在2004年前后爆發(fā)的房地產(chǎn)熱潮中,美國(guó)人拼命申請(qǐng)可調(diào)利率抵押貸款,,這種貸款以超低的“誘惑利率”吸引人們購(gòu)買超出能力范圍的房屋,。到2004年,有一半的購(gòu)房者使用可調(diào)利率抵押貸款,,這一比例是三年前的三倍。不過,,這些誘惑利率只持續(xù)了幾年時(shí)間,,“重置”后的貸款利率遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)更高。2007年的最后四個(gè)月,,有兩百萬家庭目睹自己的還款額攀升35%,。這一連鎖反應(yīng)加速了傳說中的房屋止贖潮,摧毀了房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng),。
如今,,人們?cè)诨I措資金購(gòu)買房屋時(shí)要謹(jǐn)慎得多,絕大多數(shù)的人會(huì)選擇30年期固定利率貸款,。這些家庭從一開始便有能力還清每個(gè)月的貸款,,而且他們的工資會(huì)穩(wěn)步增長(zhǎng),所以這筆固定數(shù)目的還款額占父母收入的比重就越來越小,。這有助于他們積累起數(shù)目可觀的儲(chǔ)蓄金來持續(xù)償還貸款,,即使一方或雙方失業(yè)好幾個(gè)月,他們也有能力保住農(nóng)場(chǎng)或房屋,。沒有什么比安全而長(zhǎng)久的借貸更能夠讓房主酣睡的了,。
的確,美國(guó)的房主們都把可調(diào)利率抵押貸款引發(fā)的災(zāi)難銘記于心,。不過拜登新政府似乎和之前的特朗普?qǐng)F(tuán)隊(duì)一樣,,他們正在重蹈覆轍,再犯2007年那些傾心誘惑利率的人所犯的錯(cuò)誤,。拜登主張通過1.9萬億美元的“美國(guó)拯救計(jì)劃”(American Rescue Plan),,并在第二階段籌集數(shù)萬億美元用于重建基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和其他行動(dòng),,原因在于利率已經(jīng)降至歷史低點(diǎn),而且注定會(huì)保持下去,。拜登提名的財(cái)政部部長(zhǎng)珍妮特?耶倫在其參議院確認(rèn)聽證會(huì)上宣布:“現(xiàn)在利率如此之低,,我們最明智的做法就是有所大動(dòng)作?!彼a(bǔ)充道,,“世道已經(jīng)改變,我相信未來很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間都會(huì)保持低利率,?!?/p>
耶倫的確也發(fā)出了警告,表示“利率存在上升的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”,。另外,,她也認(rèn)同30年期固定利率是更加安全的做法?!袄史浅5偷臅r(shí)候發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期債券來籌集資金還債,,這是有好處的?!?/p>
但在過去的一年時(shí)間里,,美國(guó)主要通過出售一年期以下(通常是少于六個(gè)月)的國(guó)債來償還激增的聯(lián)邦借貸。從耶倫的聲明中并不能看出她是否會(huì)嘗試發(fā)行期限更長(zhǎng)且更安全的新債券,,最可能出現(xiàn)的情況有兩種,。第一,拜登政府堅(jiān)持以極短的借貸為主,,這一做法十分誘人,,因?yàn)榭梢栽诙虝r(shí)間內(nèi)將利息支出保持在最低水平,并有助于控制赤字,。不過這樣會(huì)帶來巨大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,因?yàn)?個(gè)月期國(guó)債等債券的價(jià)格是15個(gè)月前的兩倍,價(jià)格飆升的話就將淹沒預(yù)算,。
第二,,耶倫可能會(huì)將更高比例的新借貸轉(zhuǎn)為長(zhǎng)期債券。一個(gè)問題是,,7年期和10年期國(guó)債的收益率最近在飆升,,這可能標(biāo)志著一個(gè)趨勢(shì)的開始。通脹上升的速度比幾個(gè)月前預(yù)計(jì)的要快,,因此價(jià)格上漲和經(jīng)濟(jì)反彈的共同作用可能會(huì)將基準(zhǔn)10年期國(guó)債以及所有其他長(zhǎng)期和短期國(guó)債的收益率推向遠(yuǎn)高于目前的水平,。
最根本的問題在于債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)規(guī)模龐大,在新冠疫情爆發(fā)之前,美國(guó)的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)就已經(jīng)非常重,,而且還在不斷增長(zhǎng),,看不到盡頭。到今年年底,,用于重振經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)巨額支出將使美國(guó)的債務(wù)大山擴(kuò)大至26萬億美元,,較2019年躍升逾50%。簡(jiǎn)而言之,,目前負(fù)擔(dān)如此之大,,以至于民眾突然之間更容易受到利率上升的影響。現(xiàn)在如果利率整體上升0.5個(gè)百分點(diǎn),,美國(guó)的利息支出將比2019年同樣的增長(zhǎng)高出一半,。
