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這項限制令讓美國人在疫情中得到慘痛教訓

Shawn Tully
2020-05-01

近一半美國人所在的州都有限制醫(yī)院床位數(shù)量的硬性規(guī)定,這種情況實際上妨礙了新醫(yī)院的建設(shè)和現(xiàn)有醫(yī)療設(shè)施的擴建,。

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新冠疫情讓美國得到了慘痛的教訓:限制醫(yī)院床位數(shù)量無疑是一種糟糕做法,。

在美國,近一半的州都有限制醫(yī)院床位數(shù)量的硬性規(guī)定,,這實際上妨礙了新醫(yī)院的建設(shè)和現(xiàn)有醫(yī)療設(shè)施的擴建,,甚至會限制術(shù)后恢復科在流感高發(fā)季節(jié)增加病床用于治療激增的患者。這種需求認證法律人為限制了醫(yī)院的床位數(shù)量,,導致這些州的床位數(shù)量遠遠低于其他執(zhí)行自由市場策略的各州,。

當致命疫情爆發(fā)時,那些病床數(shù)量受管制州的醫(yī)院就會陷入困境:大批感染者需要床位,,但因醫(yī)院早已人滿為患,,根本就沒有床位可用。CON法律導致醫(yī)院面對患者數(shù)量激增的情況時,,束手無策,。

鑒于這種由法律所施加的限制,你或許會以為,,新冠疫情會使美國醫(yī)院體系徹底崩潰,,迫使醫(yī)療服務提供商拒絕收治患者,并且會加快疫情傳播,。甚至許多專家早在幾周前就已經(jīng)提出了這種“末日”情景的預測,。但這種情況并沒有發(fā)生。原因不止是因為民眾很好地遵守了社交隔離措施,,能夠避免災難的發(fā)生的另一部分原因是,,一些州取消了對床位數(shù)量的管制,即允許醫(yī)院在官方規(guī)定的“床位數(shù)量”以外進行擴建。因此,,之前一直施行嚴格管制的紐約州也變得與得克薩斯州等沒有施行CON法律的州一樣自由了,。

允許醫(yī)院自由擴張帶來的顯著的效果,或許會促使各州考慮永久取消CON法律,。如果這種預測成真,,各州將取消數(shù)十年來一直施行的管制,醫(yī)療服務提供商也能在正常時期通過新增加的床位盈利,。而就算未來再次發(fā)生疫情,,他們也能成為防控疫情的屏障,而不是像現(xiàn)在一樣脆弱且不堪一擊,。

但如果各州重新執(zhí)行“需求認證”法律,,一旦未來再次發(fā)生疫情,醫(yī)院將不堪重負,。來自菲尼克斯的外科醫(yī)生,、卡托研究所研究員杰弗里·辛格表示:“我希望各州州長們說:‘我們不要再次冒這種風險?!c實行CON法律的州相比,,執(zhí)行自由市場策略的州床位更充足。各州應該以這些州為榜樣,,以保證未來美國有足夠多的床位,?!?/p>

什么是“需求認證”法律,?

需求認證法律是指,各州由州議會表決后,,通過法規(guī)執(zhí)行需求認證,。但最初這是一項在全美執(zhí)行的聯(lián)邦措施。1974年,,美國鼓勵各州組建政府部門,,對于醫(yī)療保健服務施行嚴格管制。這種做法背后的理論是,,自由競爭會導致醫(yī)療服務集中到富裕的城郊,,而貧窮的城市和農(nóng)村社區(qū)醫(yī)療水平將會落后,并且醫(yī)療服務提供商會在美國興建大量核磁共振成像和透析中心,,導致低質(zhì)量的醫(yī)院泛濫,。而最終,這些過度投資的成本都將由醫(yī)療保障體系和患者買單,。時至今日依舊如此,。

