????為蘋(píng)果公司（Apple）CEO史蒂夫?喬布斯尋找接班人,，或許是硅谷最困難的工作之一。但是,，無(wú)論蘋(píng)果公司的董事會(huì)是否愿意,，他們都必須完成這一任務(wù)。

????最近,，《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》（Wall Street Journal）援引未透露姓名的消息人士的話稱,，“蘋(píng)果公司董事會(huì)的一些成員已經(jīng)就CEO繼任問(wèn)題與獵頭公司進(jìn)行討論，并至少與一家大型科技公司的負(fù)責(zé)人進(jìn)行了接洽,。但他們似乎并不是在代表整個(gè)董事會(huì)來(lái)進(jìn)行這項(xiàng)工作,。該報(bào)道稱，（史蒂夫?喬布斯）在一封電子郵件中寫(xiě)道,，“這沒(méi)有任何意義”,，同時(shí)稱，蘋(píng)果公司的發(fā)言人拒絕置評(píng),。

????蘋(píng)果公司董事會(huì)目前正處在一個(gè)左右為難的尷尬境地,。如果董事會(huì)還不開(kāi)始積極尋找CEO接班人，問(wèn)題將隨之而來(lái),。但是,，如果董事會(huì)成員以這種“非正式”的方式尋找接班人，同樣也會(huì)帶來(lái)問(wèn)題,。

????蘋(píng)果公司董事會(huì)對(duì)公司的治理一直是外界關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。近年來(lái),，公司遭遇了包括期權(quán)回溯,、喬布斯健康狀況之謎以及圍繞CEO繼任計(jì)劃的疑云等諸多問(wèn)題。

????不過(guò),，《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》這篇報(bào)道引發(fā)的問(wèn)題對(duì)任何一家公司的董事會(huì)來(lái)說(shuō)都是值得借鑒的,。

????很顯然，從我和董事們的交流可以判斷,，CEO繼任是所有公司董事會(huì)面臨的最大難題之一,。這主要與董事會(huì)權(quán)利平衡和CEO扮演的角色緊密相關(guān)。當(dāng)CEO同時(shí)也是董事會(huì)成員時(shí),，他的身份會(huì)非常微妙：對(duì)于既是管理層又是董事會(huì)成員的雙重身份來(lái)說(shuō),，很難清晰的界定其職責(zé)范圍（請(qǐng)參閱：默多克將何去何從？）,。

????試想,，如果一個(gè)公司的董事會(huì)成員企圖通過(guò)秘密的、未經(jīng)授權(quán)的方式，僅由少數(shù)董事私下結(jié)成小集團(tuán)來(lái)選擇CEO接班人,，那么,，這只能說(shuō)這家公司在治理上的存在隱憂。相反,，董事會(huì)成員應(yīng)該利用合理的渠道,，共同參與制定繼任計(jì)劃。

????董事會(huì)私下行事恰好說(shuō)明董事會(huì)公開(kāi)的工作出了問(wèn)題——說(shuō)明董事會(huì)的流程,、權(quán)利或特性等方面存在需要解決的問(wèn)題,。在這種情況下，任何董事會(huì)都應(yīng)該努力找出并解決真正的根源問(wèn)題,，而不是采用迂回方式達(dá)到目標(biāo),。

????蘋(píng)果公司的董事會(huì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)結(jié)構(gòu)有些獨(dú)特，共有兩位聯(lián)席董事,。蘋(píng)果公司網(wǎng)站的信息顯示,，喬布斯雖然在董事會(huì)任職，但他不是董事會(huì)主席,。其中一位聯(lián)席董事是雅芳化妝品公司（AVON）的CEO鐘彬嫻,，她同時(shí)也是薪酬委員會(huì)主席。另一位是生物技術(shù)公司基因泰克（Genentech）前CEO亞瑟?列文森,，他是提名和治理委員會(huì)主席,。

????蘋(píng)果公司拒絕對(duì)當(dāng)前董事會(huì)的做法置評(píng)。不過(guò),，蘋(píng)果公司網(wǎng)站上的公司治理準(zhǔn)則中,，有一部分題為“管理層評(píng)估和繼任”，描述了CEO,、薪酬委員會(huì)和整個(gè)董事會(huì)在這一過(guò)程中應(yīng)該扮演的角色,。

????這一準(zhǔn)則規(guī)定：“薪酬委員會(huì)應(yīng)該對(duì)包括CEO在內(nèi)的所有高管進(jìn)行年度評(píng)價(jià)，并與董事會(huì)一道將對(duì)此進(jìn)行審議,。此外,，董事會(huì)還要審議CEO的業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)評(píng)估報(bào)告，以確保CEO能有效地領(lǐng)導(dǎo)公司,。作為年度評(píng)估的一部分,，董事會(huì)和CEO應(yīng)對(duì)管理層發(fā)展和高管繼任計(jì)劃進(jìn)行年度評(píng)估?！?/p>

