3月13日,周五,。紙業(yè)巨頭金佰利公司的高管們召開了最后一次緊急會議,,然后匆匆地關(guān)閉辦公樓,。回家途中,,北美家庭護理業(yè)務(wù)總裁阿里斯特?馬斯托里德斯把車停在當(dāng)?shù)匾患椅譅柆敵虚T口,,打算利用疫情期間最后一次下班的機會,親眼看看銷售一線的緊急情況,。馬斯托里德斯負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)管Cottonelle和Scott等衛(wèi)生紙品牌,。但那天晚上,在這家位于威斯康星州尼納市溫納貝戈湖畔的沃爾瑪超市,,他找不到自己的產(chǎn)品,。“長長的貢多拉貨架上沒有一件衛(wèi)生紙和紙巾,,我這輩子從沒有想過我竟然會見證這一幕,。”他說,,“這是一件非常令人不安的事情,。”
事實上,,那一周將因為“2020年衛(wèi)生紙大恐慌”而被世人銘記,。前一天,即3月12日,,根據(jù)消費性包裝品(CPG)調(diào)研機構(gòu)NCSolutions提供的數(shù)據(jù),,衛(wèi)生紙銷售額較上年同日飆漲了734%,成為最暢銷的日常雜貨用品,。隨著購物者準(zhǔn)備無限期地待在家里以躲避冠狀病毒,,他們先后把亞馬遜,以及全美各地超市的衛(wèi)生紙橫掃一空,。宅家期間,,由于不再上班,也不會去餐廳或酒店,,人們“方便”所需的衛(wèi)生紙可能比平常高出40%,。但他們買得更多:據(jù)市場資訊公司尼爾森統(tǒng)計,截至5月2日的9周內(nèi),,衛(wèi)生紙的銷售額同比增長近71%——要不是人們買不到足夠多的衛(wèi)生紙的話,,其漲幅還會更高。
起初,,各路專家對短缺問題不以為然,。《華爾街日報》在3月22日發(fā)表社論稱:“有一種恐懼我們可以緩解,那就是不用擔(dān)心美國的衛(wèi)生紙快用完了,?!钡聦嵣希诿绹蟛糠值貐^(qū),,人們的確買不到衛(wèi)生紙,。到3月23日,美國70%的雜貨店(包括網(wǎng)上銷售商)的衛(wèi)生紙已經(jīng)斷貨,?!爱?dāng)所有人都超前采購時,就會造成短缺,,感知就變成了現(xiàn)實,?!必惗髯稍児镜娜蚬?yīng)鏈業(yè)務(wù)主管皮特?瓜拉亞說,。
在新冠疫情爆發(fā)兩個月后,這種白色的東西仍然異常稀缺,。在亞馬遜,,衛(wèi)生紙品牌Charmin的所有產(chǎn)品都無限期地顯示“無貨”?!坝捎谛l(wèi)生紙的供應(yīng)量有限,,”好市多超市已經(jīng)暫停進貨?!安⒉皇钦f我們現(xiàn)在還有大批衛(wèi)生紙藏在倉庫,,不愿拿出來銷售?!蔽譅柆?shù)陌l(fā)言人丹?托波雷克說,,“需求真的非常高,任何地方都很難有存貨,?!?/font>
如今,,各大公司正在接受這樣一個現(xiàn)實:像衛(wèi)生紙這樣普通的東西,,其實代表著一種獨特而復(fù)雜的供應(yīng)鏈挑戰(zhàn)。自相矛盾的是,,消費性包裝品行業(yè)近年來在效率方面取得的巨大進步——尤其是“準(zhǔn)時制”生產(chǎn)和分銷模式在全球范圍內(nèi)的普及——現(xiàn)在反倒阻塞了向客戶提供衛(wèi)生紙的管道,。像消毒濕巾和發(fā)酵粉一樣,衛(wèi)生紙只是一件很普通的日常生活必需品,,但這一次,,它讓美國企業(yè)界深刻地領(lǐng)會到了現(xiàn)代制造業(yè)和物流業(yè)的弱點。“我們一直非常努力地確保我們的系統(tǒng)盡可能高效地運轉(zhuǎn),,這必然意味著我們現(xiàn)有的存貨很難滿足一周又一周的需求,。”食品雜貨行業(yè)組織FMI的首席執(zhí)行官萊斯利?薩拉辛說,。
在Charmin生產(chǎn)商寶潔公司和金佰利等紙業(yè)巨頭那里,,來自這些雜貨店的大額訂單像滾雪球般激增了好幾個數(shù)量級。這意味著,,盡管產(chǎn)量有所增加,,但積壓訂單很可能會延續(xù)到夏天。與此同時,,貨架上總是空空如也,,讓人永遠都覺得衛(wèi)生紙確實短缺。因此,,恐慌性購買仍在繼續(xù),。寶潔的首席產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)官胡利奧?內(nèi)梅思說:“從網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全攻擊到地震再到火災(zāi),我們做好了應(yīng)對數(shù)千種不同事件的準(zhǔn)備,?!彼恼Z氣因其阿根廷口音而顯得尤為真摯?!暗覀儧]有為所有這些事情同時發(fā)生做準(zhǔn)備,,而這正是新冠疫情帶給我們的慘痛現(xiàn)實?!?/font>
是的,,衛(wèi)生紙確實生長在樹上——大部分是長在巴西的桉樹上。美國和加拿大的樹木需要生長幾十年才能被砍伐,,而散發(fā)著薄荷香味的巴西桉樹只需要六七年就能長到100英尺(約合30米)高,,比玉米長得還快?!斑@就是它們成本如此低的原因,。”被廣泛譽為“紙博士”的BMO資本市場公司的包裝和森林產(chǎn)品分析師馬克?懷爾德解釋道,。