1987年,美國國會廢除了這項聯(lián)邦規(guī)定,在之后的三十年間,,有15個州先后取消了CON法律,。在保留管制的35個州,州政府機關(guān)有權(quán)批準,、否決或修改醫(yī)院,、門診中心和其他醫(yī)療服務提供商新建或擴建醫(yī)療設(shè)施的申請。各州對于管制服務的規(guī)定也有所不同,。在新澤西州,,醫(yī)療保健設(shè)施許可/認證署有權(quán)批準或拒絕各類醫(yī)院、診療中心,、療養(yǎng)院以及十多種其他服務的需求認證,。

其中最常見并且受限制最多的是醫(yī)院。執(zhí)行CON法律的35個州中,,有28個州要求新建或擴建醫(yī)院必須通過政府部門審批,。各州經(jīng)常會禁止在同一家連鎖醫(yī)院體系內(nèi),將一家醫(yī)院過剩的床位轉(zhuǎn)讓給床位不足的醫(yī)院,。實行管制的28個州中包括紐約州,、馬薩諸塞州、康涅狄格州,、華盛頓州和伊利諾伊州等疫情最嚴重的州,。值得注意的是,沒有執(zhí)行CON法律的州包括賓夕法尼亞州,、加利福尼亞州和得克薩斯州,。

CON法律并沒有達到預期的效果

人們以為人為限制任何產(chǎn)品或服務的供應就能提高醫(yī)療普及率并降低成本,這種觀念值得懷疑,。許多研究顯示,,CON法律破壞了市場競爭,其所帶來的結(jié)果可想而知:更高的價格,、更高的整體成本和更低的普及率,。問題在于,現(xiàn)有的醫(yī)院,、療養(yǎng)院和診療中心都有強烈的動機,,阻止低成本競爭對手進入他們的市場,并避免價格下降,。喬治梅森大學莫卡斯特中心高級研究員馬特·米切爾說:“這就是各州的保護主義,。”米切爾發(fā)現(xiàn),,執(zhí)行CON法律的州提供的門診手術(shù)中心,、透析設(shè)施和核磁共振成像設(shè)施遠少于其他州。

美國勞工部、財政部和衛(wèi)生與公眾服務部部長在2018年致總統(tǒng)信中警告:“各州限制醫(yī)療服務市場準入的政策,,會限制人們的選擇,、競爭和創(chuàng)新?!边@三個部門與聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會和司法部的反壟斷部門建議各州考慮取消CON,,或者縮小這類政策的規(guī)模。辛格說:“就好像一個州的政府部門告訴所有零售商,,每家商店只能有四個貨架擺放廁紙,,但實際上消費者會搶光六個貨架上的廁紙。這時就會出現(xiàn)廁紙短缺,,而消費者只能高價購買,。”

執(zhí)行CON法律的州,,床位供應量遠遠低于其他州

有人認為這種限制措施會大幅提高醫(yī)療普及率,,增加人們的選擇。但事實恰恰相反,,莫卡斯特中心發(fā)現(xiàn),,在執(zhí)行自由市場政策的州,人均床位數(shù)量比執(zhí)行CON的州高出30%,,無論城市還是農(nóng)村都是如此,。全美每千人的平均床位數(shù)量是2.77個。相比之下,,意大利為3.18個,,中國為4.3個,韓國為12.3個,,日本高達13.1個,。執(zhí)行不同政策的州之間的區(qū)別非常明顯,。莫卡斯特中心的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),,執(zhí)行CON法律的州每千人的平均床位數(shù)量比其他州少1.31個。

其中許多州都有龐大的城市區(qū),,它們提供的空床位數(shù)量非常低,,因此一旦被新型病毒攻擊,這些州將沒有緩沖的余地,。城市研究所弗雷德里克·布萊文對2018年美國50個州居民空床位數(shù)量進行了研究,;從疫情爆發(fā)到現(xiàn)在,這些數(shù)字恐怕也沒太大變化,。全美每千人的空床位數(shù)量為0.80個,,但康涅狄格州只有0.45個,馬薩諸塞州為0.51個,華盛頓州為0.57個,,紐約州為0.58個,。

