Lead Edge Capital公司的創(chuàng)始人米切爾·格林同時(shí)持有Uber,、Bird,、Spotify,、阿里巴巴和騰訊的資產(chǎn),，但他在風(fēng)投界一直是個(gè)不顯山不露水的人物，這也是他有意而為之的,。

格林表示：“我并不需要長(zhǎng)篇大論地寫博客,，就某些事情發(fā)表評(píng)論,。我們只想幫助創(chuàng)業(yè)者把公司做大，讓我們的合伙人多賺些錢,?！?/p>

阿里巴巴是格林的公司做出的最重要的一筆戰(zhàn)略投資。格林對(duì)《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》表示：“我們獲得了大約10億美元的回報(bào),。”最近,，思科還以現(xiàn)金加股票的模式,，作價(jià)23.5億美元收購(gòu)了Lead Edge公司投資的Duo Security公司。就在這筆收購(gòu)之前,，思科還以11.7億美元的估值,，領(lǐng)投了向Duo Security公司的一輪7000萬(wàn)美元的融資。

Lead Edge是怎樣做投資的,？一靠不請(qǐng)自來(lái)地打電話,，二靠做深度研究，三靠一個(gè)大牌云集的合伙人網(wǎng)絡(luò),。它的網(wǎng)站將公司的合伙人放在了顯著位置，還附上了一句話：“我們可以把你介紹給誰(shuí),？”

“我們有八九個(gè)合伙人,，他們的工作非常簡(jiǎn)單——每天都給各路企業(yè)家打電話、發(fā)短信,。任意一個(gè)年份,，每個(gè)合伙人都會(huì)給大約750家公司打電話,。再乘以8，也就是說(shuō),，我們的團(tuán)隊(duì)每年要打電話給6000多個(gè)公司的CEO,。”

Lead Edge就是這樣聯(lián)系上Duo Security公司的,。他們與這家公司聯(lián)系了40多次，都沒(méi)有收到對(duì)方的回復(fù),。后來(lái)，他們動(dòng)用了自己強(qiáng)大的關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò),。最后,，Lead Edge的一位董事會(huì)成員向Duo Security公司的CEO做了一番介紹,，最終促成了這兩家公司的交易。

“我可能不是世界上最聰明的人,，但我是最能堅(jiān)持的,。”格林對(duì)我說(shuō)道,。

在接受《Term Sheet》欄目采訪時(shí),，格林探討了他的投資策略,，他為什么選擇了Uber而非Lyft,，以及風(fēng)投界的形勢(shì)正在如何演變,。

《財(cái)富》：請(qǐng)談?wù)勀愕耐顿Y理論,，在你投資一家公司前，你會(huì)尋找哪些指標(biāo),？

格林：我們有8個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn),，我們希望我們投資的公司能滿足其中的5到7個(gè)要求。

這8個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是：

——你們的收入在1000萬(wàn)美元以上嗎,？

——你們的收入增長(zhǎng)率在每年50%以上嗎,？

——你們的利潤(rùn)能增長(zhǎng)70%以上嗎？

——你們有經(jīng)常性業(yè)務(wù)嗎,？

——你們的人才保留率是多少,？能達(dá)到90%以上嗎?

——你們盈利嗎,？還是不賺不賠,？

——你們是否有多元化的顧客基礎(chǔ)？

——最后一點(diǎn)十分重要：你們的資金使用效率如何,？

資本使用效率是一個(gè)非常重要的指標(biāo),，因?yàn)轱L(fēng)投界的大量資本打了水漂，我們希望我們投資的公司能以非?？斓乃俣仍鲩L(zhǎng),，同時(shí)也不要燒掉太多資本。

舉個(gè)例子：有很多軟件公司燒了6000多萬(wàn)美元資本,，才做到了2500萬(wàn)美元市值。我們想找的是類似Duo Security這樣的公司,，他們的收入在2億美元以上,，但只消耗了4000萬(wàn)美元左右的資本。

資本使用效率之所以重要,，是因?yàn)槿绻?jīng)濟(jì)出現(xiàn)衰退,，那些燒錢率比較低的公司仍然可以繼續(xù)存活下去,，并且以較低的增長(zhǎng)率繼續(xù)保持增長(zhǎng),。

