蘋果股票曾經是華爾街的寵兒,，2018年10月3日達到233美元峰值，公司市值因此攀至1.1萬億美元,，打破世界紀錄,。此后其股價共計下跌33%，因此大批分析師宣稱蘋果股價現在十分便宜,，也并不奇怪,。乍一看，用來判斷股票估值偏高還是偏低的衡量標準甚至都支持樂觀派的觀點,。

蘋果公司悲觀的盈余公告,，加上當前的下行趨勢卻傳達了相反的信息：投資者要小心。簡而言之,，蘋果不再是可以為再投資資本帶來強勁回報的成長股,；也不是毋需花費大筆資金就能持續(xù)為股東創(chuàng)造可觀收益的價值股。未來最好的辦法是蘋果不得不投入大量資金研發(fā)新產品或進行收購,，而這些舉措最多只能帶來普通收益,，當然不可能產生像iPhone一樣的回報。

蘋果公司的首席執(zhí)行官蒂姆·庫克在1月2日出人意料地拉響警報,，稱蘋果收益會遠低于他之前的預測,，本周二公布的第一季度財報就在意料之中了。蘋果公司該季度營收為883億美元,，“毛利率”（收入減去商品銷售成本）為38%,。這與今年年初庫克的預判一致，遠低于他在2018年11月1日十分樂觀的預測,，當天蘋果公布了2018財年（9月30日結束）創(chuàng)下的歷史紀錄,，當時庫克預計銷售額為890億至930億美元，營業(yè)毛利會高達38.5%,。和1月2日一樣,，庫克將此歸咎于占蘋果銷售額五分之一的中國市場急劇放緩,，以及消費者不愿意花1000美元購買新的iPhone XS系列產品。

蘋果股價在收盤后交易中上漲了3.6%,，華爾街似乎松了一口氣,。事實上，哪怕是1月初的駭人警告也基本沒有動搖投資者長期以來對蘋果公司的信心,，因此宣布消息確實如期而至也不太可能讓人們做出“賣出”的建議,。就在發(fā)布會前，大約50名股票分析師中有一半將蘋果公司的股票標記為“買入”,，而另一半則標記為“持有”,。沒有一位分析師建議客戶賣出。分析師平均預測蘋果股價到年底將上漲13%,，達到176美元,。

倒退的蘋果公司

要想弄明白蘋果為什么其實一點也不便宜，需要回顧該公司自2018年秋天登頂以來出現的重大財富逆轉,。2018年,，蘋果重塑輝煌，投資者因此預言該公司將迎來增長和復興,。

從2015年年底到2017年年底,，蘋果公司都表現不佳。COROA（資產的現金經營回報率）是判斷蘋果下行趨勢的一個重要指標,，該指標由會計專家杰克·切謝爾斯基發(fā)明,。COROA將企業(yè)全年創(chuàng)造的所有現金相加，重新加上賦稅和實際支付的利息（而非應計利息）,，以消除稅收和杠桿的影響,，再將該數值除以業(yè)務中配置的總資產。COROA越高,，管理層在工廠,、倉庫、商店和營運資金中投入的每一美元的收益就越高,。如果COROA逐年上升,，意味著一家公司在資產負債表上新投入的每一美元資產都在產生越來越高的回報。換句話說,，公司在不斷增長,，并朝著正確的方向前進。

相反,，蘋果卻在倒退,。從2016財年初到2017年9月30日，蘋果的總資產（按年度平均值計算）激增1040億美元，達到3920億美元,。然而,，盡管蘋果采用將留存收益投入低收益?zhèn)姆绞綄?000多億美元重新投資，2017年的經營現金流比2015年下降了170億美元,。其COROA或資產現金回報率在這兩年間從33.1%跌至19.9%,。

