情況似乎好得難以置信。
現(xiàn)在,,美國(guó)有個(gè)難得的機(jī)會(huì)以非常低廉的利率借款,,即便總債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)迅速上升,,總利息支出卻在持續(xù)下降。美國(guó)可以為有價(jià)值的項(xiàng)目大手筆投錢,,而不必承擔(dān)通常會(huì)重創(chuàng)聯(lián)邦預(yù)算的利息支出激增風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。
但拉里·薩默斯明確指出,只有一個(gè)問題仍然需要保持警惕,。薩默斯曾經(jīng)在美國(guó)前總統(tǒng)比爾·克林頓政府擔(dān)任財(cái)政部部長(zhǎng),,他毫不掩飾地表達(dá)了自己對(duì)利用當(dāng)今超低利率擴(kuò)大聯(lián)邦借貸,向基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施,、綠色能源和社會(huì)項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行投資的支持,。他認(rèn)為,債務(wù)規(guī)模和赤字規(guī)模的重要程度遠(yuǎn)不如債務(wù)成本,。
薩默斯在他的藍(lán)圖上提出了關(guān)鍵的警告,。美國(guó)財(cái)政部只有將戰(zhàn)略重點(diǎn)放在以當(dāng)前長(zhǎng)期利率借款(目前利率處于歷史最低水平),并且鎖定遙遠(yuǎn)未來可承受的支出,,才能夠規(guī)避巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。讓薩默斯震驚的是,美國(guó)政府恰恰采取與之相反的危險(xiǎn)策略,,即用隔夜債務(wù)為長(zhǎng)期債券融資,。“實(shí)際上,,政府現(xiàn)在擁有的是用浮動(dòng)利率短期負(fù)債,,而不是長(zhǎng)期固定利率負(fù)債?!?月13日薩默斯接受彭博電視(Bloomberg Television)的《華爾街周報(bào)》(Wall Street Week)采訪時(shí)表示,。“在極度不確定的時(shí)刻,,在很多人認(rèn)為利率非常低的時(shí)刻,,增加短債的決定似乎很奇怪?!?/p>
薩默斯特別談到了美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的“量化寬松”(QE)政策,,即利用日常借款工具購(gòu)買當(dāng)前發(fā)行的大量長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債。購(gòu)買規(guī)模高達(dá)每月800億美元,。美國(guó)每年可以省下數(shù)百億美元,,因?yàn)檫@些國(guó)債利息會(huì)以閉環(huán)方式直接返還給美國(guó)財(cái)政部。但該計(jì)劃很容易適得其反,。美國(guó)支付的隔夜利率極低,,目的是防止新產(chǎn)生的、用于購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債的資金流入新增貸款從而加劇通脹。具體而言,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在吸引金融機(jī)構(gòu)將“超額準(zhǔn)備金”納入其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表?,F(xiàn)在,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)只需要支付0.15%的超低利息就能夠增加貨幣供應(yīng)量,,同時(shí)還可以遏制通脹,。
然而這條路的前方有很大可能存在危險(xiǎn)。經(jīng)濟(jì)從封鎖中持續(xù)復(fù)蘇,,導(dǎo)致當(dāng)今強(qiáng)大的通脹壓力持續(xù),,甚至還可能惡化。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)被迫為4.2萬億美元的銀行準(zhǔn)備金支付更高利率,,才能夠阻止大量資金流入汽車,、住房和消費(fèi)貸款從而推高物價(jià)。額外費(fèi)用將大大增加聯(lián)邦預(yù)算的利息支出,。由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將減少買入新發(fā)行債券,,也會(huì)減少央行向財(cái)政部提供的實(shí)際“補(bǔ)貼”,進(jìn)一步打破脆弱的平衡,。到目前為止,,史上最低的債券收益率,加上美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)購(gòu)買大量新發(fā)行國(guó)債再將利息返還給財(cái)政部的招數(shù),,導(dǎo)致債務(wù)激增的同時(shí)美國(guó)國(guó)債收益率不斷下跌,。而且美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的做法推動(dòng)困境愈發(fā)迫近。只要出現(xiàn)一陣通貨膨脹,,就可能導(dǎo)致這一特別平衡舉措的崩潰,。
歷史上最大的可調(diào)整利率貸款(ARM)
薩默斯所指的美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)“古怪”道路,只是造成高壓狀況極端危險(xiǎn)的部分原因,。美國(guó)財(cái)政部也在為應(yīng)對(duì)新冠疫情承擔(dān)的巨額刺激支出提供大量資金,,短期國(guó)債到期時(shí)間短則四周,,長(zhǎng)則一年,。總體來說,,2019年年底以來美國(guó)聯(lián)邦債務(wù)增長(zhǎng)了30%,,達(dá)到22.2萬億美元,其中約一半的支持基礎(chǔ)為美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)隔夜借款,、12個(gè)月或更短時(shí)間到期的債券或浮動(dòng)利率證券,。正如胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家約翰·科克倫所說:“美國(guó)當(dāng)前面臨的危險(xiǎn),與2006年房地產(chǎn)泡沫期間用可調(diào)利率抵押貸款買房的美國(guó)人一樣,?!?/p>
現(xiàn)在,全球最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體正在操作史上最大的可調(diào)整利率貸款。簡(jiǎn)言之,,美國(guó)正在冒著巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)人為壓低當(dāng)前利息支出,,使財(cái)政狀況看起來比實(shí)際情況穩(wěn)定些。薩默斯呼吁美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)“結(jié)束量化寬松”,,主要因?yàn)樵撚?jì)劃與快速滾動(dòng)的信用支持多年期債券并不匹配,。7月底的美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)議上,聯(lián)邦公開市場(chǎng)委員會(huì)(Open Market Committee)的大多數(shù)成員都主張從今年晚些時(shí)候開始逐漸退出量化寬松,。嘉信理財(cái)(Charles Schwab)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家預(yù)測(cè),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將在11月開始逐漸退出,每月將買入的美元金額減少85億美元,。
眾所周知,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可以繼續(xù)通過巧妙手段讓美國(guó)保持當(dāng)前的軌道。但前提是通貨膨脹只是短期現(xiàn)象,。7月,,消費(fèi)者價(jià)格指數(shù)(CPI)上漲5.4%,漲幅為2008年8月以來最大,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)預(yù)測(cè)2021年全年CPI將增長(zhǎng)3%,,遠(yuǎn)高于2%的平均目標(biāo)。除了促進(jìn)充分就業(yè),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的首要任務(wù)是確保物價(jià)穩(wěn)定,。如果通脹繼續(xù),要維持物價(jià)穩(wěn)定可能會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)的可調(diào)整利率貸款融資進(jìn)行大規(guī)模利率調(diào)整,。如此調(diào)整可能導(dǎo)致債務(wù)年度利息支出出現(xiàn)美國(guó)歷史上最大規(guī)模的激增,,從表面上合算變成驚人昂貴。拉里·薩默斯的警告便會(huì)成真,。
美國(guó)財(cái)政部短期內(nèi)為大部分由新冠病毒推動(dòng)的支出提供資金
美國(guó)為抗擊新冠疫情承擔(dān)的新債務(wù)加大了未來的財(cái)政風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。盡管現(xiàn)在美國(guó)財(cái)政部正轉(zhuǎn)向長(zhǎng)期借款,但一兩年后到期債務(wù)將增加數(shù)萬億美元,,使得美國(guó)更容易受利率突然上浮影響,。
2019年12月底,聯(lián)邦政府欠的“公眾債務(wù)”達(dá)17.2萬億美元,。此類債務(wù)包括個(gè)人,、公司、外國(guó)政府和12家聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行持有的美國(guó)國(guó)債,。其中,,2.4萬億美元是期限為四周到一年的短期國(guó)債,占比14%,。9.3萬億美元是至少兩年期最長(zhǎng)到基準(zhǔn)10年期的中期國(guó)債,,占比58%。20年期和30年期國(guó)債為2.4萬億美元,占債務(wù)總額14%,??偟膩碚f,美國(guó)超過72%的借款是中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債,。
美國(guó)為新冠疫情承擔(dān)巨額突發(fā)開支和借款時(shí),,相對(duì)謹(jǐn)慎的形象發(fā)生了根本性轉(zhuǎn)變。從2019年年底到2020年8月,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部大幅虧空,,發(fā)行了驚人的2.7萬億美元短期國(guó)債,平均每?jī)蓚€(gè)月滾動(dòng)一次,。其每4美元新借款中就有3美元為短期國(guó)債,。相比之下,美國(guó)財(cái)政部只賣出了1.4萬億美元的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債,,收益只有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高的短期國(guó)債一半,。(債券發(fā)行數(shù)據(jù)均為同期到期的美國(guó)國(guó)債凈值。)