到目前為止,美國(guó)已經(jīng)將潛在的損害降到了最低程度,,在最短期限內(nèi)為大部分井噴的債務(wù)融資,,美國(guó)去年的利率也大幅下降。令人驚訝的是,,債務(wù)爆炸式增長(zhǎng)的同時(shí)利息負(fù)擔(dān)卻不斷減少,,這也讓拜登團(tuán)隊(duì)相信能夠繼續(xù)揮霍下去。即使拜登和耶倫的團(tuán)隊(duì)采取更為傳統(tǒng)的策略,,將債券組合更多地轉(zhuǎn)向長(zhǎng)期,,他們也仍然會(huì)出售數(shù)萬億一年期以下的債券。
拜登團(tuán)隊(duì)似乎遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低估了未來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。利率大幅波動(dòng),即便回到去年年初的水平,,也將推動(dòng)利率支出從國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室(CBO)預(yù)測(cè)的下降軌跡迅速上升,,已經(jīng)處在危險(xiǎn)之中的未來預(yù)算赤字會(huì)大大增加。
當(dāng)然,,最危險(xiǎn)的情況是過去一年所出現(xiàn)的那種,,也最類似于可調(diào)利率抵押貸款的災(zāi)難。
短期考慮
美國(guó)財(cái)政部的最新債務(wù)和赤字?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)更新至2020年12月31日,。因此,,它比截至9月的財(cái)年數(shù)據(jù)更貼近當(dāng)前情況。美國(guó)在這個(gè)日歷年經(jīng)歷了借貸狂潮,,這是一個(gè)大新聞,。最容易被忽視的是新債務(wù)到期時(shí)間的變化。截至2019年年底,,美國(guó)公眾持有的債務(wù)為16.66萬億美元,。(這是有價(jià)證券融資的金額。)其中,2.34萬億美元(14.5%)是30年期國(guó)債,,9.9萬億美元(60%)是一到十年期國(guó)債,,大部分都是這種規(guī)模的短期國(guó)債。只有26%的人持有一年期以下的短期國(guó)庫(kù)券,,或者浮動(dòng)債券和通脹保值債券,,這些債券的利率并不固定,會(huì)隨著市場(chǎng)波動(dòng),,這意味著它們可以在短時(shí)間內(nèi)大幅上漲,。
2020年,美國(guó)的債務(wù)總額取得了4.3萬億美元的驚人增長(zhǎng),,達(dá)到近21萬億美元,。短期國(guó)庫(kù)券、通脹保值債券和浮動(dòng)債務(wù)的規(guī)模從2.4萬億美元躍升至4.96萬億美元,,增幅達(dá)105%,。相比之下,較安全的票據(jù)和債券的漲幅僅不到這個(gè)數(shù)字的三分之二,。在全部增長(zhǎng)中,,62%來自票據(jù)或浮動(dòng)利率債券。截至去年年底,,33%的貸款屬于這一類別,,較2019年以來的7%大幅上升,債務(wù)總額則增長(zhǎng)了逾四分之一,。
這些年與年之間的對(duì)比仍然不能全面反映美國(guó)的債務(wù)時(shí)間表在過去一年收緊了多少,。我們從短期國(guó)庫(kù)券談起,即便是一年期或不到一年的債券,,美國(guó)也傾向于做空,。美國(guó)債務(wù)管理辦公室(Office of Debt Management)在1月的一份報(bào)告顯示,剔除到期債券,,90%國(guó)庫(kù)券的發(fā)行期限為22周或更短,。至于期限較長(zhǎng)的票據(jù)(一至十年期),半數(shù)的發(fā)行期限在三年或以內(nèi),。美國(guó)僅籌集了8320億美元,,不到新債券出售額的五分之一,這些債券的期限為5至30年,,非常安全,。
過去一年,投資者大舉買入美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券,,美國(guó)全部可轉(zhuǎn)讓債券的平均到期時(shí)間因此從70個(gè)月降至63個(gè)月,。特朗普時(shí)期的財(cái)政部國(guó)債累累,,原因顯而易見。國(guó)債利率的驚人下跌在美國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的歷史上十分罕見,,3個(gè)月期國(guó)債收益率從2020年年初的1.54%跌至年底的0.09%,,跌幅達(dá)94%。長(zhǎng)期利率也大幅下降,,但這一趨勢(shì)并未對(duì)降低整體利息成本起到多大作用,。
為什么會(huì)這樣?因?yàn)槿种慕杩钊匀皇?年或更長(zhǎng)期限的證券,。由于5年期,、7年期、10年期和30年期國(guó)債的收益率增長(zhǎng)緩慢,,這些長(zhǎng)期債券的平均利率是美國(guó)國(guó)債收益率的幾倍,。截至2020年12月31日,票據(jù)和債券的收益率分別為1.7%和3.4%,,低于上年同期的2.1%和3.9%,。較長(zhǎng)期債券平均利率的小幅下降幾乎幫不上忙,因?yàn)樾掳l(fā)行10年期和30年期債券的利率上升更猛,。最大的杠桿是短期國(guó)庫(kù)券利率的驚人下跌,,這些債券主要為激增的支出買單。
孤注一擲,?