2018財年，蘋果經歷了令人矚目的偉大復興,。2018年的秋天是蘋果事業(yè)的小陽春,。公司股價在10月初登頂，一個月后公布的財年業(yè)績創(chuàng)下新高,，扭轉了2015年至2017年的局勢,。2018年，蘋果的經營現金流提高了130億美元,，相當于17%,，但蘋果的這一重大勝利卻并非是通過增加新資產實現的,；事實上,，財年末的資產負債表比年初減少了60億美元。既減少資產,，又擴大現金流,，這個黃金組合是推高股票的秘方，也說明公司管理十分得力,。

蘋果公司怎么處理它沒有留為己用的那部分現金呢,？這些錢再加上其它部分資金都返還給了投資者。2018財年蘋果的自由現金流,，即運營現金減去資本支出達到637億美元,。但公司花了864億美元回購股票、支付股息,，這個驚人的數字是其自由現金流的136%,，這意味著它從資產負債表中拿出了超額現金獎勵投資者。蘋果公司的增長似乎來自基礎業(yè)務的復蘇,。2018年,，蘋果收入暴漲370億美元，增長率為16%,，成本僅上漲13.8%,，帶來了利潤的提高。當年中等價位的iPhone 6大賣,；事實上,，iPhone銷售額的增長占總收入增長的70%。

盡管蘋果實現了用最少新增投資產生最多現金流的改變，成績驕人,，但卻沒有充分利用這筆現金,。它將731億美元用于高價回購自己的股票——平均價格為180.3美元，比今天的股價高出14%,。如果按照今天的股價回購,，使用同樣的錢能降低其股份總數，將每股收益提高1.5%,。

輝煌難以再現

蘋果第一季度收益的下滑,、庫克對中國市場和iPhone XS銷量的預警，清楚地表明2018年的成功獨一無二,，不可復制,。另一方面，蘋果市值下跌三分之一,，跌幅達3620億美元,，這意味著投資者未來的收益將遠低于四個月前的預期。那么蘋果看似不高的估值是否低估了一家偉大公司的未來前景,，蘋果股票現在是否值得大量購入,？

實際上，蘋果在以下兩種情況下可能真的很便宜,。第一種情況是將這家智能手機巨頭視為無增長的價值型股票,。過去幾年，蘋果可持續(xù)的自由現金流大約在500億美元左右,，遠低于2018年的驕人數字,。這樣一來，其市值上限為現金流量的14.5倍,。因此,，如果蘋果重復去年的做法，以回購和分紅的形式將所有現金流返還給投資者,，它的“實際”收益率為6.9%（14.5倍的倒數）,，假設通脹率為2%，則其名義收益率為8.9%,。由于十年期國債收益率只有2.5%,，蘋果的收益率看起來仍然非常可觀,?！斑@就像買了一只收益率穩(wěn)定保持在幾乎9%的優(yōu)先股，”切謝爾斯基說,，“前提是蘋果能持續(xù)從龐大的客戶群中獲得穩(wěn)定的收入,?！?/p>

如果這種情形成立，蘋果現在的股價確實很便宜,。但蘋果公司處在一個動蕩不安,、快速發(fā)展的行業(yè)，長期保持高利潤需要不斷推出新產品,，而非依賴舊產品,。“蘋果就像幾年前的微軟一樣,?！鼻兄x爾斯基說?！拔④洀腤indows軟件中甩掉了大量現金,，但未能推出新的熱門產品，最終通過擴大服務重新實現增長,?！?/p>

在第二種情況下，如果蘋果可以找到像iPhone一樣轟動的新產品,，那么現在的股價就很便宜,。新產品必須十分熱銷，才能將利潤維持在當前水平,，更不用說推動增長了,。目前為止,，XS遠遠算不上熱門,。iPhone巨大的利潤空間吸引著競爭對手的追逐，三星等勁敵正在對其霸主地位發(fā)起挑戰(zhàn),。最有可能的是,，蘋果將不得不投入大量現金尋找新的熱門產品。

