業(yè)生涯的前半段，我就像機(jī)器上的一個(gè)螺絲釘,，在一家三級(jí)券商向普通投資者銷(xiāo)售投資產(chǎn)品,。我親眼見(jiàn)證了這些矛盾,。我也深知,，當(dāng)華爾街與普羅大眾的利益發(fā)生碰撞時(shí)會(huì)發(fā)生什么事情,。這些年來(lái)，我一直在嘗試著說(shuō)出真相,。但直到現(xiàn)在,，導(dǎo)致不良行為的那些動(dòng)機(jī)依然存在。在當(dāng)前的經(jīng)紀(jì)人薪酬體制下,，哪怕是最心系客戶的經(jīng)紀(jì)人,，也會(huì)經(jīng)常面臨自己的傭金與客戶利益相矛盾的情況。一般說(shuō)來(lái),，經(jīng)紀(jì)人要想拿到最豐厚的傭金,，就得銷(xiāo)售那些讓客戶繳納最高費(fèi)用的產(chǎn)品，以及效益不佳的產(chǎn)品,。

在其他行業(yè),，如果某種產(chǎn)品售價(jià)更高，那往往意味著其質(zhì)量和功效也更高——比如名表和豪車(chē),，或者路邊的小旅館和麗嘉酒店的區(qū)別,。而金融服務(wù)產(chǎn)品則恰恰相反。幾乎所有學(xué)術(shù)研究都指出,，你為一個(gè)投資產(chǎn)品花得錢(qián)越少,，這個(gè)投資產(chǎn)品越簡(jiǎn)單，它的長(zhǎng)期投資價(jià)值才越高,。

華爾街也深知這一事實(shí),。不可否認(rèn)，高昂的費(fèi)用和過(guò)高的交易成本會(huì)損害一個(gè)退休賬戶的長(zhǎng)期潛在價(jià)值,，顯然有悖于投資者的利益,。

然而，證券經(jīng)紀(jì)業(yè)務(wù)正是以銷(xiāo)售更高成本的投資產(chǎn)品為基礎(chǔ)的,，因?yàn)檫@就是利潤(rùn)之源,。全美基金公司對(duì)經(jīng)紀(jì)公司銷(xiāo)售團(tuán)隊(duì)的薪酬激勵(lì)模式，是一個(gè)必須被連根拔起的腫瘤,。顧問(wèn)與客戶之間這種與生俱來(lái)的矛盾,，也需要為現(xiàn)今若隱若現(xiàn)的“退休危機(jī)”負(fù)一定的責(zé)任。另外,，美國(guó)公眾之所以對(duì)金融行業(yè)持一邊倒的負(fù)面看法,，也與這種矛盾也有一定關(guān)系。

好消息是,，我們已經(jīng)站在了一個(gè)岔路口上,。奧巴馬政府正在全行業(yè)推動(dòng)所謂的“信托標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。美國(guó)勞工部打算用這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，替代目前這套較弱,，同時(shí)也含混不清,，不容易給普通投資者帶來(lái)滿意結(jié)果的“適用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。有關(guān)法案已經(jīng)提交國(guó)會(huì)進(jìn)行討論,，它要求經(jīng)紀(jì)人在幫助投資者打理退休賬戶時(shí),，必須扮演一個(gè)沒(méi)有利益沖突的信托顧問(wèn)的角色。任何頭腦清醒的正常人都會(huì)認(rèn)同,，這顯然才是一條正確的路,。

但一涉及到政治，跟我們打交道的并不總是正常人,。投資經(jīng)紀(jì)行業(yè)是一個(gè)非常強(qiáng)大的行業(yè),，其游說(shuō)團(tuán)體會(huì)不遺余力地為他們爭(zhēng)取利益。據(jù)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問(wèn)委員會(huì)估算,，目前該行業(yè)采取的“適用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”導(dǎo)致美國(guó)家庭多繳納的費(fèi)用和蒙受的損失約在170億美元左右,。而結(jié)合10份獨(dú)立研究來(lái)看，美國(guó)老百姓真正損失的成本很可能在85億到330億美元之間,。眼看煮熟的鴨子要飛了,，難怪投資經(jīng)紀(jì)們要組團(tuán)抵制新規(guī)則了。