對于像衛(wèi)生紙這種利潤率薄如蟬翼的產(chǎn)品來說,,省下的每一分錢都是關(guān)鍵。根據(jù)匯豐銀行的數(shù)據(jù),,隨著衛(wèi)生紙銷量飆升,,對于Charmin和Cottonelle等品牌所使用的原漿的需求也一路上揚,助推其價格在5月初上漲了30美元,,達到每噸500美元左右,。但上調(diào)衛(wèi)生紙售價,,必然會招致眾怒。這就是為什么造紙業(yè)比其他行業(yè)更注重節(jié)約成本的原因,。去年退休的寶潔全球產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)官揚尼斯?斯卡弗洛斯表示:“我們必須盡可能完美地實現(xiàn)供需優(yōu)化組合,。”
至少在冠狀病毒打破平衡之前是這樣的,。從歷史上看,,生產(chǎn)剛好滿足需求的衛(wèi)生紙是很容易做到的,因為需求幾乎亙古不變,。由于它的塊頭如此之大,,沒有人想用多余的衛(wèi)生紙占據(jù)寶貴的居住空間。這些因素使得衛(wèi)生紙成為“準(zhǔn)時制”生產(chǎn)模式的經(jīng)典范例,。事實上,,在過去十年,“準(zhǔn)時制”已經(jīng)成為消費性包裝品行業(yè)的主導(dǎo)生產(chǎn)模式,。
但這也意味著,,疫情爆發(fā)后,當(dāng)驚恐萬分的購物者涌入衛(wèi)生紙貨架通道時,,供應(yīng)鏈中任何地方的存貨最多只能賣兩到三周,。早在今年2月,,寶潔就提高了佳潔士牙膏和玉蘭油保濕霜等品牌的產(chǎn)量,,以應(yīng)對可能出現(xiàn)的需求上漲和工廠關(guān)閉潮。但“我們手頭上的紙類產(chǎn)品訂單從未增加過,?!眱?nèi)梅思說。成本因素也起了作用:再開一條汰漬洗滌劑裝配線只需要不到1,000萬美元,,而增加一臺造紙機則需要大約3億美元的投資,。斯卡弗洛斯解釋說。
根據(jù)市場研究公司Fastmarkets RISI的數(shù)據(jù),,衛(wèi)生紙生產(chǎn)設(shè)備在3月的產(chǎn)能利用率高達99.8%,,正常水平為92%。即便如此,,美國當(dāng)月的總產(chǎn)量僅增長了8%,,達到70萬噸?!斑@場疫情充分暴露了精益供應(yīng)鏈管理的局限性,。”貝恩咨詢公司的瓜拉亞說,。
沒有哪家零售商像亞馬遜這樣把準(zhǔn)時制模式推向極致,。從一天甚至一小時交貨期中獲利,取決于對需求的準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測?!叭绻麃嗰R遜知道他們可以在周二下訂單,,周五就能在倉庫拿到貨,那就完全沒有問題,?!彪娮由虅?wù)優(yōu)化公司Ideoclick的戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃副總裁、前亞馬遜高管安德里亞?利說,。
然而,,衛(wèi)生紙生產(chǎn)難題已經(jīng)對亞馬遜構(gòu)成一項前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)——一些訂單遲遲數(shù)月無法到貨。3月21日,,亞馬遜首席執(zhí)行官杰夫?貝佐斯宣布將暫時中止允許部分商品進入其倉庫的做法,,“以優(yōu)先儲備和交付生活必需品?!钡?,就衛(wèi)生紙這種基本生活用品而言,哪怕是在疫情推動銷量飆升的情況下,,亞馬遜也賺不了多少錢,,如果有錢可賺的話。(首席財務(wù)官布賴恩?奧爾薩夫斯基在最近一次財報電話會議上透露稱,,亞馬遜在許多低價商品上獲得的額外收入“基本上跟成本持平”,。該公司拒絕接受本文作者采訪。)盡管賣衛(wèi)生紙無利可圖,,但不賣也要付出客服成本,。“亞馬遜竟然連續(xù)8周無法提供Charmin衛(wèi)生紙,,這是極其可悲的,。”咨詢公司戰(zhàn)略資源集團的董事總經(jīng)理,、寶潔前高管伯特?弗利金格這樣說道,。
具有諷刺意味的是,當(dāng)人們被困在家里的時候,,亞馬遜正在放棄其他商品的潛在銷售額,,同時還在設(shè)法鋪設(shè)其衛(wèi)生紙管道。加拿大皇家銀行資本市場的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)分析師馬克?馬哈尼說:“我敢肯定,,他們一定在踢自己的屁股,。”
沃利?諾溫斯基是舊金山一家電子商務(wù)公司的高管,。他通過亞馬遜訂購衛(wèi)生紙,,每兩周收一次貨,。不過,從2月下旬開始,,盡管他訂購的洗發(fā)水和肥皂還能準(zhǔn)時到貨,,但亞馬遜連續(xù)四次錯過了衛(wèi)生紙交貨期。然后,,在4月底,,三包24卷裝Quilted Northern衛(wèi)生紙卻在一周時間內(nèi)陸續(xù)送達。但到這時候,,這些衛(wèi)生紙對他已經(jīng)沒有多大用處了,。“我們?nèi)ド痰曩I了衛(wèi)生紙,。我不會突然需要兩個月的用量,。”他說,。
諾溫斯基的經(jīng)歷讓我們得以窺探短缺問題是如何在幕后阻礙企業(yè)運營的,。由于需求仍然超過生產(chǎn)能力,衛(wèi)生紙不得不“按比例分配”,。這意味著零售商只能得到其訂購數(shù)量的一小部分——這種做法通常只適用于當(dāng)季最熱門的玩具或游戲,。前亞馬遜高管安德里亞?利說,由于亞馬遜優(yōu)先考慮訂購用戶,,延遲發(fā)貨意味著它沒有獲得足夠多的衛(wèi)生紙,,甚至無法滿足一些在疫情爆發(fā)很久以前就下的訂單。面對類似的問題,,好市多決定暫時不在網(wǎng)上銷售衛(wèi)生紙,。負(fù)責(zé)財務(wù)的高級副總裁鮑勃?納爾遜告訴《財富》雜志:“我們選擇盡可能地維持倉庫庫存,?!?/font>
