2021年讓人意外地將在一片陰霾中結(jié)束,。11月,,一項(xiàng)重要的消費(fèi)者信心調(diào)查結(jié)果不及2020年新冠疫情危機(jī)最嚴(yán)重時(shí)的水平,;事實(shí)上,那些消費(fèi)信心數(shù)據(jù)甚至還不如全球金融危機(jī)期間有些時(shí)候的水平,。其他指標(biāo)也顯示出消費(fèi)者信心走弱,。如果只拿消費(fèi)者信心來評估經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況,你可能會認(rèn)為我們正處于衰退時(shí)期,。
普遍的悲觀情緒不能簡單歸咎于經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況。經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇連續(xù)第二年超出預(yù)期,,經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出明顯高于疫情前的水平,。而且復(fù)蘇也絕對是廣泛性的。盡管人們都在談?wù)摗癒型”復(fù)蘇,但與2008年金融危機(jī)后的情況相比,,當(dāng)前的復(fù)蘇所觸及的社會階層范圍要廣泛得多。
消費(fèi)者信心低迷背后,,可能有兩個(gè)主因需要認(rèn)真審視,,即:當(dāng)前的通貨膨脹,,以及讓人愈發(fā)感覺永遠(yuǎn)都不會結(jié)束的疫情。雖然二者都有可能一直讓人覺得經(jīng)濟(jì)不容樂觀,,但都不太可能會在2022年阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)的擴(kuò)張勢頭,。因此,消費(fèi)者支出可能會維持在高位水平,,盡管消費(fèi)者信心不高。
復(fù)蘇超出預(yù)期
今年,,美國經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)再次輕松超出預(yù)期,。全美失業(yè)率預(yù)計(jì)在2022年將達(dá)到5%,但目前已經(jīng)下降至4.2%,。GDP年增長率可能將達(dá)到5.5%,高于彭博社編制的年初預(yù)測中值(3.9%),。 2020年同樣出現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勢復(fù)蘇,,當(dāng)時(shí)疫情的爆發(fā)引發(fā)悲觀情緒四處彌漫,以至于后來經(jīng)濟(jì)呈現(xiàn)強(qiáng)有力的V型反彈,,也沒有引起多大的關(guān)注。
撇開增長率不談,,目前美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出高于疫情前的水平,,除非再次遭遇衰退沖擊,否則很有可能超過疫情前的勢頭,,這意味著未來的產(chǎn)出可能會高于疫情危機(jī)來襲前的預(yù)期。
與此同時(shí),,千千萬萬家庭也從經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇中受益?,F(xiàn)金存款比疫情前高出2萬億美元以上,家庭凈財(cái)富增長了20%以上,。
沒那么K型
關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)和民眾情緒之間脫節(jié)的一種普遍說法是,,這種復(fù)蘇是不均衡的,,大部分人口都享受不到,。然而,,廣為流傳的K型復(fù)蘇(復(fù)蘇僅惠及少數(shù)人)說法并不那么站得住腳。雖然許多人仍處于經(jīng)濟(jì)困境當(dāng)中,,且這一情況還遠(yuǎn)未有結(jié)束的跡象,,但認(rèn)為經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇僅讓一小部分人受益是錯(cuò)誤的。
的確,,收入金字塔頂部的20%人群凈財(cái)富增長尤其強(qiáng)勁(增幅超過17萬億美元),但收入最低的20%人群也迎來了超過3000億美元的財(cái)富增長,。這與2008年后的復(fù)蘇形成鮮明對比,,當(dāng)時(shí)盡管金融危機(jī)已經(jīng)過去多年,低收入群體仍因凈財(cái)富萎縮而苦苦掙扎,。因此,雖然疫情期間不平等現(xiàn)象可能會加劇,,但總的來看,,各個(gè)社會階層都迎來了凈財(cái)富增長。
