每當(dāng)保羅·希爾回想起他在NASA飛控室指揮的一次重大險(xiǎn)情處置的經(jīng)歷,,他經(jīng)常情不自禁地感嘆:“我的天,我們搞不好可能把所有人都害死,?!? 那是2001年3月,發(fā)現(xiàn)號(hào)航天飛機(jī)在飛向國(guó)際空間站的過(guò)程中突然遭遇重大險(xiǎn)情,。危急關(guān)頭,,希爾并沒(méi)有慌了手腳,而是專(zhuān)注于手上掌握的信息,。 當(dāng)時(shí),,發(fā)現(xiàn)號(hào)航天飛機(jī)已經(jīng)與國(guó)際空間站對(duì)接了,此時(shí)一位飛行控制員發(fā)現(xiàn),,發(fā)現(xiàn)號(hào)的兩個(gè)冷卻循環(huán)中的一個(gè)基本上已經(jīng)停止工作了,,很可能是由于循環(huán)系統(tǒng)內(nèi)部結(jié)冰造成的。 如果冰塊破裂,,有可能會(huì)損害航天飛機(jī)的冷卻系統(tǒng),,進(jìn)而燒壞發(fā)現(xiàn)號(hào)上的電腦。 是讓宇航員冒著生命危險(xiǎn)實(shí)施緊急脫離,,還是任由發(fā)現(xiàn)號(hào)變成一艘“死船”,,繼續(xù)與空間站保持駁接?面臨生死考驗(yàn),,宇航員和地面控制中心只有半個(gè)小時(shí)左右的時(shí)間做決定,。 希爾對(duì)《商業(yè)內(nèi)幕》回憶道:“這可不是個(gè)好消息?!? 希爾后來(lái)撰寫(xiě)了一本書(shū),,書(shū)名叫《從飛控室到董事會(huì)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)之路:釋放團(tuán)隊(duì)績(jī)效指南》(Leadership from the Mission Control Room to the Boardroom: A Guide to Unleashing Team Performance),。他曾作為飛行指揮官參與過(guò)24次航天飛機(jī)和國(guó)際空間站的相關(guān)任務(wù),并曾領(lǐng)導(dǎo)過(guò)2003年哥倫比亞號(hào)航天飛機(jī)失事事故的調(diào)查,。 他對(duì)《商業(yè)內(nèi)幕》表示,,NASA的飛控官們有一定的策略和辦法來(lái)對(duì)抗危機(jī)中的壓力。而這些辦法在2001年的這次危機(jī)中幫了大忙,。 “我們有可能失去這架航天飛機(jī)” 控制中心叫醒了空間站和航天飛機(jī)上的所有宇航員,,大家立即著手解決冷卻循環(huán)的問(wèn)題。工程支持團(tuán)隊(duì)沒(méi)能診斷出具體故障,。時(shí)間一分一秒地過(guò)去,,希爾和他的團(tuán)隊(duì)目不轉(zhuǎn)睛地盯著數(shù)據(jù),控制中心變得異常安靜,。 “大家在研究數(shù)據(jù),、彼此說(shuō)話、通過(guò)語(yǔ)音與飛控員交談以及做決定的時(shí)候,,就會(huì)變得更專(zhuān)注,、更冷靜?!彼f(shuō),。 后來(lái),航天飛機(jī)上的宇航員們加大了兩個(gè)冷卻循環(huán)的運(yùn)行,,使其溫度達(dá)到了標(biāo)準(zhǔn)值以上,,最終成功解決了這個(gè)問(wèn)題。 發(fā)現(xiàn)號(hào)航天飛機(jī)最終成功完成了它的使命并安全著陸,。經(jīng)過(guò)對(duì)冷卻系統(tǒng)的檢查,,證實(shí)了冷卻循環(huán)內(nèi)確實(shí)存在濕度過(guò)大的問(wèn)題。 希爾回憶道:“如果我們不是選擇了那種方法應(yīng)對(duì),,我們有可能失去這架航天飛機(jī),。假如我們當(dāng)時(shí)做了愚蠢的決定,比如強(qiáng)行脫離空間站,,試圖向地面返航,那么我們很有可能會(huì)失去這些宇航員,?!? 危機(jī)解決后,國(guó)際空間站項(xiàng)目經(jīng)理走了進(jìn)來(lái),,盛贊了希爾的飛控團(tuán)隊(duì),。 希爾回憶道:“那是我第一次暫時(shí)放下了我們正在做的事,心想:‘這些家伙干了件偉大的事,,他們真不錯(cuò),?!钡侥菚r(shí)之前,我只想著怎樣去做正確的事,,半刻也不曾分心過(guò),。” NASA飛行控制中心有戰(zhàn)勝恐慌的策略 NASA的飛控團(tuán)隊(duì)之所以能成功處置此類(lèi)災(zāi)難性的局面,,首先靠的是精神的高度集中,。希爾表示,在火燒眉毛的關(guān)頭,,大喊大叫沒(méi)有任何意義,,他的團(tuán)隊(duì)只會(huì)關(guān)注一系列問(wèn)題:
希爾指出,,僵化的思維模式也是不可取的,切記不能讓過(guò)去的經(jīng)驗(yàn)影響了你對(duì)一次新危機(jī)的理解——這一點(diǎn)不管對(duì)航天還是創(chuàng)業(yè)都適用,。 “有時(shí)危機(jī)一發(fā)生,,你就想迅速采取行動(dòng)。這時(shí)你可能會(huì)說(shuō):‘嘿,,我們以前遇到過(guò)這種局面,。我們以前有三次都是這樣做的,而且都管用,,所以這次我也要這樣做’,。而災(zāi)難往往就是這樣造成的?!? “我的天哪,!我們剛剛真的那么干了?” 正因?yàn)槿绱?,希爾也?huì)經(jīng)常向團(tuán)隊(duì)灌輸一絲“恐懼”感,,以免他們真的被過(guò)去的成功經(jīng)驗(yàn)影響了判斷。 他表示:“我們今天做的每一件事、每一個(gè)決定都很重要,。我們必須仔細(xì)研究數(shù)據(jù),,做出正確的決定,采取正確的行動(dòng),,或者給出正確的建議,,以保護(hù)這些宇航員,況且這些人本來(lái)就是我們的朋友,?!? 這樣的話,只要將精神集中在科學(xué)分析和一系列特定的問(wèn)題上,,哪怕是在危機(jī)期間,,NASA的飛行控制團(tuán)隊(duì)也能保持冷靜、理性的工作氛圍,。 希爾表示:“我的一個(gè)老上司曾經(jīng)說(shuō)過(guò):‘當(dāng)你一心只想跳樓的時(shí)候,,并不一定是你真的遇到危機(jī)的時(shí)候。你要做的是收集更多的信息,,晚一點(diǎn)再恐慌也不遲’,。” 希爾也是這樣做的,。也正因?yàn)槿绱?,發(fā)現(xiàn)號(hào)航天飛機(jī)才安然度過(guò)了冷卻系統(tǒng)故障造成的“生死半小時(shí)”。 “在NASA的飛行控制中心,,只要你經(jīng)受了訓(xùn)練,,熟悉了這個(gè)環(huán)境,即便是十分棘手的緊急情況,,也不是那么難以對(duì)付的,。”希爾說(shuō)道:“不過(guò)當(dāng)我換了班走出飛控室時(shí),,我記得我望著天空,,心中想道:‘天哪,我們剛剛真的那么干了,?’”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)) 本文原載于Business Insider.com,。 譯者:賈政景 |