沒有一家企業(yè)希望在購買狂潮最終消退時,圍困在堆積如山的衛(wèi)生紙中,。(高消費城市的消費者都會有這樣的感受:“我們每個月要支付一平方英尺5美元的租金,。我可不想把這些衛(wèi)生紙都存在家中?!敝Z溫斯基說,。)“我們可以打造一條能夠100%應(yīng)對所有這些沖擊的供應(yīng)鏈?!惫侠瓉喺f,,“但這就好比你能夠造一輛固若金湯,讓你碰到任何交通事故時都可以毫發(fā)無損的轎車,,但你永遠也不會想開它,。”
不過,隨著人們更多地在家工作,,各大制造商正在適應(yīng)需求持續(xù)增長的可能性,。在3月那個星期五離開辦公室后,金佰利公司總裁馬斯托里德斯花了整個周末來決定停產(chǎn)哪一種衛(wèi)生紙——將“庫存單位”至少削減一半,。該公司最終決定專注于生產(chǎn)6包裝的Cottonelle“超大卷”衛(wèi)生紙,,而不是12包裝。如此一來,,工廠就不必頻頻關(guān)閉機器來更換原材料,,從而最大程度地減少停機時間。在后疫情時代,,一些種類恐怕再也不會重返生產(chǎn)線,。“我認(rèn)為,,在這場疫情塵埃落定后,,我們的產(chǎn)品類別將出現(xiàn)很大變化?!瘪R斯托里德斯說,。
在寶潔公司,歷經(jīng)兩個月的破紀(jì)錄生產(chǎn),,內(nèi)梅思的團隊正在實施從危機中吸取的教訓(xùn),。“我們正在以此為契機,,全面推動供應(yīng)鏈升級再造,。”內(nèi)梅思說,。在想方設(shè)法適應(yīng)超可預(yù)測的需求之后,,寶潔正在為應(yīng)對“一個明顯更不穩(wěn)定的環(huán)境”而重新設(shè)計其運營方式。這包括快速追蹤新供應(yīng)商的適應(yīng)情況,、增加分銷網(wǎng)點,,以及利用數(shù)據(jù)生成更早的需求沖擊警告。保持社交距離的必要性也讓寶潔意識到,,該公司需要增加換崗班次,,讓員工盡可能分散地工作,從而更有效地為工廠配置員工,。
就連辦公室職員最近也開始去生產(chǎn)一線幫忙,。畢竟,短缺問題讓Charmin品牌的高管和普通消費者一樣惱火,。內(nèi)梅思說:“我買衛(wèi)生紙的渠道跟大家都是一樣的,?!碑?dāng)然,除非它賣光了,。
順應(yīng)挑戰(zhàn)
面對嚴(yán)峻的衛(wèi)生紙短缺問題,,多家《財富》美國500強企業(yè)正在想方設(shè)法地滿足不斷飆升的需求。
金佰利(第175位)
為了避免裝配線中斷,,這家紙業(yè)巨頭已經(jīng)減少了衛(wèi)生紙生產(chǎn)種類,。金佰利正在優(yōu)先生產(chǎn)6卷裝Cottonelle衛(wèi)生紙,而不是12卷裝,,這有助于將供應(yīng)分散到更多的客戶手中,。
寶潔(第50位)
就連辦公室職員最近也開始在工廠輪班,以推動產(chǎn)量達到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的水平,。此外,,首席產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)官胡利奧?內(nèi)梅思表示,寶潔也更加依賴分析技術(shù)來預(yù)測需求波動,,并給予其“更大的上下波動空間”,。
好市多(第14位)
這家會員制倉儲量販店限制每位會員只能購買一大包衛(wèi)生紙(這有助于防止顧客發(fā)生爭執(zhí))。至少在6月之前,,好市多將停止在網(wǎng)上銷售衛(wèi)生紙,。
沃爾瑪(第1位)
自3月以來,由于購物需求導(dǎo)致其供應(yīng)鏈不堪重負(fù),,沃爾瑪每天都在招聘5,000名新員工——目標(biāo)是增加20萬名員工——以保持貨架庫存,,及時交付訂貨。此外,,這家零售巨頭還要求制造商繞過倉庫,,直接向旗下門店運送衛(wèi)生紙,以避免在倉庫之間轉(zhuǎn)運所造成的物流減速,。(財富中文網(wǎng))
本文另一版本登載于《財富》雜志2020年6月/7月刊,,標(biāo)題為《疫情之下,衛(wèi)生紙為何短缺,?》,。
譯者:任文科
3月13日,周五,。紙業(yè)巨頭金佰利公司的高管們召開了最后一次緊急會議,然后匆匆地關(guān)閉辦公樓,?;丶彝局校泵兰彝プo理業(yè)務(wù)總裁阿里斯特?馬斯托里德斯把車停在當(dāng)?shù)匾患椅譅柆敵虚T口,,打算利用疫情期間最后一次下班的機會,,親眼看看銷售一線的緊急情況,。馬斯托里德斯負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)管Cottonelle和Scott等衛(wèi)生紙品牌。但那天晚上,,在這家位于威斯康星州尼納市溫納貝戈湖畔的沃爾瑪超市,,他找不到自己的產(chǎn)品?!伴L長的貢多拉貨架上沒有一件衛(wèi)生紙和紙巾,,我這輩子從沒有想過我竟然會見證這一幕?!彼f,,“這是一件非常令人不安的事情?!?/font>