出人意料的是,供應緊張并沒有導致嚴重短缺

在此需要提醒讀者的是:我無法充分協(xié)調(diào)紐約州,、疾病預防與控制中心,、華盛頓大學健康指標和評估研究所等提供的住院患者數(shù)據(jù)。因此無法確定不同數(shù)據(jù)來源所統(tǒng)計的床位類別,。這是本文對于美國和個別州沒有出現(xiàn)預想中的床位“短缺”之后說法的理解,。

IHME網(wǎng)站上顯示,美國“所需床位”約為66,000個,,“短缺”13,400個,,其中ICU床位缺口為8,900個,普通病床缺口為4,500個,。這些數(shù)據(jù)表明,,在疫情已經(jīng)爆發(fā)或預計將爆發(fā)的地區(qū),主要是紐約城區(qū)等熱點城市區(qū)域,,在疫情爆發(fā)之前提供的床位約為52,600個,。這些數(shù)字與城市研究所的數(shù)字一致,表明紐約,、新澤西,、馬薩諸塞、康涅狄格和羅德島的空床位總數(shù)不足24,000個,。而這五個地區(qū)占到美國新冠肺炎總確診人數(shù)的一半左右,。

24,000個空床位遠遠低于國家標準水平。例如,,長島拿騷縣每千人空床位數(shù)量只有0.34個,,布魯克林所在的金斯縣為0.32個,康涅狄格州的費爾菲爾德縣為0.42個,,都遠低于美國的平均水平0.8個,。

但別擔心,美國已為需要住院治療的所有新冠肺炎患者都找到了床位,。66,000個病床的需求已全部到位,。IHME網(wǎng)站顯示,紐約州共收治了20,300名新冠肺炎患者,,比該州床位數(shù)多出7,200人,,這顯然代表了紐約州在疫情之前的空床位水平。五個州的醫(yī)院總計為新冠肺炎患者提供了38,500個床位,,較危機前的床位數(shù)量高出60%,。

美國是如何做到無視CON法律規(guī)定,,大幅增加醫(yī)院床位的呢?

各州放寬規(guī)定,,幫助醫(yī)院應對患者的激增

一個重要因素是發(fā)布關(guān)于選擇性手術(shù)的禁令,,即將本應分配給康復手術(shù)患者或髖關(guān)節(jié)置換術(shù)患者的床位,安排給新冠肺炎重癥患者,。但各州也為全面取消管制做出了重要貢獻,。包括紐約州、北卡羅來納州和肯塔基州等在內(nèi),,超過18個州已取消CON法律,,或縮小了CON法律對醫(yī)院床位數(shù)量的管制。辛格說:“在實行CON法律的州,,醫(yī)院無法為急診室和康復病房增加床位,。亞利桑那州的醫(yī)院在流感高發(fā)季節(jié)總會遇到這種狀況。但如果各州能取消CON限制,,醫(yī)院就可以增加大量病床,。”

取消CON法律的限制,,提高醫(yī)院的靈活性,,已取得了很好的效果。但如果總住院人數(shù)的峰值不止于7萬人,,而是IHME和其他機構(gòu)在幾周前所預測的20萬,,醫(yī)院又該怎么辦?

