傳統(tǒng)上,,美國人希望退休后過得安逸些。在辦公室或者工廠工作四十載以后,,60多歲便卸下工作的重擔,,在生命的最后幾十年與親朋好友悠然度過,回憶生命里的美好,。但金融危機肆虐之后,,越來越多的美國老年人選擇留在職場。
有人認為這一趨勢比較積極,,有助于經(jīng)濟發(fā)展,。也有人感到不安,因為很明顯不少老年人繼續(xù)工作只是因為不工作就沒法養(yǎng)活自己,。其中有些人因為房產(chǎn)市場崩盤失去了財富,,有些是因為儲蓄不足,或是子女收入不高無力贍養(yǎng),??傊诵萑耸繙p少怎么看都不太妙,。
今后幾年,,美國老年人繼續(xù)工作的壓力可能有增無減,。因為贍養(yǎng)退休人士的年輕勞動者增長放緩,甚至可能不增反降,。
就在十年前,,美國還是生育率極高的發(fā)達國家。全國總體生育率約為2.1,,意味著美國女性一生中平均生育2.1個孩子,。該水平能保證人口長期穩(wěn)定。但之后美國的生育率下滑,,2016年降至1.8,,意味著長期來看人口將萎縮。
主要原因是拉美裔生育率下降,,該人群生育率逐漸接近其他族裔,。大蕭條無疑也是生育率走低因素之一。人們對收入和財富的預期不斷降低,,也更加擔心生兒育女對家庭財務的影響,。
生育的孩子減少最終意味著,退休人群越來越龐大,,贍養(yǎng)的年輕勞動力卻越來越少,。結果是投入社會保險和醫(yī)療保險系統(tǒng)的資金減少,要么降低退休金,,要么上調(diào)退休年齡,,或者政府赤字不斷增長。從過往經(jīng)歷推測,,美國人將工作更多年,。
20世紀80年代末,美國的生育率下降后迎來反彈,??烧缃?jīng)濟學家萊曼·斯通所說,出于一些原因,,類似歷史可能不會重演,。一方面,住房成本居高不下且持續(xù)提升,,而撫養(yǎng)和教育的成本卻絲毫沒有減少的跡象,。為能在就業(yè)市場中順利發(fā)展,勞動者需要接受更高層次的教育,,美國的家庭因而推遲育兒計劃,,所以新生兒減少。斯通預計,美國生育率最低可能達到1.5或是1.4,,與日本和一些歐洲國家差不多。
美國人口歷來有一大增長來源:移民,。有了低技能的移民幫忙,,撫養(yǎng)孩子的成本比較低,養(yǎng)起來也比較容易,。高技能的移民收入更多,,納稅也很多,,利用政府的服務卻很少,,他們對國家財政的正面貢獻相當大,。
可是,美國吸納的低技能移民人數(shù)下降,,撫養(yǎng)成本料將增加。美國總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普的政策和言論讓美國對海外精英不再像過去一樣友好,,高技能移民可能很快減少,。
換言之,,美國也許很快會失去人口增長的兩大動力,逐漸成為老年人增多,、人口不斷萎縮的國家,,年輕人背負贍養(yǎng)老人的負擔更重,老人也不得不延長工作時間,,即使在到了過去的退休年紀也不能放棄工作。
在這方面,,美國將步日本的后塵,。日本保持低生育率的時間比美國久得多,直到最近也沒有多少移民流入,。即便移民人口有所增加,,大部分也都是低技能人群,。由于薪資很低,,毫無競爭力,,企業(yè)文化又僵化,,日本很難吸引高技能的國外人才。
因此,,日本的社會保障體系承受著巨大的壓力,。隨著人口老齡化加劇,,日本一再調(diào)升退休年齡,,削減福利,,對勞動者加稅,。日本還為老年從業(yè)者提供了工資補貼,,如果推遲退休就可以拿到更高的退休金,。
胡蘿卜加大棒的組合拳促使日本老年人留在勞動力大軍之中,。60歲到64歲仍在工作的男性和女性國民都比過去增加了許多,,65歲到69歲國民的就業(yè)水平回升到20世紀90年代“失去的十年”之前的較高水平,。2012年經(jīng)濟復蘇以來,65歲以上的日本就業(yè)國民估計已經(jīng)增加約200萬人,。
有些人稱之為奇跡,,或者說是好消息。將大批老年人留在職場,,的確幫助日本在缺少高技能移民和年輕人的形勢下擺脫了經(jīng)濟停滯??蛇@真是美國理想的對策嗎?讓六七十歲的爺爺奶奶輩站柜臺辦公難道就是勝利,,還是無奈的必然,?