中間階層群體的情況也值得注意,。他們的資產(chǎn)基礎(chǔ)——尤其受到住房價(jià)值的影響——在2008年之后遭受重創(chuàng),復(fù)蘇十分緩慢(盡管他們沒有像處于底層人群那樣長時(shí)間深陷泥沼),。而疫情期間并沒有發(fā)生這樣的崩盤——恰恰相反,,房地產(chǎn)價(jià)值不斷走高,大幅提升了業(yè)主的資產(chǎn)財(cái)富,。
收入最高群體的凈資產(chǎn)更多地與股票和企業(yè)所有權(quán)相關(guān),2008年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后其資產(chǎn)恢復(fù)要比其他群體來得輕松得多,,2020年更是幾乎沒花什么時(shí)間便收復(fù)失地,。他們的財(cái)富反彈最快,漲幅最大,。雖然每次經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇都加劇了財(cái)富不平等,但伴隨底層財(cái)富下降的不平等加劇與伴隨底層財(cái)富同樣強(qiáng)勁增長的不平等加劇是截然不同的,。
勞動力市場緊俏
有人說,,家庭經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況僅由政府刺激措施驅(qū)動,,改善只是暫時(shí)性的,,最終會消失。但這一觀點(diǎn)也是錯(cuò)誤的,。勞動力市場是幾乎所有人的主要收入來源,,它正在蓬勃發(fā)展。失業(yè)率迅速下降,,以至于勞動力市場正瀕臨“吃緊”——勞動力市場競爭十分激烈,也使得工作者迎來長足的工資增長,。2008年經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退之后,,歷時(shí)90多個(gè)月,美國失業(yè)率才下降至勞動力市場緊俏的水平以下——而這一次,,這種情況僅僅18個(gè)月后就出現(xiàn)了。
更重要的是,,低薪勞動力市場尤其吃緊,低教育水平,、低技能的工人薪資增長比高教育水平,、高技能的工人更快——這種情況非常罕見。這種情況可能會持續(xù)下去,,因?yàn)樵诰频陿I(yè)等行業(yè),職位空缺尤其嚴(yán)重,,仍接近歷史最高水平,,遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于疫情前的水平。
那消費(fèi)者為什么信心低迷呢,?
有人可能會說,GDP增長率和凈資產(chǎn)的分配是宏觀意義上的東西,,并不能為普通大眾所切實(shí)感知,。但到處可見的“招人”告示是看得見摸得著的,股票價(jià)格和工資增長也是如此,。
值得注意的是,脫節(jié)不僅僅存在于經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)和消費(fèi)者信心之間,。它還存在于消費(fèi)者信心和消費(fèi)者支出之間,。疫情爆發(fā)后,,零售和食品服務(wù)銷售額處于很高的水平,,名義上2021年比2019年的月度水平超出1000億美元,實(shí)際增長13%,。鑒于儲蓄,、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表和勞動力市場目前的狀況,這種支出很可能會持續(xù)下去,,而不是像消費(fèi)者信心報(bào)告讓人覺得的那樣——出現(xiàn)支出崩潰。
因此,,如果我們能夠感受到經(jīng)濟(jì)的強(qiáng)勁勢頭,,消費(fèi)者也確實(shí)在花錢,那么就需要找其他的因素來解釋消費(fèi)者的低迷情緒,。有兩大因素造成了人們對經(jīng)濟(jì)前景的悲觀看法:居高不下的通脹率以及感覺沒完沒了的疫情,。如今,二者都是經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的阻礙因素,,但我們有充分的理由相信,,它們有望在2022年得到緩解,如果不是完全緩解的話,。
首先,,通脹率正處于數(shù)十年來的高位。雖然價(jià)格上漲并未影響到所有的商品服務(wù),,但汽油,、汽車等價(jià)格飆漲的品類,確實(shí)讓家庭收入受到了擠壓,。此外,,普通大眾的看法可能會受到激烈的公開辯論和頻繁報(bào)道物價(jià)飛漲的新聞媒體的影響,。
然而,美國家庭對通脹的預(yù)期并沒有發(fā)生變化,,并沒有預(yù)期物價(jià)增長會持續(xù)下去,。 他們預(yù)期,未來一年物價(jià)將會顯著上行,,但未來五年只會出現(xiàn)小幅的變化。換句話說,,美國家庭目前并不認(rèn)為通脹是結(jié)構(gòu)性的,、永久性的,。
