大約一年前,，全球股市經(jīng)歷了一次暴跌，有人將其稱為中國的黑色星期一,。去年8月24日,，上證指數(shù)重挫8.5%,，進(jìn)而帶動全球股市下滑，貨幣和大宗商品市場也因此陷入混亂,。

除了經(jīng)濟(jì)損失,，本次市場暴跌還有損中國決策層的聲譽。這些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人曾引領(lǐng)中國度過了全球金融危機(jī),，但這次他們遇到了挫折,，投資者的大舉拋售反映出中國政府在控制市場方面能力有限。面對可能無法繼續(xù)迅猛增長的中國經(jīng)濟(jì),，投資者也就軟著陸一說提出了質(zhì)疑,。還有人認(rèn)為中國可能引發(fā)新一輪金融危機(jī)。

差不多在同一時間,，人們開始觀察人民幣,，以便找到中國經(jīng)濟(jì)存在弱點的跡象。據(jù)說,，貨幣走弱是貶值的明確征兆,，它意味著一定出了什么問題。而實際原因是人民幣走弱是匯率市場化的體現(xiàn),，但這種說法對許多人來說則不那么有說服力,。

一年過去了，盡管全球經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)復(fù)蘇似乎依然遙不可及,，但中國的情況已經(jīng)穩(wěn)定了下來,。雖然今年初股市又讓人們擔(dān)驚受怕了一次，但中國政府的促增長措施已經(jīng)開始見效,，盡管那意味著對長期發(fā)展至關(guān)重要的改革進(jìn)程將放慢,。

這能說明中國已經(jīng)擺脫困境了嗎？除非大家把許多問題都拋諸腦后,，比如債務(wù)規(guī)模擴(kuò)大,，公司盈利能力下降，以及眾多國企生存艱難,，其中包括為整個城鎮(zhèn)提供就業(yè)機(jī)會的鋼鐵廠和礦山,。

當(dāng)然，房地產(chǎn)市場有了起色,。樓市開始去庫存,，建設(shè)活動持續(xù)反彈；按照目前的銷售速度,，南京,、合肥等城市的樓市庫存將在短短三、四個月內(nèi)售罄，只是這種銷售速度并不常見,。受資本管制影響,，資本外流速度也在放慢。

人民幣下跌時,，投資者并未慌張,。央行官員在官方媒體上闡述了他們的看法，進(jìn)而改善了政策溝通情況,，這就意味著更多人明白了為何會出現(xiàn)這種情況——由于現(xiàn)在的人民幣匯率以11種貨幣構(gòu)成的貿(mào)易加權(quán)貨幣籃為基礎(chǔ),，它兌美元的匯率將出現(xiàn)更大的起伏。

目前的問題在于,，全球金融危機(jī)以來,，中國的債務(wù)雪球越滾越大，這是一張錯綜復(fù)雜的網(wǎng),，連接著和政府有關(guān)聯(lián)的企業(yè),、政府控制的銀行以及債券市場。中國的公司,、個人,、政府以及銀行債務(wù)之和從2008年GDP的164%升至了2015年的247%。不過,，盡管過去五年中國的美元債券發(fā)行量猛增,，但外幣債務(wù)只占中國債務(wù)總額的一小部分，約為1500億美元,。

在所有這些債務(wù)中,，會有多少變成壞賬呢？沒人知道,。預(yù)測數(shù)字跨度很大,，從近7萬億元人民幣一直到大約23萬億元人民幣。1萬億美元左右的最低預(yù)期約占中國10萬億美元經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模的10%,。

雖然外界認(rèn)為中國國家主席習(xí)近平傾向于采取強(qiáng)硬措施,，比如關(guān)閉無法維繼的國企，以及對和政府有關(guān)的借款人加強(qiáng)約束,，但到目前為止,，中國采取的辦法一直是釋放更多的刺激措施，只是規(guī)模沒有前幾次那么大,。雖然可以爭取時間，但這樣做會產(chǎn)生更多債務(wù),。

那么,，債務(wù)引發(fā)的崩盤會很快出現(xiàn)嗎？答案是：可能不會,。

中國的大多數(shù)債務(wù)都以人民幣計價,，也就是說,，在最壞情況下，中央政府可以通過發(fā)行貨幣來解救那些和政府有關(guān)而且具有系統(tǒng)重要性的借款人,；中國政府可以直接向國有銀行放貸,，這種資金來源枯竭的可能性較小,；同時,，中國還是凈出口國和資本借出國，也就是說,，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)不需要靠變化無常的外國人來填補(bǔ)赤字,。