在這種情況下,,即使各州再次取消CON法律,,填補床位短缺將變得更加困難。CON法律的目的是嚴格限制床位,,但這種政策卻直接妨礙了疫情防控,。對于各州來說更好的選擇是,取消CON法律,,允許創(chuàng)業(yè)者和新競爭對手提供床位,。這將一方面滿足消費者對于醫(yī)療保健服務的床位需求,同時還可以額外提供充足的床位,,應對下一次未知的疫情,。(財富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:Biz

新冠疫情讓美國得到了慘痛的教訓:限制醫(yī)院床位數(shù)量無疑是一種糟糕做法,。

在美國,,近一半的州都有限制醫(yī)院床位數(shù)量的硬性規(guī)定,這實際上妨礙了新醫(yī)院的建設(shè)和現(xiàn)有醫(yī)療設(shè)施的擴建,,甚至會限制術(shù)后恢復科在流感高發(fā)季節(jié)增加病床用于治療激增的患者,。這種需求認證法律人為限制了醫(yī)院的床位數(shù)量,,導致這些州的床位數(shù)量遠遠低于其他執(zhí)行自由市場策略的各州。

當致命疫情爆發(fā)時,,那些病床數(shù)量受管制州的醫(yī)院就會陷入困境:大批感染者需要床位,,但因醫(yī)院早已人滿為患,根本就沒有床位可用,。CON法律導致醫(yī)院面對患者數(shù)量激增的情況時,,束手無策。

鑒于這種由法律所施加的限制,,你或許會以為,,新冠疫情會使美國醫(yī)院體系徹底崩潰,迫使醫(yī)療服務提供商拒絕收治患者,,并且會加快疫情傳播,。甚至許多專家早在幾周前就已經(jīng)提出了這種“末日”情景的預測。但這種情況并沒有發(fā)生,。原因不止是因為民眾很好地遵守了社交隔離措施,,能夠避免災難的發(fā)生的另一部分原因是,一些州取消了對床位數(shù)量的管制,,即允許醫(yī)院在官方規(guī)定的“床位數(shù)量”以外進行擴建,。因此,之前一直施行嚴格管制的紐約州也變得與得克薩斯州等沒有施行CON法律的州一樣自由了,。

允許醫(yī)院自由擴張帶來的顯著的效果,,或許會促使各州考慮永久取消CON法律。如果這種預測成真,,各州將取消數(shù)十年來一直施行的管制,,醫(yī)療服務提供商也能在正常時期通過新增加的床位盈利。而就算未來再次發(fā)生疫情,,他們也能成為防控疫情的屏障,,而不是像現(xiàn)在一樣脆弱且不堪一擊。

但如果各州重新執(zhí)行“需求認證”法律,,一旦未來再次發(fā)生疫情,,醫(yī)院將不堪重負。來自菲尼克斯的外科醫(yī)生,、卡托研究所研究員杰弗里·辛格表示:“我希望各州州長們說:‘我們不要再次冒這種風險,。’與實行CON法律的州相比,,執(zhí)行自由市場策略的州床位更充足,。各州應該以這些州為榜樣,以保證未來美國有足夠多的床位,?!?/p>

什么是“需求認證”法律,?

需求認證法律是指,各州由州議會表決后,,通過法規(guī)執(zhí)行需求認證,。但最初這是一項在全美執(zhí)行的聯(lián)邦措施。1974年,,美國鼓勵各州組建政府部門,,對于醫(yī)療保健服務施行嚴格管制。這種做法背后的理論是,,自由競爭會導致醫(yī)療服務集中到富裕的城郊,,而貧窮的城市和農(nóng)村社區(qū)醫(yī)療水平將會落后,并且醫(yī)療服務提供商會在美國興建大量核磁共振成像和透析中心,,導致低質(zhì)量的醫(yī)院泛濫,。而最終,這些過度投資的成本都將由醫(yī)療保障體系和患者買單,。時至今日依舊如此,。

1987年,美國國會廢除了這項聯(lián)邦規(guī)定,,在之后的三十年間,,有15個州先后取消了CON法律。在保留管制的35個州,,州政府機關(guān)有權(quán)批準,、否決或修改醫(yī)院、門診中心和其他醫(yī)療服務提供商新建或擴建醫(yī)療設(shè)施的申請,。各州對于管制服務的規(guī)定也有所不同,。在新澤西州,醫(yī)療保健設(shè)施許可/認證署有權(quán)批準或拒絕各類醫(yī)院,、診療中心,、療養(yǎng)院以及十多種其他服務的需求認證。