截至2020年8月,,短期國(guó)債借款總額所占份額躍升超過10個(gè)百分點(diǎn),,達(dá)到23.4%。加上浮動(dòng)利率債券,,一年期以內(nèi)的國(guó)債和與短期利率掛鉤的國(guó)債比例從四分之一躍升到未償債務(wù)的三分之一以上,。2020年前三個(gè)季度,聯(lián)邦債券平均到期日從69個(gè)月降至62個(gè)月,,為史上最大突然降幅之一,。
此后,美國(guó)財(cái)政部調(diào)整了方向,,大幅減少發(fā)行一年內(nèi)短期國(guó)債,,并擴(kuò)大期限較長(zhǎng)的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債發(fā)行規(guī)模,逐步恢復(fù)“未償還債券”平衡,。美國(guó)財(cái)政部的債務(wù)管理辦公室(Office of Debt Management)在截至6月30日的聯(lián)邦政府三季度更新報(bào)告中詳細(xì)介紹了相關(guān)趨勢(shì),。報(bào)告中包括了截至本財(cái)年9月底的新債務(wù)發(fā)行預(yù)測(cè)。據(jù)其預(yù)測(cè),,截至9月30日的12個(gè)月內(nèi),,美國(guó)財(cái)政部將回收7420億美元的短期國(guó)債,,金額超過新發(fā)行短債,。
2021財(cái)年近2萬億美元的新增借款總額中,有1.45萬億美元將由到期時(shí)間為五年或五年以上的中期國(guó)債以及到期時(shí)間為20年和30年的長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債提供,。美國(guó)正在重新走上更保守也更傳統(tǒng)的道路,,依靠較長(zhǎng)期債券籌集近四分之三新借款。彈指間,美國(guó)債務(wù)平均到期期限就已經(jīng)回升至新冠疫情爆發(fā)前的69個(gè)月,。
雖然美國(guó)財(cái)政部將債券期限恢復(fù)到危機(jī)前水平是一件好事情,。但問題是:即使比例保持在過去的水平,現(xiàn)在美國(guó)短期未償債務(wù)還是比2019年年底多得多,??磳?shí)際金額比看占比更重要。截至7月,,美國(guó)欠下的短期國(guó)債金額達(dá)6.6萬億美元,,還要加上浮動(dòng)利率債務(wù),比2019年12月持有的各類短債多出2萬億美元,。由于短期國(guó)債比例已經(jīng)恢復(fù)正常,,四季度美國(guó)財(cái)政部將再次發(fā)行短期國(guó)債。
從現(xiàn)在起,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部可能繼續(xù)出售短期國(guó)債和浮動(dòng)利率債券,,以維持公眾持有總債務(wù)30%的份額。未來幾年,,財(cái)政部每年要借入約2萬億美元,,為龐大赤字提供資金。因此,,兩個(gè)月至一年期美元債務(wù)和浮動(dòng)利率債券將繼續(xù)快速增長(zhǎng),,原因都是新冠疫情應(yīng)急資金大幅提升了整體負(fù)債水平。與18個(gè)月前相比,,6.6萬億美元且不斷增長(zhǎng)的債務(wù)需要不斷展期或重設(shè)利率,,使得預(yù)算更容易受到通貨膨脹爆發(fā)和利率上升影響。
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可能面臨銀行準(zhǔn)備金成本大幅提升,,所以必須遏制通脹
新增萬億短期借款給美國(guó)的財(cái)政路徑造成了新風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為防止銀行將新供應(yīng)資金注入信貸體系而引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)過熱所采取的政策,可能導(dǎo)致利息負(fù)擔(dān)急劇上升,。如今,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)以快速增加貨幣供應(yīng)聞名,其挑戰(zhàn)是阻止貨幣超級(jí)寬松時(shí)代萬億資金通常會(huì)產(chǎn)生的作用,,即加劇通貨膨脹,。
美國(guó)財(cái)政部通過向金融機(jī)構(gòu)出售中長(zhǎng)期債券籌集資金。與此同時(shí),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將發(fā)行美元存入自己的賬戶,,從而產(chǎn)生新資金,然后再用新資金從銀行購(gòu)買國(guó)債和抵押貸款支持證券,,增加貨幣供應(yīng)量,,增加家庭和企業(yè)的信貸供應(yīng),。如此一來,貸款人就有更多的流動(dòng)性為信用卡余額和住房貸款融資,??蛻魧⒚涝嫒胫辟~戶,銀行將新存款的一部分出借以獲得更多的存款,,從自身和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手銀行獲得更多的貸款繼而形成循環(huán),,擴(kuò)大整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體內(nèi)的消費(fèi)者和商業(yè)支出。
過去,,如果金融機(jī)構(gòu)剛從財(cái)政部買入國(guó)債再迅速發(fā)行,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不會(huì)買入。之前美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)購(gòu)買的金額剛好夠在經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇時(shí)提供額外信貸,。通貨膨脹迫在眉睫時(shí),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)以誘人的利率向銀行出售國(guó)債,以收回爭(zhēng)相競(jìng)購(gòu)商品和服務(wù)的過剩美元,。銀行資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上持有大量美國(guó)國(guó)債作為儲(chǔ)備,,貸款需求增加時(shí)將其中一部分出售給美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)。但2008年10月金融危機(jī)最嚴(yán)重時(shí)啟動(dòng)的量化寬松計(jì)劃改變了這一模式,。某種程度上,,量化寬松的目標(biāo)是將長(zhǎng)期利率維持在極低水平,提振房屋,、股票和其他資產(chǎn)價(jià)格,,增加家庭和企業(yè)的財(cái)富。在量化寬松政策下,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部發(fā)行了更大規(guī)模的中期國(guó)債(兩年期至10年期)和長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債(20年期至30年期),而美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)則吞下了其中絕大部分份額,。
截至2021年8月中旬的12個(gè)月內(nèi),美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)買入了9780億美元的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債,。據(jù)我估計(jì),,在到期時(shí)間不低于五年的約1.2萬億美元國(guó)債中,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)購(gòu)買的份額超過了80%,??偠灾?016年年中以來,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)持有的兩類較長(zhǎng)期債券金額已經(jīng)翻了一番,,達(dá)到4.7萬億美元。
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)買入的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債都計(jì)在其規(guī)模龐大的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表資產(chǎn)端,。請(qǐng)記住,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)從銀行手中購(gòu)入的國(guó)債就是銀行剛剛從美國(guó)財(cái)政部買入的。實(shí)際上,,銀行只是將債券轉(zhuǎn)售給美聯(lián)儲(chǔ),。金融機(jī)構(gòu)很清楚,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將對(duì)剛剛收購(gòu)的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債進(jìn)行清理,,還提供中介傭金,。“這是利率如此低廉的原因之一,?!狈鹆_里達(dá)大西洋大學(xué)(Florida Atlantic University)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和貨幣政策教授威廉·路德說?!般y行都知道,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)立刻按當(dāng)前高價(jià)買下銀行想出售的美國(guó)國(guó)債?!?/p>
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在動(dòng)用數(shù)以萬億計(jì)的新增資金從銀行購(gòu)買創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的美國(guó)國(guó)債,。如果過去一年銀行將美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)近1萬億美元的資金轉(zhuǎn)化為新貸款,物價(jià)就會(huì)飆升,?!懊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)需要杠桿確保貨幣供應(yīng)量大幅增加,且不會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)化為新增銀行信貸,?!甭返轮赋觥,!懊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)的目標(biāo)是鉗制資金,,避免資金流入信貸體系導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹?!泵缆?lián)儲(chǔ)強(qiáng)大的工具就是:支付存款利息,。