無論主流媒體如何大肆渲染通脹問題,我們都有充分的理由相信這將成為事實(shí),。與經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)勁復(fù)蘇相關(guān)的需求劇增所引發(fā)的沖擊,推動了通脹,,而產(chǎn)品和勞動力市場出現(xiàn)的瓶頸問題,,又加劇了通脹。 這種沖擊性通脹目前無法自我維持,,可能會在2022年顯著放緩,。盡管如此,,即使物價(jià)增長放緩,伴隨經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)勁復(fù)蘇而來的勞動力市場緊俏現(xiàn)象也仍將持續(xù),,這意味著工資增長可能仍將強(qiáng)勁,。2022年,名義工資的強(qiáng)勁增長可能會轉(zhuǎn)化為可觀的實(shí)際工資增長,。
這會改變消費(fèi)者信心嗎?不一定,。往往被人遺忘的一點(diǎn)是,通貨膨脹是一個(gè)反映變化率的概念,,而不是影響消費(fèi)者信心的價(jià)格水平,。以天然氣價(jià)格為例。要降低對通脹的貢獻(xiàn),,它停止上漲即可——通脹率下降不需要它下降。然而,,只要價(jià)格水平每周都能讓人們感受到漲價(jià)的痛苦,,就能讓他們的消費(fèi)信心持續(xù)低迷。值得注意的是,,直到2014年底和2015年初天然氣價(jià)格大幅下跌,后全球金融危機(jī)周期才迎來消費(fèi)者信心的提升,。
第二個(gè)因素是疫情倦怠癥,。疫情期間,經(jīng)濟(jì)給生活帶來的種種不確定性和不穩(wěn)定性無疑是令人沮喪的,,相信人們都深有體會,。學(xué)校什么時(shí)候停課,旅行計(jì)劃是否需要取消,,要不要再進(jìn)行一次核酸檢測……這些問題讓許多家庭都籠罩在疑云中,。
然而,我們不應(yīng)一旦擔(dān)心2020年初的經(jīng)濟(jì)混亂會重演,。新冠病毒與經(jīng)濟(jì)之間已經(jīng)在很大程度上脫鉤,,因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)懂得如何與病毒的社區(qū)傳播共存,而沒有一味實(shí)施持續(xù)而廣泛的封鎖措施,。這種脫鉤是真實(shí)的,,已在近期的多波疫情中得到證明——再次在美國大范圍蔓延的新冠病毒讓增長領(lǐng)域發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)移,,而沒有破壞當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張勢頭。顛覆性病毒變異的剩余風(fēng)險(xiǎn)一直存在,,但2022年,新變異毒株很可能不會對經(jīng)濟(jì)造成什么影響,,不會引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)恐慌,。
零售銷售或更強(qiáng)勁
雖然我們無法完全解釋消費(fèi)者信心與消費(fèi)者支出之間的脫節(jié),但這種脫節(jié)本身就讓我們有理由為2022年的到來感到高興,。盡管信心低迷,但消費(fèi)者仍選擇繼續(xù)推動經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,。2022年,,隨著導(dǎo)致消費(fèi)情緒低落的一些原因可能會消退,,零售銷售可能會變得更加強(qiáng)勢,讓經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)更加強(qiáng)勁,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
菲利普·卡爾森-斯萊扎克是波士頓咨詢公司紐約辦事處的董事總經(jīng)理兼合伙人,,也是該公司的全球首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家,。保羅·斯沃茨是波士頓咨詢公司旗下亨德森研究所的董事和高級經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。
譯者:萬志文
2021年讓人意外地將在一片陰霾中結(jié)束,。11月,,一項(xiàng)重要的消費(fèi)者信心調(diào)查結(jié)果不及2020年新冠疫情危機(jī)最嚴(yán)重時(shí)的水平,;事實(shí)上,,那些消費(fèi)信心數(shù)據(jù)甚至還不如全球金融危機(jī)期間有些時(shí)候的水平。其他指標(biāo)也顯示出消費(fèi)者信心走弱,。如果只拿消費(fèi)者信心來評估經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況,,你可能會認(rèn)為我們正處于衰退時(shí)期,。