但是,,如果押注國(guó)債利率將保持在當(dāng)前水平,這是否屬于魯莽之舉,?三分之一的債務(wù)要么在不到一年的時(shí)間內(nèi)到期(國(guó)庫(kù)券),,要么是浮動(dòng)利率(可能會(huì)迅速飆升),其余三分之二債券的利率則會(huì)穩(wěn)定較長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間,。截至2019年9月,,8周和26周國(guó)債的收益率均維持在2%。穆迪投資者服務(wù)公司(Moody's Investor Services)預(yù)計(jì)今年的通脹率將達(dá)到2%,,而摩根大通(J.P. Morgan Chase)的首席執(zhí)行官杰米?戴蒙在第四季度收益電話會(huì)議上表示價(jià)格可能會(huì)上漲3%甚至4%。美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)計(jì),,隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)從新冠疫情中反彈,,今年的增長(zhǎng)率將超過5%。10年期國(guó)債收益率已經(jīng)從去年9月的不到0.7%躍升至1.1%,。
如果所有關(guān)于未來低利率的預(yù)測(cè)都是錯(cuò)的,,那會(huì)發(fā)生什么事情?在拜登公布他的1.9萬億美元計(jì)劃之前,,美國(guó)聯(lián)邦預(yù)算問責(zé)委員會(huì)(Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget)曾經(jīng)預(yù)測(cè)今年的赤字將達(dá)到2.3萬億美元,,僅這一項(xiàng)額外支出就將使赤字達(dá)到至少4萬億美元。雖然并不確定,但我們假設(shè)其中一半的錢借自國(guó)庫(kù)券,,那么到2021年年底,,可流通債務(wù)總額將從21萬億美元上升到25萬億美元,持有的短期國(guó)庫(kù)券和其他浮動(dòng)債券將從7萬億美元上升到9萬億美元,。
然后我們?cè)賮硐胂笠幌?,?021年下半年,美國(guó)國(guó)債的平均利率回到2%,。期限如此之短,,我們將不得不在2022年年初對(duì)大部分債券進(jìn)行再融資。到2022年,,僅短期國(guó)庫(kù)券和浮動(dòng)債務(wù)的成本就將從不到50億美元上升到1800億美元左右,,利息支出也將激增至5800億美元左右。這比2019年的數(shù)目高出2000多億美元,,也將扼殺支出會(huì)大幅增加而利息支出會(huì)下降的樂觀看法,。5800億美元的利息將吸收超過2.5%的GDP,遠(yuǎn)高于財(cái)政部前官員拉里?薩默斯和賈森?弗曼在最近一篇文章中提出的2%這一危險(xiǎn)比例,。薩默斯和弗曼認(rèn)為,,大幅增加支出才是正道,并預(yù)計(jì)其不可能達(dá)到GDP的2%,。
但這是有可能發(fā)生的,。如果真的如此,利息將在國(guó)民收入中占據(jù)越來越大的份額,。即使利率低于國(guó)民收入的增長(zhǎng)速度,,利息也會(huì)越來越重,因?yàn)闄?quán)益成本飆升將推動(dòng)美國(guó)的赤字迅速增加,??烧{(diào)利率抵押貸款的不幸經(jīng)歷告訴我們,你不應(yīng)該冒險(xiǎn)借100萬美元買房子,,因?yàn)閮赡旰蟮倪€款額可能會(huì)翻倍,,而你的薪水還在一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)上升,無法支付那些大額還款,。特朗普鋌而走險(xiǎn),,但在事與愿違之前選擇放棄。如今,,新政府更加相信“世道已經(jīng)改變”,,但如果世界恢復(fù)常態(tài),下注房子將會(huì)被證明是失敗之舉,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:秦維奇
在2004年前后爆發(fā)的房地產(chǎn)熱潮中,,美國(guó)人拼命申請(qǐng)可調(diào)利率抵押貸款,,這種貸款以超低的“誘惑利率”吸引人們購(gòu)買超出能力范圍的房屋。到2004年,,有一半的購(gòu)房者使用可調(diào)利率抵押貸款,,這一比例是三年前的三倍。不過,,這些誘惑利率只持續(xù)了幾年時(shí)間,,“重置”后的貸款利率遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)更高。2007年的最后四個(gè)月,,有兩百萬家庭目睹自己的還款額攀升35%,。這一連鎖反應(yīng)加速了傳說中的房屋止贖潮,摧毀了房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng),。
