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硅谷銀行引發(fā)的銀行倒閉潮,,與30多年前的儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)驚人相似

Will Daniel
2023-03-26

除了寬松的監(jiān)管以外,,銀行還存在高管管理不善和過度依賴一類儲(chǔ)戶等問題,,而儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)的噩夢再現(xiàn)的可能性,,令許多區(qū)域銀行的高管夜不能寐,。

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美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)董事會(huì)主席保羅·沃爾克在華盛頓特區(qū)出席會(huì)議期間單手扶頭。圖片來源:BETTMANN/GETTY IMAGES

薩繆爾·克萊門斯,,也就是大名鼎鼎的馬克·吐溫,,有生之年沒有經(jīng)歷過1929年的銀行擠兌和市場崩潰,沒有見證過1987年的“黑色星期一”(Black Monday)和2008年的經(jīng)濟(jì)大衰退(Great Recession),,更不知道最近硅谷銀行(Silicon Valley Bank)倒閉所引發(fā)的銀行業(yè)危機(jī),。但他有一句名言:“歷史不會(huì)重演,但總是驚人的相似,?!边@句話卻能夠非常精準(zhǔn)地總結(jié)從他生活的時(shí)代至今出現(xiàn)過的金融恐慌。

硅谷銀行倒閉在銀行系統(tǒng)產(chǎn)生的影響,,與20世紀(jì)80年代末的儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)所引發(fā)的恐慌,,似乎驚人的相似。無論當(dāng)時(shí)還是現(xiàn)在,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Federal Reserve)都進(jìn)行了快速加息,,以應(yīng)對惡性通脹。這種策略當(dāng)初發(fā)揮了作用,,現(xiàn)在似乎依舊有效,,但卻是以對利息敏感的資產(chǎn)貶值為代價(jià),例如美國國債和抵押貸款擔(dān)保證券等,,這些資產(chǎn)在許多銀行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中占有很大的比重,。除了寬松的監(jiān)管以外,銀行還存在高管管理不善和過度依賴一類儲(chǔ)戶等問題,,而儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)的噩夢再現(xiàn)的可能性,,令許多區(qū)域銀行的高管夜不能寐。

2008年和大金融危機(jī)(Great Financial Crisis)的記憶,,影響了監(jiān)管部門對新危機(jī)的應(yīng)對,,尤其是放寬在2010年通過的《多德-弗蘭德華爾街改革和消費(fèi)者保護(hù)法案》(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act)的監(jiān)管,被認(rèn)為是硅谷銀行倒閉的罪魁禍?zhǔn)?。但正如億萬富翁投資者瑞·達(dá)里歐和拉里·芬克在危機(jī)發(fā)生后不久所說的那樣,,硅谷銀行倒閉后引發(fā)區(qū)域銀行倒閉潮的可能性,令我們回想起儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)的諸多細(xì)節(jié),。

芬克上周在一年一度給股東的信中寫道,,“我們尚不清楚”,最近這次危機(jī)的后果是否“會(huì)蔓延到整個(gè)美國區(qū)域銀行業(yè)(與儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)類似),使更多的銀行被接管和倒閉,?!钡c20世紀(jì)80年代的儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)一樣,最近硅谷銀行以及銀門銀行(Silvergate Bank)和簽名銀行(Signature Bank)的倒閉,,都是美國區(qū)域銀行的損失,,所引發(fā)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn),可能令美國政府冒險(xiǎn)動(dòng)用納稅人的錢,。

由于社交媒體的崛起,已經(jīng)破產(chǎn)的硅谷銀行和簽名銀行,,還要面臨20世紀(jì)80年代儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)時(shí)的首席執(zhí)行官們可能從未想象過的問題,。但正如投資公司Sanders Morris Harris的董事長喬治·鮑爾在接受《財(cái)富》雜志采訪時(shí)所說的那樣:

“硅谷銀行的危機(jī)可能在許多方面,與儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)有巨大區(qū)別,,但這場危機(jī)背后卻存在一個(gè)同樣的算數(shù)問題——當(dāng)儲(chǔ)戶或者貸款商失去信心時(shí),,長期杠桿一定會(huì)立即引發(fā)災(zāi)難?!?/p>