假如希望避免重蹈日本的覆轍,,美國要采取行動避免形成類似日本的人口結構,。為了降低育兒的成本,,除了政府給予育兒方面的稅收優(yōu)惠,,普及學前教育,還要參考美國參議員伊麗莎白·沃倫的建議,,切實降低住房成本,,而且刻不容緩,。此外,,美國應該果斷調(diào)整特朗普對高技能移民的政策,大幅增加發(fā)放基于就業(yè)的綠卡,,采用加拿大式的積分系統(tǒng),,吸引國外大批高技能的人才移民到美國。
總之,,與其逼著老人工作到死,,不如確保年輕一代勞動者健康穩(wěn)定,。(財富中文網(wǎng)) 譯者:Pessy 審校:夏林
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Traditionally, Americans could look forward to a comfortable retirement. After four decades in an office or a factory, sometime in their 60s they would lay down their burdens and enjoy a final couple of decades with time to relax, spend time with family and friends, and reflect on their life. But since the financial crisis, older Americans have been increasingly staying in the workplace:
Some see this as a positive trend, because it adds to the economy. But others rightfully view it with trepidation, because there’s the distinct possibility that many of these elderly people just can’t afford to retire. Whether their nest eggs were wiped out in the housing crash, or they just didn’t save enough, or whether their kids don’t make enough money to support them, the decline of retirement seems like an ominous development.
The pressures on older Americans to work will likely only become greater in the coming years. This is because the young, working population needed to support retirees will see slower growth, and possibly outright shrinkage.
As recently as 10 years ago, the U.S. had unusually high fertility rates for a developed nation. The total fertility rate — the number of children a woman can be expected to have over her lifetime — was about 2.1 children per woman, which is the level required for long-term population stability. But since then, the rate has fallen to 1.8 in 2016, implying long-term population shrinkage:
Much of this is due to a fall in fertility among Hispanics, whose birth rates are converging with those of other groups. The Great Recession was undoubtedly a trigger as well; permanently lower expectations of income and wealth made child-rearing seem like a more financially daunting prospect.
Fewer kids means, eventually, fewer young workers to support an increasing population of retirees. This will result in less money being paid into the Social Security and Medicare systems, requiring either cuts in benefits, a higher retirement age or ever-ballooning deficits. Past experience suggests that Americans will be asked to work longer.
The U.S. bounced back from falling fertility once before, in the late 1980s. But as economist Lyman Stone has written, there are reasons why history may not repeat itself. High and increasing costs of housing, child care and education show no sign of reversing. The need for ever-higher levels of education in order to thrive in the U.S. job market is causing families to delay childbirth, which results in fewer children. Stone projects that U.S. fertility rates could fall as low as 1.5 or 1.4 — the levels that prevail in Japan and some European countries.
There is one more source of population growth that the U.S. has traditionally depended on — immigration. Low-skilled immigrants make it easier to raise kids by providing cheap child-care services. High-skilled immigrants earn more and pay a lot of taxes, while using few government services themselves, meaning that their fiscal contribution is enormously positive:
But low-skilled immigration to the U.S. has declined, meaning that more expensive childcare is on the horizon. And high-skilled immigration may soon taper off, as President Donald Trump’s policies and rhetoric make the country less hospitable for the world’s best and brightest.
In other words, the U.S. may soon find itself without its two big long-term population boosters, and wind up as a graying, shrinking nation, with young people burdened with supporting ever-more old people, and the elderly themselves forced to work long into what used to be the golden years.
In this, the U.S. will be following in the footsteps of Japan. Japan has had low fertility for much longer than the U.S., and until recently had little immigration. Even now, although immigration has been increased, it’s mostly of the low-skilled variety — with uncompetitive low salaries and an ossified corporate culture, Japan has had great difficulty attracting high-skilled foreigners.
As a result, the country’s social security system has come under great strain. As the country grew older and older, Japan repeatedly raised the retirement age, cut benefits and raised taxes on the working population. It also created a wage subsidy for elderly employment, and allowed older people to claim higher total benefits if they delayed their retirements.
This combination of carrots and sticks successfully pushed older Japanese people to stay in the labor force. Both men and women aged 60 through 64 began working much more than before, while employment levels for people aged 65 through 69 recovered to the high levels that had prevailed before Japan’s lost decade in the 1990s. People over 65 are estimated to have raised the country’s employment levels by about 2 million since the economic recovery began in 2012.
This is being hailed as a miracle or good news in some quarters. And it’s true that putting armies of old people to work has helped Japan arrest its economic stagnation despite its lack of skilled immigration or young people. But is this really the solution that the U.S. should want? Is putting grandma and grandpa behind a store counter or in an office into their late 60s and 70s a victory, or a grim necessity?
If the U.S. wants to avoid Japan’s fate, it needs to take steps to avoid Japan’s population structure. Urgent measures to make housing cheaper, such as those suggested by Senator Elizabeth Warren, should be paired with generous child-tax credits and universal pre-K education, in order to bring down the costs of having children. And the U.S. should emphatically reverse course on Trump’s policies toward skilled immigrants, dramatically expanding the number of employment-based green cards and implementing a Canadian-style points-based system for letting in large numbers of skilled foreigners.
Keeping a healthy, stable population of productive young workers is better than working until we drop.
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