在FTX最近倒閉之后,,是時(shí)候略微改動(dòng)里根時(shí)代的一句老話了:"信任,但要核實(shí),。"這句話最早是在冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的核武器外交的背景下使用的,,現(xiàn)在適用于如今的加密貨幣市場(chǎng),它使小投資者面臨異常高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。
聯(lián)邦政府正處在十字路口,,面臨兩種可能性:他們要么繼續(xù)走目前的道路,迎接更多的不穩(wěn)定性,,要么對(duì)加密貨幣進(jìn)行監(jiān)管,,有可能為一種新型金融產(chǎn)品提供合法性,但也會(huì)對(duì)其進(jìn)行壓力測(cè)試,,要求其證明其大肆宣揚(yáng)的優(yōu)點(diǎn)能夠經(jīng)得起考驗(yàn),。
我花了幾十年時(shí)間研究信任社會(huì)學(xué),因?yàn)樗c信貸,、監(jiān)管套利和金融市場(chǎng)有關(guān)——我認(rèn)為,,監(jiān)管最有可能成為一種穩(wěn)定力量,同時(shí)保護(hù)小投資者免受FTX垮臺(tái)后許多人遭受的極端損失,。如果加密貨幣要繼續(xù)存在下去,,那么監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)是時(shí)候不再袖手旁觀了。
在過去的幾年里,,加密貨幣市場(chǎng)一直在醞釀一場(chǎng)完美風(fēng)暴,。散戶投資者蜂擁而入,可能是出于對(duì)錯(cuò)失良機(jī)的恐懼,,也可能是受到巨額收益前景的激勵(lì),。推廣者通過開發(fā)用戶友好的應(yīng)用程序,讓人們可以輕松地在家用電腦和智能手機(jī)上進(jìn)行交易。投資開始看起來像一場(chǎng)游戲,。
許多新進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)的人并不完全了解他們正進(jìn)入怎樣的領(lǐng)域,,以及他們所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。他們可能信任一些知名的市場(chǎng)人物,,如已經(jīng)名譽(yù)掃地的FTX創(chuàng)始人薩姆·班克曼-弗里德(Sam Bankman-Fried),,相信拉里·戴維(Larry David)在超級(jí)碗上為FTX拍攝的廣告等在顯眼位置投放的名人背書,或者相信風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司,、對(duì)沖基金和私募股權(quán)公司投入加密貨幣的"行家的投資",。
我們后來看到,即使是行家的投資也不是那么明智,。加密貨幣市場(chǎng)經(jīng)歷了多次繁榮和蕭條,,它們逐漸從科技行業(yè)的無政府邊緣走向金融市場(chǎng)的中心。
美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的工作變得更容易了
許多聯(lián)邦政客受到行業(yè)游說活動(dòng)的影響,,因此到目前為止,,政府幾乎沒有為小投資者制定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)或保護(hù)措施。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)也一直在猶豫該怎么做,,不確定這些奇特而不穩(wěn)定的資產(chǎn)是否涉及金融證券,、衍生品、貨幣或其他完全不同的資產(chǎn),。他們不愿干預(yù)那些似乎處于財(cái)富創(chuàng)造前沿的交易,。
隨著加密貨幣市場(chǎng)面臨自己的“雷曼兄弟時(shí)刻”,人們必須考慮突然的損失是否會(huì)擴(kuò)散,,甚至威脅到更廣泛的金融體系的穩(wěn)定,。加密貨幣市場(chǎng)越大,涉及的主要金融機(jī)構(gòu)越多,,危險(xiǎn)就越大,。
通過推遲對(duì)加密貨幣市場(chǎng)的干預(yù),美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)可能讓一些投資者吃苦頭,。沒有什么比賠錢更能讓人集中精力了:它讓監(jiān)管顯得更有必要,,從而改變了一般對(duì)話和政治格局,,這也讓美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的工作變得更容易,。
如果監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)試圖更早采取行動(dòng),他們就更難辯稱,,如果沒有監(jiān)管,,可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)不良后果。現(xiàn)在,,每個(gè)人都知道那些不良后果是什么,,隨后的監(jiān)管措施也更容易被證明是合理的。
美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)和其他監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該抓住這個(gè)時(shí)機(jī)。小投資者缺乏大投資者所受益的雄厚財(cái)力和靈活性,,他們理應(yīng)能夠參與到一個(gè)不僅僅需要社會(huì)信任的體系中來,。他們應(yīng)該得到監(jiān)管保護(hù),以核實(shí)加密貨幣投資的相對(duì)穩(wěn)定性和安全性,。