多年來,受準(zhǔn)備金余額利率(IORB)波動(dòng)影響,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為隔離資金而支付的費(fèi)用差異巨大,。金融危機(jī)之后六年里,該利率僅為0.07%到0.15%,。但隨著2018年經(jīng)濟(jì)好轉(zhuǎn),,準(zhǔn)備金余額利率躍升至2%,2019年1月至8月徘徊在2.4%之上,。就在去年2月,,該利率仍然為1.58%。去年將聯(lián)邦基金利率削減至接近零,,將準(zhǔn)備金余額利率拉回到現(xiàn)在的0.15%左右,。
為什么銀行愿意存入數(shù)萬億準(zhǔn)備金只獲得如此微薄的利息?路德指出,,原因之一是銀行別無選擇,。巴塞爾規(guī)則要求銀行資本與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加權(quán)資產(chǎn)比率非常高,,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加權(quán)資產(chǎn)也包括根據(jù)違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)調(diào)整的貸款。第二個(gè)原因是,,盡管準(zhǔn)備金余額利率聽起來很低,,但美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)通常會(huì)做一些安排,使其略高于銀行間借貸的聯(lián)邦基金利率,。此外,,銀行向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)收取數(shù)萬億美元利息時(shí),不用承擔(dān)通常的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。路德說:“銀行放在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的準(zhǔn)備金完全安全,,這筆錢不存在違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也不需要提供服務(wù)。盡管其收益很低,,但仍然具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,。”
“合并資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表”的魔力
當(dāng)前的財(cái)政故事,,是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前所未有地出手援助美國(guó)財(cái)政部的傳奇,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)創(chuàng)造數(shù)以萬億計(jì)的新資金,在量化寬松政策下購(gòu)買財(cái)政部出售給銀行的創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的長(zhǎng)期債務(wù),。如今,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)持有4.7萬億美元的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債。如此一來,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部不用欠外人,,而是欠美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)。兩個(gè)部門都并入政府的綜合資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,,也就是說美國(guó)欠自己的錢,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)從財(cái)政部收取的利息,都會(huì)直接返還給財(cái)政部,。這一安排將可能是巨額利息的賬單最后變成了虛擬的洗牌,。
以下是我對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)流向財(cái)政部資金流的估計(jì)。2020年,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)支付了其持有4.7萬億長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債的約2%收益,,即940億美元。對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)來說,,購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債確實(shí)要付出代價(jià),,但就目前而言代價(jià)很小。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)只有支付利息,,防止其交給銀行用于購(gòu)買中期國(guó)債和短期國(guó)債的資金流入刺激通脹的信貸,,才能夠安全地產(chǎn)生用于積累債券的“免費(fèi)”資金。現(xiàn)在,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)只為4.2萬億美元的準(zhǔn)備金支付了0.15%利息,。實(shí)際上,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)全額支持著通過新發(fā)貨幣購(gòu)買的美國(guó)國(guó)債,每年僅耗資60億美元(4.2萬億美元的0.15%),。
2020年,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)向財(cái)政部上繳了880億美元的利潤(rùn),其中包括從財(cái)政部收取的940億美元利息,,再減去支付的60億美元準(zhǔn)備金利息,。對(duì)財(cái)政部來說,,這筆交易太合算,!財(cái)政部不用向銀行、對(duì)沖基金和其他外部方面支付940億美元利息,,而是在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的幫助下將這筆錢轉(zhuǎn)給自己,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)協(xié)助財(cái)政部將美國(guó)的利息支出控制在940億美元以下。但在向財(cái)政部提供巨大幫助的過程中,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)要承擔(dān)巨大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,因?yàn)槊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)實(shí)際上是動(dòng)用準(zhǔn)備金支付隔夜債務(wù)從而為長(zhǎng)期債融資。綜合資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的負(fù)面影響為,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)坐上了易爆的飛船,,一旦爆炸,損失將轉(zhuǎn)嫁到財(cái)政部,,最終影響聯(lián)邦預(yù)算,。
通脹引發(fā)的危險(xiǎn)
如果短期利率飆升會(huì)怎樣?最大的威脅是通貨膨脹已經(jīng)到來,,而且將長(zhǎng)期持續(xù),。為了控制物價(jià),美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)需要提高準(zhǔn)備金率,。央行陷入困境,。記住,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)絕對(duì)不能讓準(zhǔn)備金流入新信貸,,否則將加劇已經(jīng)開始沸騰的通脹壓力,。
比如說,通貨膨脹率保持在當(dāng)前的5%,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可能需要支付相當(dāng)于兩年前2.4%的費(fèi)用,。如果今年晚些時(shí)候像預(yù)期的一樣開始退出量化寬松,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)買入新發(fā)行債券將越來越少,。
但這將引發(fā)另一個(gè)不利于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)底線的大變化,。
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不用再向財(cái)政部返還債券的利息。屆時(shí)債券將由外部投資者持有,,收取本應(yīng)流回財(cái)政部的利息,。因此,,量化寬松將導(dǎo)致賬面成本更高。但是也要考慮一下,,由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行準(zhǔn)備金利率大幅上升,,每年近1000 億美元的利息支出波動(dòng)會(huì)如何影響聯(lián)邦預(yù)算。
2019年,,美國(guó)為平均17.5萬億美元債務(wù)支付了3760億美元的利息,。從那時(shí)起,整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體利率大幅下降,,新借債成本大幅降低,。不過準(zhǔn)備金利息大幅下降也起到了很大作用。令人驚訝的是,,美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室(Congressional Budget Office)預(yù)測(cè),,盡管債務(wù)將從2019年水平增長(zhǎng)近40%,到2022年達(dá)到24.3萬億美元,,美國(guó)支付的利息卻奇跡般地大幅降低,,僅為3040億美元。想象一下,,如果準(zhǔn)備金利息增加1000億美元會(huì)怎樣,。各項(xiàng)利息成本將增加33%。這還不僅僅是準(zhǔn)備金利息問題,。通脹率升高還將極大提高6.6萬億美元一年期內(nèi)短期國(guó)債和浮動(dòng)利率債務(wù)的成本,。一夜之間,美國(guó)預(yù)算預(yù)測(cè)將陷入混亂,。這就是薩默斯所說的危險(xiǎn),。他說得沒有錯(cuò),我們不知道最強(qiáng)大融資武器何時(shí)調(diào)整,但能夠想象它的破壞力有多大,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
情況似乎好得難以置信,。
現(xiàn)在,美國(guó)有個(gè)難得的機(jī)會(huì)以非常低廉的利率借款,,即便總債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)迅速上升,,總利息支出卻在持續(xù)下降。美國(guó)可以為有價(jià)值的項(xiàng)目大手筆投錢,,而不必承擔(dān)通常會(huì)重創(chuàng)聯(lián)邦預(yù)算的利息支出激增風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。