《財(cái)富》雜志就歷史上的金融危機(jī)和當(dāng)前銀行業(yè)動(dòng)蕩之間的相似之處和差異,,采訪了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的前官員和投資經(jīng)理等,。加息再加上中小型區(qū)域金融機(jī)構(gòu)倒閉帶來的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,與儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)有許多相似之處。這種金融歷史上的相似之處值得警惕,,因?yàn)榘凑彰绹畣栘?zé)辦公室(U.S. General Accountability Office)統(tǒng)計(jì),,儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)導(dǎo)致1980年至1995年的15年間,全美1,000多家貸款機(jī)構(gòu)破產(chǎn),,最終使納稅人損失超過1,600億美元,。

歷史回顧和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

一條簡單的歷史教訓(xùn):儲(chǔ)貸協(xié)會(huì)最早于1831年成立于賓夕法尼亞州,當(dāng)時(shí)銀行還不提供住房抵押貸款,。這些機(jī)構(gòu)又被稱為“儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)”,,支持社區(qū)聯(lián)合,相互幫助購買住房,。

許多儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)提供的抵押貸款利率低于銀行,,但相應(yīng)地存款利率也更低。這些貸款機(jī)構(gòu)憑借低成本,,在美國銀行系統(tǒng)中的地位日益提高,,到1932年,美國通過了《聯(lián)邦住房貸款銀行法案》(Federal Home Loan Bank Act),,旨在監(jiān)管儲(chǔ)貸行業(yè),,以幫助低收入美國人實(shí)現(xiàn)擁有住房的目標(biāo)。兩年后,聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款保險(xiǎn)公司(Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation)成立,,為持續(xù)擴(kuò)張的儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)提供存款保險(xiǎn),。

1951年,位于美國伊利諾伊州芝加哥市51號(hào)大街東104號(hào)(104 East 51st Street)的伊利諾伊州聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄與貸款服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)(Illinois Service Federal Savings and Loan)的辦公室外,。圖片來源:PHOTO BY THE ABBOTT SENGSTACKE FAMILY PAPERS/ROBERT ABBOTT SENGSTACKE/GETTY IMAGES

到1980年,,美國已經(jīng)有接近4,000家儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu),總資產(chǎn)達(dá)到6,000億美元,,其中包括當(dāng)時(shí)美國接近一半未償還的住房抵押貸款,。1979年,保羅·沃爾克擔(dān)任美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席時(shí),,決心解決現(xiàn)在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們所說的“大通脹”(Great Inflation),。沃爾克開始以前所未有的速度和力度加息,導(dǎo)致時(shí)任美國總統(tǒng)吉米·卡特在其唯一一個(gè)任期后期不得不承受殘酷的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退?,F(xiàn)任美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席杰羅姆·鮑威爾似乎主要也采取了這種策略來應(yīng)對通脹,。幾年內(nèi)(并且經(jīng)過有一次短期衰退后),美國進(jìn)入了物價(jià)穩(wěn)定的“大緩和”(Great Moderation)時(shí)期,,但在那之前,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)的一切都發(fā)生了變化。

康拉德·阿爾特指出,,隨著利率大幅上漲,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)持有的以抵押貸款為主的固定利率資產(chǎn)貶值。阿爾特曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任美國參議院銀行業(yè)委員會(huì)(U.S. Senate Banking Committee)的顧問,,在1989年至1996年期間曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任美國貨幣監(jiān)理署(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency)的幕僚長和高級副主計(jì)長,,是終結(jié)儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)的功臣之一?!芭c此同時(shí),,他們的融資成本上漲,因此為了吸引存款而不得不增加支出,。最終形成了我們所說的負(fù)利差,。”這意味著這些儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)開始虧損,,并無力償債,。