其中最常見并且受限制最多的是醫(yī)院,。執(zhí)行CON法律的35個州中,,有28個州要求新建或擴建醫(yī)院必須通過政府部門審批。各州經(jīng)常會禁止在同一家連鎖醫(yī)院體系內(nèi),,將一家醫(yī)院過剩的床位轉(zhuǎn)讓給床位不足的醫(yī)院,。實行管制的28個州中包括紐約州、馬薩諸塞州,、康涅狄格州,、華盛頓州和伊利諾伊州等疫情最嚴重的州。值得注意的是,,沒有執(zhí)行CON法律的州包括賓夕法尼亞州,、加利福尼亞州和得克薩斯州,。

CON法律并沒有達到預期的效果

人們以為人為限制任何產(chǎn)品或服務的供應就能提高醫(yī)療普及率并降低成本,,這種觀念值得懷疑,。許多研究顯示,CON法律破壞了市場競爭,,其所帶來的結(jié)果可想而知:更高的價格,、更高的整體成本和更低的普及率。問題在于,,現(xiàn)有的醫(yī)院,、療養(yǎng)院和診療中心都有強烈的動機,阻止低成本競爭對手進入他們的市場,,并避免價格下降,。喬治梅森大學莫卡斯特中心高級研究員馬特·米切爾說:“這就是各州的保護主義?!泵浊袪柊l(fā)現(xiàn),,執(zhí)行CON法律的州提供的門診手術(shù)中心、透析設(shè)施和核磁共振成像設(shè)施遠少于其他州,。

美國勞工部,、財政部和衛(wèi)生與公眾服務部部長在2018年致總統(tǒng)信中警告:“各州限制醫(yī)療服務市場準入的政策,會限制人們的選擇,、競爭和創(chuàng)新,。”這三個部門與聯(lián)邦貿(mào)易委員會和司法部的反壟斷部門建議各州考慮取消CON,,或者縮小這類政策的規(guī)模,。辛格說:“就好像一個州的政府部門告訴所有零售商,每家商店只能有四個貨架擺放廁紙,,但實際上消費者會搶光六個貨架上的廁紙,。這時就會出現(xiàn)廁紙短缺,而消費者只能高價購買,?!?/p>

執(zhí)行CON法律的州,床位供應量遠遠低于其他州

有人認為這種限制措施會大幅提高醫(yī)療普及率,,增加人們的選擇,。但事實恰恰相反,莫卡斯特中心發(fā)現(xiàn),,在執(zhí)行自由市場政策的州,,人均床位數(shù)量比執(zhí)行CON的州高出30%,無論城市還是農(nóng)村都是如此,。全美每千人的平均床位數(shù)量是2.77個,。相比之下,,意大利為3.18個,中國為4.3個,,韓國為12.3個,,日本高達13.1個。執(zhí)行不同政策的州之間的區(qū)別非常明顯,。莫卡斯特中心的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),,執(zhí)行CON法律的州每千人的平均床位數(shù)量比其他州少1.31個。

其中許多州都有龐大的城市區(qū),,它們提供的空床位數(shù)量非常低,,因此一旦被新型病毒攻擊,這些州將沒有緩沖的余地,。城市研究所弗雷德里克·布萊文對2018年美國50個州居民空床位數(shù)量進行了研究,;從疫情爆發(fā)到現(xiàn)在,這些數(shù)字恐怕也沒太大變化,。全美每千人的空床位數(shù)量為0.80個,,但康涅狄格州只有0.45個,馬薩諸塞州為0.51個,,華盛頓州為0.57個,,紐約州為0.58個,。