事實上,,那一周將因為“2020年衛(wèi)生紙大恐慌”而被世人銘記。前一天,,即3月12日,,根據(jù)消費性包裝品(CPG)調(diào)研機構(gòu)NCSolutions提供的數(shù)據(jù),衛(wèi)生紙銷售額較上年同日飆漲了734%,,成為最暢銷的日常雜貨用品,。隨著購物者準(zhǔn)備無限期地待在家里以躲避冠狀病毒,他們先后把亞馬遜,,以及全美各地超市的衛(wèi)生紙橫掃一空,。宅家期間,由于不再上班,,也不會去餐廳或酒店,,人們“方便”所需的衛(wèi)生紙可能比平常高出40%。但他們買得更多:據(jù)市場資訊公司尼爾森統(tǒng)計,,截至5月2日的9周內(nèi),,衛(wèi)生紙的銷售額同比增長近71%——要不是人們買不到足夠多的衛(wèi)生紙的話,其漲幅還會更高,。
起初,,各路專家對短缺問題不以為然?!度A爾街日報》在3月22日發(fā)表社論稱:“有一種恐懼我們可以緩解,,那就是不用擔(dān)心美國的衛(wèi)生紙快用完了?!钡聦嵣?,在美國大部分地區(qū),人們的確買不到衛(wèi)生紙,。到3月23日,,美國70%的雜貨店(包括網(wǎng)上銷售商)的衛(wèi)生紙已經(jīng)斷貨,。“當(dāng)所有人都超前采購時,,就會造成短缺,,感知就變成了現(xiàn)實?!必惗髯稍児镜娜蚬?yīng)鏈業(yè)務(wù)主管皮特?瓜拉亞說,。
在新冠疫情爆發(fā)兩個月后,這種白色的東西仍然異常稀缺,。在亞馬遜,,衛(wèi)生紙品牌Charmin的所有產(chǎn)品都無限期地顯示“無貨”?!坝捎谛l(wèi)生紙的供應(yīng)量有限,,”好市多超市已經(jīng)暫停進貨?!安⒉皇钦f我們現(xiàn)在還有大批衛(wèi)生紙藏在倉庫,,不愿拿出來銷售?!蔽譅柆?shù)陌l(fā)言人丹?托波雷克說,,“需求真的非常高,任何地方都很難有存貨,?!?/font>
如今,各大公司正在接受這樣一個現(xiàn)實:像衛(wèi)生紙這樣普通的東西,,其實代表著一種獨特而復(fù)雜的供應(yīng)鏈挑戰(zhàn),。自相矛盾的是,消費性包裝品行業(yè)近年來在效率方面取得的巨大進步——尤其是“準(zhǔn)時制”生產(chǎn)和分銷模式在全球范圍內(nèi)的普及——現(xiàn)在反倒阻塞了向客戶提供衛(wèi)生紙的管道,。像消毒濕巾和發(fā)酵粉一樣,,衛(wèi)生紙只是一件很普通的日常生活必需品,但這一次,,它讓美國企業(yè)界深刻地領(lǐng)會到了現(xiàn)代制造業(yè)和物流業(yè)的弱點,。“我們一直非常努力地確保我們的系統(tǒng)盡可能高效地運轉(zhuǎn),,這必然意味著我們現(xiàn)有的存貨很難滿足一周又一周的需求,。”食品雜貨行業(yè)組織FMI的首席執(zhí)行官萊斯利?薩拉辛說,。
在Charmin生產(chǎn)商寶潔公司和金佰利等紙業(yè)巨頭那里,,來自這些雜貨店的大額訂單像滾雪球般激增了好幾個數(shù)量級。這意味著,,盡管產(chǎn)量有所增加,,但積壓訂單很可能會延續(xù)到夏天。與此同時,,貨架上總是空空如也,,讓人永遠都覺得衛(wèi)生紙確實短缺。因此,,恐慌性購買仍在繼續(xù),。寶潔的首席產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)官胡利奧?內(nèi)梅思說:“從網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全攻擊到地震再到火災(zāi),我們做好了應(yīng)對數(shù)千種不同事件的準(zhǔn)備,?!彼恼Z氣因其阿根廷口音而顯得尤為真摯?!暗覀儧]有為所有這些事情同時發(fā)生做準(zhǔn)備,,而這正是新冠疫情帶給我們的慘痛現(xiàn)實?!?/font>
是的,,衛(wèi)生紙確實生長在樹上——大部分是長在巴西的桉樹上。美國和加拿大的樹木需要生長幾十年才能被砍伐,,而散發(fā)著薄荷香味的巴西桉樹只需要六七年就能長到100英尺(約合30米)高,,比玉米長得還快?!斑@就是它們成本如此低的原因,。”被廣泛譽為“紙博士”的BMO資本市場公司的包裝和森林產(chǎn)品分析師馬克?懷爾德解釋道,。
對于像衛(wèi)生紙這種利潤率薄如蟬翼的產(chǎn)品來說,,省下的每一分錢都是關(guān)鍵。根據(jù)匯豐銀行的數(shù)據(jù),,隨著衛(wèi)生紙銷量飆升,,對于Charmin和Cottonelle等品牌所使用的原漿的需求也一路上揚,助推其價格在5月初上漲了30美元,,達到每噸500美元左右,。但上調(diào)衛(wèi)生紙售價,必然會招致眾怒,。這就是為什么造紙業(yè)比其他行業(yè)更注重節(jié)約成本的原因,。去年退休的寶潔全球產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)官揚尼斯?斯卡弗洛斯表示:“我們必須盡可能完美地實現(xiàn)供需優(yōu)化組合?!?/font>