阿爾特后來成立了投資公司Klaros集團(tuán)(Klaros Group)。他表示,,當(dāng)時(shí)作為一名年輕律師,,他參與了應(yīng)對儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī),并且他發(fā)現(xiàn)“在幾乎每一家儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu),,都存在許多非常不完善的行為,,比如非常輕率的貸款等活動(dòng)。”有越來越多與硅谷銀行有關(guān)的令人討厭的消息曝出,,例如為吸引灣區(qū)的客戶,,贈(zèng)送高檔紅酒和報(bào)銷滑雪旅行的所有費(fèi)用等。同樣,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)招攬客戶的手段是“以賽馬,、高爾夫課程和藝術(shù)品作為抵押提供貸款”,他們生活奢侈,,“購買公務(wù)機(jī),,這些都是真實(shí)存在的情況?!?/p>

阿爾特稱,,他認(rèn)為在20世紀(jì)80年代,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)普遍存在管理不善的問題,,因?yàn)檫@些垂死掙扎的公司,,獲得了監(jiān)管者毫不動(dòng)搖的支持,,而儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)的高管們都很清楚這一點(diǎn),。

他說:“如果你有一家公司既沒有股權(quán)也沒有經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值,為什么不賭一把呢,?如果你賭輸了,,存款保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)[聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款保險(xiǎn)公司]可以兜底,畢竟你沒有在公司中投入任何資金,,因此也就不會(huì)蒙受任何損失,。如果你賭贏了,你可以說:‘嘿,,太好了,,運(yùn)氣真好?!虼诉@種行為在儲(chǔ)貸行業(yè)變得日益猖獗,。”

阿爾特表示,,如果他現(xiàn)在是一名銀行監(jiān)管者,,他肯定就會(huì)擔(dān)心“道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”問題,即政府救助倒閉的銀行會(huì)鼓勵(lì)銀行領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者承擔(dān)過多風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。與硅谷銀行的情況一樣,,銀行所有者和管理者知道其已經(jīng)資不抵債,尤其是他們很清楚政府不會(huì)允許他們破產(chǎn),。阿爾特稱,,這可能導(dǎo)致管理者“承擔(dān)過多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”。

熟悉的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)方程

2021年,在新冠疫苗問世后,,美國經(jīng)濟(jì)重啟,,恰逢美國通脹率達(dá)到自20世紀(jì)80年代沃爾克上任以來的最高水平,而為了給經(jīng)濟(jì)降溫和抑制通脹,,鮑威爾采取了快速加息的策略,,加息速度超過了任何前任。與20世紀(jì)80年代一樣,,隨著利率上漲,,固定利率資產(chǎn)(國債和抵押貸款擔(dān)保證券)在銀行資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中的比重下降。因此,,據(jù)美國聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司(FDIC)統(tǒng)計(jì),,截至2022年年底,美國銀行的貸款組合損失超過6,000億美元,。

2023年3月8日,,星期三,美國華盛頓特區(qū),,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席杰羅姆·鮑威爾在眾議院金融服務(wù)委員會(huì)(House Financial Services Committee)的聽證會(huì)上發(fā)言,。圖片來源:SAMUEL CORUM/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY IMAGES

硅谷銀行的資產(chǎn)貶值尤其嚴(yán)重。到2022年年底,,在硅谷銀行的長期抵押貸款擔(dān)保證券中,,90%的債券資產(chǎn)收益率低于2%。利率上漲意味著現(xiàn)在這些債券的價(jià)值更低,,因此在今年3月初,,當(dāng)擔(dān)心硅谷銀行倒閉的儲(chǔ)戶爭相到該銀行取款時(shí),它卻沒有足夠的現(xiàn)金,。

康拉德·阿爾特指出,,目前,銀行再一次面臨利率上漲,、長期固定利率資產(chǎn)貶值和存款存在壓力的局面,。“因此,,我們正在重蹈覆轍,。回顧這條路,,你可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生這樣合理的猜測:‘嗯,,這開始變得與儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)有許多相似之處?!?/p>