如今,,人們?cè)诨I措資金購(gòu)買房屋時(shí)要謹(jǐn)慎得多,絕大多數(shù)的人會(huì)選擇30年期固定利率貸款,。這些家庭從一開始便有能力還清每個(gè)月的貸款,,而且他們的工資會(huì)穩(wěn)步增長(zhǎng),所以這筆固定數(shù)目的還款額占父母收入的比重就越來越小,。這有助于他們積累起數(shù)目可觀的儲(chǔ)蓄金來持續(xù)償還貸款,,即使一方或雙方失業(yè)好幾個(gè)月,他們也有能力保住農(nóng)場(chǎng)或房屋,。沒有什么比安全而長(zhǎng)久的借貸更能夠讓房主酣睡的了,。
的確,美國(guó)的房主們都把可調(diào)利率抵押貸款引發(fā)的災(zāi)難銘記于心,。不過拜登新政府似乎和之前的特朗普?qǐng)F(tuán)隊(duì)一樣,,他們正在重蹈覆轍,再犯2007年那些傾心誘惑利率的人所犯的錯(cuò)誤,。拜登主張通過1.9萬億美元的“美國(guó)拯救計(jì)劃”(American Rescue Plan),,并在第二階段籌集數(shù)萬億美元用于重建基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和其他行動(dòng),原因在于利率已經(jīng)降至歷史低點(diǎn),,而且注定會(huì)保持下去,。拜登提名的財(cái)政部部長(zhǎng)珍妮特?耶倫在其參議院確認(rèn)聽證會(huì)上宣布:“現(xiàn)在利率如此之低,我們最明智的做法就是有所大動(dòng)作,?!彼a(bǔ)充道,“世道已經(jīng)改變,,我相信未來很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間都會(huì)保持低利率?!?/p>
耶倫的確也發(fā)出了警告,,表示“利率存在上升的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”,。另外,她也認(rèn)同30年期固定利率是更加安全的做法,?!袄史浅5偷臅r(shí)候發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期債券來籌集資金還債,這是有好處的,?!?/p>
但在過去的一年時(shí)間里,美國(guó)主要通過出售一年期以下(通常是少于六個(gè)月)的國(guó)債來償還激增的聯(lián)邦借貸,。從耶倫的聲明中并不能看出她是否會(huì)嘗試發(fā)行期限更長(zhǎng)且更安全的新債券,,最可能出現(xiàn)的情況有兩種。第一,,拜登政府堅(jiān)持以極短的借貸為主,,這一做法十分誘人,因?yàn)榭梢栽诙虝r(shí)間內(nèi)將利息支出保持在最低水平,,并有助于控制赤字,。不過這樣會(huì)帶來巨大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),因?yàn)?個(gè)月期國(guó)債等債券的價(jià)格是15個(gè)月前的兩倍,,價(jià)格飆升的話就將淹沒預(yù)算,。
第二,耶倫可能會(huì)將更高比例的新借貸轉(zhuǎn)為長(zhǎng)期債券,。一個(gè)問題是,,7年期和10年期國(guó)債的收益率最近在飆升,這可能標(biāo)志著一個(gè)趨勢(shì)的開始,。通脹上升的速度比幾個(gè)月前預(yù)計(jì)的要快,,因此價(jià)格上漲和經(jīng)濟(jì)反彈的共同作用可能會(huì)將基準(zhǔn)10年期國(guó)債以及所有其他長(zhǎng)期和短期國(guó)債的收益率推向遠(yuǎn)高于目前的水平。
最根本的問題在于債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)規(guī)模龐大,,在新冠疫情爆發(fā)之前,,美國(guó)的債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)就已經(jīng)非常重,而且還在不斷增長(zhǎng),,看不到盡頭,。到今年年底,用于重振經(jīng)濟(jì)的持續(xù)巨額支出將使美國(guó)的債務(wù)大山擴(kuò)大至26萬億美元,,較2019年躍升逾50%,。簡(jiǎn)而言之,目前負(fù)擔(dān)如此之大,,以至于民眾突然之間更容易受到利率上升的影響?,F(xiàn)在如果利率整體上升0.5個(gè)百分點(diǎn),美國(guó)的利息支出將比2019年同樣的增長(zhǎng)高出一半,。
到目前為止,,美國(guó)已經(jīng)將潛在的損害降到了最低程度,,在最短期限內(nèi)為大部分井噴的債務(wù)融資,美國(guó)去年的利率也大幅下降,。令人驚訝的是,,債務(wù)爆炸式增長(zhǎng)的同時(shí)利息負(fù)擔(dān)卻不斷減少,這也讓拜登團(tuán)隊(duì)相信能夠繼續(xù)揮霍下去,。即使拜登和耶倫的團(tuán)隊(duì)采取更為傳統(tǒng)的策略,,將債券組合更多地轉(zhuǎn)向長(zhǎng)期,他們也仍然會(huì)出售數(shù)萬億一年期以下的債券,。