普遍的悲觀情緒不能簡單歸咎于經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況,。經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇連續(xù)第二年超出預(yù)期,,經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出明顯高于疫情前的水平。而且復(fù)蘇也絕對是廣泛性的,。盡管人們都在談?wù)摗癒型”復(fù)蘇,但與2008年金融危機(jī)后的情況相比,,當(dāng)前的復(fù)蘇所觸及的社會階層范圍要廣泛得多,。
消費(fèi)者信心低迷背后,,可能有兩個(gè)主因需要認(rèn)真審視,即:當(dāng)前的通貨膨脹,,以及讓人愈發(fā)感覺永遠(yuǎn)都不會結(jié)束的疫情。雖然二者都有可能一直讓人覺得經(jīng)濟(jì)不容樂觀,,但都不太可能會在2022年阻礙經(jīng)濟(jì)的擴(kuò)張勢頭。因此,,消費(fèi)者支出可能會維持在高位水平,盡管消費(fèi)者信心不高,。
復(fù)蘇超出預(yù)期
今年,美國經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)再次輕松超出預(yù)期,。全美失業(yè)率預(yù)計(jì)在2022年將達(dá)到5%,但目前已經(jīng)下降至4.2%,。GDP年增長率可能將達(dá)到5.5%,高于彭博社編制的年初預(yù)測中值(3.9%),。 2020年同樣出現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勢復(fù)蘇,當(dāng)時(shí)疫情的爆發(fā)引發(fā)悲觀情緒四處彌漫,,以至于后來經(jīng)濟(jì)呈現(xiàn)強(qiáng)有力的V型反彈,,也沒有引起多大的關(guān)注,。
撇開增長率不談,,目前美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出高于疫情前的水平,,除非再次遭遇衰退沖擊,否則很有可能超過疫情前的勢頭,,這意味著未來的產(chǎn)出可能會高于疫情危機(jī)來襲前的預(yù)期,。
與此同時(shí),,千千萬萬家庭也從經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇中受益。現(xiàn)金存款比疫情前高出2萬億美元以上,,家庭凈財(cái)富增長了20%以上。
沒那么K型
關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)和民眾情緒之間脫節(jié)的一種普遍說法是,,這種復(fù)蘇是不均衡的,,大部分人口都享受不到。然而,,廣為流傳的K型復(fù)蘇(復(fù)蘇僅惠及少數(shù)人)說法并不那么站得住腳。雖然許多人仍處于經(jīng)濟(jì)困境當(dāng)中,,且這一情況還遠(yuǎn)未有結(jié)束的跡象,,但認(rèn)為經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇僅讓一小部分人受益是錯(cuò)誤的。
的確,,收入金字塔頂部的20%人群凈財(cái)富增長尤其強(qiáng)勁(增幅超過17萬億美元),,但收入最低的20%人群也迎來了超過3000億美元的財(cái)富增長,。這與2008年后的復(fù)蘇形成鮮明對比,當(dāng)時(shí)盡管金融危機(jī)已經(jīng)過去多年,,低收入群體仍因凈財(cái)富萎縮而苦苦掙扎。因此,,雖然疫情期間不平等現(xiàn)象可能會加劇,,但總的來看,各個(gè)社會階層都迎來了凈財(cái)富增長。
中間階層群體的情況也值得注意,。他們的資產(chǎn)基礎(chǔ)——尤其受到住房價(jià)值的影響——在2008年之后遭受重創(chuàng),復(fù)蘇十分緩慢(盡管他們沒有像處于底層人群那樣長時(shí)間深陷泥沼),。而疫情期間并沒有發(fā)生這樣的崩盤——恰恰相反,,房地產(chǎn)價(jià)值不斷走高,大幅提升了業(yè)主的資產(chǎn)財(cái)富,。