而真正令人驚訝的,，則是他們?yōu)榱藸?zhēng)辯哪種規(guī)則對(duì)投資者最好而采取的說(shuō)辭,。上周，華爾街迎來(lái)了一位好幫手——美國(guó)眾議院議長(zhǎng)保羅?萊恩對(duì)奧巴馬政府的提議大加抨擊,。他表示,，信托規(guī)則會(huì)帶來(lái)過(guò)多的監(jiān)管以及繁瑣程序，甚至?xí)破冉?jīng)紀(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)不得不放棄為小額客戶提供服務(wù),。

在他的官方博客上,，萊恩用這樣一個(gè)語(yǔ)帶嘲諷的名詞解釋抨擊信托標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：

信托規(guī)則：名詞（2016年），一種監(jiān)管手段,，由勞工部制定,。

1：奧巴馬政府提出的一種一刀切的監(jiān)管手段。2：給金融規(guī)劃人員帶來(lái)了更多的文書(shū)工作和備案要求,，限制了700多萬(wàn)擁有個(gè)人退休金賬戶的美國(guó)人獲得高質(zhì)量的投資建議,。3：提高了人們獲取財(cái)務(wù)建議的成本，對(duì)小額賬戶家庭造成了嚴(yán)重?fù)p害,。

例句：

奧馬巴政府的信托規(guī)則,，將損害數(shù)百萬(wàn)辛勤工作、為退休做打算,、為未來(lái)省錢(qián)的美國(guó)人,。

眾議院共和黨人正在安?瓦格納,、菲爾?羅、彼得?羅斯克姆等議員的帶領(lǐng)下,，努力保護(hù)千萬(wàn)個(gè)家庭免受信托規(guī)則的傷害,。

民主、共和兩黨都認(rèn)為,，政府應(yīng)該放棄這一動(dòng)議,，從頭做起,。

萊恩的邏輯令人瞠目結(jié)舌,。這番話簡(jiǎn)直就是說(shuō)，有些人的便宜是非占不可的,，這樣才值得投資公司為他們服務(wù),。我認(rèn)為，在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上,，萊恩站在了錯(cuò)誤的一面,，同樣他也站在了歷史的對(duì)立面。但更重要的是,，萊恩認(rèn)為,，對(duì)于普通投資者來(lái)說(shuō)，哪怕是有利益矛盾的咨詢,，也比沒(méi)有咨詢強(qiáng),。他的看法至少有兩個(gè)謬誤之處。

首先,，這番言論徹底偏離了美國(guó)的價(jià)值觀,。在這個(gè)國(guó)家，我們不會(huì)容忍任何一個(gè)其他行業(yè)如此運(yùn)作,，不論是公開(kāi)的還是隱蔽的,。

更重要的是，這是一個(gè)謊言,，一個(gè)可怕的謊言,。

時(shí)至2016年，我們已經(jīng)進(jìn)入了一個(gè)空前未有的金融技術(shù)創(chuàng)新時(shí)代,。對(duì)于普通人來(lái)說(shuō),，從來(lái)沒(méi)有一個(gè)時(shí)代比現(xiàn)在更適合出手投資。當(dāng)代的股票和證券買(mǎi)家擁有幾乎無(wú)限的選擇權(quán),，可以極為高效,，以相當(dāng)?shù)统杀镜耐緩竭M(jìn)入投資市場(chǎng)。手續(xù)費(fèi)和交易成本已經(jīng)大幅降低,。與此同時(shí),，各種創(chuàng)新的集中爆發(fā),，也使得自動(dòng)化的咨詢服務(wù)和交易所交易基金產(chǎn)品如雨后春筍般涌現(xiàn)。

以往一名投資者如果想通過(guò)經(jīng)紀(jì)人買(mǎi)入一支A股基金,，需要先期繳納超過(guò)5%的手續(xù)費(fèi),。而如今，向任何一個(gè)對(duì)現(xiàn)代投資渠道稍有了解的人提出這樣的要求,，都會(huì)讓人笑掉大牙,。