拜登團(tuán)隊(duì)似乎遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低估了未來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。利率大幅波動(dòng),即便回到去年年初的水平,,也將推動(dòng)利率支出從國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室(CBO)預(yù)測(cè)的下降軌跡迅速上升,,已經(jīng)處在危險(xiǎn)之中的未來預(yù)算赤字會(huì)大大增加。
當(dāng)然,,最危險(xiǎn)的情況是過去一年所出現(xiàn)的那種,,也最類似于可調(diào)利率抵押貸款的災(zāi)難。
短期考慮
美國(guó)財(cái)政部的最新債務(wù)和赤字?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)更新至2020年12月31日,。因此,,它比截至9月的財(cái)年數(shù)據(jù)更貼近當(dāng)前情況。美國(guó)在這個(gè)日歷年經(jīng)歷了借貸狂潮,,這是一個(gè)大新聞,。最容易被忽視的是新債務(wù)到期時(shí)間的變化。截至2019年年底,,美國(guó)公眾持有的債務(wù)為16.66萬億美元,。(這是有價(jià)證券融資的金額。)其中,,2.34萬億美元(14.5%)是30年期國(guó)債,,9.9萬億美元(60%)是一到十年期國(guó)債,大部分都是這種規(guī)模的短期國(guó)債,。只有26%的人持有一年期以下的短期國(guó)庫(kù)券,,或者浮動(dòng)債券和通脹保值債券,這些債券的利率并不固定,,會(huì)隨著市場(chǎng)波動(dòng),,這意味著它們可以在短時(shí)間內(nèi)大幅上漲。
2020年,,美國(guó)的債務(wù)總額取得了4.3萬億美元的驚人增長(zhǎng),,達(dá)到近21萬億美元。短期國(guó)庫(kù)券、通脹保值債券和浮動(dòng)債務(wù)的規(guī)模從2.4萬億美元躍升至4.96萬億美元,,增幅達(dá)105%,。相比之下,較安全的票據(jù)和債券的漲幅僅不到這個(gè)數(shù)字的三分之二,。在全部增長(zhǎng)中,62%來自票據(jù)或浮動(dòng)利率債券,。截至去年年底,,33%的貸款屬于這一類別,較2019年以來的7%大幅上升,,債務(wù)總額則增長(zhǎng)了逾四分之一,。
這些年與年之間的對(duì)比仍然不能全面反映美國(guó)的債務(wù)時(shí)間表在過去一年收緊了多少。我們從短期國(guó)庫(kù)券談起,,即便是一年期或不到一年的債券,,美國(guó)也傾向于做空。美國(guó)債務(wù)管理辦公室(Office of Debt Management)在1月的一份報(bào)告顯示,,剔除到期債券,,90%國(guó)庫(kù)券的發(fā)行期限為22周或更短。至于期限較長(zhǎng)的票據(jù)(一至十年期),,半數(shù)的發(fā)行期限在三年或以內(nèi),。美國(guó)僅籌集了8320億美元,不到新債券出售額的五分之一,,這些債券的期限為5至30年,,非常安全。
過去一年,,投資者大舉買入美國(guó)國(guó)庫(kù)券,,美國(guó)全部可轉(zhuǎn)讓債券的平均到期時(shí)間因此從70個(gè)月降至63個(gè)月。特朗普時(shí)期的財(cái)政部國(guó)債累累,,原因顯而易見,。國(guó)債利率的驚人下跌在美國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的歷史上十分罕見,3個(gè)月期國(guó)債收益率從2020年年初的1.54%跌至年底的0.09%,,跌幅達(dá)94%,。長(zhǎng)期利率也大幅下降,但這一趨勢(shì)并未對(duì)降低整體利息成本起到多大作用,。
為什么會(huì)這樣,?因?yàn)槿种慕杩钊匀皇?年或更長(zhǎng)期限的證券。由于5年期,、7年期,、10年期和30年期國(guó)債的收益率增長(zhǎng)緩慢,這些長(zhǎng)期債券的平均利率是美國(guó)國(guó)債收益率的幾倍,。截至2020年12月31日,,票據(jù)和債券的收益率分別為1.7%和3.4%,,低于上年同期的2.1%和3.9%。較長(zhǎng)期債券平均利率的小幅下降幾乎幫不上忙,,因?yàn)樾掳l(fā)行10年期和30年期債券的利率上升更猛,。最大的杠桿是短期國(guó)庫(kù)券利率的驚人下跌,這些債券主要為激增的支出買單,。
孤注一擲,?
