????美國商品期貨交易委員會和其他監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的調(diào)查顯示,，這些銀行在金融危機期間提交的利率遠低于實際借貸成本。原因很簡單：它們害怕如果透露的數(shù)字遠高于競爭對手,，可能引發(fā)流動性危機傳言,。2007年，巴克萊提供的準確數(shù)據(jù)顯示,，其借貸成本高于競爭對手,，令其擔心既然競爭對手一直在捏造數(shù)字，真實數(shù)據(jù)可能引起投資者和監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的警惕????戴蒙德周三將接受英國議會負責LIBOR丑聞調(diào)查的一個委員會的質(zhì)詢,，他在寫給該委員會主席的一封信中談到了這個問題,?！皣@巴克萊流動性的無端猜測源于巴克萊提交的LIBOR相對高于其他銀行。巴克萊認為,，基于市場環(huán)境,，這些銀行提交的數(shù)字太低。這引發(fā)了巴克萊對LIBOR設定流程可靠性的懷疑,?！?/p>

????美國司法部的和解文件顯示，2007年8月巴克萊開始故意報低數(shù)字,。一位“報價者”稱,，巴克萊需要“隨行就市”。另一位則告誡稱,，不能“出頭”,，因為“槍打出頭鳥”。

????上述委員會肯定會問到的是2008年10月29日戴蒙德與英國央行（Bank of England）副行長的一次談話,。談話細節(jié)已在巴克萊提交給委員會的報告中列明,。這位副行長當時擔心巴克萊提交的較高利率可能預示著壓力將至。戴蒙德的談話后記錄顯示,，“雖然他（副行長）知道我們不需要建議,，但我們的數(shù)字不需要總是像近來那么高?！?/p>

????巴克萊的文件顯示,，戴蒙德與巴克萊投資銀行業(yè)務的首席營運官杰里?德爾米西耶討論了上述對話。戴蒙德不認為英國央行是在指示他報低利率,，也否認指使德爾米西耶調(diào)低這些數(shù)據(jù),。但德爾米西耶的“結(jié)論是，英國央行指示不要將LIBOR保持在這么高的水平,，并向報價者傳達了這個精神,。”

????巴克萊的文件將這一事件描述為戴蒙德和德爾米西耶之間的誤解,。

????但一切聽起來顯然就像是英國央行在鼓勵巴克萊調(diào)低LIBOR報價,。這一丑聞可能超越戴蒙德，直達銀行監(jiān)管機構(gòu)本身,。敬請關注鮑勃?戴蒙德唱主角的英國議會聽證會,，屆時必將有更多信息曝光,。

????譯者：早稻米

????During the financial crisis, according to the findings of the CFTC and other authorities, many of the banks were submitting rates far lower than their actual borrowing costs. The reason was simple: They feared that by showing rates far above those of their competitors, they'd spark rumors they were facing a liquidity crisis. In 2007, Barclays was providing accurate data that showed higher borrowing costs than its peers, and was alarmed that those numbers would alarm investors and regulators since its peers were cooking their numbers,。????

???? Diamond addressed the issue in a letter to the Chairman of the committee he'll face on Wednesday. "The unwarranted speculation regarding Barclays liquidity was as a result of its LIBOR submissions being high relative to those of other banks. At the time, Barclays opinion was that those banks' submissions were too low given market circumstances. This raised questions for the bank about the integrity of the LIBOR setting process."

????According to the U.S. Department of Justice settlement, Barclays adopted a policy of submitting artificially low numbers in August of 2007. One "submitter" stated that the bank needed to be "part of the pack" and another cautioned the importance of holding its "head below the parapet" so that it did not get "shot off."

????What's certain to attract questions from the panel is a conversation between Diamond and a Deputy Governor of the Bank of England on October 29th, 2008. The details are given in a report Barclays submitted to the committee. The bank official was concerned that Barclays relatively high submissions might signal distress. According to a note Diamond made after the conversation, the official stated that "while he was certain we did not need advice, that it did not always need to be the case that we appeared as high as we have recently."

????According to Barclays documents, Diamond discussed the conversation with his chief operating officer of the investment bank, Jerry del Missier. Diamond did not think he had received instructions to artificially lower submissions from the Bank of England. He also denies instructing del Missier to lower the data. But del Missier "concluded that an instruction had been passed down from the Bank of England not to keep LIBOR so high. He passed down an instruction to that effect to the submitters."

????The Barclays documents portray the incident as a case as a misunderstanding between Diamond and del Missier.

????But it certainly sounds as if the Bank of England encouraged Barclays to lower its LIBOR submissions. The scandal could potentially reach beyond Diamond to the bank-skewering regulators themselves. The incident will undoubtedly provide still more material for what's been a regular spectacle, high drama in Parliament, with Bob Diamond at center stage.