????CEO現(xiàn)在每年能夠賺到1,500萬(wàn)美元的薪酬,，大約是普通員工年均工資的257倍,。

????這筆薪酬對(duì)我們絕大多數(shù)人來(lái)說(shuō)高得令人難以置信。畢竟,，CEO上千萬(wàn)美元的平均年薪幾乎是一位擁有學(xué)士學(xué)位的普通工人終生收入的4.5倍,。

????雖然高管薪酬在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間大幅下跌，但肇始于20世紀(jì)70年代的上升趨勢(shì)已經(jīng)再次啟動(dòng),。2013年是CEO薪酬持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)的第四個(gè)年頭，高達(dá)8.8%的增速遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過同期通脹率,。

????公司法專家邁克爾?多爾夫在他即將出版的新書《不可或缺和其他神話》(Indispensable and Other Myths)中聲稱,，CEO薪酬的漲幅已經(jīng)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了他們對(duì)公司和社會(huì)所做的真實(shí)貢獻(xiàn)。頗具諷刺意味的是,，這種不均衡正是公司董事會(huì)企圖把高管薪酬與績(jī)效掛鉤所導(dǎo)致的結(jié)果,。多爾夫認(rèn)為，雖然績(jī)效薪酬表面上講得通,，但這其實(shí)是一種有缺陷的理念,，無(wú)法激勵(lì)高管更加努力地工作，反而有可能抑制公司業(yè)績(jī)的增長(zhǎng),。他聲稱,，如果一位工人從事的是像流水線作業(yè)這種“枯燥且重復(fù)的”工作，績(jī)效工資可以產(chǎn)生預(yù)期效果,。但如果把這種薪酬安排應(yīng)用在從事創(chuàng)造性或管理類工作的員工身上,，它就無(wú)法奏效。

????甚至更糟的是,，績(jī)效薪酬刺激工資持續(xù)增長(zhǎng),，原因很簡(jiǎn)單：厭惡風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是人的天性，在其他條件均等的情況下,，人們總是要求相對(duì)較少,、但有保障的薪酬,，而不是相對(duì)較多、但不一定能拿到手的薪酬,。舉例來(lái)說(shuō),，普通人寧愿領(lǐng)取100萬(wàn)美元有保障的薪酬，也不愿領(lǐng)取50萬(wàn)美元基本工資,，外加獲取幾率為50%的100萬(wàn)美元獎(jiǎng)金,。在這兩個(gè)例子中，人們當(dāng)然希望賺取100萬(wàn)美元,，但他們往往會(huì)做出更穩(wěn)妥的選擇,。多爾夫認(rèn)為，這種傾向?qū)⒋偈垢吖芙吡?zhēng)取高薪保障,，進(jìn)而使得董事會(huì)的“績(jī)效薪酬”無(wú)非是錦上添花而已,。

????此外，那些爬到高管層級(jí)的人往往不需要外部因素激勵(lì)他們努力做好工作,。把工資和績(jī)效掛鉤其實(shí)會(huì)產(chǎn)生相反的效果,，鼓勵(lì)高管一門心思地提高那些將成功過于簡(jiǎn)單化的指標(biāo)，比如公司股價(jià),。有時(shí)候,，這種薪酬安排甚至鼓勵(lì)高管赤裸裸地作弊。

????衡量一位CEO的“績(jī)效”可能是公司董事會(huì)最難完成的任務(wù)之一,。為了闡明這一點(diǎn),，多爾夫援引了通用電氣公司(General Electric)前CEO杰克?韋爾奇的例子。韋爾奇1999年被《財(cái)富》雜志( Fortune)譽(yù)為“世紀(jì)經(jīng)理人”,。1981年,，當(dāng)韋爾奇接掌通用電氣的時(shí)候，這家公司的市值僅為140億美元,。20年后,，他退休時(shí)，這家公司的市值已經(jīng)飆升至4,150億美元,。多爾夫?qū)懙溃?/p>

????“杰克?韋爾奇的真正價(jià)值究竟有多大,？沒錯(cuò)，通用電氣是在他擔(dān)任CEO期間茁壯成長(zhǎng)的,，但有多少功勞應(yīng)該記在韋爾奇的名下,，而不是通用電氣預(yù)先存在的人才、知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán),、工廠,、市場(chǎng)地位和品牌聲譽(yù)？整體市況或運(yùn)氣成分又發(fā)揮了多大作用,？誰(shuí)也無(wú)法信心滿滿地回答這個(gè)問題,。將通用電氣的股價(jià)飆漲僅僅歸功于韋爾奇一人,，似乎是一種極端化的立場(chǎng)?！?/p>

????當(dāng)然,，僅僅因?yàn)殡y以評(píng)估CEO對(duì)公司的貢獻(xiàn)，并不意味著公司董事會(huì)應(yīng)該放棄這種想法,。問題是,，公司董事會(huì)已經(jīng)滿足于通過薪酬方案來(lái)推動(dòng)問責(zé)制這種錯(cuò)覺。當(dāng)股價(jià)和其他簡(jiǎn)單的指標(biāo)顯示成功時(shí),，他們就支付天價(jià)薪酬,，但很少懲罰業(yè)績(jī)不佳的高管。