但是,如果押注國(guó)債利率將保持在當(dāng)前水平,,這是否屬于魯莽之舉,?三分之一的債務(wù)要么在不到一年的時(shí)間內(nèi)到期(國(guó)庫(kù)券),要么是浮動(dòng)利率(可能會(huì)迅速飆升),,其余三分之二債券的利率則會(huì)穩(wěn)定較長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間,。截至2019年9月,8周和26周國(guó)債的收益率均維持在2%,。穆迪投資者服務(wù)公司(Moody's Investor Services)預(yù)計(jì)今年的通脹率將達(dá)到2%,,而摩根大通(J.P. Morgan Chase)的首席執(zhí)行官杰米?戴蒙在第四季度收益電話會(huì)議上表示價(jià)格可能會(huì)上漲3%甚至4%。美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)計(jì),,隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)從新冠疫情中反彈,,今年的增長(zhǎng)率將超過5%。10年期國(guó)債收益率已經(jīng)從去年9月的不到0.7%躍升至1.1%,。
如果所有關(guān)于未來低利率的預(yù)測(cè)都是錯(cuò)的,,那會(huì)發(fā)生什么事情?在拜登公布他的1.9萬億美元計(jì)劃之前,,美國(guó)聯(lián)邦預(yù)算問責(zé)委員會(huì)(Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget)曾經(jīng)預(yù)測(cè)今年的赤字將達(dá)到2.3萬億美元,,僅這一項(xiàng)額外支出就將使赤字達(dá)到至少4萬億美元。雖然并不確定,,但我們假設(shè)其中一半的錢借自國(guó)庫(kù)券,,那么到2021年年底,可流通債務(wù)總額將從21萬億美元上升到25萬億美元,,持有的短期國(guó)庫(kù)券和其他浮動(dòng)債券將從7萬億美元上升到9萬億美元,。
然后我們?cè)賮硐胂笠幌拢?021年下半年,,美國(guó)國(guó)債的平均利率回到2%,。期限如此之短,我們將不得不在2022年年初對(duì)大部分債券進(jìn)行再融資,。到2022年,,僅短期國(guó)庫(kù)券和浮動(dòng)債務(wù)的成本就將從不到50億美元上升到1800億美元左右,利息支出也將激增至5800億美元左右。這比2019年的數(shù)目高出2000多億美元,,也將扼殺支出會(huì)大幅增加而利息支出會(huì)下降的樂觀看法,。5800億美元的利息將吸收超過2.5%的GDP,遠(yuǎn)高于財(cái)政部前官員拉里?薩默斯和賈森?弗曼在最近一篇文章中提出的2%這一危險(xiǎn)比例,。薩默斯和弗曼認(rèn)為,,大幅增加支出才是正道,并預(yù)計(jì)其不可能達(dá)到GDP的2%,。
但這是有可能發(fā)生的,。如果真的如此,利息將在國(guó)民收入中占據(jù)越來越大的份額,。即使利率低于國(guó)民收入的增長(zhǎng)速度,利息也會(huì)越來越重,,因?yàn)闄?quán)益成本飆升將推動(dòng)美國(guó)的赤字迅速增加,。可調(diào)利率抵押貸款的不幸經(jīng)歷告訴我們,,你不應(yīng)該冒險(xiǎn)借100萬美元買房子,,因?yàn)閮赡旰蟮倪€款額可能會(huì)翻倍,而你的薪水還在一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)上升,,無法支付那些大額還款,。特朗普鋌而走險(xiǎn),但在事與愿違之前選擇放棄,。如今,,新政府更加相信“世道已經(jīng)改變”,但如果世界恢復(fù)常態(tài),,下注房子將會(huì)被證明是失敗之舉,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:秦維奇
During the housing frenzy that took off around 2004, Americans gorged on adjustable-rate mortgages, featuring super-low "teaser" payments that enticed folks to buy more house than they could afford. By 2004, half of all home buyers were using ARMS, triple the share three years before. But the teasers lasted just a couple of years, then loans "reset" at much higher rates–––two million families saw their payments climb by as much as 35% in the last four months of 2007. That rippling shock hastened the storied flood of foreclosures that wrecked the housing market.