Looking back now on an incident that took place in 2001 while he directed a flight from NASA’s mission control room, Paul Hill often thinks, “Holy cow, we could’ve killed everybody.” But in that moment, during the space shuttle Discovery’s March 2001 expedition to the International Space Station (ISS), Hill just focused on the facts at hand. The shuttle was docked at the ISS when a flight controller flagged the fact that one of its two cooling loops had essentially stopped working — possibly due to ice forming inside the system. If the ice broke off, it could ultimately damage the cooling system and burn out Discovery’s computers. The crews and mission control would then have about half an hour to either risk loss of life and initiate an emergency de-orbit, or remain stranded on the space station with a dead shuttle. “That wasn’t good news,” Hill told Business Insider. Hill, the author of “Leadership from the Mission Control Room to the Boardroom: A Guide to Unleashing Team Performance,” worked on 24 different space shuttle and ISS missions as a flight director and led the investigation into the 2003 Columbia disaster. He told Business Insider that NASA’s flight controllers employ certain strategies and thought processes to combat stress during crises. Those tactics came in handy during the 2001 incident. ‘We would’ve lost that shuttle’ Mission control woke up both the space station crew and the shuttle crew, who started working to solve the problem with the cooling loop. The engineering support team failed to identify the issue. Hill and his team watched the data, as mission control became quieter. “Everybody tends to become more focused and more calm as they’re working through the data, talking to each other, talking to the flight director on the voice loops, and making decisions,” he said. The crew corrected the issue by running both cooling loops hotter than they were supposed to be run. Ultimately, the Discovery completed its mission and landed safely. A review of the cooling systems confirmed there’d been excess moisture in the loops. “Had we not treated it the way we did, we would’ve lost that shuttle,” Hill said. “There’s a really good chance we could have lost those astronauts if that’d happened after we had un-docked or we had tried something foolish like jumping off the space station and trying to run for the ground.” After it was all over, the space