????很多時(shí)候,，問責(zé)制的錯(cuò)覺恰恰為董事會(huì)所樂見,。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家早就意識(shí)到公司所有人（股東）和實(shí)際控制人（董事會(huì)和高管）的分離所造成的問題。上市公司的大多數(shù)所有人擁有的股份數(shù)額不足以使他們對(duì)一家公司施加任何控制,；對(duì)于這些所有人來(lái)說(shuō),，抽時(shí)間來(lái)監(jiān)管公司的管理工作也不劃算。在這種情況下,，董事會(huì)和高管完全可以犧牲公司所有人的利益,，毫無(wú)顧忌地謀取一己私利?？?jī)效工資正是為解決這個(gè)問題而設(shè)計(jì)的,，但它最終只是一塊遮羞布而已。多爾夫?qū)懙溃?/p>

????“1993年,，CEO平均薪酬已經(jīng)從戰(zhàn)后持續(xù)30年的穩(wěn)定階段（每年大約100萬(wàn)美元）大幅上漲。當(dāng)時(shí),，每家公司薪酬最高的五位高管吸走了大約5%的公司利潤(rùn),。盡管這個(gè)比例聽起來(lái)似乎很大，但短短十年后,，它又翻了一番,。”

????有些人認(rèn)為,，這只不過是自由市場(chǎng)正常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的結(jié)果,，即無(wú)形之手正在獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)那些對(duì)美國(guó)公司日益重要的工作崗位。但天價(jià)薪酬的捍衛(wèi)者常常忘了一個(gè)事實(shí)：董事會(huì)并不總是在照看公司股東的最佳利益,，尤其是當(dāng)他們確定某位高管薪酬的時(shí)候——這位高管往往是他們的同僚,，而且最初很可能就是這個(gè)人聘請(qǐng)這些董事加入董事會(huì)的。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

????譯者：葉寒

????The average CEO now makes $10.5 million per year, or 257 times the amount his median employee pulls in.

????For the vast majority of us, these salaries are mind-boggling. After all, that $10 million the average CEO makes in a year is nearly 4.5 times more than what your typical bachelor-degree-holding worker makes in his entire lifetime.

????And though executive compensation fell sharply during the recession, the upward trend it had been on since the 1970s has once again resumed, with CEO pay increasing by 8.8% in 2013, a rate that’s far greater than inflation and the fourth straight year of increases.

????Corporate law expert Michael B. Dorff argues in his forthcoming book, Indispensable and Other Myths, that increases in CEO compensation have far outstripped what executives actually produce for their firms and society at large. Ironically, corporate boards’ attempts to tie executive pay to performance have caused this imbalance. Dorff argues that while paying for performance makes sense on its face, it’s actually a flawed philosophy that can hinder corporate performance rather than motivate executives to work harder. He argues that while pay for performance works when a worker is engaged in “boring and repetitive” tasks like assembly line work, it fails when it is applied to workers engaged in creative tasks or those that involve managing people.

????Even worse, pay-for-performance encourages escalating salaries for the simple reason that human beings are risk-averse — and, all else equal — will demand smaller but guaranteed payments to a larger payout that’s less certain. For instance, the average person would prefer a guaranteed salary of $1 million to a base salary of $500,000 with a $1 million bonus that the person has a 50% chance of capturing. In both instances, the person should expect to earn $1 million, but people tend to choose the more stable option. This dynamic, according to Dorff, leads executives to bargain hard for high pay guarantees, leaving the board’s “performance pay” to be nothing more than icing on the cake.

????Furthermore, those who rise to the executive level often need no outside motivation to succeed at their jobs. Indeed, pinning pay to performance can actually be counterproductive for these people, encouraging them to focus on metrics that oversimplify success, like a company’s stock price. At times, it even encourages executives to outright cheat.

????Measuring the “performance” of a CEO is likely one of the most difficult tasks for corporate boards. To illustrate this point, Dorff uses the example of former General Electric GE 0.15% CEO Jack Welch, who was dubbed by Fortune in 1999 as the “manager of the century” after leading GE from a $14 billion market cap in 1981 to $415 billion 20 years later when he retired. Writes Dorff:

????“How much was Jack Welch really worth? General Electric certainly prospered during his tenure as CEO, but how much of that was due to Welch as opposed to GE’s preexisting personnel, intellectual property, factories, market position, and brand reputation? How much was due to general market conditions or fortuitous circumstances? There is no way to answer that question with any confidence. Crediting Welch alone with the rise in GE’s stock price seems an extreme position.”

????Just because it’s difficult to measure a CEO’s contribution to a company doesn’t, of course, mean that a corporate board should just give up on the idea. The problem is corporate boards have settled for the illusion of accountability with compensation programs that pay big when stock prices and other simple metrics indicate success, but they do little to punish for poor performance.

????Much of the time, the illusion of accountability is all boards desire. Economists have long recognized the problem of separating between who owns a company (shareholders) and those who control it (the board and executives). Because most owners of publicly traded corporations don’t own a large enough share to exert any control over a firm or to benefit from taking the time to oversee its stewardship, boards and executives can enrich themselves at the expense of a firm’s owners. Pay for performance was supposed to solve this problem, but it ended up being nothing more than a fig leaf. As Dorff writes:

????“In 1993, when average CEO pay had already risen sharply from its thirty-year, postwar plateau of about a million dollars a year, compensation for the top five exectutives at each corporation absorbed some 5 percent of corporate profits on average…. As big as that number seems, though, that number doubled just ten years later.”

????Some suggest that this is simply the work of the free market rewarding what has become an increasingly important job for American corporations. But defenders of escalating pay often forget that boards aren’t always looking after the best interests of their shareholders, especially when it comes to deciding the pay of an executive who is in their peer group and is likely responsible for placing directors on the board in the first place.