今年1月以來(lái),,汽車制造商、電子產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)商一直在設(shè)法應(yīng)對(duì)半導(dǎo)體(控制機(jī)載計(jì)算功能的關(guān)鍵元件)供應(yīng)短缺問(wèn)題,。出于對(duì)芯片供應(yīng)明顯不足的擔(dān)憂,,制造商紛紛增加了芯片訂單,。而芯片制造商為滿足激增的需求,又隨之加大投入,、擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能,。但現(xiàn)在,供需失調(diào)已出現(xiàn)逆轉(zhuǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,分析師警告稱,,芯片供應(yīng)或由短缺轉(zhuǎn)為過(guò)剩。
“包括美國(guó),、歐盟,、韓國(guó)和中國(guó)在內(nèi),全球各大發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體均制定了擴(kuò)大國(guó)內(nèi)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)能的計(jì)劃,,”穆迪(Moody's)副總裁兼高級(jí)信貸官莉莉安·李(Lillian Li)表示,。
美國(guó)拜登政府計(jì)劃通過(guò)國(guó)會(huì)正在討論的一項(xiàng)法案為美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)提供520億美元的資金支持。歐盟則承諾提供1600億美元的新冠復(fù)興資金,,用于發(fā)展本地區(qū)的科技能力,,以期到2030年將歐盟在全球半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)的份額提升至20%。與此同時(shí),,在政府減稅政策的刺激下,,韓國(guó)芯片制造商也承諾將在未來(lái)10年投入4500億美元用于芯片產(chǎn)能建設(shè)。
莉莉安表示:“如此巨額的投資或?qū)?dǎo)致產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩及投資配置低效等問(wèn)題”,,她的說(shuō)法與其他分析師的警告不謀而合,。今年6月,貝恩公司(Bain & Company)的分析師就曾表示,,擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能將“損害供應(yīng)商的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益”,,因?yàn)楫?dāng)需求減弱時(shí),所有供應(yīng)商都將無(wú)法充分利用自己生產(chǎn)線的產(chǎn)能,。
今年4月,,行業(yè)分析師丹尼爾·尼尼(Daniel Nenni)在接受《財(cái)富》采訪時(shí)表示,除非在當(dāng)前的恐慌性購(gòu)買之外出現(xiàn)“半導(dǎo)體需求的大幅增長(zhǎng)”,,否則市場(chǎng)必將出現(xiàn)供過(guò)于求的局面,。芯片供應(yīng)短缺問(wèn)題始于汽車行業(yè)。疫情期間,,消費(fèi)者對(duì)新車的需求大幅增加,,汽車制造商紛紛增加了自己的芯片組訂單,導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)芯片供不應(yīng)求,、交貨延期等現(xiàn)象,,進(jìn)而引發(fā)了采購(gòu)經(jīng)理的搶購(gòu)潮,為保障庫(kù)存,采購(gòu)代理訂購(gòu)的芯片數(shù)量早已超過(guò)自己的實(shí)際需要,。待到恐慌平息之后,芯片過(guò)剩幾成定局,。莉莉安警告稱,,作為最急于實(shí)現(xiàn)芯片國(guó)產(chǎn)化的國(guó)家,中國(guó)可能比其他國(guó)家更容易出現(xiàn)供過(guò)于求的局面,。
穆迪8月2日發(fā)布的報(bào)告顯示,,中國(guó)去年在半導(dǎo)體研發(fā)方面的投入達(dá)350億美元,較2019年增長(zhǎng)407%,。2020年,,中國(guó)半導(dǎo)體進(jìn)口額超過(guò)3500億美元。為打破對(duì)進(jìn)口半導(dǎo)體的依賴,,中國(guó)政府投入巨資,,規(guī)模數(shù)以10億美元計(jì)。美國(guó)曾利用其在半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)的主導(dǎo)地位對(duì)中國(guó)的芯片進(jìn)口進(jìn)行限制,。
去年5月,,美國(guó)切斷了中國(guó)智能手機(jī)制造商華為的先進(jìn)芯片供應(yīng)渠道,迫使這家總部位于深圳的企業(yè)將自己的業(yè)務(wù)重心從智能手機(jī)銷售轉(zhuǎn)向其他業(yè)務(wù),。
但莉莉安表示,,中國(guó)為推動(dòng)半導(dǎo)體國(guó)產(chǎn)化所付出的努力可能導(dǎo)致某些芯片(如存儲(chǔ)芯片)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩,在總體需求低于總體產(chǎn)能時(shí),,那些“信貸渠道較少,、政府支持不足”的企業(yè)將會(huì)失去獲利空間。
但即便是得到政府大力支持的芯片制造商,,也面臨著擴(kuò)張過(guò)快的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。
清華紫光是中國(guó)最知名的內(nèi)存芯片制造商之一,卻也面臨著破產(chǎn)危機(jī),。在中國(guó)擴(kuò)大芯片產(chǎn)能的推動(dòng)下,,清華紫光大幅擴(kuò)建芯片廠,并在此過(guò)程中欠下了約300億美元的債務(wù),。但這些建設(shè)成本高達(dá)100億美元的芯片工廠需要數(shù)年時(shí)間才能建成,,投資回報(bào)周期較長(zhǎng)。去年11月,,清華紫光暫停了兩家新建工廠的開發(fā)項(xiàng)目,,并因公司資金緊張無(wú)法按時(shí)歸還欠款。一債權(quán)人已將這家違約公司告上法庭,,并在推動(dòng)這家芯片制造商申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)重組,。
莉莉安說(shuō):“對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō),推動(dòng)國(guó)內(nèi)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展有利也有弊。好處顯而易見,,比如可以規(guī)避掉地緣政治方面的不確定因素,。但產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)依然存在?!保ㄘ?cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:梁宇
審校:夏林
今年1月以來(lái),,汽車制造商、電子產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)商一直在設(shè)法應(yīng)對(duì)半導(dǎo)體(控制機(jī)載計(jì)算功能的關(guān)鍵元件)供應(yīng)短缺問(wèn)題,。出于對(duì)芯片供應(yīng)明顯不足的擔(dān)憂,,制造商紛紛增加了芯片訂單。而芯片制造商為滿足激增的需求,,又隨之加大投入,、擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能。但現(xiàn)在,,供需失調(diào)已出現(xiàn)逆轉(zhuǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,分析師警告稱,芯片供應(yīng)或由短缺轉(zhuǎn)為過(guò)剩,。