station program manager came in and commended the mission control team. “It was the first time I actually sort of disconnected from what we were doing and thought, ‘Oh yeah, these guys are doing a great job. They are really good,'” Hill said. “Up until then it was all about doing the right thing and not taking our eyes off the ball.” Mission control has a strategy for staving off panic This intense focus is partly how the flight controllers are able deal with potentially catastrophic situations. Instead of “running down the halls with our hair on fire,” Hill said the team would focus on a series of questions. ? What was everything they knew — and did not know — about the situation at hand? ? What did the data actually say about the situation at hand? ? What was the worst thing that could happen as a result of the situation? ? Did the team have enough information to know for sure — and how could they get more information? ? What immediate steps could be taken to continue making progress in the mission or keep everyone safe? He said it’s important not to let past strategies or outcomes bias your understanding about a new crisis — whether you’re flying people into space or launching your own business. “Where you get in trouble is some bad thing starts happening and you feel the urge to start taking action,” he said. “You say, ‘Hey, I’ve been in this situation before. This is what we did the last three times. It’s always worked so I’m going to do it again.'” ‘Oh my God, did we just do that?’ Hill said that’s why he always tried to instill a bit of “fear” in his team members, lest they allow their past successes go to their heads. “What we do today, the decision we make today, matters,” he said. “We have to look at this data and make the right decision and take the right action or make the right recommendation to protect these astronauts, these people who are friends of ours.” By focusing on scientific analysis and honing in on specific questions, Hill said NASA’s mission control is able to establish a calm, logic-driven environment, even in the midst of a potential crisis. “As an old boss of mind said, ‘That first indication that you have a crisis is probably not when you want to go and jump out the window,'” Hill said. “Get a little bit more information, we can always panic later.” Hill did just that, once the danger had passed during the crisis with the Discovery’s cooling loops. “Really ugly emergencies in mission control, once you get trained and you’re accustomed to the environment, aren’t that difficult to deal with,” he said. “But when I walked out after I was finished with my shift, I remember looking up at the sky, and thinking, ‘Oh my God, did we just do that?'” This article originally appeared on BusinessInsider.com |