但拉里·薩默斯明確指出,只有一個(gè)問題仍然需要保持警惕,。薩默斯曾經(jīng)在美國(guó)前總統(tǒng)比爾·克林頓政府擔(dān)任財(cái)政部部長(zhǎng),,他毫不掩飾地表達(dá)了自己對(duì)利用當(dāng)今超低利率擴(kuò)大聯(lián)邦借貸,向基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、綠色能源和社會(huì)項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行投資的支持,。他認(rèn)為,,債務(wù)規(guī)模和赤字規(guī)模的重要程度遠(yuǎn)不如債務(wù)成本。
薩默斯在他的藍(lán)圖上提出了關(guān)鍵的警告,。美國(guó)財(cái)政部只有將戰(zhàn)略重點(diǎn)放在以當(dāng)前長(zhǎng)期利率借款(目前利率處于歷史最低水平),,并且鎖定遙遠(yuǎn)未來可承受的支出,才能夠規(guī)避巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。讓薩默斯震驚的是,,美國(guó)政府恰恰采取與之相反的危險(xiǎn)策略,即用隔夜債務(wù)為長(zhǎng)期債券融資,?!皩?shí)際上,,政府現(xiàn)在擁有的是用浮動(dòng)利率短期負(fù)債,而不是長(zhǎng)期固定利率負(fù)債,?!?月13日薩默斯接受彭博電視(Bloomberg Television)的《華爾街周報(bào)》(Wall Street Week)采訪時(shí)表示?!霸跇O度不確定的時(shí)刻,在很多人認(rèn)為利率非常低的時(shí)刻,增加短債的決定似乎很奇怪,。”
薩默斯特別談到了美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的“量化寬松”(QE)政策,,即利用日常借款工具購(gòu)買當(dāng)前發(fā)行的大量長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債,。購(gòu)買規(guī)模高達(dá)每月800億美元。美國(guó)每年可以省下數(shù)百億美元,,因?yàn)檫@些國(guó)債利息會(huì)以閉環(huán)方式直接返還給美國(guó)財(cái)政部,。但該計(jì)劃很容易適得其反。美國(guó)支付的隔夜利率極低,,目的是防止新產(chǎn)生的,、用于購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債的資金流入新增貸款從而加劇通脹。具體而言,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在吸引金融機(jī)構(gòu)將“超額準(zhǔn)備金”納入其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表?,F(xiàn)在,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)只需要支付0.15%的超低利息就能夠增加貨幣供應(yīng)量,,同時(shí)還可以遏制通脹,。
然而這條路的前方有很大可能存在危險(xiǎn)。經(jīng)濟(jì)從封鎖中持續(xù)復(fù)蘇,,導(dǎo)致當(dāng)今強(qiáng)大的通脹壓力持續(xù),,甚至還可能惡化。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)被迫為4.2萬億美元的銀行準(zhǔn)備金支付更高利率,才能夠阻止大量資金流入汽車,、住房和消費(fèi)貸款從而推高物價(jià),。額外費(fèi)用將大大增加聯(lián)邦預(yù)算的利息支出。由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將減少買入新發(fā)行債券,,也會(huì)減少央行向財(cái)政部提供的實(shí)際“補(bǔ)貼”,,進(jìn)一步打破脆弱的平衡。到目前為止,,史上最低的債券收益率,,加上美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)購(gòu)買大量新發(fā)行國(guó)債再將利息返還給財(cái)政部的招數(shù),導(dǎo)致債務(wù)激增的同時(shí)美國(guó)國(guó)債收益率不斷下跌,。而且美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的做法推動(dòng)困境愈發(fā)迫近,。只要出現(xiàn)一陣通貨膨脹,就可能導(dǎo)致這一特別平衡舉措的崩潰,。
歷史上最大的可調(diào)整利率貸款(ARM)
薩默斯所指的美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)“古怪”道路,,只是造成高壓狀況極端危險(xiǎn)的部分原因。美國(guó)財(cái)政部也在為應(yīng)對(duì)新冠疫情承擔(dān)的巨額刺激支出提供大量資金,,短期國(guó)債到期時(shí)間短則四周,,長(zhǎng)則一年??傮w來說,,2019年年底以來美國(guó)聯(lián)邦債務(wù)增長(zhǎng)了30%,達(dá)到22.2萬億美元,,其中約一半的支持基礎(chǔ)為美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)隔夜借款,、12個(gè)月或更短時(shí)間到期的債券或浮動(dòng)利率證券。正如胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家約翰·科克倫所說:“美國(guó)當(dāng)前面臨的危險(xiǎn),,與2006年房地產(chǎn)泡沫期間用可調(diào)利率抵押貸款買房的美國(guó)人一樣,。”
現(xiàn)在,,全球最大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體正在操作史上最大的可調(diào)整利率貸款,。簡(jiǎn)言之,美國(guó)正在冒著巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)人為壓低當(dāng)前利息支出,,使財(cái)政狀況看起來比實(shí)際情況穩(wěn)定些,。薩默斯呼吁美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)“結(jié)束量化寬松”,主要因?yàn)樵撚?jì)劃與快速滾動(dòng)的信用支持多年期債券并不匹配,。7月底的美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)議上,,聯(lián)邦公開市場(chǎng)委員會(huì)(Open Market Committee)的大多數(shù)成員都主張從今年晚些時(shí)候開始逐漸退出量化寬松。嘉信理財(cái)(Charles Schwab)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家預(yù)測(cè),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將在11月開始逐漸退出,,每月將買入的美元金額減少85億美元,。
眾所周知,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可以繼續(xù)通過巧妙手段讓美國(guó)保持當(dāng)前的軌道,。但前提是通貨膨脹只是短期現(xiàn)象,。7月,消費(fèi)者價(jià)格指數(shù)(CPI)上漲5.4%,,漲幅為2008年8月以來最大,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)預(yù)測(cè)2021年全年CPI將增長(zhǎng)3%,遠(yuǎn)高于2%的平均目標(biāo),。除了促進(jìn)充分就業(yè),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的首要任務(wù)是確保物價(jià)穩(wěn)定。如果通脹繼續(xù),,要維持物價(jià)穩(wěn)定可能會(huì)對(duì)美國(guó)的可調(diào)整利率貸款融資進(jìn)行大規(guī)模利率調(diào)整,。如此調(diào)整可能導(dǎo)致債務(wù)年度利息支出出現(xiàn)美國(guó)歷史上最大規(guī)模的激增,從表面上合算變成驚人昂貴,。拉里·薩默斯的警告便會(huì)成真,。
美國(guó)財(cái)政部短期內(nèi)為大部分由新冠病毒推動(dòng)的支出提供資金
美國(guó)為抗擊新冠疫情承擔(dān)的新債務(wù)加大了未來的財(cái)政風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。盡管現(xiàn)在美國(guó)財(cái)政部正轉(zhuǎn)向長(zhǎng)期借款,,但一兩年后到期債務(wù)將增加數(shù)萬億美元,,使得美國(guó)更容易受利率突然上浮影響。
2019年12月底,,聯(lián)邦政府欠的“公眾債務(wù)”達(dá)17.2萬億美元,。此類債務(wù)包括個(gè)人、公司,、外國(guó)政府和12家聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行持有的美國(guó)國(guó)債。其中,,2.4萬億美元是期限為四周到一年的短期國(guó)債,,占比14%。9.3萬億美元是至少兩年期最長(zhǎng)到基準(zhǔn)10年期的中期國(guó)債,,占比58%,。20年期和30年期國(guó)債為2.4萬億美元,占債務(wù)總額14%,??偟膩碚f,美國(guó)超過72%的借款是中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債,。
美國(guó)為新冠疫情承擔(dān)巨額突發(fā)開支和借款時(shí),,相對(duì)謹(jǐn)慎的形象發(fā)生了根本性轉(zhuǎn)變。從2019年年底到2020年8月,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部大幅虧空,,發(fā)行了驚人的2.7萬億美元短期國(guó)債,,平均每?jī)蓚€(gè)月滾動(dòng)一次。其每4美元新借款中就有3美元為短期國(guó)債,。相比之下,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部只賣出了1.4萬億美元的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債,收益只有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更高的短期國(guó)債一半,。(債券發(fā)行數(shù)據(jù)均為同期到期的美國(guó)國(guó)債凈值,。)
截至2020年8月,短期國(guó)債借款總額所占份額躍升超過10個(gè)百分點(diǎn),,達(dá)到23.4%,。加上浮動(dòng)利率債券,一年期以內(nèi)的國(guó)債和與短期利率掛鉤的國(guó)債比例從四分之一躍升到未償債務(wù)的三分之一以上,。2020年前三個(gè)季度,,聯(lián)邦債券平均到期日從69個(gè)月降至62個(gè)月,為史上最大突然降幅之一,。