“包括美國(guó),、歐盟、韓國(guó)和中國(guó)在內(nèi),,全球各大發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體均制定了擴(kuò)大國(guó)內(nèi)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)能的計(jì)劃,,”穆迪(Moody's)副總裁兼高級(jí)信貸官莉莉安·李(Lillian Li)表示。
美國(guó)拜登政府計(jì)劃通過(guò)國(guó)會(huì)正在討論的一項(xiàng)法案為美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)提供520億美元的資金支持,。歐盟則承諾提供1600億美元的新冠復(fù)興資金,,用于發(fā)展本地區(qū)的科技能力,以期到2030年將歐盟在全球半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)的份額提升至20%,。與此同時(shí),,在政府減稅政策的刺激下,韓國(guó)芯片制造商也承諾將在未來(lái)10年投入4500億美元用于芯片產(chǎn)能建設(shè),。
莉莉安表示:“如此巨額的投資或?qū)?dǎo)致產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩及投資配置低效等問(wèn)題”,,她的說(shuō)法與其他分析師的警告不謀而合。今年6月,,貝恩公司(Bain & Company)的分析師就曾表示,,擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能將“損害供應(yīng)商的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益”,因?yàn)楫?dāng)需求減弱時(shí),,所有供應(yīng)商都將無(wú)法充分利用自己生產(chǎn)線的產(chǎn)能,。
今年4月,行業(yè)分析師丹尼爾·尼尼(Daniel Nenni)在接受《財(cái)富》采訪時(shí)表示,,除非在當(dāng)前的恐慌性購(gòu)買之外出現(xiàn)“半導(dǎo)體需求的大幅增長(zhǎng)”,,否則市場(chǎng)必將出現(xiàn)供過(guò)于求的局面,。芯片供應(yīng)短缺問(wèn)題始于汽車行業(yè)。疫情期間,,消費(fèi)者對(duì)新車的需求大幅增加,,汽車制造商紛紛增加了自己的芯片組訂單,導(dǎo)致出現(xiàn)芯片供不應(yīng)求,、交貨延期等現(xiàn)象,,進(jìn)而引發(fā)了采購(gòu)經(jīng)理的搶購(gòu)潮,為保障庫(kù)存,,采購(gòu)代理訂購(gòu)的芯片數(shù)量早已超過(guò)自己的實(shí)際需要。待到恐慌平息之后,,芯片過(guò)剩幾成定局,。莉莉安警告稱,作為最急于實(shí)現(xiàn)芯片國(guó)產(chǎn)化的國(guó)家,,中國(guó)可能比其他國(guó)家更容易出現(xiàn)供過(guò)于求的局面,。
穆迪8月2日發(fā)布的報(bào)告顯示,中國(guó)去年在半導(dǎo)體研發(fā)方面的投入達(dá)350億美元,,較2019年增長(zhǎng)407%,。2020年,中國(guó)半導(dǎo)體進(jìn)口額超過(guò)3500億美元,。為打破對(duì)進(jìn)口半導(dǎo)體的依賴,,中國(guó)政府投入巨資,規(guī)模數(shù)以10億美元計(jì),。美國(guó)曾利用其在半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)的主導(dǎo)地位對(duì)中國(guó)的芯片進(jìn)口進(jìn)行限制,。
去年5月,美國(guó)切斷了中國(guó)智能手機(jī)制造商華為的先進(jìn)芯片供應(yīng)渠道,,迫使這家總部位于深圳的企業(yè)將自己的業(yè)務(wù)重心從智能手機(jī)銷售轉(zhuǎn)向其他業(yè)務(wù),。
但莉莉安表示,中國(guó)為推動(dòng)半導(dǎo)體國(guó)產(chǎn)化所付出的努力可能導(dǎo)致某些芯片(如存儲(chǔ)芯片)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩,,在總體需求低于總體產(chǎn)能時(shí),,那些“信貸渠道較少、政府支持不足”的企業(yè)將會(huì)失去獲利空間,。
但即便是得到政府大力支持的芯片制造商,,也面臨著擴(kuò)張過(guò)快的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
清華紫光是中國(guó)最知名的內(nèi)存芯片制造商之一,,卻也面臨著破產(chǎn)危機(jī),。在中國(guó)擴(kuò)大芯片產(chǎn)能的推動(dòng)下,清華紫光大幅擴(kuò)建芯片廠,,并在此過(guò)程中欠下了約300億美元的債務(wù),。但這些建設(shè)成本高達(dá)100億美元的芯片工廠需要數(shù)年時(shí)間才能建成,投資回報(bào)周期較長(zhǎng)。去年11月,,清華紫光暫停了兩家新建工廠的開發(fā)項(xiàng)目,,并因公司資金緊張無(wú)法按時(shí)歸還欠款。一債權(quán)人已將這家違約公司告上法庭,,并在推動(dòng)這家芯片制造商申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)重組,。
莉莉安說(shuō):“對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō),推動(dòng)國(guó)內(nèi)半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)的發(fā)展有利也有弊,。好處顯而易見,,比如可以規(guī)避掉地緣政治方面的不確定因素。但產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)依然存在,?!保ㄘ?cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:梁宇
審校:夏林
Since January, automakers and electronics producers have contended with a shortage in semiconductors—the components vital to controlling onboard computing functions. Panicked by an apparent chip drought, manufacturers increased orders to secure future supplies, and chipmakers responded by investing in new capacity. But now the imbalance between demand and supply risks swinging the other way, as analysts warn a chip drought could become a chip glut.