里根總統(tǒng)可以依靠復(fù)雜的美國(guó)政府情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)來獨(dú)立核實(shí)蘇聯(lián)是否遵守核武器條約:而不單是信任俄羅斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人,。
如今,小投資者需要一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的公共監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)來監(jiān)督市場(chǎng)參與者,,并相對(duì)獨(dú)立地確保他們遵守規(guī)則,,以保護(hù)投資者利益。關(guān)鍵市場(chǎng)參與者的充分資本化需要以透明的方式進(jìn)行,,而不是通過層層離岸空殼公司來進(jìn)行,。
必須有人確保,復(fù)雜的所有權(quán)利益不會(huì)產(chǎn)生利益沖突(助長(zhǎng)將投資者的資金當(dāng)作存錢罐的行為),,從而給其他人以可乘之機(jī),。那些從普通人那里尋求資金的人必須坦率地面對(duì)加密貨幣投資的下行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和上行潛力。加密貨幣市場(chǎng)將受益于監(jiān)管部門監(jiān)督所能提供的合法性,,向市場(chǎng)參與者保證“狂野西部”時(shí)代已經(jīng)結(jié)束,。
能夠信任是好事,但最好還是能核實(shí)一下,。對(duì)于加密貨幣市場(chǎng)的小投資者來說,,這如今是政府的當(dāng)務(wù)之急。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
布魯斯·G·卡魯瑟(Bruce G. Carruthers)是西北大學(xué)約翰·D·麥克阿瑟(John D. MacArthur)社會(huì)學(xué)教授,,著有《承諾經(jīng)濟(jì):美國(guó)的信任,、權(quán)力和信用》(The Economy of Promises: Trust, Power, and Credit in America)。
譯者:中慧言-王芳
在FTX最近倒閉之后,,是時(shí)候略微改動(dòng)里根時(shí)代的一句老話了:"信任,,但要核實(shí)。"這句話最早是在冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的核武器外交的背景下使用的,,現(xiàn)在適用于如今的加密貨幣市場(chǎng),,它使小投資者面臨異常高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
聯(lián)邦政府正處在十字路口,,面臨兩種可能性:他們要么繼續(xù)走目前的道路,,迎接更多的不穩(wěn)定性,要么對(duì)加密貨幣進(jìn)行監(jiān)管,,有可能為一種新型金融產(chǎn)品提供合法性,,但也會(huì)對(duì)其進(jìn)行壓力測(cè)試,要求其證明其大肆宣揚(yáng)的優(yōu)點(diǎn)能夠經(jīng)得起考驗(yàn),。
我花了幾十年時(shí)間研究信任社會(huì)學(xué),,因?yàn)樗c信貸,、監(jiān)管套利和金融市場(chǎng)有關(guān)——我認(rèn)為,監(jiān)管最有可能成為一種穩(wěn)定力量,,同時(shí)保護(hù)小投資者免受FTX垮臺(tái)后許多人遭受的極端損失,。如果加密貨幣要繼續(xù)存在下去,那么監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)是時(shí)候不再袖手旁觀了,。
在過去的幾年里,,加密貨幣市場(chǎng)一直在醞釀一場(chǎng)完美風(fēng)暴。散戶投資者蜂擁而入,,可能是出于對(duì)錯(cuò)失良機(jī)的恐懼,,也可能是受到巨額收益前景的激勵(lì)。推廣者通過開發(fā)用戶友好的應(yīng)用程序,,讓人們可以輕松地在家用電腦和智能手機(jī)上進(jìn)行交易,。投資開始看起來像一場(chǎng)游戲。
許多新進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)的人并不完全了解他們正進(jìn)入怎樣的領(lǐng)域,,以及他們所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。他們可能信任一些知名的市場(chǎng)人物,如已經(jīng)名譽(yù)掃地的FTX創(chuàng)始人薩姆·班克曼-弗里德(Sam Bankman-Fried),,相信拉里·戴維(Larry David)在超級(jí)碗上為FTX拍攝的廣告等在顯眼位置投放的名人背書,,或者相信風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司、對(duì)沖基金和私募股權(quán)公司投入加密貨幣的"行家的投資",。
我們后來看到,,即使是行家的投資也不是那么明智。加密貨幣市場(chǎng)經(jīng)歷了多次繁榮和蕭條,,它們逐漸從科技行業(yè)的無政府邊緣走向金融市場(chǎng)的中心,。
美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的工作變得更容易了