Uber這么多年都沒(méi)有盈利，而是一直處于虧損,。這似乎與你的“不燒錢”投資哲學(xué)背道而馳,？

格林：當(dāng)我們投資Uber的時(shí)候，它是符合我們對(duì)資本使用效率的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的,。我們投資Uber是在2014年末到2015年初這段時(shí)間,，當(dāng)時(shí)Uber已經(jīng)融到了18億美元資本,。我們最關(guān)注的是現(xiàn)金消耗與凈收入的對(duì)比。一家公司拉到了融資,，并不代表這筆錢已經(jīng)被花掉了,。另外，我們有時(shí)也會(huì)投資于資本使用效率不高的公司,，但這樣做是有特殊原因的,。還有,，資本使用效率也并非我們投資的必要條件，它只是8個(gè)重要標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中的一個(gè),。我們希望投資的是那些能夠滿足5到7個(gè)條件的公司,。

你為什么選擇投資Uber而不是Lyft？

格林：有意思的是,，我當(dāng)時(shí)甚至都不認(rèn)識(shí)Uber創(chuàng)始人特拉維斯·卡拉尼克,。我對(duì)Lyft聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人約翰·齊默的了解要遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)前者。約翰是一個(gè)出色的人,，那么我們?yōu)槭裁催x擇了Uber而不是Lyft呢?

Floodgate公司的女風(fēng)投家Ann Miura-Ko是我們的好朋友,。她告訴我們,，我們應(yīng)該關(guān)注一下Lyft，當(dāng)時(shí)它的估值是4億美元左右,。事實(shí)證明,，我們確實(shí)犯了傻，當(dāng)時(shí)我們應(yīng)該關(guān)注一下Lyft的。最后我們以400億美元的估值投資了Uber,。在Lead Edge內(nèi)部，我們也有過(guò)很大爭(zhēng)論,。有的合伙人認(rèn)為我們應(yīng)該同時(shí)投資Uber和Lyft,。還有些合作伙伴則認(rèn)為,，我們應(yīng)該只做Uber,，因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)行業(yè)的絕大部分價(jià)值會(huì)被市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者攫取，排名第二的公司能獲得的資本就會(huì)少得多,。

你認(rèn)為2019年這兩家公司的IPO情況相比會(huì)如何？

格林：我想這兩家公司可能都會(huì)表現(xiàn)得很好,，這完全取決于市場(chǎng),，我不知道今年的市場(chǎng)走向如何，但據(jù)我們預(yù)計(jì),，Uber的IPO市值應(yīng)該在1000億美元到1500億美元之間,。Lyft的IPO也會(huì)受到華爾街的歡迎，但我相信,，如果你喜歡Lyft，你就會(huì)愛(ài)上Uber,。首先,，Uber是全球化的；其次,，它在全球各地?fù)碛写罅坎煌馁Y產(chǎn),。三是它的優(yōu)食（UberEATS）服務(wù)可謂是一艘火箭飛船，有高速增長(zhǎng)的潛力,。

相比以前,，企業(yè)現(xiàn)在可以獲得的資本要多得多了,。作為一個(gè)增長(zhǎng)型投資者，你如何看待風(fēng)投領(lǐng)域局勢(shì)的演變?

格林：現(xiàn)在有很多熱錢進(jìn)入了風(fēng)投和私募領(lǐng)域,，我認(rèn)為下一步還會(huì)有更多熱錢流入這個(gè)資產(chǎn)類別,。因此，現(xiàn)在正是創(chuàng)業(yè)的好時(shí)機(jī)——你獲得資本的機(jī)會(huì)要比以前多得多,。不過(guò)我認(rèn)為這也稀釋了回報(bào),。有一句話說(shuō)得非常好：“對(duì)于一筆交易，你可以想出多高的價(jià)就出多高的價(jià),，只是希望你最好沒(méi)有下錯(cuò)賭注,?！?/p>

很多人預(yù)測(cè)2019年市場(chǎng)將走低。你看到經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩的跡象了嗎?