Today, folks are taking a much more prudent approach to financing their homes. They overwhelmingly going with 30-year loans at fixed rates. Since the family can make the monthly nut from day one, and their paychecks grow over the years, the ever-flat payment takes less and less of mom and dad's incomes. That helps them build a nice nest egg, so they can keep paying, and keep the ranch or colonial, if one or even both of them are out of work for a few months. Nothing does more to keep homeowners sleeping soundly than borrowing safe and long.
Indeed, America's homeowners took the ARM disaster to heart. But it appears that the new Biden Administration, just as the Trump team before it, is making the same mistake as the crowd that fell for teaser rates in 2007. Biden asserts that America can afford to spend the $1.9 trillion on his American Rescue Plan, followed by a phase two that would raise more trillions for rebuilding infrastructure and other initiatives, because interest rates have sunk to historic lows, and are destined to stay there. At her Senate confirmation hearing, Janet Yellen, Biden nominee for Treasury Secretary, declared that "Right now, with interest rates so low, the smartest thing we can do is act big." She added, "The world has changed. I believe the future is likely to bring low interest rates for a long time."
Yellen did provide notes of caution. "It is a risk that interest rates will rise," she warned. She also endorsed the "the 30-year fixed choice is safer" approach. "There is an advantage to funding the debt...when interest rates are very low by issuing long-term debt."
But in the past year, the U.S. has mostly financed the explosion in federal borrowings by selling Treasuries that come due in less than a year, more often in under six months. It's unclear from Yellen's statements whether she'll attempt to float new debt at longer, safer maturities. One of two scenarios are mostly likely. In the first, the Biden Administration holds to primarily borrowing extremely short. That's tempting, because it's the course that would keep interest expense lowest, and help curb deficits, in the immediate future. But the risks are towering, because a jump in the likes of 6-month Treasuries, which were at double today's levels 15 months ago, would swamp the budget.
Second, Yellen could shift a higher proportion of the new borrowings to longer-term bonds. One problem is that the recent spike in yields on 7 and 10-year Treasuries could mark the start of a trend. Inflation is heading upwards faster than projected a few months ago, so the confluence of rising prices and a rebounding economy could push yields on the benchmark 10-year, and all other Treasuries long and short, well beyond today's levels.
The most fundamental problem is sheer size of a debt load that was already huge and growing with no end in sight before the pandemic struck. The gigantic, ongoing spending gauged to recharge the economy will swell the debt mountain to as much as $26 trillion by the close of this year, a jump of over 50% from 2019. Put simply, that burden is now so big that we're suddenly much more vulnerable to any rise in rates. A jump of .5 points overall means America's tab for interest will be half-again higher than if the same increase happened in 2019.
So far, the U.S. has minimized the potential damage by financing most of the blowout at the shortest maturities, where rates plunged all during last year. Amazing, that's kept our interest burden shrinking at the same time debt exploded, and given the Biden team confidence that it's safe to keep the splurge going. Even if the Biden-Yellen team pursues a more traditional strategy by shifting the mix more towards longer-term securities, it will still be selling trillions in bonds with maturities of less than a year. We could easily have $9 trillion in that "ARM category," equivalent to half of all debt last year, by the end of 2019.
The Biden team appears to be way underestimating the danger ahead. Rates are highly volatile, and a shift back to even the levels of early last year will drive interest expense from the declining trajectory now projected by the CBO, to a rapidly-rising curve that will greatly deepen future budget deficits already on a dangerous course.
Of course, the riskiest scenario is the one followed in the past year, and the one that most resembles the misadventure in ARMs.
Short-term thinking
The latest data on debt and deficits from the U.S. Treasury provide an update through December 31, 2020. Hence, it's more current than the numbers for the fiscal year ended in September. In that calendar year, the U.S. experienced a borrowing rampage that's been big news. What's mostly overlooked is the change in when that new debt comes due. At the close of 2019, U.S. debt held by the public stood at $16.66 trillion. (That's the amount financed by marketable securities.) Of that number, $2.34 trillion or 14.5% was in 30-year Treasury Bonds, and $9.9 trillion or 60% in Treasury notes with maturities of over one to ten years––as we'll seen, most are on the short tranche of that scale. Just 26% sat in either Treasury bills or T-Bills at less than one year, or such securities at floating and inflation-protected bonds (TIPS) whose rates aren't fixed, but move with the market, meaning they can jump at short notice.