許多聯(lián)邦政客受到行業(yè)游說活動(dòng)的影響,因此到目前為止,,政府幾乎沒有為小投資者制定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)或保護(hù)措施,。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)也一直在猶豫該怎么做,不確定這些奇特而不穩(wěn)定的資產(chǎn)是否涉及金融證券,、衍生品,、貨幣或其他完全不同的資產(chǎn)。他們不愿干預(yù)那些似乎處于財(cái)富創(chuàng)造前沿的交易,。
隨著加密貨幣市場(chǎng)面臨自己的“雷曼兄弟時(shí)刻”,,人們必須考慮突然的損失是否會(huì)擴(kuò)散,甚至威脅到更廣泛的金融體系的穩(wěn)定,。加密貨幣市場(chǎng)越大,,涉及的主要金融機(jī)構(gòu)越多,危險(xiǎn)就越大,。
通過推遲對(duì)加密貨幣市場(chǎng)的干預(yù),美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)可能讓一些投資者吃苦頭。沒有什么比賠錢更能讓人集中精力了:它讓監(jiān)管顯得更有必要,,從而改變了一般對(duì)話和政治格局,,這也讓美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的工作變得更容易。
如果監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)試圖更早采取行動(dòng),,他們就更難辯稱,,如果沒有監(jiān)管,可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)不良后果?,F(xiàn)在,,每個(gè)人都知道那些不良后果是什么,隨后的監(jiān)管措施也更容易被證明是合理的,。
美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)和其他監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該抓住這個(gè)時(shí)機(jī),。小投資者缺乏大投資者所受益的雄厚財(cái)力和靈活性,他們理應(yīng)能夠參與到一個(gè)不僅僅需要社會(huì)信任的體系中來,。他們應(yīng)該得到監(jiān)管保護(hù),,以核實(shí)加密貨幣投資的相對(duì)穩(wěn)定性和安全性。
里根總統(tǒng)可以依靠復(fù)雜的美國(guó)政府情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)來獨(dú)立核實(shí)蘇聯(lián)是否遵守核武器條約:而不單是信任俄羅斯領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人,。
如今,,小投資者需要一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的公共監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)來監(jiān)督市場(chǎng)參與者,并相對(duì)獨(dú)立地確保他們遵守規(guī)則,,以保護(hù)投資者利益,。關(guān)鍵市場(chǎng)參與者的充分資本化需要以透明的方式進(jìn)行,而不是通過層層離岸空殼公司來進(jìn)行,。
必須有人確保,,復(fù)雜的所有權(quán)利益不會(huì)產(chǎn)生利益沖突(助長(zhǎng)將投資者的資金當(dāng)作存錢罐的行為),從而給其他人以可乘之機(jī),。那些從普通人那里尋求資金的人必須坦率地面對(duì)加密貨幣投資的下行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和上行潛力,。加密貨幣市場(chǎng)將受益于監(jiān)管部門監(jiān)督所能提供的合法性,向市場(chǎng)參與者保證“狂野西部”時(shí)代已經(jīng)結(jié)束,。
能夠信任是好事,,但最好還是能核實(shí)一下。對(duì)于加密貨幣市場(chǎng)的小投資者來說,,這如今是政府的當(dāng)務(wù)之急,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
布魯斯·G·卡魯瑟(Bruce G. Carruthers)是西北大學(xué)約翰·D·麥克阿瑟(John D. MacArthur)社會(huì)學(xué)教授,著有《承諾經(jīng)濟(jì):美國(guó)的信任,、權(quán)力和信用》(The Economy of Promises: Trust, Power, and Credit in America),。
譯者:中慧言-王芳
Following the recent collapse of FTX, it’s time to repurpose an old Reagan-era phrase: “Trust, but verify.” First used in the context of Cold War nuclear arms diplomacy, the phrase now applies to today’s cryptocurrency markets, which have exposed small investors to disproportionately high risk.