以Vanguard為例。該公司的低成本指數(shù)基金目前管理著超過(guò)3萬(wàn)億美元的資金,，投資者需要向它繳納的費(fèi)用,，只是所謂的全面服務(wù)型經(jīng)紀(jì)人收費(fèi)的一個(gè)零頭。諷刺的是,，在面向散戶的基金里,，幾乎沒(méi)有一個(gè)高成本基金的績(jī)效能在任何一個(gè)有意義的時(shí)間段里超過(guò)它。這個(gè)證據(jù)相當(dāng)有力,，甚至沒(méi)有必要引用任何旁證來(lái)證明——沒(méi)有任何一份研究能駁倒這個(gè)結(jié)論,。

目前市面上還有兩個(gè)知名度比較高的自動(dòng)化咨詢服務(wù)平臺(tái)，分別是Betterment和Wealthfront,。運(yùn)營(yíng)僅僅幾年后,，它們便已經(jīng)分別管理著30多億美元的目標(biāo)導(dǎo)向型投資組合。嘉信理財(cái)也開(kāi)始提供類(lèi)似服務(wù),，除了對(duì)現(xiàn)金余額收取一點(diǎn)利息,，它不向客戶收取任何費(fèi)用。

如果你有更高要求的話,，Personal Capital和富達(dá)等公司還提供更豐富的服務(wù),，他們可以為投資者指定一名真人顧問(wèn)，但由于大量工作流已經(jīng)自動(dòng)化了,，所以客戶只需支付極低的成本即可,。

此外，市場(chǎng)上還有一些傳統(tǒng)的咨詢機(jī)構(gòu),，比如我的公司,。我們是一家注冊(cè)投資顧問(wèn)公司（RIA），主要為高凈值和超高凈值的投資者服務(wù),。以往每當(dāng)有中等收入的投資者上門(mén)尋求幫助,，而我們又不得不婉拒他的請(qǐng)求時(shí)，心里都是萬(wàn)分糾結(jié),。如今,，讓我們頗為自豪的是，在高科技的幫助下,，我們也啟動(dòng)了一項(xiàng)機(jī)器人顧問(wèn)服務(wù),，它可以為以往我們沒(méi)有能力服務(wù)的普通家庭提供投資建議,。

我認(rèn)為，最多不出5年,，每一家稍有規(guī)模的注冊(cè)投資顧問(wèn)公司都將推出類(lèi)似的解決方案,。這樣一來(lái)，普通投資者就不必向存在著無(wú)可救藥的利益矛盾的經(jīng)紀(jì)公司尋求幫助了,。

美國(guó)是一個(gè)總在尋找新方法做事的國(guó)家,。我們每個(gè)人都期望，一個(gè)健康繁榮的退休金體系為各階層的美國(guó)民眾提供可接受的投資選擇,。如果投資經(jīng)紀(jì)行業(yè)這類(lèi)既得利益集團(tuán)容許市面上出現(xiàn)其它方式來(lái)滿足這個(gè)目標(biāo),，那么它還可以再次迎來(lái)繁榮發(fā)展的機(jī)會(huì)。幸運(yùn)的是,，這些選擇已經(jīng)存在,，而且每天都在變得更加強(qiáng)健,。

不幸的是,，在美國(guó)，靠向廣大投資者銷(xiāo)售質(zhì)量可疑且價(jià)格偏高的投資產(chǎn)品來(lái)賺錢(qián),，是一種有著悠久歷史的行為,。另外，一個(gè)政客如果不從金融服務(wù)行業(yè)拿錢(qián),，就很難當(dāng)選,，不管你屬于哪個(gè)黨，也不管你來(lái)自這個(gè)國(guó)家的哪個(gè)地區(qū),。保險(xiǎn)公司,、券商、基金公司和政客背后的其他金主們是絕對(duì)不會(huì)坐以待斃的,。