收入最高群體的凈資產(chǎn)更多地與股票和企業(yè)所有權(quán)相關(guān),,2008年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)后其資產(chǎn)恢復(fù)要比其他群體來得輕松得多,,2020年更是幾乎沒花什么時(shí)間便收復(fù)失地,。他們的財(cái)富反彈最快,,漲幅最大,。雖然每次經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇都加劇了財(cái)富不平等,但伴隨底層財(cái)富下降的不平等加劇與伴隨底層財(cái)富同樣強(qiáng)勁增長的不平等加劇是截然不同的,。
勞動力市場緊俏
有人說,,家庭經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況僅由政府刺激措施驅(qū)動,,改善只是暫時(shí)性的,最終會消失,。但這一觀點(diǎn)也是錯(cuò)誤的,。勞動力市場是幾乎所有人的主要收入來源,它正在蓬勃發(fā)展,。失業(yè)率迅速下降,,以至于勞動力市場正瀕臨“吃緊”——勞動力市場競爭十分激烈,,也使得工作者迎來長足的工資增長。2008年經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退之后,,歷時(shí)90多個(gè)月,,美國失業(yè)率才下降至勞動力市場緊俏的水平以下——而這一次,這種情況僅僅18個(gè)月后就出現(xiàn)了。
更重要的是,,低薪勞動力市場尤其吃緊,,低教育水平,、低技能的工人薪資增長比高教育水平,、高技能的工人更快——這種情況非常罕見。這種情況可能會持續(xù)下去,,因?yàn)樵诰频陿I(yè)等行業(yè),,職位空缺尤其嚴(yán)重,仍接近歷史最高水平,,遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于疫情前的水平,。
那消費(fèi)者為什么信心低迷呢,?
有人可能會說,GDP增長率和凈資產(chǎn)的分配是宏觀意義上的東西,,并不能為普通大眾所切實(shí)感知,。但到處可見的“招人”告示是看得見摸得著的,股票價(jià)格和工資增長也是如此,。
值得注意的是,,脫節(jié)不僅僅存在于經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)和消費(fèi)者信心之間。它還存在于消費(fèi)者信心和消費(fèi)者支出之間,。疫情爆發(fā)后,零售和食品服務(wù)銷售額處于很高的水平,,名義上2021年比2019年的月度水平超出1000億美元,,實(shí)際增長13%。鑒于儲蓄,、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表和勞動力市場目前的狀況,,這種支出很可能會持續(xù)下去,,而不是像消費(fèi)者信心報(bào)告讓人覺得的那樣——出現(xiàn)支出崩潰。
因此,,如果我們能夠感受到經(jīng)濟(jì)的強(qiáng)勁勢頭,,消費(fèi)者也確實(shí)在花錢,那么就需要找其他的因素來解釋消費(fèi)者的低迷情緒,。有兩大因素造成了人們對經(jīng)濟(jì)前景的悲觀看法:居高不下的通脹率以及感覺沒完沒了的疫情,。如今,,二者都是經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的阻礙因素,,但我們有充分的理由相信,,它們有望在2022年得到緩解,如果不是完全緩解的話,。
首先,,通脹率正處于數(shù)十年來的高位。雖然價(jià)格上漲并未影響到所有的商品服務(wù),,但汽油,、汽車等價(jià)格飆漲的品類,確實(shí)讓家庭收入受到了擠壓,。此外,普通大眾的看法可能會受到激烈的公開辯論和頻繁報(bào)道物價(jià)飛漲的新聞媒體的影響,。
然而,,美國家庭對通脹的預(yù)期并沒有發(fā)生變化,并沒有預(yù)期物價(jià)增長會持續(xù)下去,。 他們預(yù)期,,未來一年物價(jià)將會顯著上行,,但未來五年只會出現(xiàn)小幅的變化,。換句話說,,美國家庭目前并不認(rèn)為通脹是結(jié)構(gòu)性的、永久性的,。
無論主流媒體如何大肆渲染通脹問題,,我們都有充分的理由相信這將成為事實(shí)。與經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)勁復(fù)蘇相關(guān)的需求劇增所引發(fā)的沖擊,,推動了通脹,,而產(chǎn)品和勞動力市場出現(xiàn)的瓶頸問題,又加劇了通脹,。 這種沖擊性通脹目前無法自我維持,可能會在2022年顯著放緩,。盡管如此,,即使物價(jià)增長放緩,,伴隨經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)勁復(fù)蘇而來的勞動力市場緊俏現(xiàn)象也仍將持續(xù),這意味著工資增長可能仍將強(qiáng)勁,。2022年,名義工資的強(qiáng)勁增長可能會轉(zhuǎn)化為可觀的實(shí)際工資增長,。