????因?yàn)閷ふ褻EO的接班人非常困難,，所以CEO的參與將不無(wú)裨益。不過(guò),，除CEO外,，董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立董事應(yīng)該對(duì)這一過(guò)程擁有清晰的控制權(quán),。所有的董事會(huì)都應(yīng)當(dāng)評(píng)估董事會(huì)準(zhǔn)則和章程，以確保董事會(huì)對(duì)這一過(guò)程擁有控制權(quán)——而且,，他們應(yīng)該每年進(jìn)行評(píng)估,，制定可靠的繼任計(jì)劃，并找出任何有可能影響工作流程的障礙,。

????一份有效的CEO繼任計(jì)劃是董事會(huì)對(duì)公司進(jìn)行良好治理的頭等大事,。這對(duì)于任何公司來(lái)說(shuō)都是至關(guān)重要的，無(wú)論公司現(xiàn)有狀況如何,。事實(shí)上,，它是董事會(huì)對(duì)公司和所有利益相關(guān)方承擔(dān)的最重要的職責(zé)之一。

????對(duì)蘋(píng)果公司來(lái)說(shuō),，最好的局面應(yīng)該是董事會(huì)能以適當(dāng)?shù)?、?jīng)過(guò)授權(quán)的方式來(lái)制定CEO繼任計(jì)劃。

????本文作者愛(ài)麗諾?布洛斯罕是董事會(huì)咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)價(jià)值聯(lián)盟和公司治理聯(lián)盟（The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance,，http://thevaluealliance.com/）的首席執(zhí)行官,。

????（翻譯 喬樹(shù)靜）

????Lining up a successor to a CEO like Steve Jobs may very well be the least coveted job inSilicon Valley. But it's a task that Apple's board will have to perform, whether they want to or not.

????The Wall Street Journal recently reported, according to unnamed sources, that "some members of Apple Inc.'s board have discussed CEO succession with executive recruiters and at least one head of a high-profile technology company" and the "directors don't appear to have been acting on behalf of the full board." The Journal reported that "in an email, [Steve Jobs wrote] 'I think it's hogwash' "and "an Apple spokesman declined to comment."

????For the Apple (AAPL) board, this is a no win situation. If the board isn't actively working on CEO succession, it's a problem. But if board members are working on succession in this "unofficial" way, that's a problem too.

????The Apple board has been in the spotlight from a governance standpoint for a long time. Over the years, the issues have included stock options backdating, the lack of transparency related to Jobs' health, and questions surrounding a CEO succession plan at the company.

????But the issues raised by the Journal story offer lessons for any corporate board.

????When I talk to directors, CEO succession clearly stands out as one of the most difficult issues for their boards. Much of that has to do with the power dynamics in the boardroom and the role of the CEO. When the CEO sits on the board, it can be difficult to create a clear demarcation between the CEO's role as a member of management and what the CEO's role should be as a member of the board (See: What's in store for Rupert Murdoch?).

????If members of any board are trying to accomplish CEO succession via stealth or unauthorized, small cliques of directors, that is, of course, a very troubling sign for a corporation's governance. Directors should be using their own proper channels to engage in succession planning.

????Taking the work of the board offline means there is a working problem with the board online -- signaling that a problem with process, power, or personalities at the board level needs to be resolved. It behooves any board in such circumstances to try to address the real source of the difficulty, rather than use alternate means to accomplish a goal.

????Apple has a somewhat unique board leadership structure, with two co-lead directors. Jobs sits on the board but is not the chair, according to the company's website. One co-lead director is Avon (AVP) CEO Andrea Jung, who also chairs the compensation committee. And the other is former Genentech CEO Arthur Levinson, who also chairs the nominating and governance committee.

????While Apple declined to offer comment on the current processes of its board, the company's governance guidelines, available on their website, have a section entitled "management review and succession," which outlines a role for the compensation committee and for the full board, including the CEO, in the process.

????The guidelines state, "The Compensation Committee should conduct, and review with the Board, an annual evaluation of the performance of all executive officers, including the CEO," and "The Board also reviews the CEO performance evaluation to ensure that the CEO is providing effective leadership of the Corporation. As part of the annual evaluation, the Board and the CEO should conduct an annual review of management development and succession planning for senior management, including the CEO."

????While CEO involvement can be helpful, because the issue of CEO succession can be so difficult, independent members of the board need to establish clear authority over the process apart from the CEO. All boards should review their guidelines and charters to ensure that they actually have authority over this process – and they should review every year the extent to which they have developed a solid succession plan and identify any obstacles preventing a flexible, working process.

????The effectiveness of CEO succession is a bellwether for good board governance at companies. And it is important at any company, no matter its circumstances. In fact, it represents one of the most important duties a board has to its company -- and to all its stakeholders.

????The best-case scenario at Apple? A situation where the board is working on CEO succession and using proper, not unauthorized, channels to do so.

????Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com/), a board advisory firm.