甚至到了現(xiàn)在,，華爾街還在拼命策劃用其它什么東西替換掉勞工部提出的信托規(guī)則，并紛紛抱怨稱,，該規(guī)則給行業(yè)造成的壓力太大,。比如最近我聽(tīng)到了一個(gè)頗有喬治?奧威爾風(fēng)格的措詞，叫做“最大利益標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”,。真正的信托投資顧問(wèn)都比較抵觸這個(gè)提法,，因?yàn)樗鼊澚艘粋€(gè)虛假的等號(hào)，把單純樸實(shí)的投資者搞得更糊涂了——他們本來(lái)就很難理解“顧問(wèn)”和“經(jīng)紀(jì)”之間有什么區(qū)別,。

其實(shí)大可不必如此,。信托標(biāo)準(zhǔn)完全可以讓金融顧問(wèn)和他們的客戶都滿意。在大西洋對(duì)岸就有一個(gè)鮮活的例子,。

2006年,，英國(guó)進(jìn)行了一次“零售分銷(xiāo)評(píng)估”,，試圖了解在存在利益沖突的情況下，普通投資者的利益受金融顧問(wèn)的影響有多大,。此次評(píng)估給出的建議于2013年正式立法生效,。特別值得注意的是，銷(xiāo)售投資產(chǎn)品的零售經(jīng)紀(jì)傭金被取消了,。

在那次金融規(guī)則改革之前,，倫敦金融城（也就是華爾街的英國(guó)版）也是大叫大鬧，稱改革必將導(dǎo)致數(shù)百萬(wàn)投資者再也沒(méi)法獲得投資建議,，必然導(dǎo)致大量裁員,，一些善意的投資顧問(wèn)也沒(méi)法造福民眾了。3年后的事實(shí)證明,，這些極端的預(yù)測(cè)都是危言聳聽(tīng),。雖然目前在英國(guó)金融服務(wù)管理局注冊(cè)的金融顧問(wèn)的確少于2011年（目前為3.1萬(wàn)人，2011年為4萬(wàn)人）,，但其中至少一個(gè)原因是,，這是全國(guó)現(xiàn)象，英國(guó)所有部門(mén)都在面臨改革,，同時(shí)對(duì)金融顧問(wèn)的審查也更嚴(yán)了,。而事先很多人擔(dān)憂的“知識(shí)斷層”并未實(shí)質(zhì)出現(xiàn)。現(xiàn)代技術(shù)使得英國(guó)客戶有了更多渠道,，能夠從那些已經(jīng)規(guī)范了自身行為,，并致力于提供沒(méi)有利益矛盾的服務(wù)模式的顧問(wèn)那里獲得投資建議。

在圍繞信托標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的這場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)論中,，究竟哪方會(huì)輸,、哪方會(huì)贏，抑或雙方是否會(huì)達(dá)成某種折衷,，目前還不得而知,。不管結(jié)果如何，這個(gè)行業(yè)最終將不得不放棄“利益矛盾是服務(wù)所需”這樣的彌天大謊,。而技術(shù)創(chuàng)新和美國(guó)資本主義的不竭動(dòng)力,，也必將能再次找到一種有利可圖的方式，改善金融服務(wù)業(yè)的生存狀態(tài),。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文作者Joshua Brown是財(cái)富管理公司Ritholtz Wealth Management的CEO,，該公司去年啟動(dòng)了一項(xiàng)機(jī)器人咨詢服務(wù)。他還是熱門(mén)理財(cái)博客“The Reformed Broker”的撰稿人,。

譯者：樸成奎

審校：任文科

There’s a horrendous lie being told by the brokerage industry and its army of lobbying groups. It goes something like this:

“Middle-class Americans are not worth serving if we can’t charge them egregious fees and sell them products that they do not need.”

They’re not using that exact language, but this is precisely what they’re saying. This message disgusts me personally and I’m in a unique position to comment on it professionally. As I documented in my book Backstage Wall Street, the business model of selling investment products to investors is hopelessly rife with conflicts.

For the first half of my career, I was a cog in the machine, working at third-tier broker-dealers and selling products to the masses. I saw these conflicts firsthand. Over the years since, I’ve tried to get the truth out there about what I’d seen when Wall Street and Main Street collide. But the incentives that create bad behavior are still there. Under the current compensation regime, even the best intentioned brokers are continually put in a situation where what’s best for their own paycheck is not always what’s in their clients’ best interest. Brokers are routinely compensated the most heavily for selling the products that cost their clients the most in fees and lost performance.