出人意料的是,供應緊張并沒有導致嚴重短缺

在此需要提醒讀者的是:我無法充分協(xié)調(diào)紐約州,、疾病預防與控制中心,、華盛頓大學健康指標和評估研究所等提供的住院患者數(shù)據(jù)。因此無法確定不同數(shù)據(jù)來源所統(tǒng)計的床位類別,。這是本文對于美國和個別州沒有出現(xiàn)預想中的床位“短缺”之后說法的理解。

IHME網(wǎng)站上顯示,,美國“所需床位”約為66,000個,“短缺”13,400個,,其中ICU床位缺口為8,900個,,普通病床缺口為4,500個。這些數(shù)據(jù)表明,,在疫情已經(jīng)爆發(fā)或預計將爆發(fā)的地區(qū),,主要是紐約城區(qū)等熱點城市區(qū)域,,在疫情爆發(fā)之前提供的床位約為52,600個,。這些數(shù)字與城市研究所的數(shù)字一致,,表明紐約、新澤西,、馬薩諸塞,、康涅狄格和羅德島的空床位總數(shù)不足24,000個,。而這五個地區(qū)占到美國新冠肺炎總確診人數(shù)的一半左右,。

24,000個空床位遠遠低于國家標準水平,。例如,,長島拿騷縣每千人空床位數(shù)量只有0.34個,,布魯克林所在的金斯縣為0.32個,,康涅狄格州的費爾菲爾德縣為0.42個,,都遠低于美國的平均水平0.8個,。

但別擔心,,美國已為需要住院治療的所有新冠肺炎患者都找到了床位,。66,000個病床的需求已全部到位,。IHME網(wǎng)站顯示,紐約州共收治了20,300名新冠肺炎患者,,比該州床位數(shù)多出7,200人,這顯然代表了紐約州在疫情之前的空床位水平,。五個州的醫(yī)院總計為新冠肺炎患者提供了38,500個床位,較危機前的床位數(shù)量高出60%,。

美國是如何做到無視CON法律規(guī)定,,大幅增加醫(yī)院床位的呢?

各州放寬規(guī)定,,幫助醫(yī)院應對患者的激增

一個重要因素是發(fā)布關(guān)于選擇性手術(shù)的禁令,即將本應分配給康復手術(shù)患者或髖關(guān)節(jié)置換術(shù)患者的床位,,安排給新冠肺炎重癥患者,。但各州也為全面取消管制做出了重要貢獻。包括紐約州,、北卡羅來納州和肯塔基州等在內(nèi),超過18個州已取消CON法律,,或縮小了CON法律對醫(yī)院床位數(shù)量的管制,。辛格說:“在實行CON法律的州,醫(yī)院無法為急診室和康復病房增加床位,。亞利桑那州的醫(yī)院在流感高發(fā)季節(jié)總會遇到這種狀況,。但如果各州能取消CON限制,醫(yī)院就可以增加大量病床,?!?/p>

取消CON法律的限制,,提高醫(yī)院的靈活性,,已取得了很好的效果。但如果總住院人數(shù)的峰值不止于7萬人,,而是IHME和其他機構(gòu)在幾周前所預測的20萬,,醫(yī)院又該怎么辦?

在這種情況下,,即使各州再次取消CON法律,,填補床位短缺將變得更加困難。CON法律的目的是嚴格限制床位,,但這種政策卻直接妨礙了疫情防控,。對于各州來說更好的選擇是,取消CON法律,,允許創(chuàng)業(yè)者和新競爭對手提供床位,。這將一方面滿足消費者對于醫(yī)療保健服務的床位需求,,同時還可以額外提供充足的床位,應對下一次未知的疫情,。(財富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:Biz

The coronavirus outbreak should be teaching an important lesson. Capping the number of hospital beds is a bad idea.

Around half of all Americans live in states governed by iron-fisted regulations that effectively block the construction of new hospitals, the expansion of existing facilities, or even the addition of beds in recovery rooms to treat an overflow of patients in a bad flu season. Those certificate-of-need laws, or CONs, artificially hold the number of hospital beds at far lower volumes than providers would supply in a free market.