In 2020, total debt grew by a staggering $4.3 trillion to almost $21 trillion. The volume of T-Bills, TIPs and floating debt jumped by 105%, from $2.4 to $4.96 trillion. By contrast, the safer Notes and Bonds rose by less than two-thirds that amount. Of the total increase, 62% came from Bills or floating rate bonds. By the end of last year, 33% of all borrowings were in that category, a jump from 7 points since 2019, on total debt that than expanded by over a quarter.
Those year-over-year comparisons still don't give the full picture of how much our debt timetable tightened in the past year. Let's start with T-Bills. Even for those one-year-or-less securities, the U.S. leaned short. A report in January from the Office of Debt Management reveals that 90% of Treasury bills, net of those that matured, were issued at terms of 22 weeks or less. As for longer-dated Notes (one to ten year instruments), half of were issued at three years or less. The U.S. raised only $832 billion, less than one-fifth of the new debt sold, in highly-safe maturities of five to thirty years.
The swing to T-Bills has in the past year lowered the average maturity on all U.S. marketable debt from 70 to 63 months. It's obvious why the Trump Treasury banked so heavily in T-Bills. Their rates staged one of the most stunning drops in the history of U.S. capital markets. The yield on 3-month T-Bills cratered from 1.54% at the start of 2020 to .09% by year end, a fall of 94%. Long rates fell sharply as well. But that trend didn't do nearly as much to hold down overall interest costs.
Why? Two-thirds of all borrowing are still in securities with maturities of five years or more. Since those 5, 7, 10 and 30-years roll off slowly, the average rates on that long-dated debt are multiples of what the U.S. is paying on T-bills. As of December 31, the Treasury was paying 1.7% on Notes and 3.4% on Bonds, down from 2.1% and 3.9% respectively a year earlier. That slight decrease in average rates on longer-dated debt provided little help, since an increase in newly-issued 10 and 30 years blunted the drop in rates. The big lever was the astounding drop in rates on the T-bills that mainly paid for the blowout in expenditures.
A reckless bet?
But is it reckless to bet that T-bill rates will remain at current levels? One-third of the entire debt load is either due in less than a year (T-Bills) or in floating-rate instruments where rates can spike quickly, interest on the remaining two-thirds is locked in for much longer periods. As late as September of 2019, yields on both 8 and 26 week bills stood at 2%. Moody's Investor Services predicts that inflation will reach 2% this year, and J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Jame Dimon on his Q4 earnings call said that prices could rise 3% or even 4%. The CBO expects growth to exceed 5% for the year as the economy rebounds from the COVID crisis. The yield on the 10-year has already jumped from under .7% in September to 1.1%.
What happens if all the forecasts of "low-rates to the horizon" are wrong? The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget was forecasting a $2.3 trillion deficit for this year before Biden unveiled his $1.9 trillion plan. That extra spending alone would put the shortfall at a minimum of $4 trillion. Let's assume half that amount is borrowed in T-bills, though we don't know that for sure. But if that's the case, total marketable debt would go from $21 to $25 trillion by the end of 2021, and T-Bills and other floating bond holdings would rise from $7 trillion to $9 trillion.
Then, let's imagine that in the second half of 2021, the average rate on T-bills goes back to 2%. Maturities are so short we'd have to refinance most of them by early 2022. In 2022, the cost of that T-bill and floating debt alone would be rising to something like $180 billion from just under $5 billion. Interest payments would explode to around $580 billion. That's more than $200 billion higher than in 2019, and it would kill the rosy view that spending can jump while interest payments fall. At $580 billion, interest would be absorbing over 2.5% of GDP, well above the 2% the former Treasury officials Larry Summers and Jason Furman deemed dangerous in a recent article. Summers and Furman believe a spending splurge is the way to go, and predict getting to 2% of GDP won't happen.
But it might. And if it does, interest will keeping a bigger and bigger share of national income. Even if rates are below the pace of growth in national income, interest will take increasing bites because our deficits, driven by the surging cost of entitlements, will grow so rapidly. The ARM mishap showed us that you shouldn't risk borrowing $1 million to buy a house when the payment could double two years from now, on a salary that's inching up and can no longer stretch to make those big payments. Trump took that risk, but departed before it could backfire. Now, the new administration's doubling down on the belief that the "world has changed." But if the world goes back to anything like normal, betting the house will prove to be a loser.