至少在冠狀病毒打破平衡之前是這樣的,。從歷史上看,生產(chǎn)剛好滿足需求的衛(wèi)生紙是很容易做到的,因為需求幾乎亙古不變,。由于它的塊頭如此之大,,沒有人想用多余的衛(wèi)生紙占據(jù)寶貴的居住空間。這些因素使得衛(wèi)生紙成為“準(zhǔn)時制”生產(chǎn)模式的經(jīng)典范例,。事實上,,在過去十年,“準(zhǔn)時制”已經(jīng)成為消費性包裝品行業(yè)的主導(dǎo)生產(chǎn)模式,。
但這也意味著,,疫情爆發(fā)后,當(dāng)驚恐萬分的購物者涌入衛(wèi)生紙貨架通道時,,供應(yīng)鏈中任何地方的存貨最多只能賣兩到三周,。早在今年2月,寶潔就提高了佳潔士牙膏和玉蘭油保濕霜等品牌的產(chǎn)量,,以應(yīng)對可能出現(xiàn)的需求上漲和工廠關(guān)閉潮,。但“我們手頭上的紙類產(chǎn)品訂單從未增加過?!眱?nèi)梅思說,。成本因素也起了作用:再開一條汰漬洗滌劑裝配線只需要不到1,000萬美元,而增加一臺造紙機則需要大約3億美元的投資,。斯卡弗洛斯解釋說,。
根據(jù)市場研究公司Fastmarkets RISI的數(shù)據(jù),衛(wèi)生紙生產(chǎn)設(shè)備在3月的產(chǎn)能利用率高達99.8%,,正常水平為92%,。即便如此,美國當(dāng)月的總產(chǎn)量僅增長了8%,,達到70萬噸,。“這場疫情充分暴露了精益供應(yīng)鏈管理的局限性,?!必惗髯稍児镜墓侠瓉喺f。
沒有哪家零售商像亞馬遜這樣把準(zhǔn)時制模式推向極致,。從一天甚至一小時交貨期中獲利,,取決于對需求的準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測?!叭绻麃嗰R遜知道他們可以在周二下訂單,,周五就能在倉庫拿到貨,那就完全沒有問題,?!彪娮由虅?wù)優(yōu)化公司Ideoclick的戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃副總裁,、前亞馬遜高管安德里亞?利說。
然而,,衛(wèi)生紙生產(chǎn)難題已經(jīng)對亞馬遜構(gòu)成一項前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)——一些訂單遲遲數(shù)月無法到貨,。3月21日,亞馬遜首席執(zhí)行官杰夫?貝佐斯宣布將暫時中止允許部分商品進入其倉庫的做法,,“以優(yōu)先儲備和交付生活必需品,?!钡?,就衛(wèi)生紙這種基本生活用品而言,哪怕是在疫情推動銷量飆升的情況下,,亞馬遜也賺不了多少錢,,如果有錢可賺的話。(首席財務(wù)官布賴恩?奧爾薩夫斯基在最近一次財報電話會議上透露稱,,亞馬遜在許多低價商品上獲得的額外收入“基本上跟成本持平”,。該公司拒絕接受本文作者采訪。)盡管賣衛(wèi)生紙無利可圖,,但不賣也要付出客服成本,。“亞馬遜竟然連續(xù)8周無法提供Charmin衛(wèi)生紙,,這是極其可悲的,。”咨詢公司戰(zhàn)略資源集團的董事總經(jīng)理,、寶潔前高管伯特?弗利金格這樣說道,。
具有諷刺意味的是,當(dāng)人們被困在家里的時候,,亞馬遜正在放棄其他商品的潛在銷售額,,同時還在設(shè)法鋪設(shè)其衛(wèi)生紙管道。加拿大皇家銀行資本市場的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)分析師馬克?馬哈尼說:“我敢肯定,,他們一定在踢自己的屁股,。”
沃利?諾溫斯基是舊金山一家電子商務(wù)公司的高管,。他通過亞馬遜訂購衛(wèi)生紙,,每兩周收一次貨。不過,,從2月下旬開始,,盡管他訂購的洗發(fā)水和肥皂還能準(zhǔn)時到貨,但亞馬遜連續(xù)四次錯過了衛(wèi)生紙交貨期,。然后,,在4月底,,三包24卷裝Quilted Northern衛(wèi)生紙卻在一周時間內(nèi)陸續(xù)送達。但到這時候,,這些衛(wèi)生紙對他已經(jīng)沒有多大用處了,。“我們?nèi)ド痰曩I了衛(wèi)生紙,。我不會突然需要兩個月的用量,。”他說,。
諾溫斯基的經(jīng)歷讓我們得以窺探短缺問題是如何在幕后阻礙企業(yè)運營的,。由于需求仍然超過生產(chǎn)能力,衛(wèi)生紙不得不“按比例分配”,。這意味著零售商只能得到其訂購數(shù)量的一小部分——這種做法通常只適用于當(dāng)季最熱門的玩具或游戲,。前亞馬遜高管安德里亞?利說,由于亞馬遜優(yōu)先考慮訂購用戶,,延遲發(fā)貨意味著它沒有獲得足夠多的衛(wèi)生紙,,甚至無法滿足一些在疫情爆發(fā)很久以前就下的訂單。面對類似的問題,,好市多決定暫時不在網(wǎng)上銷售衛(wèi)生紙,。負(fù)責(zé)財務(wù)的高級副總裁鮑勃?納爾遜告訴《財富》雜志:“我們選擇盡可能地維持倉庫庫存?!?/font>
沒有一家企業(yè)希望在購買狂潮最終消退時,,圍困在堆積如山的衛(wèi)生紙中。(高消費城市的消費者都會有這樣的感受:“我們每個月要支付一平方英尺5美元的租金,。我可不想把這些衛(wèi)生紙都存在家中,。”諾溫斯基說,。)“我們可以打造一條能夠100%應(yīng)對所有這些沖擊的供應(yīng)鏈,。”瓜拉亞說,,“但這就好比你能夠造一輛固若金湯,,讓你碰到任何交通事故時都可以毫發(fā)無損的轎車,但你永遠也不會想開它,?!?/font>