然而，刺激政策只能是權(quán)宜之計,。它可能有助于延緩信貸金融的突然撤退或者資產(chǎn)價值的陡然下降,。在歷史上，這兩種情況一直都是金融危機(jī)的誘因,。但要解決將資金用于生產(chǎn)力匱乏的行業(yè)和投資造成的重大扭曲現(xiàn)象,，就需要進(jìn)行改革，這是刺激政策所無法代替的,。

決策層已經(jīng)取得了一些進(jìn)展,。他們正在解決債券市場的道德風(fēng)險問題，途徑是允許幾家國企違約,；中國的金融體系已經(jīng)開始區(qū)分信用風(fēng)險,，雖然按國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)其做法還不成熟，但這對中國市場來說是個突破,。

隨著全球風(fēng)險增大,，決策層必須在保穩(wěn)定和進(jìn)行必要改革的需求之間做出平衡和妥協(xié)。今后的選擇會很艱難,。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

作者Hugh Young是阿伯丁資產(chǎn)管理亞洲分公司董事總經(jīng)理

譯者：Charlie

審校：詹妮

This week marks the anniversary of last year’s stock market crash that some have dubbed China’s Black Monday. Shanghai shares fell 8.5% on August 24, triggering losses on exchanges around the world and causing mayhem in currency and commodity markets.

Apart from the financial losses, the market meltdown damaged the reputation of China’s policymakers. The technocrats who had steered the country through the global financial crisis were humbled as investor capitulation showed the limits of their power to control markets. Investors questioned assumptions about a soft landing for an economy that could no longer sustain its relentless pace of growth. There was talk China would trigger the next financial crisis.

Around the same time, people started monitoring the renminbi for signs of economic vulnerability. Currency weakness, it was argued, clearly meant devaluation – a sure sign that something was amiss. The real reason – that a weaker yuan was a symptom of currency liberalization – was, for many people, less convincing.

One year on, and although the prospects for a sustainable global recovery seem just as remote, things in China have stabilized. Despite another stock market scare at the start of this year, government stimulus is bearing fruit, even if that means slowing reforms crucial to long-term development.

Does this mean China has turned a corner? Only if you ignore a long list of problems that include: ballooning debt; declining corporate profitability; and the countless state-owned businesses such as steelmakers and miners that provide work for entire towns, but struggle to survive.

True, the property market has picked up. Housing inventory levels are starting to clear and construction activity has been recovering: cities such as Nanjing and Hefei have only three to four months of housing stock based on current rates of sale, although these are exceptional. The pace of capital outflows has been decelerating because of capital controls.

When the renminbi weakens, investors haven’t panicked. Better policy communication – central bank officials have started sharing their views on state media – means more people understand why this is happening: with the Chinese currency now guided by a trade-weighted basket of 11 currencies, its relationship with the US dollar will be more volatile.

The problem now is that China’s debt – an intricate web connecting government-linked businesses, state-controlled banks and the bond markets – has snowballed since the global financial crisis. Combined corporate, household, government and bank debt rose from 164% of GDP to 247% between 2008 and last year. However, only a fraction – around $150 billion – is debt denominated in a foreign currency, even after a surge in US dollar bond issuance from China over the past five years.

How much of all this debt can turn bad? Nobody knows: estimates range widely from nearly 7 trillion yuan to some 23 trillion yuan, depending on different assumptions. That’s around $1 trillion at the lower end of these estimates, or some 10% of China’s $10 trillion economy.

Although President Xi Jinping is thought to favor a hard-line approach – shutting commercially unviable state-owned companies, imposing discipline on government-linked borrowers – China’s solution so far has been to unleash more stimulus, albeit on a smaller scale than previous rounds. While this buys time, it also creates even more debt.

So will there be a debt-inspired meltdown soon? The answer is: probably not.

Most of China’s debt is denominated in renminbi, which means, in the worst case scenario, the central government can print money to bail out government-linked borrowers deemed systemically important; Beijing can direct lending at the government banks so this source of financing is less likely to dry up; China is also a net exporter and lender of capital, which means the economy doesn’t rely on fickle foreigners to fund any deficits.

However, stimulus can only be a temporary solution. It can help delay the sudden pull-back of credit financing or abrupt asset value depreciation that, historically, have been catalysts of financial crises. But stimulus cannot replace the reforms needed to fix the massive distortions created by the misallocation of capital into unproductive industries and investments.

To China’s credit, policymakers have made some progress here: they are tackling the problem of moral hazard in the bond market by letting a handful of state-owned companies default on repayments; the financial system is beginning to differentiate between credit risks which, while still rudimentary by global standards, is a breakthrough for local markets.

As global risks grow policymakers have to reconcile the desire for stability with the need for essential reforms. Tough choices lie ahead.