此后,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部調(diào)整了方向,大幅減少發(fā)行一年內(nèi)短期國(guó)債,,并擴(kuò)大期限較長(zhǎng)的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債發(fā)行規(guī)模,,逐步恢復(fù)“未償還債券”平衡。美國(guó)財(cái)政部的債務(wù)管理辦公室(Office of Debt Management)在截至6月30日的聯(lián)邦政府三季度更新報(bào)告中詳細(xì)介紹了相關(guān)趨勢(shì),。報(bào)告中包括了截至本財(cái)年9月底的新債務(wù)發(fā)行預(yù)測(cè),。據(jù)其預(yù)測(cè),截至9月30日的12個(gè)月內(nèi),,美國(guó)財(cái)政部將回收7420億美元的短期國(guó)債,,金額超過新發(fā)行短債。
2021財(cái)年近2萬億美元的新增借款總額中,,有1.45萬億美元將由到期時(shí)間為五年或五年以上的中期國(guó)債以及到期時(shí)間為20年和30年的長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債提供,。美國(guó)正在重新走上更保守也更傳統(tǒng)的道路,依靠較長(zhǎng)期債券籌集近四分之三新借款,。彈指間,,美國(guó)債務(wù)平均到期期限就已經(jīng)回升至新冠疫情爆發(fā)前的69個(gè)月。
雖然美國(guó)財(cái)政部將債券期限恢復(fù)到危機(jī)前水平是一件好事情,。但問題是:即使比例保持在過去的水平,,現(xiàn)在美國(guó)短期未償債務(wù)還是比2019年年底多得多??磳?shí)際金額比看占比更重要,。截至7月,美國(guó)欠下的短期國(guó)債金額達(dá)6.6萬億美元,,還要加上浮動(dòng)利率債務(wù),,比2019年12月持有的各類短債多出2萬億美元,。由于短期國(guó)債比例已經(jīng)恢復(fù)正常,四季度美國(guó)財(cái)政部將再次發(fā)行短期國(guó)債,。
從現(xiàn)在起,,美國(guó)財(cái)政部可能繼續(xù)出售短期國(guó)債和浮動(dòng)利率債券,以維持公眾持有總債務(wù)30%的份額,。未來幾年,,財(cái)政部每年要借入約2萬億美元,為龐大赤字提供資金,。因此,,兩個(gè)月至一年期美元債務(wù)和浮動(dòng)利率債券將繼續(xù)快速增長(zhǎng),原因都是新冠疫情應(yīng)急資金大幅提升了整體負(fù)債水平,。與18個(gè)月前相比,,6.6萬億美元且不斷增長(zhǎng)的債務(wù)需要不斷展期或重設(shè)利率,使得預(yù)算更容易受到通貨膨脹爆發(fā)和利率上升影響,。
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可能面臨銀行準(zhǔn)備金成本大幅提升,,所以必須遏制通脹
新增萬億短期借款給美國(guó)的財(cái)政路徑造成了新風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為防止銀行將新供應(yīng)資金注入信貸體系而引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)過熱所采取的政策,,可能導(dǎo)致利息負(fù)擔(dān)急劇上升,。如今,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)以快速增加貨幣供應(yīng)聞名,,其挑戰(zhàn)是阻止貨幣超級(jí)寬松時(shí)代萬億資金通常會(huì)產(chǎn)生的作用,,即加劇通貨膨脹。
美國(guó)財(cái)政部通過向金融機(jī)構(gòu)出售中長(zhǎng)期債券籌集資金,。與此同時(shí),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將發(fā)行美元存入自己的賬戶,從而產(chǎn)生新資金,,然后再用新資金從銀行購(gòu)買國(guó)債和抵押貸款支持證券,,增加貨幣供應(yīng)量,增加家庭和企業(yè)的信貸供應(yīng),。如此一來,貸款人就有更多的流動(dòng)性為信用卡余額和住房貸款融資,??蛻魧⒚涝嫒胫辟~戶,銀行將新存款的一部分出借以獲得更多的存款,,從自身和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手銀行獲得更多的貸款繼而形成循環(huán),,擴(kuò)大整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體內(nèi)的消費(fèi)者和商業(yè)支出。
過去,,如果金融機(jī)構(gòu)剛從財(cái)政部買入國(guó)債再迅速發(fā)行,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不會(huì)買入,。之前美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)購(gòu)買的金額剛好夠在經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇時(shí)提供額外信貸。通貨膨脹迫在眉睫時(shí),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)以誘人的利率向銀行出售國(guó)債,,以收回爭(zhēng)相競(jìng)購(gòu)商品和服務(wù)的過剩美元。銀行資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上持有大量美國(guó)國(guó)債作為儲(chǔ)備,,貸款需求增加時(shí)將其中一部分出售給美聯(lián)儲(chǔ),。但2008年10月金融危機(jī)最嚴(yán)重時(shí)啟動(dòng)的量化寬松計(jì)劃改變了這一模式。某種程度上,,量化寬松的目標(biāo)是將長(zhǎng)期利率維持在極低水平,,提振房屋、股票和其他資產(chǎn)價(jià)格,,增加家庭和企業(yè)的財(cái)富,。在量化寬松政策下,美國(guó)財(cái)政部發(fā)行了更大規(guī)模的中期國(guó)債(兩年期至10年期)和長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債(20年期至30年期),而美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)則吞下了其中絕大部分份額,。
截至2021年8月中旬的12個(gè)月內(nèi),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)買入了9780億美元的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債。據(jù)我估計(jì),,在到期時(shí)間不低于五年的約1.2萬億美元國(guó)債中,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)購(gòu)買的份額超過了80%??偠灾?,2016年年中以來,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)持有的兩類較長(zhǎng)期債券金額已經(jīng)翻了一番,,達(dá)到4.7萬億美元,。
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)買入的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債都計(jì)在其規(guī)模龐大的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表資產(chǎn)端。請(qǐng)記住,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)從銀行手中購(gòu)入的國(guó)債就是銀行剛剛從美國(guó)財(cái)政部買入的,。實(shí)際上,銀行只是將債券轉(zhuǎn)售給美聯(lián)儲(chǔ),。金融機(jī)構(gòu)很清楚,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)將對(duì)剛剛收購(gòu)的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債進(jìn)行清理,還提供中介傭金,?!斑@是利率如此低廉的原因之一?!狈鹆_里達(dá)大西洋大學(xué)(Florida Atlantic University)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和貨幣政策教授威廉·路德說,。“銀行都知道,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)會(huì)立刻按當(dāng)前高價(jià)買下銀行想出售的美國(guó)國(guó)債,?!?/p>
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)正在動(dòng)用數(shù)以萬億計(jì)的新增資金從銀行購(gòu)買創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的美國(guó)國(guó)債。如果過去一年銀行將美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)近1萬億美元的資金轉(zhuǎn)化為新貸款,,物價(jià)就會(huì)飆升,。“美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)需要杠桿確保貨幣供應(yīng)量大幅增加,,且不會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)化為新增銀行信貸,。”路德指出,?!懊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)的目標(biāo)是鉗制資金,避免資金流入信貸體系導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹,?!泵缆?lián)儲(chǔ)強(qiáng)大的工具就是:支付存款利息。
多年來,,受準(zhǔn)備金余額利率(IORB)波動(dòng)影響,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為隔離資金而支付的費(fèi)用差異巨大。金融危機(jī)之后六年里,,該利率僅為0.07%到0.15%,。但隨著2018年經(jīng)濟(jì)好轉(zhuǎn),準(zhǔn)備金余額利率躍升至2%,,2019年1月至8月徘徊在2.4%之上,。就在去年2月,該利率仍然為1.58%,。去年將聯(lián)邦基金利率削減至接近零,,將準(zhǔn)備金余額利率拉回到現(xiàn)在的0.15%左右。