致命的業(yè)務(wù)過度集中

儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)和硅谷銀行與簽名銀行面臨的問題還有另外一個(gè)重要的相似之處,,那就是業(yè)務(wù)過度集中于一個(gè)行業(yè),。儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)幾乎完全專注于提供抵押貸款,在20世紀(jì)80年代,,當(dāng)利率上浮導(dǎo)致房價(jià)下跌時(shí),,這種策略開始出現(xiàn)問題。而硅谷銀行主要服務(wù)科技公司,,這些公司通常沒有經(jīng)受過考驗(yàn),,也沒有盈利,因此當(dāng)利率上漲和風(fēng)投融資速度放慢時(shí),,它們就會(huì)面臨風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。Sanders Morris Harris公司的鮑爾稱,銀行業(yè)務(wù)過度集中于任何一個(gè)行業(yè),,“最終會(huì)導(dǎo)致金融過度,,引發(fā)大災(zāi)難”。

他還表示,,硅谷銀行與儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)的狀況有一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的相似之處,,引發(fā)了最近的銀行擠兌。

他說:“儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)時(shí)期的銀行貸款機(jī)構(gòu)和硅谷銀行等科技貸款機(jī)構(gòu),,將自己樹立成經(jīng)濟(jì)中的典型,,它們都心照不宣地要求貸款方將存款存在貸款機(jī)構(gòu)?!彼忉尩?,為了讓儲(chǔ)戶繼續(xù)投資,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)和硅谷銀行都額外提供了許多華而不實(shí)的條件,。“你不能強(qiáng)迫借款人將資金存到你的貸款機(jī)構(gòu),,因?yàn)檫@是違法的,,但你能夠通過不斷勸說,影響他們這樣做,?!北热纾韫茹y行向客戶提供亞馬遜(Amazon)的云計(jì)算信用積分,、DocuSign服務(wù)折扣,,甚至高檔紅酒。

鮑爾表示,,這種經(jīng)營策略使硅谷銀行能夠迅速吸引存款,,因?yàn)槠鋬?chǔ)戶集中,主要是人脈廣泛的科技公司開立的大額儲(chǔ)蓄賬戶,?!皳碛写箢~存款的儲(chǔ)戶在聽到銀行倒閉的傳聞后,,選擇分散存款,突然之間,,銀行的存款狀況從四分之三滿的杯子變成了只有八分之一滿,。這時(shí),銀行變得無力償債,?!?/p>

一些關(guān)鍵區(qū)別

雖然儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)和當(dāng)前的銀行業(yè)動(dòng)蕩有許多相似之處,但兩者之間還是存在一些重要的區(qū)別,?;蛟S最重要的區(qū)別是,現(xiàn)在的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)有能力介入危機(jī),,挽救局面,。

1983年,在儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)期間,,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)估計(jì),,為了償付存在倒閉的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)的有保險(xiǎn)儲(chǔ)戶,大約需要250億美元,。但美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)歷史學(xué)家表示,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)的保險(xiǎn)基金、聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款保險(xiǎn)公司僅有60億美元儲(chǔ)備資金,。

科羅拉多大學(xué)丹佛分校(University of Colorado-Denver)的講師,、Econ One Research的總經(jīng)理邁克爾·J·奧蘭多對《財(cái)富》雜志表示:“當(dāng)時(shí),面對迅速惡化的問題,,這些機(jī)構(gòu)的存款保險(xiǎn)嚴(yán)重不足,,這影響了監(jiān)管者的選擇?!钡珚W蘭多稱,,現(xiàn)在,監(jiān)管者有大量“滅火的手段”,,至少在近期內(nèi)可以幫助減少銀行倒閉產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響,。奧蘭多同時(shí)是美國聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備系統(tǒng)(Federal Reserve System)的研究經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。

儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)與硅谷銀行和簽名銀行破產(chǎn)之間的另外一個(gè)區(qū)別是最近銀行擠兌的速度,。社交媒體和銀行業(yè)應(yīng)用程序的流行,,讓儲(chǔ)戶能夠快速發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行的問題,并取走資金,。