不過,隨著人們更多地在家工作,,各大制造商正在適應(yīng)需求持續(xù)增長的可能性,。在3月那個星期五離開辦公室后,金佰利公司總裁馬斯托里德斯花了整個周末來決定停產(chǎn)哪一種衛(wèi)生紙——將“庫存單位”至少削減一半,。該公司最終決定專注于生產(chǎn)6包裝的Cottonelle“超大卷”衛(wèi)生紙,,而不是12包裝,。如此一來,工廠就不必頻頻關(guān)閉機器來更換原材料,,從而最大程度地減少停機時間,。在后疫情時代,一些種類恐怕再也不會重返生產(chǎn)線,?!拔艺J(rèn)為,在這場疫情塵埃落定后,,我們的產(chǎn)品類別將出現(xiàn)很大變化,。”馬斯托里德斯說,。
在寶潔公司,,歷經(jīng)兩個月的破紀(jì)錄生產(chǎn),內(nèi)梅思的團隊正在實施從危機中吸取的教訓(xùn),。“我們正在以此為契機,,全面推動供應(yīng)鏈升級再造,。”內(nèi)梅思說,。在想方設(shè)法適應(yīng)超可預(yù)測的需求之后,,寶潔正在為應(yīng)對“一個明顯更不穩(wěn)定的環(huán)境”而重新設(shè)計其運營方式。這包括快速追蹤新供應(yīng)商的適應(yīng)情況,、增加分銷網(wǎng)點,,以及利用數(shù)據(jù)生成更早的需求沖擊警告。保持社交距離的必要性也讓寶潔意識到,,該公司需要增加換崗班次,,讓員工盡可能分散地工作,從而更有效地為工廠配置員工,。
就連辦公室職員最近也開始去生產(chǎn)一線幫忙,。畢竟,短缺問題讓Charmin品牌的高管和普通消費者一樣惱火,。內(nèi)梅思說:“我買衛(wèi)生紙的渠道跟大家都是一樣的,。”當(dāng)然,,除非它賣光了,。
順應(yīng)挑戰(zhàn)
面對嚴(yán)峻的衛(wèi)生紙短缺問題,多家《財富》美國500強企業(yè)正在想方設(shè)法地滿足不斷飆升的需求,。
金佰利(第175位)
為了避免裝配線中斷,,這家紙業(yè)巨頭已經(jīng)減少了衛(wèi)生紙生產(chǎn)種類,。金佰利正在優(yōu)先生產(chǎn)6卷裝Cottonelle衛(wèi)生紙,而不是12卷裝,,這有助于將供應(yīng)分散到更多的客戶手中,。
寶潔(第50位)
就連辦公室職員最近也開始在工廠輪班,以推動產(chǎn)量達到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的水平,。此外,,首席產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)官胡利奧?內(nèi)梅思表示,寶潔也更加依賴分析技術(shù)來預(yù)測需求波動,,并給予其“更大的上下波動空間”,。
好市多(第14位)
這家會員制倉儲量販店限制每位會員只能購買一大包衛(wèi)生紙(這有助于防止顧客發(fā)生爭執(zhí))。至少在6月之前,,好市多將停止在網(wǎng)上銷售衛(wèi)生紙,。
沃爾瑪(第1位)
自3月以來,由于購物需求導(dǎo)致其供應(yīng)鏈不堪重負(fù),,沃爾瑪每天都在招聘5,000名新員工——目標(biāo)是增加20萬名員工——以保持貨架庫存,,及時交付訂貨。此外,,這家零售巨頭還要求制造商繞過倉庫,,直接向旗下門店運送衛(wèi)生紙,以避免在倉庫之間轉(zhuǎn)運所造成的物流減速,。(財富中文網(wǎng))
本文另一版本登載于《財富》雜志2020年6月/7月刊,,標(biāo)題為《疫情之下,衛(wèi)生紙為何短缺,?》,。
譯者:任文科
BEFORE EXECUTIVES at paper-goods giant Kimberly-Clark rushed to shut their offices on Friday the 13th of March, they convened for one last emergency meeting. Commuting home that final time, Arist Mastorides, president of family care for North America, stopped at his local Walmart, on the edge of Lake Winnebago in Neenah, Wis., to see the emergency firsthand. Mastorides oversees toilet paper brands like Cottonelle and Scott, but that evening he could find none of his own products. “A long gondola shelf that’s completely empty of bathroom and facial tissue, I never in my life thought I would ever see that,” he says. “That’s a very unsettling thing.”