為什么銀行愿意存入數(shù)萬億準(zhǔn)備金只獲得如此微薄的利息,?路德指出,,原因之一是銀行別無選擇。巴塞爾規(guī)則要求銀行資本與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加權(quán)資產(chǎn)比率非常高,,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)加權(quán)資產(chǎn)也包括根據(jù)違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)調(diào)整的貸款,。第二個(gè)原因是,盡管準(zhǔn)備金余額利率聽起來很低,,但美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)通常會(huì)做一些安排,,使其略高于銀行間借貸的聯(lián)邦基金利率。此外,,銀行向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)收取數(shù)萬億美元利息時(shí),不用承擔(dān)通常的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。路德說:“銀行放在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的準(zhǔn)備金完全安全,,這筆錢不存在違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也不需要提供服務(wù),。盡管其收益很低,但仍然具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,?!?/p>
“合并資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表”的魔力
當(dāng)前的財(cái)政故事,是美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前所未有地出手援助美國(guó)財(cái)政部的傳奇,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)創(chuàng)造數(shù)以萬億計(jì)的新資金,,在量化寬松政策下購(gòu)買財(cái)政部出售給銀行的創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)。如今,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)持有4.7萬億美元的中長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債,。如此一來,美國(guó)財(cái)政部不用欠外人,,而是欠美聯(lián)儲(chǔ),。兩個(gè)部門都并入政府的綜合資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,也就是說美國(guó)欠自己的錢,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)從財(cái)政部收取的利息,,都會(huì)直接返還給財(cái)政部。這一安排將可能是巨額利息的賬單最后變成了虛擬的洗牌,。
以下是我對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)流向財(cái)政部資金流的估計(jì),。2020年,美國(guó)財(cái)政部向美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)支付了其持有4.7萬億長(zhǎng)期國(guó)債的約2%收益,,即940億美元,。對(duì)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)來說,購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債確實(shí)要付出代價(jià),,但就目前而言代價(jià)很小,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)只有支付利息,防止其交給銀行用于購(gòu)買中期國(guó)債和短期國(guó)債的資金流入刺激通脹的信貸,,才能夠安全地產(chǎn)生用于積累債券的“免費(fèi)”資金?,F(xiàn)在,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)只為4.2萬億美元的準(zhǔn)備金支付了0.15%利息,。實(shí)際上,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)全額支持著通過新發(fā)貨幣購(gòu)買的美國(guó)國(guó)債,每年僅耗資60億美元(4.2萬億美元的0.15%),。
2020年,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)向財(cái)政部上繳了880億美元的利潤(rùn),其中包括從財(cái)政部收取的940億美元利息,,再減去支付的60億美元準(zhǔn)備金利息,。對(duì)財(cái)政部來說,這筆交易太合算!財(cái)政部不用向銀行,、對(duì)沖基金和其他外部方面支付940億美元利息,,而是在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的幫助下將這筆錢轉(zhuǎn)給自己。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)協(xié)助財(cái)政部將美國(guó)的利息支出控制在940億美元以下,。但在向財(cái)政部提供巨大幫助的過程中,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)要承擔(dān)巨大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),因?yàn)槊缆?lián)儲(chǔ)實(shí)際上是動(dòng)用準(zhǔn)備金支付隔夜債務(wù)從而為長(zhǎng)期債融資,。綜合資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的負(fù)面影響為,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)坐上了易爆的飛船,一旦爆炸,,損失將轉(zhuǎn)嫁到財(cái)政部,,最終影響聯(lián)邦預(yù)算。
通脹引發(fā)的危險(xiǎn)
如果短期利率飆升會(huì)怎樣,?最大的威脅是通貨膨脹已經(jīng)到來,,而且將長(zhǎng)期持續(xù)。為了控制物價(jià),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)需要提高準(zhǔn)備金率,。央行陷入困境。記住,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)絕對(duì)不能讓準(zhǔn)備金流入新信貸,,否則將加劇已經(jīng)開始沸騰的通脹壓力。
比如說,,通貨膨脹率保持在當(dāng)前的5%,。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)可能需要支付相當(dāng)于兩年前2.4%的費(fèi)用。如果今年晚些時(shí)候像預(yù)期的一樣開始退出量化寬松,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)買入新發(fā)行債券將越來越少,。
但這將引發(fā)另一個(gè)不利于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)底線的大變化。
美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不用再向財(cái)政部返還債券的利息,。屆時(shí)債券將由外部投資者持有,,收取本應(yīng)流回財(cái)政部的利息。因此,,量化寬松將導(dǎo)致賬面成本更高,。但是也要考慮一下,由于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行準(zhǔn)備金利率大幅上升,,每年近1000 億美元的利息支出波動(dòng)會(huì)如何影響聯(lián)邦預(yù)算,。
2019年,美國(guó)為平均17.5萬億美元債務(wù)支付了3760億美元的利息,。從那時(shí)起,,整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體利率大幅下降,新借債成本大幅降低。不過準(zhǔn)備金利息大幅下降也起到了很大作用,。令人驚訝的是,,美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室(Congressional Budget Office)預(yù)測(cè),盡管債務(wù)將從2019年水平增長(zhǎng)近40%,,到2022年達(dá)到24.3萬億美元,美國(guó)支付的利息卻奇跡般地大幅降低,,僅為3040億美元,。想象一下,如果準(zhǔn)備金利息增加1000億美元會(huì)怎樣,。各項(xiàng)利息成本將增加33%,。這還不僅僅是準(zhǔn)備金利息問題。通脹率升高還將極大提高6.6萬億美元一年期內(nèi)短期國(guó)債和浮動(dòng)利率債務(wù)的成本,。一夜之間,,美國(guó)預(yù)算預(yù)測(cè)將陷入混亂。這就是薩默斯所說的危險(xiǎn),。他說得沒有錯(cuò),我們不知道最強(qiáng)大融資武器何時(shí)調(diào)整,,但能夠想象它的破壞力有多大。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
譯者:馮豐
審校:夏林
It almost seems too good to be true.
Right now, the U.S. has a rare opportunity to borrow at such slender rates that our total interest expense will keep falling even as our total debt load rises rapidly. The U.S. gets to lavish money on worthwhile initiatives without risking a surge in interest expense that, at most times, would swamp the federal budget.
But there’s just one problem, one that Larry Summers singles out. President Clinton’s Treasury secretary is an outspoken champion of exploiting today’s super-low interest rates to expand federal borrowing for investment in infrastructure, green energy, and social programs. The size of the debt and deficits, he has argued, is much less important than the costs of carrying that debt.