科羅拉多州立大學(xué)(Colorado State University)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授斯蒂芬·韋勒告訴《財(cái)富》雜志:“[硅谷銀行]的擠兌主要來自科技行業(yè),,科技行業(yè)的從業(yè)者精通社交媒體,而且他們有強(qiáng)大的能力在48小時(shí)內(nèi)取走所有可用現(xiàn)金,。而在儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)期間,,擠兌的時(shí)間長達(dá)數(shù)周,、數(shù)月甚至數(shù)年。這是一個(gè)慢速崩潰過程,?!?/p>

有專家甚至指出,硅谷銀行可能經(jīng)歷了史上第一次因社交媒體導(dǎo)致的銀行擠兌,,他們說,,知名風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者曾經(jīng)迅速警告投資組合公司取走存款。Bahnsen Group的首席投資官大衛(wèi)·巴恩森對《財(cái)富》雜志表示,,他認(rèn)為“毫無疑問”,,是強(qiáng)大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者“助長了銀行擠兌”。這是一個(gè)快速的過程,。

后果:大規(guī)模整合

韋勒教授是區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展研究所(Regional Economic Development Institute)的聯(lián)席所長,。他警告,在所有金融機(jī)構(gòu)當(dāng)中,,最近的危機(jī)可能對小型銀行的影響最為嚴(yán)重,。硅谷銀行倒閉暴露出聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司有限的保險(xiǎn)只能夠?yàn)樾⌒徒鹑跈C(jī)構(gòu)兜底,無法為更具有系統(tǒng)重要性的機(jī)構(gòu)提供保障,。聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司的保險(xiǎn)對儲(chǔ)戶的保額不超過25萬美元,。他說:“大銀行擁有小銀行不具備的優(yōu)勢,”那就是幾乎“一定”會(huì)得到政府的全力救助,?!按蠖荒艿梗勾筱y行擁有壓倒性的吸引力,?!?/p>

自從儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來,小型社區(qū)銀行的數(shù)量持續(xù)減少,。據(jù)聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司統(tǒng)計(jì),,1980年,,全美由聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司承保的銀行超過14,000家,,2021年卻不足4,500家。

韋勒表示,,這是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的問題,。他在一項(xiàng)研究中分析了社區(qū)和區(qū)域銀行對美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的積極影響,尤其是在大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)覆蓋不足的農(nóng)村地區(qū),。

2022年,,韋勒與貝爾蒙特大學(xué)(Belmont University)的盧克·佩塔克以及威斯康辛大學(xué)麥迪遜分校(University of Wisconsin-Madison)的特莎·康羅伊聯(lián)合發(fā)表了一篇論文。韋勒發(fā)現(xiàn),,擁有更多社區(qū)銀行的地區(qū)“整體上區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)更繁榮,,并且提高了區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)承受宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊的韌性,。”社區(qū)銀行帶來的好處包括企業(yè)倒閉減少,,房價(jià)更有彈性,,就業(yè)增長更強(qiáng)勁。

他說:“我們的研究顯示,,[資產(chǎn)規(guī)模]10億美元以下的社區(qū)銀行,,實(shí)際上對于創(chuàng)業(yè)和就業(yè)增長至關(guān)重要,尤其是在美國農(nóng)村地區(qū),。正是這些銀行,,可能因?yàn)榇舜挝C(jī)而最終倒閉?!?/p>

然而,,今年3月21日,美國財(cái)政部的部長珍妮特·耶倫對游說團(tuán)體美國銀行家協(xié)會(huì)(American Bankers Association)表示,,如果“小型銀行機(jī)構(gòu)”面臨“存款擠兌可能導(dǎo)致危機(jī)蔓延”,,她可能會(huì)采取“類似措施”來阻止儲(chǔ)戶擠兌。

《財(cái)富》雜志采訪的多位專家稱,,可悲的是,,小銀行的悲劇是可以避免的。阿爾特曾經(jīng)在儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)后協(xié)助監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)起草立法,。他表示,,他的建議在20世紀(jì)80年代末和90年代初經(jīng)常被忽視,而且那些錯(cuò)失的機(jī)會(huì)目前正在對美國經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生影響,。