Indeed, that week will be remembered for the Great Toilet Paper Panic of 2020. The previous day, March 12, TP sales had ballooned 734% compared with the same day the previous year, becoming the top-selling product at grocery stores by dollars spent, according to NCSolutions, which tracks consumer packaged goods (CPG). As shoppers prepared to hunker down at home indefinitely to avoid the coronavirus, they wiped Amazon, then supermarkets across America, clean of the bathroom basic. People might need as much as 40% more toilet paper at home for “occasions” (as the industry calls them) that would otherwise happen at workplaces, restaurants, or hotels. But they bought far more: Sales were up nearly 71% year over year in the nine weeks through May 2, according to Nielsen. They would have risen even higher—except that people can’t find enough toilet paper to buy.
At first, experts waved off concerns about shortages. A Wall Street Journal editorial on March 22 declared, “There is one fear we can alleviate: the idea that America is running out of toilet paper.” But much of America did, in fact, run out. By March 23, toilet paper was out of stock at 70% of U.S. grocery stores (including online sellers). “When everybody forward-buys, then you do create a shortage. Perception becomes reality,” says Pete Guarraia, who heads consultancy Bain’s global supply-chain practice.
Some two months into the pandemic, the white stuff remains scarce. All types of Charmin are indefinitely “unavailable” on Amazon.com; Costco has suspended TP shipping “due to limited supply.” “It’s not like there’s troves of it sitting in warehouses that we didn’t get to stores,” says Dan Toporek, a spokesperson for Walmart. “There’s just truly such high demand it’s hard to have in stock anywhere.”
Major companies are now absorbing the reality that something as mundane as toilet paper represents a uniquely complex supply-chain challenge. Paradoxically, the great strides the CPG industry has made in efficiency in recent years—especially the near-global adoption of “just in time” manufacturing and distribution—have now clogged the pipes that get TP to customers. And toilet paper is merely one of the essential items, from disinfectant wipes to baking yeast, teaching business a hard lesson about weaknesses of modern manufacturing and logistics. “The fact that we’ve been working so hard to try to make sure our systems run as efficiently as they possibly can has necessarily meant that we didn’t have weeks and weeks of supplies sitting around,” says Leslie Sarasin, CEO of FMI, a trade group that represents the grocery industry.
Big purchases from those groceries have snowballed—by orders of magnitude—at manufacturers like Procter & Gamble, maker of Charmin, and Kimberly-Clark. That means that even as production has increased, back orders are likely to last well into the summer. Persistently bare shelves, meanwhile, perpetuate the perception that there is a true shortage; thus, the panic buying continues. “We are prepared for thousands of different events, from cybersecurity attacks to earthquakes to fire,” says Julio Nemeth, P&G’s chief product supply officer, whose earnest voice is accented by his native Argentina. “But we were not prepared for all of those happening at the same time, which is what the pandemic brought to us.”
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AS IT HAPPENS, toilet paper really does grow on trees—eucalyptus trees, mostly, in Brazil. Whereas in the U.S. and Canada trees take decades before they can be cut down, the sweetly mint-scented Brazilian trees reach 100 feet into the sky in just six or seven years, growing faster than corn. “That’s what makes them so low cost,” says Mark Wilde, a packaging and forest products analyst at BMO Capital Markets who is widely known as Dr. Paper.
For a product like toilet paper with single-ply margins, every penny saved is key. And as sales of bog rolls have surged, demand for the virgin pulp used in Charmin and Cottonelle has also ticked up, sending prices of the commodity $30 higher in early May, to around $500 a ton, according to HSBC. But try charging more for toilet paper, and you’ll incur consumer outrage. That’s why the paper industry is more cost-obsessed than perhaps any other. “It’s as absolutely ideally optimized, as perfectly as it can be, between the supply and the demand,” says Yannis Skoufalos, who retired last year as P&G’s global product supply officer.
At least that was the case until the coronavirus upset the balance. Historically, it has been easy to produce just the right amount of TP because demand is so boringly consistent. And because of its bulk, no one wants extra rolls taking up valuable space. Those factors have made toilet paper the quintessential candidate for just-in-time manufacturing, the methodology that has come to dominate the CPG industry in the past decade.
But it also meant that when pandemic shoppers descended on paper aisles, there was no more than two or three weeks’ worth to sell, anywhere in the supply chain. As early as February, preparing for potentially greater demand and feared plant closures, P&G boosted production of brands like Crest toothpaste and Olay moisturizer. But “we never had more on hand in the paper category,” says Nemeth. Cost considerations played a role: Whereas you could open up another assembly line to fill bottles of Tide detergent for under $10 million, an additional paper machine would require an investment of roughly $300 million, explains Skoufalos.
Toilet paper machines ran at 99.8% of capacity in March, according to Fastmarkets RISI, up from their normal 92%. Even so, overall U.S. production increased only 8%, to some 700,000 tons for the month. “This pandemic has revealed the limits of lean supply-chain management,” says Bain’s Guarraia.