這會改變消費(fèi)者信心嗎,?不一定。往往被人遺忘的一點(diǎn)是,,通貨膨脹是一個(gè)反映變化率的概念,,而不是影響消費(fèi)者信心的價(jià)格水平。以天然氣價(jià)格為例,。要降低對通脹的貢獻(xiàn),它停止上漲即可——通脹率下降不需要它下降,。然而,,只要價(jià)格水平每周都能讓人們感受到漲價(jià)的痛苦,就能讓他們的消費(fèi)信心持續(xù)低迷,。值得注意的是,,直到2014年底和2015年初天然氣價(jià)格大幅下跌,后全球金融危機(jī)周期才迎來消費(fèi)者信心的提升,。
第二個(gè)因素是疫情倦怠癥。疫情期間,,經(jīng)濟(jì)給生活帶來的種種不確定性和不穩(wěn)定性無疑是令人沮喪的,,相信人們都深有體會。學(xué)校什么時(shí)候停課,,旅行計(jì)劃是否需要取消,,要不要再進(jìn)行一次核酸檢測……這些問題讓許多家庭都籠罩在疑云中,。
然而,我們不應(yīng)一旦擔(dān)心2020年初的經(jīng)濟(jì)混亂會重演,。新冠病毒與經(jīng)濟(jì)之間已經(jīng)在很大程度上脫鉤,,因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)體已經(jīng)懂得如何與病毒的社區(qū)傳播共存,而沒有一味實(shí)施持續(xù)而廣泛的封鎖措施,。這種脫鉤是真實(shí)的,,已在近期的多波疫情中得到證明——再次在美國大范圍蔓延的新冠病毒讓增長領(lǐng)域發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)移,而沒有破壞當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張勢頭,。顛覆性病毒變異的剩余風(fēng)險(xiǎn)一直存在,,但2022年,新變異毒株很可能不會對經(jīng)濟(jì)造成什么影響,,不會引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)恐慌,。
零售銷售或更強(qiáng)勁
雖然我們無法完全解釋消費(fèi)者信心與消費(fèi)者支出之間的脫節(jié),但這種脫節(jié)本身就讓我們有理由為2022年的到來感到高興,。盡管信心低迷,,但消費(fèi)者仍選擇繼續(xù)推動經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,。2022年,,隨著導(dǎo)致消費(fèi)情緒低落的一些原因可能會消退,零售銷售可能會變得更加強(qiáng)勢,,讓經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)更加強(qiáng)勁,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
菲利普·卡爾森-斯萊扎克是波士頓咨詢公司紐約辦事處的董事總經(jīng)理兼合伙人,也是該公司的全球首席經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家,。保羅·斯沃茨是波士頓咨詢公司旗下亨德森研究所的董事和高級經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家,。
譯者:萬志文
Surprisingly, 2021 is ending with an abundance of gloom. In November, a prominent survey of consumer confidence was lower than it was at the depths of the COVID crisis in 2020; indeed, there were even times during the Global Financial Crisis that also had better confidence data. Weakening sentiment shows up in other gauges too. If we were to assess the economy on grump alone, one could think we’re in recessionary territory.