格林：我們研究了我們投資的這些公司第四季度的業(yè)績(jī),，它們都符合我們的預(yù)期。我認(rèn)為,，今年第一,、第二季度，美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)會(huì)有所放緩,。這是因?yàn)橐荒昵拔覀儗?shí)施了減稅,。但總的來(lái)說(shuō)，從我們投資的這些公司看,，沒(méi)有任何跡象表明美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)會(huì)在6到12個(gè)月內(nèi)出現(xiàn)衰退,。那么未來(lái)幾年里會(huì)發(fā)生經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退嗎,？當(dāng)然,，它遲早會(huì)發(fā)生的,。

我還發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個(gè)現(xiàn)象——群眾的眼光往往并不是雪亮的。你去問(wèn)100個(gè)搞私募和對(duì)沖的,，看他們?cè)谧鍪裁?，然后你反過(guò)來(lái)做，可能就會(huì)賺錢,。

你為什么會(huì)得出這個(gè)結(jié)論,？

格林：因?yàn)槲艺J(rèn)為群眾往往是錯(cuò)的，世界上最好的投資者都是孤獨(dú)的,。

你的結(jié)論很有趣,。你是否做過(guò)哪些最與眾不同的賭注,，讓你相信了“群眾往往是錯(cuò)的”,？

格林：阿里巴巴是2014年上市的,。2015年9月,，它的股價(jià)是63美元,。我在年會(huì)上做了一個(gè)報(bào)告,，指出阿里的股票是這個(gè)世界上最值得買的。到了11月,，它的股價(jià)就從63美元漲到了80美元。到2016年2月,，也就是全世界都在敵視中國(guó)的時(shí)候,，它的股價(jià)跌到了58美元。但到了2018年,，它一度上漲到了205美元。現(xiàn)在它的股價(jià)是150美元,，我認(rèn)為買入阿里股票是一筆值得尖叫的交易,。

阿里巴巴類似于亞馬遜、eBay,、PayPal和Netflix的合體。它是一家非常強(qiáng)大的公司,，它的股票是值得持有并傳給你的孫子的,。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：樸成奎

For someone whose portfolio includes Uber, Bird, Spotify, Alibaba, and Tencent, Lead Edge Capital founder Mitchell Green has managed to largely stay out of the VC spotlight. And that’s by design.

“I don’t need to be out there writing long blog posts pontificating on certain things,” Green says. “All we want to do is help entrepreneurs build big companies and make our LPs money.”

Green’s Alibaba investment helped put his growth-stage investment firm on the map. “We returned about a billion dollars,” he told The Wall Street Journal. More recently, Cisco bought Lead Edge portfolio company Duo Security for $2.35 billion in a combination of cash and stock after the firm had co-led Duo’s $70 million round at a $1.17 billion post-money valuation.

Lead Edge gets into deals through aggressive cold calling, deep research, and a star-studded network of limited partners. The Lead Edge website prominently features the firm’s LPs with the headline, “Who can we introduce you to?”

“We have 8 or 9 associates whose job is very simple — they pound the phone and send emails every day to entrepreneurs. In a given year, each associate should have made 750 calls to companies. Multiply that by 8 associates, and that means our team is talking to about 6,000 CEOs per year.”

And that’s exactly how Lead Edge got into Duo Security. They contacted the company more than 40 times with no response. Then, they leveraged their robust network for a way in. Finally, a Lead Edge board member offered to make an introduction to the CEO, and the firm ended up getting in the deal.

“I may not be the smartest person in the world, but I am the most persistent,” Green told me.

In a Q&A with Term Sheet, Green discusses his investment strategy, why he chose Uber over Lyft, and how the venture landscape is evolving.

TERM SHEET: Tell me about your investment thesis and what you look for a company before you invest.

GREEN: We have eight criteria, and we’re trying to find companies that meet five to seven of our eight total requirements.

The 8 criteria are:

— Are you $10 million+ in revenue?

— Are you growing your revenue 50% or more a year?

— Do you have 70%+ growth margins?

— Do you have a recurring business?

— What’s your retention? Do you have 90%+ gross retention?

— Are you profitable or break even?

— Do you have a diversified customer base?

— And this one is really important: How efficient are you with your capital?