“All the world’s advanced economies, including the U.S., the EU, South Korea, and China have set out plans to advance capacity in the domestic semiconductor industry,” says Lillian Li, vice president and senior credit officer at Moody’s.
In the U.S., the Biden administration plans to allocate $52 billion in incentives for the domestic semiconductor industry via a bill Congress is currently debating. The EU has committed $160 billion of COVID recovery funds to developing regional tech capabilities as it aims to boost the bloc’s share of semiconductor manufacturing to 20% of the global total by 2030. Meanwhile, chipmakers in South Korea, buoyed by government tax breaks, have committed $450 billion over the next 10 years to building chip capacity.
“These major investments could lead to overcapacity and inefficient investment allocation,” Li says, echoing warnings made by other analysts. In June, analysts at consultancy Bain & Company said building capacity would “hurt the economics” of suppliers, since each will likely run production lines below capacity once demand abates.
In April, industry analyst Daniel Nenni told Fortune there would be a glut unless “there is some big boom in semiconductor demand” beyond the current panic buying. The chip shortage began when automakers, surprised by consumer appetite for new cars in the pandemic, increased their orders for chipsets, pushing demand beyond supply and increasing lead times for deliveries. The squeeze on supply sparked panic buying as purchasing agents ordered more chips than they need in an attempt to secure stock. Once the panic subsides, the world could find itself with too many chips. But Li warns that China—the country most desperate to secure a domestic chip supply—could suffer a glut more easily than its peers.
According to a Moody's report published Monday, China spent $35 billion on semiconductor development last year, up 407% from 2019. Beijing is spending billions to break China’s reliance on semiconductor imports, which were worth over $350 billion in 2020. The U.S. has used its dominance in the semiconductor industry to throttle China’s access to chips.
In May last year, the U.S. severed Chinese smartphone maker Huawei Technologies’ access to advanced chips, forcing the Shenzhen-based firm to pivot its business model away from smartphone sales.
But, Li says, Beijing’s push for semiconductor independence could lead to overcapacity in particular chipmaking sectors—such as memory chips—and leave companies with “l(fā)ess access to credit and government support” unprofitable, as total demand falls short of capacity.
But even chipmakers with strong government support are at risk of expanding too aggressively.
One of China’s most prominent memory chipmakers, Tsinghua Unigroup, is facing bankruptcy despite its close ties to the state. Motivated by Beijing’s directive to build chip capacity, Tsinghua Unigroup has racked up some $30 billion in debts as it raced to build chip factories. But chip factories, which cost up to $10 billion to build, take years to complete. The return on investment is slow. In November last year, Tsinghua Unigroup paused two new factory developments and defaulted on credit repayments as the company entered a cash crunch. One of the group’s creditors has taken the defaulting company to court and is pushing the chipmaker to file for bankruptcy and restructure.
“For China, developing domestic semiconductors has pros and cons,” Li says. “The advantages, such as avoiding geopolitical insecurities, are very apparent. But the risk of spurring overcapacity remains.”