他提到曾經(jīng)在立法中要求銀行測試加息環(huán)境下的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表狀況,。他說:“這個(gè)要求被寫入法律。但實(shí)際上沒有機(jī)構(gòu)執(zhí)行?,F(xiàn)在,,立法中依舊沒有與利率風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有關(guān)的內(nèi)容。因此,,這就是一條我們很快就會(huì)忘記的教訓(xùn),。事實(shí)上,我們早已知道一直以來都存在監(jiān)管空白,,這應(yīng)該引起監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的重視,,但事實(shí)卻并非如此?!?/p>

在最近的銀行倒閉風(fēng)波之后,,回顧儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)得到的教訓(xùn)就是,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu),、高管和投資者會(huì)忘記金融業(yè)歷史上最重要的教訓(xùn),,并重蹈覆轍,。

鮑爾說:“經(jīng)濟(jì)記憶的半衰期約為三至五年。之后人們就會(huì)忘記以前的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,重新開始盲目借貸的循環(huán),。”(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:劉進(jìn)龍

審校:汪皓

薩繆爾·克萊門斯,,也就是大名鼎鼎的馬克·吐溫,,有生之年沒有經(jīng)歷過1929年的銀行擠兌和市場崩潰,沒有見證過1987年的“黑色星期一”(Black Monday)和2008年的經(jīng)濟(jì)大衰退(Great Recession),,更不知道最近硅谷銀行(Silicon Valley Bank)倒閉所引發(fā)的銀行業(yè)危機(jī),。但他有一句名言:“歷史不會(huì)重演,但總是驚人的相似,?!边@句話卻能夠非常精準(zhǔn)地總結(jié)從他生活的時(shí)代至今出現(xiàn)過的金融恐慌。

硅谷銀行倒閉在銀行系統(tǒng)產(chǎn)生的影響,,與20世紀(jì)80年代末的儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)所引發(fā)的恐慌,,似乎驚人的相似。無論當(dāng)時(shí)還是現(xiàn)在,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Federal Reserve)都進(jìn)行了快速加息,,以應(yīng)對惡性通脹。這種策略當(dāng)初發(fā)揮了作用,,現(xiàn)在似乎依舊有效,,但卻是以對利息敏感的資產(chǎn)貶值為代價(jià),例如美國國債和抵押貸款擔(dān)保證券等,,這些資產(chǎn)在許多銀行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中占有很大的比重,。除了寬松的監(jiān)管以外,銀行還存在高管管理不善和過度依賴一類儲(chǔ)戶等問題,,而儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)的噩夢再現(xiàn)的可能性,,令許多區(qū)域銀行的高管夜不能寐。

2008年和大金融危機(jī)(Great Financial Crisis)的記憶,,影響了監(jiān)管部門對新危機(jī)的應(yīng)對,,尤其是放寬在2010年通過的《多德-弗蘭德華爾街改革和消費(fèi)者保護(hù)法案》(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act)的監(jiān)管,被認(rèn)為是硅谷銀行倒閉的罪魁禍?zhǔn)?。但正如億萬富翁投資者瑞·達(dá)里歐和拉里·芬克在危機(jī)發(fā)生后不久所說的那樣,,硅谷銀行倒閉后引發(fā)區(qū)域銀行倒閉潮的可能性,令我們回想起儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)的諸多細(xì)節(jié),。

芬克上周在一年一度給股東的信中寫道,“我們尚不清楚”,,最近這次危機(jī)的后果是否“會(huì)蔓延到整個(gè)美國區(qū)域銀行業(yè)(與儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)類似),,使更多的銀行被接管和倒閉,。”但與20世紀(jì)80年代的儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)一樣,,最近硅谷銀行以及銀門銀行(Silvergate Bank)和簽名銀行(Signature Bank)的倒閉,,都是美國區(qū)域銀行的損失,所引發(fā)的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,可能令美國政府冒險(xiǎn)動(dòng)用納稅人的錢,。

由于社交媒體的崛起,已經(jīng)破產(chǎn)的硅谷銀行和簽名銀行,,還要面臨20世紀(jì)80年代儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)時(shí)的首席執(zhí)行官們可能從未想象過的問題,。但正如投資公司Sanders Morris Harris的董事長喬治·鮑爾在接受《財(cái)富》雜志采訪時(shí)所說的那樣:

“硅谷銀行的危機(jī)可能在許多方面,與儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)有巨大區(qū)別,,但這場危機(jī)背后卻存在一個(gè)同樣的算數(shù)問題——當(dāng)儲(chǔ)戶或者貸款商失去信心時(shí),,長期杠桿一定會(huì)立即引發(fā)災(zāi)難?!?/p>

《財(cái)富》雜志就歷史上的金融危機(jī)和當(dāng)前銀行業(yè)動(dòng)蕩之間的相似之處和差異,,采訪了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的前官員和投資經(jīng)理等,。加息再加上中小型區(qū)域金融機(jī)構(gòu)倒閉帶來的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,與儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)有許多相似之處。這種金融歷史上的相似之處值得警惕,,因?yàn)榘凑彰绹畣栘?zé)辦公室(U.S. General Accountability Office)統(tǒng)計(jì),,儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)導(dǎo)致1980年至1995年的15年間,全美1,000多家貸款機(jī)構(gòu)破產(chǎn),,最終使納稅人損失超過1,600億美元,。

歷史回顧和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

一條簡單的歷史教訓(xùn):儲(chǔ)貸協(xié)會(huì)最早于1831年成立于賓夕法尼亞州,當(dāng)時(shí)銀行還不提供住房抵押貸款,。這些機(jī)構(gòu)又被稱為“儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)”,,支持社區(qū)聯(lián)合,相互幫助購買住房,。

許多儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)提供的抵押貸款利率低于銀行,,但相應(yīng)地存款利率也更低。這些貸款機(jī)構(gòu)憑借低成本,,在美國銀行系統(tǒng)中的地位日益提高,,到1932年,美國通過了《聯(lián)邦住房貸款銀行法案》(Federal Home Loan Bank Act),,旨在監(jiān)管儲(chǔ)貸行業(yè),,以幫助低收入美國人實(shí)現(xiàn)擁有住房的目標(biāo)。兩年后,聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款保險(xiǎn)公司(Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation)成立,,為持續(xù)擴(kuò)張的儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)提供存款保險(xiǎn),。

到1980年,美國已經(jīng)有接近4,000家儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu),,總資產(chǎn)達(dá)到6,000億美元,,其中包括當(dāng)時(shí)美國接近一半未償還的住房抵押貸款。1979年,,保羅·沃爾克擔(dān)任美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席時(shí),,決心解決現(xiàn)在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們所說的“大通脹”(Great Inflation)。沃爾克開始以前所未有的速度和力度加息,,導(dǎo)致時(shí)任美國總統(tǒng)吉米·卡特在其唯一一個(gè)任期后期不得不承受殘酷的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退?,F(xiàn)任美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席杰羅姆·鮑威爾似乎主要也采取了這種策略來應(yīng)對通脹。幾年內(nèi)(并且經(jīng)過有一次短期衰退后),,美國進(jìn)入了物價(jià)穩(wěn)定的“大緩和”(Great Moderation)時(shí)期,,但在那之前,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)的一切都發(fā)生了變化,。

康拉德·阿爾特指出,,隨著利率大幅上漲,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)持有的以抵押貸款為主的固定利率資產(chǎn)貶值,。阿爾特曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任美國參議院銀行業(yè)委員會(huì)(U.S. Senate Banking Committee)的顧問,,在1989年至1996年期間曾經(jīng)擔(dān)任美國貨幣監(jiān)理署(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency)的幕僚長和高級副主計(jì)長,是終結(jié)儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)的功臣之一,?!芭c此同時(shí),他們的融資成本上漲,,因此為了吸引存款而不得不增加支出,。最終形成了我們所說的負(fù)利差?!边@意味著這些儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)開始虧損,,并無力償債。