The federal government is at a crossroads, facing two possibilities: They can either continue on the current path and keep the door open to more instability or regulate crypto, potentially lending legitimacy to a novel financial product–but also putting it through a stress test that will require it to demonstrate that its much-touted merits can stand up to scrutiny.
I’ve spent decades studying the sociology of trust as it relates to credit, regulatory arbitrage, and financial markets–and I would argue that regulation is most likely to serve as a stabilizing force, while protecting small investors from the extreme losses that many suffered after FTX’s downfall. If crypto is here to stay, it’s time for regulators to step off the sidelines.
A perfect storm has been brewing over the past few years in crypto markets. Retail investors rushed in, perhaps motivated by the fear of missing out or inspired by the prospect of spectacular gains. Promoters eased their way by creating user-friendly apps so that people could trade from their home computers and smartphones. Investing began to seem like a game.
Many of these new entrants into the market didn’t fully understand what they were getting into and the risks they were running. They may have trusted prominent market figures like FTX’s now-disgraced founder Sam Bankman-Fried, well-placed celebrity endorsements like Larry David’s Super Bowl ad for FTX, or the “smart money” put into crypto by venture capital firms, hedge funds, and private equity.
We’ve since seen that even the smart money wasn’t so smart. Cryptocurrency markets have gone through multiple booms and busts as they gradually moved from the anarchic fringe of the tech industry toward the center of financial markets.
The SEC’s job has been made easier
Many federal politicians have been swayed by industry lobbying efforts, so until now there has been little effort to set standards or establish protections for small investors. Regulators have also been hesitant about what to do, not sure if these exotic and unstable assets involved financial securities, derivatives, money, or something entirely different. They were reluctant to meddle with transactions that seemed to be on the cutting edge of wealth generation.
As cryptocurrency markets face their own “Lehman Brothers moment,” one must consider whether the sudden losses could be contagious, or even threaten to destabilize the broader financial system. The bigger crypto markets become, and the more they involve major financial institutions, the greater the danger.
It’s possible that by deferring intervention in crypto markets, the SEC allowed some investors to get their fingers burned. Nothing concentrates minds like losing money: it changes both the general conversation and the political landscape by making regulation seem more necessary, which also makes the SEC’s job easier.
Had regulators tried to move earlier, it would have been more difficult for them to argue that bad outcomes might occur without oversight. Now, everyone knows what those bad outcomes look like, and subsequent regulatory moves have become easier to justify.
The SEC and other regulatory actors should seize the moment. Small investors, who lack the deep pockets and flexibility that large investors benefit from, should be able to participate in a system where more than social trust is required. They deserve the kind of regulatory protection that verifies the relative stability and security of crypto investments.
President Reagan could rely on an elaborate U.S. government intelligence apparatus to independently verify Soviet compliance with nuclear arms treaties: He didn’t simply have to trust the Russian leadership.
Today, small investors need a robust public regulatory apparatus that will oversee market actors and independently ensure their compliance with rules to protect investor interests. Adequate capitalization of key market players needs to be done transparently, rather than through layers of offshore shell companies.
Someone must make sure that complex ownership interests do not create conflicts of interest that fuel the temptation to treat investors’ funds like a piggy bank to be raided when convenient. Those seeking funds from ordinary people must be forthright about the downside risks as well as the upside potential of cryptocurrency investments. Crypto markets will benefit from the legitimacy that regulatory oversight can offer, providing assurances to market participants that the “wild west” era is over.
It is good to be able to trust–but much better to also verify. For small investors in cryptocurrency markets, this is now an imperative that the government can’t ignore.
Bruce G. Carruthers is the John D. MacArthur Professor of Sociology at Northwestern University, and author of The Economy of Promises: Trust, Power, and Credit in America.