過去蘋果公司從未表現出能夠通過保留現金來提高回報,。它可能會轉而開展收購,，此前蘋果公司一直避免選擇這種方式。但大規(guī)模的并購風險大,、成本高,。從某種意義上說，蘋果公司是自己成功的犧牲品,。它將繼續(xù)產生相對較高的收益和利潤,，但由于其新增投資會產生低收益甚至負收益，公司的現金流將持平或減少,，2016,、2017年就是這種情況。

投資者有充分理由拋售蘋果股票。很難相信它的輝煌時刻幾個月前才剛剛結束,。（財富中文網）

譯者：Agatha

Apple stock was a Wall Street darling when it peaked at $233 a share on October 3, raising its market cap to a world-record $1.1 trillion. So it’s no surprise that the iPhone-maker’s 33% drop since then has emboldened the analyst community to declare that Apple is now really, really cheap. At first glance, the standard metrics that gauge expensive versus bargain valuations even backs the optimists.

Apple’s downbeat earnings announcement, and its current, downward trajectory, carry the opposite message: Investor beware. Put simply, Apple is no longer remotely a growth stock that can deliver strong returns on reinvested capital, nor is it a value stock that can keep returning tons of cash to shareholders with no big outlays of capital. In the future, the best bet is that Apple will be forced to invest heavily in new products or acquisitions, and that those initiatives will yield at best mediocre, and certainly non-iPhone-like, returns.

Given that CEO Tim Cook had issued a shocking alarm on January 2, warning that Apple’s earnings would fall well below his previous forecast, the Q1 announcement on Tuesday held few surprises. Apple posted $88.3 billion in revenues for the quarter, and achieved a “gross margin” (revenues minus cost-of-goods-sold) of 38%. That’s in line with Cook’s alert at the start of the year, and far below his super-upbeat guidance on November 1, 2018, the day Apple unveiled its record numbers for fiscal 2018 (ended September 30), when Cook predicted sales of $89 billion to $93 billion in sales, and operating margin as high as 38.5%. As in the Jan. 2 release, Cook blamed the shortfall on a sharp slowdown in China, a market that accounts for one-fifth of Apple’s sales, and consumers’ resistance to spending $1,000 and up for an upgrade to its new iPhone XS line.

Wall Street seemed relieved: Its stock jumped 3.6% in post-close trading. Indeed, even the dire early-January warning did little to shake investors’ long-term faith in Apple, so it’s unlikely the announcement confirming the bad news will trigger any “sell” recommendations. Just prior to the new release, half of the approximately 50 equity analysts following Apple labeled its shares a “buy,” and the other half issued “holds.” Not a single analyst advised clients to sell. On average, analysts forecast a 13% gain in the share price, to $176 by year end.

A company in retreat

To understand why Apple is actually far from cheap, it’s important to examine its severe reversal of fortunes since the glorious autumn of 2018. That year represented a big comeback that prompted investors to herald a renaissance in growth.

From late 2015 to late 2017, Apple was in a funk. A good metric for gauging its decline is COROA, or cash operating return on assets, a measure developed by accounting expert Jack Ciesielski. COROA totals all the cash generated by an enterprise during the year, eliminating the effects of taxes and leverage by adding back taxes and interest actually paid as opposed to accrued, and divides that number by the assets deployed in the business. The higher the COROA, the better management’s performance in exploiting each dollar invested in plants, warehouses, stores, and working capital. And a rising COROA, year after year, means that a company is generating increasing returns on each new dollar of assets it’s adding to the balance sheet. In other words, it’s continuously improving, and charging in the right direction.

Apple, in contrast, was retreating. From the start of fiscal 2016 through September 30 of 2017, Apple’s total assets, measured as a yearly average, jumped by $104 billion to $392 billion. Yet despite re-investing that $100-billion-plus, primarily by plowing retained earnings into low-yielding securities, Apple generated $17 billion less in operating cash flows in 2017 than it posted in 2015. Its COROA, or cash return on assets, dropped over that two-year span from 33.1% to 19.9%.