The economy cannot be blamed for the pervasive pessimism. The recovery is beating expectations for a second year in a row, with output easily above pre-pandemic levels. The rebound is also decidedly broad-based. For all the talk of a “K-shaped” recovery, this one has reached much broader segments of society than was the case post-2008.
To explain the extra unhappiness, then, two main suspects require closer inspection: current-year inflation and the growing sense of a forever pandemic. While each has the potential to sustain perceptions of economic malaise, neither is likely to undermine the ongoing expansion in 2022. That makes it likely that consumer spending will stay high—despite exceptional levels of grump.
The outperforming recovery
This year again, the U.S. economy is comfortably outperforming expectations. The unemployment rate was expected to be 5% in 2022, but is already down to 4.2%. Year-over-year GDP growth is likely to come in at 5.5%—compared to a median forecast of 3.9% at the start of the year, as compiled by Bloomberg. This year’s strength follows the outperforming recovery of 2020, when the onset of the pandemic triggered universal gloom that obscured the arrival of a vigorous V-shaped recovery.
Growth rates aside, today U.S. output is above pre-pandemic levels and—barring another recessionary shock—stands a good chance of overshooting its pre-pandemic trend, meaning that output is likely to be higher in the future than was expected before the COVID crisis struck.
Households, meanwhile, have not been left out of this recovery. Cash balances are more than $2 trillion higher than pre-pandemic, and net wealth of households has risen by more than 20%.
Not so K-shaped
A commonly cited narrative for the disconnect between economic performance and popular sentiment is the idea that this recovery is uneven, leaving behind large parts of the population. Yet, the much-invoked narrative of a K-shaped recovery, where some rise but many lose, does not hold up that well. While economic hardship continues for many, and the struggles are far from over, it would be wrong to think the recovery has benefited only small segments of the population.
Yes, the top 20% of the income distribution grew their net wealth particularly strongly (by more than $17 trillion), but the bottom 20% also grew their wealth—by over $300 billion. That stands in stark contrast to the post-2008 recovery, when many years after the financial crisis, that lower income cohort was still struggling with shrinking net wealth. So, while inequality likely went up during the pandemic, the whole distribution has received a net wealth lift.
The middle of the income distribution is also noteworthy. Their asset base—particularly exposed to housing values—got hit hard after 2008 and then made a painfully slow recovery (although they didn’t endure as long a slump as those at the bottom). No such collapse happened during COVID—quite the reverse is true, as rising real estate values lifted housing wealth for owners quite significantly.
The top of the distribution, whose net worth is far more exposed to equities and business ownership, had a far less difficult time recovering after 2008 and recovered in next to no time in 2020. Their wealth rebounded the fastest and gained the most. While each recovery exacerbated wealth inequality, rising inequality when the bottom is falling is quite different from rising inequality when the bottom is also gaining strongly.
Don’t forget the labor market
Neither is it true that households’ economic situation is driven only by stimulus and is thus a one-off that will dissipate. The labor market, the main source of income for nearly everyone, is booming. Unemployment has fallen so rapidly that the economy is now on the verge of “tightness”—a labor market so competitive that workers see meaningful wage gains. After the 2008 recession, it took over 90 months for unemployment to fall below a level considered to be a tight labor market—this time the economy is there after just 18 months.