In other industries, higher-priced products are typically superior in both quality and efficacy—think luxury watches and cars, or the difference between a roadside motel and the Ritz-Carlton. With financial services products, however, it works in exactly the opposite way. Virtually every single piece of academic research ever produced on the topic says that the less you pay for an investment product, and the simpler it is, the better off you’ll be over the long-term.

Wall Street knows this for a fact. It’s undeniable that high fees and excessive trading costs damage the long-term potential of a retirement account and work against investors.

Unfortunately, the brokerage business is predicated on selling the higher cost solutions because that’s where the profit margins are. The incentives paid by fund companies to brokerage firm sales forces across the country are a cancer that must be rooted out. This built-in conflict between advisor and client is partially responsible for the nation’s looming retirement crisis. It also plays a role in the finance industry’s almost universally negative perception among Americans.

The good news is, we are at a crossroads. There’s a push right now from the Obama administration to extend a “Fiduciary Standard” across the industry. The Department of Labor is proposing this standard would take the place of the weaker and more nebulous “Suitability Standard” that now exists and leads to unsatisfactory outcomes for regular people. New legislation is now before congress that would force brokers to act as non-conflicted fiduciary advisors when helping investors with their retirement accounts. Any normal person with a functioning brain would agree that this is obviously the way things should work.

But when it comes to politics, we’re not always dealing with normal people. The brokerage industry is powerful and its lobbying groups play the game fiercely. The Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) estimates that the current suitability standard costs U.S. households some $17 billion in excess fees and adverse performance. A combination of ten independent studies estimates that the true cost is likely between $8.5 billion and $33 billion! There is a lot of money on the line, so the opposition to new rules should not come as a shock.

What’s shocking, however, is the tack they’re taking in framing this as a debate over what is best for the investor class. Last week, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan gave Wall Street an assist by slamming the Obama administration’s proposal, claiming, along with others, that the fiduciary rule will lead to so much excess regulation and red tape that brokerage firms will have to give up on servicing smaller investor accounts.

On his official blog, Ryan lashed out at the Fiduciary Standard rule with this mock definition:

fi?du?ci?a?ry rule [fi-doo-shee-er-ee rool], noun (2016): regulation, Department of Labor.

1 : A one-size-fits-all regulation from the Obama administration.2 : Creates more paperwork and costly record-keeping requirements for financial planners, restricting access to quality investment advice for upwards of 7 million Americans with IRAs. 3 : Results in higher costs for people seeking financial advice, disproportionately hurting families with smaller bank accounts.

Example Sentences:

The Obama administration’s fiduciary rule will hurt millions of hardworking Americans trying to plan for their retirements and save for the future.

House Republicans, led by Reps. Ann Wagner (R-MO), Phil Roe (R-TN), and Peter Roskam (R-IL), are working to protect families from the harmful fiduciary rule.

Democrats and Republicans agree that the administration should abandon this proposal and go back to the drawing board.

The logic here is astounding. The argument is literally that some people need to be taken advantage of in order for them to be worthwhile clients. I believe Ryan is on the wrong side of this issue and on the wrong side of history. But more than that, his argument—that somehow conflicted advice is better than none at all—is wrong for at least two reasons.

For starters, it’s cynical to the point of being downright un-American. We don’t allow any other industry in this country to operate this way, openly or otherwise.

The much bigger problem, though, is this: It’s a lie. A horrendous lie.

In 2016, we live in an age of unparalleled financial technology innovation. It has never been a better time to be an investor. The modern buyer of stocks and bonds has a nearly unlimited array of options by which to obtain extremely efficient and incredibly low-cost exposure to the investment markets. Fees and trading costs have been dropping precipitously while, at the same time, a Cambrian Explosion of sorts has given rise to all manner of automated advice services and exchange traded fund products.