When a deadly outbreak strikes, hospitals in the regulated states are handcuffed. The flood of infected patients need unoccupied beds, but those beds aren't available because the hospitals are tightly packed. The CONs hobble their flexibility to handle a surge.

Given those constraints, you’d think that the coronavirus pandemic would have swamped America’s hospitals, forcing providers to turn sick patients away, and accelerating COVID-19’s spread. Indeed, many experts were predicting that doomsday scenario just a few weeks ago. It hasn’t happened––and not just because the remarkable adherence to social distancing flattened the curve of new infections much sooner than forecast. In reality, the U.S. escaped disaster in large part because restrictive states suspended their caps, allowing hospitals to expand far beyond their official “capacity” and so that tightly controlled New York became just as free as such non-CON peers as Texas.

The remarkable results from letting freedom ring should prompt the states to weigh permanently scuttling their CONs. If that happens, states constrained for decades would add all the new beds providers could profitably fill in normal times, as well as a cushion for future outbreaks that’s now a thin, fragile buffer.

If the CONs are reinstated, American hospitals could well get overwhelmed when the next pandemic strikes. “I would hope the governors would say, ‘Let’s not risk this again,’” says Jeffrey Singer, a surgeon in Phoenix and fellow at the Cato Institute. “The free-market states have a lot more capacity than the CON states. They should be the model for ensuring America has the right hospital capacity in the future.”

What are certificate-of-need laws?

CONs are all imposed by individual states via regulations voted by their legislatures. But it was a federal measure that first spread the regimes from coast to coast. In 1974, the U.S. offered big incentives to states that created agencies empowered to establish tight controls on health care services. Then, as today, the theory ran that unfettered competition curbs care in poor urban and farm communities in favor of affluent suburbs, and that providers would flood America with MRI and dialysis centers and low-quality hospitals forcing Medicare and patients to pay extra for all the over-investment.

In 1987, Congress repealed the federal mandate, and over the next three decades, 15 states have scuttled their CONs. In the 35 that kept them, state agencies hold the power to approve, deny, or alter applications from hospitals, ambulatory centers, and other providers for new or expanded facilities. The list of regulated services varies widely by state. In New Jersey, the Healthcare Facility Licensing/Certification Agency grants or withholds CONs for all types of hospitals, as well as diagnostic treatment centers, nursing homes, and a dozen other services.

Among the most commonly and heavily restricted categories are hospitals. Of the 35 CON states, 28 require their agency’s approval for construction of a new hospital or additions to an existing one. States regularly ban hospitals in the same chain from transferring beds from a site that has too many, to facility that needs them. The restricted 28 encompass most of the states hit hardest by the coronavirus, including New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Washington, and Illinois. Notable non-CON states are Pennsylvania, California, and Texas.

CONs don’t deliver the promised benefits

The idea that artificially constraining the supply of any product or service would expand availability and lower costs is suspect. And in the case of CONs, many studies show that the practice cripples competition with predictable results: higher prices, bigger total costs, and less access. The rub is that incumbent hospitals, nursing homes, and diagnostic centers have a strong incentive to block lower-cost rivals from invading their markets and forcing down rates. “It’s protectionism on the state level,” says Matt Mitchell, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Mitchell found that CON jurisdictions offer far fewer ambulatory surgery centers, dialysis facilities, and MRIs than non-CON states.

In a letter to the President in 2018, the secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and HHS warned that “state policies that restrict entry into provider markets can limit choice, competition, and innovation.” The three departments, along with the FTC and antitrust arm of the Justice Department, advise states to consider repealing or scaling back their CONs. “It’s as though a state agency told all retailers that each store could devote only four shelves to toilet paper, when customers would be buying out six shelves,“ says Singer. "You'd have a shortage of toilet paper, and consumers would pay much higher prices for it."