The reason capital efficiency is so important is because in a world where there’s so much money being thrown around, we want to invest in companies that are growing really fast and not burning tons of capital.

Let me give you an example. The world is littered with $25-million software companies that have burned $60 million to get there. What we want to do is find companies like Duo Security that got to $200 million+ in revenue and burned about $40 million.

The reason capital efficiency is so important is that if there’s an economic downturn, we believe that the entrepreneurs who can build businesses without all that much money can just float on their burn rate and grow a little slower during a downturn.

Uber hasn’t turned a profit and has been losing money for years. How does this fit within your thesis around not investing in fast-growing businesses that burn through cash?

GREEN: When we invested in Uber, it met our criteria of being capital-efficient. When we invested in late 2014/early 2015, the company had raised about $1.8 billion of capital previously. We focus on the cash burn versus net revenue. Just because a company has raised money doesn’t mean it’s been spent. Also, keep in mind that sometimes there are specific reasons why we invest in companies that aren’t capital efficient (again, a company doesn’t need to be capital efficient since it’s only 1 of 8 criteria), and we’re looking to invest in companies that meet five to seven of the criteria.

Why did you choose to invest in Uber over Lyft?

GREEN: It’s funny — I didn’t even really know [Uber founder] Travis [Kalanick]. I actually know [Lyft co-founder] John Zimmer way better than I actually know Travis. John’s a great guy. So why did we choose Uber over Lyft?

Ann Miura-Ko from Floodgate is a good buddy of ours, and she told us we should look at Lyft around the time it was at a $400 million valuation. Look, we’re idiots — we should have looked. We ended up investing in Uber much later at a $40 billion valuation. There was actually a very big debate at Lead Edge around this. Some partners thought we should do both Uber and Lyft. Other partners felt we should only do Uber because the vast majority of the value accrues to the market leader, and the No. 2 gets much less capital.

How do you think their 2019 IPOs will compare?

GREEN: I think they’ll probably both do well. It all depends on the market, and I have no idea where the market’s headed, but we do think Uber will trade somewhere between $100 and $150 billion. A Lyft IPO will be well-received by the Street, but I believe if you like Lyft, you’ll love Uber. For one, Uber is global. Two, it has stakes in a bunch of different assets around the world. Three, you’ve got UberEATS, which is a rocketship.

Companies have access to a lot more capital these days. As a growth investor, how do you see the venture capital landscape evolving?

GREEN: There’s a lot of money going into venture capital and private equity now, and I actually think there will be even more money that comes into the asset class. It’s a great time to be an entrepreneur — you have so much more access to capital. But I think it does dilute returns. The best quote I ever heard was, “You can pay as high a price as you want for a deal, you just better be right.”

A lot of people are predicting a market downturn in 2019. Do you see any signs of a slowdown?

GREEN: In the private sector, we have seen our portfolio companies’ Q4 numbers and they’re all in line with our expectations. I do think growth will slow down a little bit in Q1 and Q2 in the U.S. just because a year ago, we had tax cuts. But overall, we don’t see anything in our portfolio that would indicate a recession in the U.S. is coming in the next 6 to 12 months. Could it happen in a few years? Sure, it’s bound to happen at some point.

I also find the following — the crowd is usually wrong. Ask 100 guys in private equity and hedge funds what they’re doing, and then do the reverse, and you’ll probably make money.

Why’d you come to that conclusion?

GREEN: Because I think the crowd is usually wrong. The best investors in the world are lonely.

Interesting. What’s the most unpopular bet you’ve made that supports the “crowd is usually wrong” framework?

GREEN: Alibaba went public in 2014. In September of 2015, Alibaba’s stock price was $63 a share. I stood up at my annual meeting and gave a presentation that I thought Alibaba was the most no-brainer investment on the planet. The stock was at 63 bucks. It then goes from $63 to $70 to $80 in November. Then by February of 2016 — when the world decided it hated China — it went to $58. The stock, at its high, was $205 in 2018. It is now at $150, and I think it’s a screaming buy.

Alibaba is like a combination of Amazon, eBay, PayPal, and Netflix. It’s a juggernaut. This is a business you want to own and give to your grandkids.