The notion that an investor needs to pay upfront fees of in excess of 5% to buy an A-share mutual fund from a broker is laughable to anyone with even a passing familiarity with the modern-day options that exist.

Vanguard is now managing in excess of $3 trillion dollars in low-cost index funds that cost investors a fraction of what full-service brokers charge for the funds they are incentivized to sell. And again, the grand irony is that there are virtually no high-cost funds available to the retail public that have been able to outperform them over any objectively meaningful timeframe. The weight of the evidence here is so staggeringly one-sided that it’s not even worth citing individual studies—there’s never been one that’s been able to say otherwise.

There are two well-known automated advisory services, or robo-advisors, called Betterment and Wealthfront. After only a few years of operation, each is managing more than $3 billion in goal-oriented investor portfolios. Charles Schwab is now offering this same service with the interesting wrinkle that they are charging clients nothing other than a tiny bit of interest on cash balances.

As we move up the ladder a bit, there are slightly more hands-on services being offered by firms like Personal Capital and Fidelity, where investors can be assigned a human advisor but pay a very low cost because of how much the workflow can be automated.

And then there are traditional advisory firms like mine. We are a registered investment advisory (RIA) catering primarily to high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth investors. We used to shudder whenever we had to turn down a middle-income investor who was asking for our help. It is now a point of pride for us that technology has allowed us to launch a robo-advisory service of our own, which offers portfolios to households that we would not have previously had the capacity to service. Within five years, my best guess is that every RIA of scale will have a similar solution for investors who would have, in another era, been forced to seek help from a hopelessly conflicted brokerage firm.

We are a nation that has always strived to find new ways of doing things. Entrenched interests like the brokerage industry can thrive once they admit that there are other ways to accomplish something we all want—a healthy and thriving retirement system that offers acceptable choices for Americans of all walks of life. Fortunately, these choices currently exist and are becoming more robust by the day.

Unfortunately, there is a long and profitable tradition of selling high-cost products of dubious quality to the investing public. It’s also very hard to become an elected official without taking money from the financial services industry, no matter which party you’re affiliated with or which region of the country you hail from. Insurance companies, broker-dealers, mutual fund companies, and other backers of the status quo will not go down without a fight.

Even now, Wall Street is hard at work concocting alternatives to the proposed Fiduciary Standard rule, which they claim is unduly onerous on the industry. One Orwellian phrase I heard recently was “Best Interests Standard,” which true fiduciary investment advisors are wincing at because it draws a false equivalency that muddies the waters even further among the unsophisticated investors, who already have difficulty understanding the difference between advisers and brokers.

It doesn’t have to be this way. It’s entirely possible for a fiduciary standard to work to both the satisfaction of financial advisers and their clients. We have a living, breathing example right across the Atlantic.

In 2006, the United Kingdom conducted a “Retail Distribution Review” or RDR to look at how ordinary investors were being affected by conflicted financial advice. The recommendations produced by the RDR were put into effect in 2013. Notably, retail brokerage commissions for the sale of investment products were made extinct.

In the lead up to this rule change, The City—London’s version of Wall Street—kicked and screamed about how change would represent the end of financial advice for millions of investors. Mass layoffs would ensue and the regulations would make it impossible for well-meaning advisors to do their jobs. Three years later, it’s apparent that all of the worst predictions have been proven false. There are fewer advisers registered with the Financial Services Authority, than there were in 2011—31,000 vs. 40,000. But at least some of that is because of the national attrition that all sectors facing reform and increased scrutiny go through. The widely feared “guidance gap” has not materially grown. Modern technology is allowing U.K. customers more access to advice from the advisers who cleaned up their acts and committed to providing a non-conflicted service model.

It is too early to tell which side will win in the fiduciary standard debate, or whether or not there will be a compromise in place of a true change in the standard of care. Regardless of what plays out, the industry will eventually be forced to abandon the horrendous lie that conflict is a requirement for service. Technological innovation and the relentless force of American capitalism will find a way to improve the state of financial advice profitably, just as it always does.

Joshua Brown is the CEO of Ritholtz Wealth Management, which last year launched a robo-advisory service. He is also the author of the popular finance blog The Reformed Broker.