But Summers stamped a key caveat on his blueprint. The strategy would only skirt big risks if the Treasury centered its strategy on borrowing at today’s long-term rates, now at their narrowest in history, locking in affordable payments far into the future. Summers is appalled that the U.S. government is going in precisely the opposite direction, pursuing the notoriously dangerous tack of essentially funding its bonds at longer maturities with overnight debt. “In effect, the government now has a floating rate, short-term liability outstanding rather than long-term, fixed interest rate liability,” Summers told Bloomberg Television’s Wall Street Week on Aug. 13. “At a moment of super uncertainty, at a moment when many people think rates are remarkably low, a decision to fund more short seems bizarre.”
Summers was specifically addressing the Federal Reserve’s “quantitative easing” (QE) campaign of deploying day-to-day borrowings as a vehicle for buying the vast bulk of the long-dated Treasuries now being issued. Those purchases are famously running at $80 billion a month. The U.S. is saving tens of billions a year because it’s sending the interest payments on those Treasuries right back to the Treasury in a closed loop. But the program could easily backfire. The U.S. is paying ultracheap overnight rates to keep the newly created money that it’s using to buy those Treasuries from leaking into new lending that would stoke inflation. Specifically, the central bank is luring financial institutions to park their “excess reserves” on its balance sheet. Right now, the Fed gets to hike the money supply and still hold off inflation by simply paying a minuscule 0.15% to sequester all those trillions.
Here’s a road map for the journey to peril, and it’s all too plausible. The economy continues to roar back from the lockdown, causing today’s strong inflationary pressures to persist or worsen. The Fed is forced to pay much higher rates on those $4.2 trillion in bank reserves to stanch the flood of money from flowing into car, home, and consumer loans, and driving prices higher. That extra expense would greatly increase the interest payments on the federal budget. Since the Fed would be buying fewer newly issued bonds, tapering would further upset the fragile balance by shrinking the effective “subsidy” the central bank is handing the Treasury. Until now, a remarkable blend of the lowest bond yields in history and the Fed’s trick of buying gobs of newly issued Treasuries and rebating the interest to the Treasury has kept that bill falling as our debt load explodes. The Fed’s walking a slippery tightrope to make that happen. A gust of inflation could send the extraordinary balancing act tumbling.
History’s biggest ARM
What Summers labels as the Fed’s “bizarre” path accounts for only part of what makes the high wire so treacherous. The Treasury is also funding a big portion of the huge stimulus outlays shouldered to counter the COVID crisis with Treasury bills due in four weeks to a year. All told, around half of U.S. federal debt that has expanded 30% since the close of 2019 to a towering $22.2 trillion, is now backed by the Fed’s overnight borrowing, bonds due in 12 months or less, or floating rate securities. As economist John Cochrane of the Hoover Institution puts it: “The U.S. is facing the same danger as Americans who bought homes during the 2006 housing bubble with adjustable-rate mortgages.”
Today, the world’s largest economy is harboring the equivalent of history’s biggest ARM. Put simply, the U.S. is courting major risks to hold today’s interest expense artificially low and make the fiscal picture look less precarious than it really is. Summers is calling on the Fed to “bring QE to an end,” in part because of the program’s mismatch of fast-rolling credit backing multiyear bonds. At the Fed’s meeting in late July, a majority of its Open Market Committee members advocated that tapering commence later this year. Economists at Charles Schwab predict that the Fed will start doing so in November, lowering the dollar amount of its purchases by $8.5 billion per month.
As we’ll see, the Fed can conceivably keep the U.S. on its current course by continuing its artful acrobatics. But that’s only if inflation is transitory. In July, the consumer price index waxed at 5.4%, matching the largest jump since August of 2008. The Fed is already predicting a 3% increase for all of 2021, well above its average target of 2%. Besides promoting full employment, the central bank’s top job is ensuring stable prices. If inflation is here to stay, fulfilling that mission could unleash a giant rate-reset on America’s ARM-style funding. That reset could take the annual interest tab for the biggest debt run-up in U.S. history from a seeming bargain to staggeringly expensive. The Larry Summers warning is right on.
The Treasury financed much of the COVID-driven spending boom on a short-term basis
The fresh debt the U.S. shouldered to battle the pandemic is making our fiscal future much riskier. Even though the Treasury is now shifting to longer-term borrowing, the extra trillions due in a year or two make the U.S. far more vulnerable to a sudden rise in rates.
At the end of December 2019, the federal government owed “debt held by the public” of $17.2 trillion. That category encompasses all Treasuries held by individuals, corporations, foreign governments, and the twelve Federal Reserve banks. Of that total, $2.4 trillion or 14% were in T-bills with maturities of four weeks to a year. The bulk at 58% or $9.3 trillion were T-notes starting with two-year terms extending to the benchmark 10-year at the long end. T-bonds at 20- and 30-year maturities accounted for $2.4 trillion, or 14% of all debt. Overall, more than 72% of U.S. borrowings sat in longer-dated T-notes and T-bonds.
That relatively prudent profile shifted radically when the U.S. undertook gigantic emergency spending and borrowing to combat the COVID-19 crisis. From the close of 2019 to August of last year, the U.S. Department of the Treasury went short in a big way. It issued an astounding $2.7 trillion in T-bills, securities rolling over, on average, every couple of months. The Treasury deployed T-bills for three out of every four dollars in new borrowing. In contrast, it sold just $1.4 trillion in longer dated T-notes and T-bonds—only half the proceeds from far riskier T-bills. (All figures for bonds issuance are expressed net of Treasuries that matured in the same periods.)
As of August 2020, the share of total borrowings in T-bills jumped by over 10 points to 23.4%. Add floating rate bonds, and the portion of less-than-one-year Treasuries and those indexed to short-term rates jumped from one-quarter to over one-third of all federal debt outstanding. The average maturity on federal bonds in the first three quarters of 2020 fell from 69 months to 62 months, one of the sharpest sudden drops in history.
Since then, the Treasury has reversed course. It’s been restoring the balance in its “outstandings” by originating far fewer T-bills that mature in less than a year, and gunning the volumes of new, longer-dated T-notes and T-bonds. The trends are detailed in a recent report from the Treasury’s Office of Debt Management updated through the federal government’s third quarter ended June 30. It includes projections for fresh debt issuance through the September close of the fiscal year. The Treasury forecasts that for the 12 months ended Sept. 30, it will retire $742 billion more in T-bills than it sells.
Of total new borrowing of almost $2 trillion for the 2021 fiscal year, $1.45 trillion will be funded by T-notes at maturities of five years or more, as well as T-bonds at 20 years and 30 years. The U.S. is returning to a much more conservative, traditional course by raising almost three-quarters of new borrowing at longer-dated maturities. In a jiffy, the average maturity of U.S. debt has jumped back to its pre-COVID level of 69 months.
It’s a good thing that the Treasury has restored the array of different maturities to their pre-crisis weights. The problem: Even if the proportions remain at their traditional levels, the U.S. now has much more short-term debt outstanding than at the close of 2019. The dollars matter more than the pieces of the pie. As of July, the U.S. owed $6.6 trillion in T-bills due in a year or less, plus floating rate debt. That’s $2 trillion more than it held across those categories in December of 2019. Now that the proportion of T-bills is back to normal, the Treasury began issuing them again in its fourth quarter.
From now on, the Treasury is likely to keep selling T-bills and floating rate bonds at a pace that maintains their current 30% share of total debt held by the public. The Treasury will need to borrow around $2 trillion annually in future years to fund our gigantic deficits. Hence, dollars owed in two-month to one-year and floating rate bonds will keep mounting rapidly—all from the much higher plateau established by COVID emergency funding. The need to constantly roll over or reset rates on that $6.6 trillion-and-growing nut makes the budget far more exposed to an inflation outbreak and rising rates versus just 18 months ago.