What’s more, the market is particularly tight at the low end of the wage spectrum where less educated and lower-skilled workers are seeing faster wage gains than higher educated and higher-skilled workers—a very rare occurrence. And this dynamic may persist as job openings, which remain near record highs and dramatically higher than pre-pandemic, are particularly extreme in sectors such as hospitality.
Why are people so grumpy then?
It might be argued that GDP growth rates and the distribution of net worth are fairly technical and not tactile to the general public. But “help wanted“ signs are tactile, as are stock prices, and rising wages.
Of note, the disconnect is not merely between economic performance and consumer sentiment. It is also between consumer sentiment and consumer spending. Retail and food services sales are in a post-pandemic overshoot, nominally running nearly $100 billion above their monthly 2019 pace in 2021—which is 13% higher in real terms. With savings, balance sheets, and labor markets where they are, that spending is very likely to persist rather than collapse in line with what sentiment reports could have us believe.
So, if the strength of the economy can be felt, and money is being spent, we need to look for other drivers to explain extra grump. Two shapers of gloomy economic perceptions stand out: current inflation and the feeling of a forever pandemic. Each of these are real dampers today, but there are good reasons to believe they may ease, if not completely, in 2022.
First, inflation is running at a pace not seen in a generation. And while price growth hasn’t infected the full range of goods and services, it is true that household incomes are getting squeezed in areas where prices are up strongly—such as at the gas pump or in car sales. Additionally, household perceptions may be influenced by a heated public debate and press coverage that has relentlessly covered price spikes.
However, household expectations of inflation have not inflected to expect permanently higher price growth. Expectations are up significantly on the one-year horizon, but five-year expectations have moved only modestly. In other words, households do not currently think inflation is structural or permanent.
There are some good reasons to believe that’s true, no matter the frenzied tone in headlines. Inflation is being driven by the shock from a demand overshoot linked to the strong recovery and compounded by the bottlenecks that have arisen in product and labor markets. This shock inflation is not—at this point—self-sustaining and is likely to slow significantly in 2022. That said, even as price growth moderates, the tight labor market that a strong recovery delivered will persist, meaning wage gains are likely to remain robust. 2022 is likely the year when strong nominal wage gains translate into respectable real wage gains.
Will that change consumer sentiment? Not necessarily. Often forgotten, inflation is a concept that captures the rate of change—not the price levels that impact consumer sentiment. To illustrate, consider gas prices. For their contribution to inflation to moderate, they simply have to stop rising—they do not need to fall for inflation to fall. Yet, as long as price levels remind people each week of price pain, that has the power to sustain their grump. Note that it wasn’t until late 2014 and early 2015, when gas prices fell sharply, that the post-GFC cycle saw a boom in consumers‘ expectations.
The second factor is pandemic fatigue. The uncertainty and instability of living in the COVID economy is unquestionably a downer—just ask yourself. Wondering when school will close or if your travel plans will need to be scrapped, or simply having to take another COVID test, contributes to a dark cloud over many households.
However, the recurrent fears of a repeat of the economic chaos of early 2020 are misplaced. The linkage between the virus and the economy has largely decoupled as (most) economies have learned to live with community spread rather than impose sustained and broad lockdowns. Such decoupling has been true and proven through many recent waves—the resurging virus shifts out growth, rather than breaking an ongoing economic expansion. There is always residual risk of a game-changing mutation, but 2022 may well be the year when new variants are taken with an economic shrug rather than economic terror.
Not too grumpy to spend
While we cannot account fully for the disconnect between consumer sentiment and consumers’ spending, that disconnect itself gives some reason for cheer about 2022. Consumers have chosen to continue to drive economic growth despite their grump, and as some of the reasons for grumpiness may fade, retail sales may be more robust—delivering an even stronger economy in 2022.
Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak is a managing director and partner in BCG’s New York office and the firm’s global chief economist. Paul Swartz is a director and senior economist at the BCG Henderson Institute in New York.