In fiscal 2018, Apple experienced a remarkable resurgence. The fall of 2018 unfurled as spectacular Indian summer. A month after its stock hit the early October peak, Apple unveiled record results for the fiscal year, reversing the pattern of 2015 to 2017. In 2018, Apple raised its operating cash flow by $13 billion or 17%, and but effectively achieved that coup without adding new assets; in fact, its balance sheet shrank by $6 billion from the start to the end of the fiscal year. Swelling cash flow while shrinking assets is an ideal combination—a formula for a rising stock price, and a earmark of strong management.

What did Apple do with the cash it generated it didn’t keep? All the money, and more, went to investors. In fiscal 2018, Apple achieved free cash flow, consisting of cash from operations minus capital expenditures, of $63.7 billion. But it paid out an astounding total of $86.4 billion, or 136% of that amount, in buybacks and dividends, meaning it contributed excess cash from its balance sheet to reward investors. Apple’s bedrock business appeared recharged for growth. In 2018, revenues jumped by $37 billion or 16%, while costs rose just 13.8%, a combination that lifted margins. The mid-priced iPhone 6 was an enormous hit; in fact, the jump in iPhone sales accounted for seventy percent of the total rise in revenues.

Although the shift to generating lots of new cash with minimal new investment was encouraging, Apple didn’t make the best use of that cash. It deployed $73.1 billion towards buying its own shares back at high prices–an average of $180.3, 14% above today’s level. Had Apple used the same dollars to purchase its stock at current prices, it would have lowered its total share count, and raised earnings-per-share, by an additional 1.5%.

Lightning rarely strikes twice

The drop in Q1 earnings, and Cook’s warnings on China and sales of the iPhone XS, show clearly that 2018 represented an unrepeatable, one-of-a-kind phenomenon. On the other hand, Apple’s market cap has dropped by one-third, or $362 billion, meaning that investors expect that future earnings will be a lot lower than they’d forecast just four months ago. So does its seemingly modest valuation underestimate a great company’s future prospects, making Apple shares a great buy?

In effect, Apple could indeed be cheap in either of two scenarios. The first casts the smart phone colossus as a no-growth value stock. Over the past several years, Apple’s sustainable free cash flow appears to be around $50 billion, well below its extraordinary numbers for 2018. That puts its multiple of market cap to cash flow at 14.5. So if Apple were to do what it did last year, and return all of its cash flow to investors in the form of buybacks and dividends, it would produce “real” returns of 6.9% (the inverse of the 14.5 multiple), and nominal returns, assuming 2% inflation, of 8.9%. Since ten year treasuries yield just 2.5%, that looks like a great deal. “It would be like buying a preferred stock yielding almost 9% forever,” says Ciesielski. “The idea is that Apple would keep generating consistent income from its huge installed base.”

If that scenario were plausible, Apple would indeed be cheap. But Apple operates in a tumultuous, fast-moving industry where keeping profits high over the long-term depends on continually launching new products, not relying on old ones. “Apple resembles Microsoft a few years ago,” says Ciesielski. “Microsoft was throwing off lots of cash from Windows software, but couldn’t find a new hit. It finally renewed growth by expanding in services.”

In a second scenario, Apple would be cheap if it could find blockbuster successors to the iPhone. New hits must keep coming to sustain profits anywhere near current levels, let alone recharge growth––and so far, the XS is far from a hit. The iPhone’s rich margins are catnip for rivals with competing products, and foes such as Samsung are raising a mounting challenge to its supremacy. Most likely, Apple will be forced to invest giant amounts of cash in search of those hits.

In the past, Apple hasn’t shown any ability to raise returns by retaining cash. It might turn to acquisitions, an option it has previously shunned. But big mergers are both risky and expensive. In a sense, Apple is a victim of its own success. It will keep generating relatively high earnings and margins, but as it re-invests at low or negative returns, the story of 2016 and 2017, its cash flows will go flat or dwindle.

Investors dumped Apple’s stock for good reason. It’s hard to believe that its Indian summer ended just months ago.