The Fed could face much higher costs on the bank reserves it must corral to forestall inflation
The new trillions in short-term borrowing plant fresh hazards in America’s fiscal path. But the Fed’s policy of paying whatever is necessary to keep the banks from pumping its newly minted money into loans that would overheat the economy could also cause a sharp rise in the nation’s interest burden. Today, the Fed is famously swelling the money supply at a rapid rate. Its challenge is blocking all those trillions from doing what they usually do in a super–easy-money era, fueling inflation.
The Treasury raises funding by selling T-notes and T-bonds to financial institutions. At the same time, the Fed is sprouting new money by crediting funds to its own account. It increases the money supply, and the availability of credit to families and businesses, by purchasing Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities from the banks with that new money. The lenders then have more liquidity to finance credit card balances and home loans. Their customers deposit the dollars in their checking accounts, and the banks lend part of those new deposits to seed more deposits that spawn more loans from themselves and rival banks in a cycle that expands consumer and business spending across the economy.
Traditionally, the Fed didn’t buy most of the newly issued Treasuries from the financial institutions that just bought them from the Treasury. It purchased just enough to provide additional credit when the economy’s clicking. When inflation was looming, it sold Treasuries to the banks at attractive rates to dial back the excess dollars chasing goods and services. The banks held a large portion of Treasuries on their balance sheets as reserves, and sold some of them to the Fed when demand for loans increased. But the QE program that started in October 2008 at the height of the Great Financial Crisis changed that paradigm. In part, the campaign is designed to lift home, stock, and other asset prices by holding longer-term rates extremely low, raising the wealth for families and corporations. Under QE, the Fed is devouring gigantic chunks of the Treasury’s even more gigantic issuance of T-notes (two to 10 years) and T-bonds (20 and 30 years).
In the 12 months to mid-August 2021, the Fed bought an epic $978 billion in T-notes and T-bonds. By my estimate, it purchased well over 80% of the total of around $1.2 trillion in those securities maturing in five years or more. All told, the Fed’s holdings of the two longer-dated classes has doubled since mid-2016 to $4.7 trillion.
That trove of T-notes and T-bonds sits on the asset side of the Fed’s famed balance sheet. Keep in mind that the Fed is buying those Treasuries from banks that just bought the same Treasuries from the U.S. Department of the Treasury. In effect, the banks are just flipping the bonds to the Fed. The financial institutions know that the central bank will hoover all the T-notes and T-bonds they just acquired, rewarding them with commissions for serving as middlemen. “That’s one reason rates are so low,” says William Luther, a professor of economics and monetary policy at Florida Atlantic University. “The banks know that the Fed will instantaneously buy all the Treasuries they want to sell at today’s high prices.”
The Fed is using trillions in newly generated money to buy Treasuries from the banks in record amounts. If the banks turned the Fed’s fount—almost $1 trillion in the past year—into fresh loans, prices would rocket. “The Fed needs a lever to ensure that huge increase in the money supply doesn’t translate into extra bank credit,” says Luther. “The Fed’s goal is to ring-fence that money so that it doesn’t flow into loans that cause inflation.” The Fed’s power tool: paying interest on deposits.
What the Fed pays to isolate those funds has varied greatly over the years. It’s called the interest on reserve balances or IORB rate. In the six years following the Great Financial Crisis, the number was a minuscule 0.07% to 0.15%. But as the economy improved in 2018, the rate jumped to 2% and hovered at 2.4% from January to August of 2019. As recently as February of last year, it stood at 1.58%. The slashing of the Federal funds rate to nearly zero last year drove the IORB back to around today’s level of 0.15%.
Why would the banks park trillions in reserves at such a paltry return? One reason, Luther points out, is that they don’t have a choice. The Basel regulations require that the banks maintain a far higher ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, including their loans adjusted for the risk of default. A second motive: Though the IORB sounds extremely modest, the Fed typically arranges matters so that it’s just slightly higher than the Fed funds rate at which the banks lend to one another. In addition, the banks are taking none of the usual risks on the trillions collecting interest at the Fed. “The reserves the banks hold at the Fed are totally safe,” says Luther. “That money doesn’t risk defaults or require servicing. And it earns a competitive return, though that return is now tiny.”
The magic of the “consolidated balance sheet”
Today’s fiscal story is the saga of the Fed aiding the Treasury as never before. The Fed is creating trillions in new money and, under QE, using it to buy the record amounts of longer-term debt that the Treasury is selling to the banks. Today, the Fed owns $4.7 trillion in those T-notes and T-bonds. Instead of owing all the money to outsiders, the Treasury instead owes it to the Fed. Because both arms fall under the government’s consolidated balance sheet, the U.S. owes that money to itself. Hence, all the interest the Fed collects from the Treasury it sends right back to the Treasury. That arrangement turns what could be a huge interest bill into a virtual wash.
Here’s my estimate of the money flow from the Fed to the Treasury. In 2020, the Treasury paid around 2% to the Fed on that $4.7 trillion that the Fed owns in long-dated Treasuries, or $94 billion. Buying all those Treasuries does come at a price to the Fed, but for now, it’s a small one. The central bank can only safely generate the “free” money available to amass those bonds if it also pays interest to keep the money it hands the banks for the T-notes and T-bills from rushing into inflation-spurring credit. Right now, the Fed’s paying a tiny 0.15% on the $4.2 trillion in reserves. In effect, it’s backing all those Treasuries bought via new money by debt that cost just $6 billion a year (0.15% of $4.2 trillion in reserves).
Last year, the Fed sent the Treasury $88 billion in profit, consisting of the $94 billion in interest that it collected from the Treasury, minus the $6 billion in interest it paid on reserves. What a deal for the Treasury! Instead of paying $94 billion in interest to banks, hedge funds, and other outsiders, the Treasury shuttled that money to itself, courtesy of the Fed. The Fed helped the U.S. Department of the Treasury keep America’s interest expense $94 billion lower than it otherwise would have been. But in providing that epic lift to the Treasury, the Fed is bearing big risks by effectively financing long-term bonds with the overnight debt it’s paying on reserves. The downside of the consolidated balance sheet: The Fed is taking a flier that could easily blow up, and if so, it will pass the damage to the Treasury, and on to the federal budget.
The danger if inflation ignites
Indeed, what happens if short-term rates spike? The big threat is that inflation has already arrived, and it’s settling in. To keep prices in check, the Fed will need to raise interest on reserves. The central bank is stuck. Remember, it absolutely cannot afford to let those reserves ooze into new credit that would inflame inflationary pressures that are already starting to boil.
Say inflation keeps running at 5%, where it is now. The Fed might need to pay as much as the 2.4% charge that prevailed just over two years ago. If tapering begins as expected later this year, the Fed will be purchasing smaller and smaller amounts of newly issued bonds.
But that will trigger another big change that’s also bad for the Fed’s bottom line.
It will no longer be rebating the interest payments on those securities to the Treasury. Instead, they will be owned by outside investors who will collect the coupons that used to go back to the Treasury. So QE would contribute to higher carrying costs as well. But let’s just consider how a swing of almost $100 billion in yearly interest expense, caused by much higher rates on bank reserves at the Fed, would ripple through the federal budget.
In 2019, the U.S. paid $376 billion in interest on average debt of $17.5 trillion. Since then, rates across the economy have cratered. That made new borrowing a lot cheaper. But the big drop in interest paid on reserves also helped a lot. Amazingly, the Congressional Budget Office is predicting that although debt will grow by almost 40% from 2019’s level to $24.3 trillion in 2022, the U.S. will miraculously be paying far less in interest, just $304 billion. But imagine that interest on reserves rises by $100 billion. That’s a 33% increase in all interest costs. And it won’t just be interest on reserves. Higher inflation will also hugely raise the costs of the $6.6 trillion in T-bills due in less than a year and floating rate debt. Overnight, the nation’s budget projections would be thrown into turmoil. That’s the peril Summers was talking about. He’s right. We don’t know when the greatest of all ARMs will reset. But we can picture the wreckage when it does.