The supply of beds is a lot lower in the CON states

Contrary to the claims that restrictions greatly improve access and choice, Mercatus found that the free-market states have, on average, 30% more hospitals per capita than do the CONs, and that edge holds for both urban and rural facilities. Across the U.S., the average number of hospital beds per 1,000 people is 2.77. By contrast, Italy has 3.18, China 4.3, South Korea 12.3, and Japan 13.1. The divide is stark between the two categories of states. According to Mercatus' research, the CON states have 1.31 fewer beds per 1,000 people than the non-CONs.

Many of the CON states with large metro areas offer extremely low levels of empty beds, and hence lack a crucial buffer if a new virus attacks. The Urban Institute’s Fredric Blavin conducted a study of unoccupied beds per 1,000 residents in all 50 states in 2018; those figures are likely little changed since just before the outbreak. While the national average stands at 0.80 free beds per 1000 population, Connecticut registers 0.45, Massachusetts 0.51, Washington 0.57, and New York 0.58.

Miraculously, tight supply didn’t cause crippling shortages

A warning to the reader: I was unable to fully reconcile the hospitalization numbers coming from such sources as New York State, the CDC, and the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). It’s unclear precisely which categories of beds different sources are counting. Still, here’s my best take on the predicted “shortages” that didn’t materialize for both the U.S. overall and for certain states.

On its website, IHME shows “beds needed” for the U.S. at roughly 66,000, and a “shortage” of 13,400, split between a shortfall of 8,900 ICU and 4,500 regular beds. Those figures suggest that the areas hit, or expected to be hit, by the virus, dominated by urban hotspots such as the New York metro area, offered around 52,600 available beds before the outbreak (66,000 beds needed minus the shortage of 13,400). Those figures square with the Urban Institute numbers showing total unoccupied beds in New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island of less than 24,000, since those five account for around half of all coronavirus cases.

Those 24,000 free beds are an incredibly lower number compared with national norms. For example, Long Island’s Nassau County had just 0.34 empty beds per 1,000 people, while Kings County, home to Brooklyn, had 0.32, and Connecticut’s Fairfield County 0.42––all far below the U.S. average of 0.8.

But wait! The U.S. found beds for all the coronavirus patients who required hospitalization. All of the 66,000 “beds needed” were supplied. According to the IHME site, New York State alone is lodging 20,300 coronavirus sufferers, 7,200 more than the state’s capacity, apparently meaning the level of unoccupied beds prior to the pandemic. All told, hospitals in the five states are supplying 38,500 beds for COVID-19 patients, 60% more than their pre-crisis capacity.

So how did America defy the CONs and create such an on-the-spot gusher in beds?

States loosened the regs to help America’s hospitals handle the surge

A big factor was the ban on elective procedures, opening up beds that would have gone to patients recovering from or hip replacement surgery to folks gravely ill with COVID-19. But the states also helped big-time with what amounted to a sweeping wave of deregulation. No fewer than 18 states waived or scaled back the CONs restricting more hospital beds, including New York, North Carolina, and Kentucky. “In non-CON states, hospitals couldn’t bring in more beds fill part of the ERs and recovery rooms,” says Singer. “That’s what the Arizona hospitals always do when hit by a bad flu season. But when states lifted their CON restrictions, the hospitals were able to add lots of beds.”

Granting hospitals the flexibility that the CON laws normally deny them worked beautifully. But what if total hospitalizations hadn’t peaked below 70,000, and had hit the roughly 200,000 that the IHME and other organizations believed possible just a few weeks ago?

In that case, making up for the shortfall, even if the states once again lifted their CONs, would be a lot harder. The CONs are designed to keep capacity tight, and that policy runs directly counter to fighting an epidemic. The better option is for the states to scrap their CONs and allow rising entrepreneurs and new rivals to provide all the beds America’s health care customers want, and ample extra capacity to tackle the next attack.

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