No retailer has taken the just-in-time model to more of an extreme than Amazon. Making a profit on one-day and even one-hour delivery depends on accurately forecasting demand. “If Amazon knows they can order on Tuesday and get it literally in their warehouses by Friday, it’s totally fine,” says Andrea Leigh, a former Amazon executive, now VP of strategy and insights at Ideoclick, an e-commerce optimization company.
The toilet paper production conundrum, however, has become an unprecedented challenge for Amazon, leaving it months behind on orders. Amazon even temporarily stopped allowing some goods into its warehouses altogether, “to prioritize stocking and delivering essential items like household staples,” CEO Jeff Bezos announced on March 21. But on basics like toilet paper, Amazon earns little profit, if any, even at pandemic-driven higher volumes, says Leigh. (Amazon’s additional revenue on many low-price items “is basically coming at cost,” CFO Brian Olsavsky said on a recent earnings call. Amazon declined to comment for this story.) And unprofitable as it is to sell, not selling toilet paper comes with a customer-service cost. “The fact that Amazon cannot deliver Charmin for over eight weeks in a row shows how pathetic it is,” says Burt Flickinger, managing director of the consultancy Strategic Resource Group, and a former P&G executive.
The irony is that with people stuck at home, Amazon is flushing away potential sales of other items while it plumbs its TP pipeline. Says Mark Mahaney, Internet analyst at RBC Capital Markets, “I’m sure they must be kicking themselves in the butt.”
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WALLY NOWINSKI, a San Francisco-based e-commerce executive, subscribes to toilet paper via Amazon, receiving biweekly deliveries. But beginning in late February, while his subscriptions to shampoo and soap kept arriving on time, Amazon missed four straight TP shipments. Then, at the end of April, three 24-roll packs of Quilted Northern showed up in the span of a week. Not that it did him much good by then. “We went out to the store and bought toilet paper. I don’t suddenly need, like, two months’ worth,” he says.
Nowinski’s experience provides a glimpse into how the shortage is constipating companies behind the scenes. Because demand still exceeds production capacity, TP is “on allocation,” meaning retailers are getting only a fraction of the amounts they’ve ordered—a measure generally applied only to the season’s hottest toys or games. Since Amazon prioritizes subscriptions, says Leigh, delayed shipments suggest it hasn’t gotten enough TP to fulfill even orders placed long before the pandemic. Facing a similar problem, Costco has decided not to sell TP online for the time being. “We have chosen to keep our warehouses in stock as best as we can,” Bob Nelson, Costco’s senior vice president of finance, tells Fortune.
What no business wants is to be stuck with mounds of rolls when buying finally slows. (Consumers in pricey cities can relate. Says Nowinski, “We pay $5 a square foot a month in rent—I don’t want to be storing all this toilet paper.”) “You can build supply chains that are 100% resilient to all shocks,” Guarraia says. “But the analogy I use is you can build a car where if you have an accident you would never be hurt, but you would never want to drive that car.”
Still, manufacturers are adapting to the likelihood of prolonged higher demand as people work more from home. After leaving the office that March Friday, Kimberly-Clark’s Mastorides spent the weekend deciding which kinds of TP to stop producing—cutting “SKUs” by at least half. The company has focused on six-packs of Cottonelle “mega rolls” versus 12-packs; that keeps plants from having to stop the machines as often to switch out materials, minimizing downtime. Some variants likely won’t return post-pandemic. “I think we’ll have a very different assortment as we exit this,” Mastorides says.
Over at P&G, after two months of record-breaking production, Nemeth’s team is implementing lessons learned from the crisis. “We are turning those into essentially a reengineering of our supply chain,” Nemeth says. Having adapted its operations for ultra-predictable demand, P&G is now redesigning them for “a significantly more volatile environment.” That includes fast-tracking onboarding for new suppliers, adding distribution sites, and using data to generate earlier demand-shock warnings. The necessities of social distancing have also helped P&G realize it can staff plants more efficiently, by spreading workers across more shifts.
Even desk workers have lately pitched in on factory floors. After all, shortages have chafed Charmin executives as much as they have the rest of us. “I buy my toilet paper where anybody buys it,” says Nemeth. Unless, of course, it’s sold out.
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ROLLING WITH THE TP PUNCHES
Fortune 500 companies grappling with toilet paper shortages are plunging ahead to keep up with surging demand.
KIMBERLY-CLARK (NO. 175)
Look for more “mega” than “double” rolls of top brand Cottonelle: Manufacturer Kimberly-Clark has cut the number of TP variations it makes to avoid pausing its assembly lines. It’s prioritizing six-roll packs over 12-packs, which helps spread the supply among more customers.
PROCTER & GAMBLE (NO. 50)
Even office workers have lately taken shifts on the factory floors to push production to record highs. The company is also relying more heavily on analytics to foresee demand fluctuations and give it “more flex up and down,” says P&G’s Julio Nemeth.
COSTCO (NO. 14)
The wholesale-quantity grocery seller has limited purchases to a single jumbo pack of toilet paper per member (helping prevent tussles between shoppers). Costco has also stopped selling TP online until at least June.
WALMART (NO. 1)
Since March, Walmart has been hiring 5,000 new workers a day—with the aim of adding 200,000 in total—to help keep shelves stocked and orders filled as shopper demand strains its supply chain. It’s also having manufacturers ship toilet paper directly to its stores, bypassing warehouses and slowdowns from trucking between them.
A version of this article appears in the June/July 2020 issue of Fortune with the headline “The case of the missing toilet paper.”