阿爾特后來成立了投資公司Klaros集團(tuán)(Klaros Group),。他表示,,當(dāng)時(shí)作為一名年輕律師,他參與了應(yīng)對儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī),,并且他發(fā)現(xiàn)“在幾乎每一家儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu),,都存在許多非常不完善的行為,比如非常輕率的貸款等活動(dòng),?!庇性絹碓蕉嗯c硅谷銀行有關(guān)的令人討厭的消息曝出,,例如為吸引灣區(qū)的客戶,贈(zèng)送高檔紅酒和報(bào)銷滑雪旅行的所有費(fèi)用等,。同樣,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)招攬客戶的手段是“以賽馬,、高爾夫課程和藝術(shù)品作為抵押提供貸款”,,他們生活奢侈,“購買公務(wù)機(jī),,這些都是真實(shí)存在的情況,。”

阿爾特稱,,他認(rèn)為在20世紀(jì)80年代,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)普遍存在管理不善的問題,因?yàn)檫@些垂死掙扎的公司,,獲得了監(jiān)管者毫不動(dòng)搖的支持,,而儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)的高管們都很清楚這一點(diǎn)。

他說:“如果你有一家公司既沒有股權(quán)也沒有經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值,,為什么不賭一把呢,?如果你賭輸了,存款保險(xiǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)[聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款保險(xiǎn)公司]可以兜底,,畢竟你沒有在公司中投入任何資金,,因此也就不會(huì)蒙受任何損失。如果你賭贏了,,你可以說:‘嘿,,太好了,運(yùn)氣真好,?!虼诉@種行為在儲(chǔ)貸行業(yè)變得日益猖獗?!?/p>

阿爾特表示,,如果他現(xiàn)在是一名銀行監(jiān)管者,他肯定就會(huì)擔(dān)心“道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”問題,,即政府救助倒閉的銀行會(huì)鼓勵(lì)銀行領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者承擔(dān)過多風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。與硅谷銀行的情況一樣,銀行所有者和管理者知道其已經(jīng)資不抵債,,尤其是他們很清楚政府不會(huì)允許他們破產(chǎn),。阿爾特稱,這可能導(dǎo)致管理者“承擔(dān)過多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”,。

熟悉的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)方程

2021年,,在新冠疫苗問世后,美國經(jīng)濟(jì)重啟,恰逢美國通脹率達(dá)到自20世紀(jì)80年代沃爾克上任以來的最高水平,,而為了給經(jīng)濟(jì)降溫和抑制通脹,,鮑威爾采取了快速加息的策略,加息速度超過了任何前任,。與20世紀(jì)80年代一樣,,隨著利率上漲,固定利率資產(chǎn)(國債和抵押貸款擔(dān)保證券)在銀行資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中的比重下降,。因此,,據(jù)美國聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司(FDIC)統(tǒng)計(jì),截至2022年年底,,美國銀行的貸款組合損失超過6,000億美元,。

硅谷銀行的資產(chǎn)貶值尤其嚴(yán)重。到2022年年底,,在硅谷銀行的長期抵押貸款擔(dān)保證券中,,90%的債券資產(chǎn)收益率低于2%。利率上漲意味著現(xiàn)在這些債券的價(jià)值更低,,因此在今年3月初,,當(dāng)擔(dān)心硅谷銀行倒閉的儲(chǔ)戶爭相到該銀行取款時(shí),它卻沒有足夠的現(xiàn)金,。

康拉德·阿爾特指出,,目前,銀行再一次面臨利率上漲,、長期固定利率資產(chǎn)貶值和存款存在壓力的局面,。“因此,,我們正在重蹈覆轍,。回顧這條路,,你可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生這樣合理的猜測:‘嗯,,這開始變得與儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)有許多相似之處?!?/p>

致命的業(yè)務(wù)過度集中

儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)和硅谷銀行與簽名銀行面臨的問題還有另外一個(gè)重要的相似之處,,那就是業(yè)務(wù)過度集中于一個(gè)行業(yè)。儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)幾乎完全專注于提供抵押貸款,,在20世紀(jì)80年代,,當(dāng)利率上浮導(dǎo)致房價(jià)下跌時(shí),這種策略開始出現(xiàn)問題,。而硅谷銀行主要服務(wù)科技公司,,這些公司通常沒有經(jīng)受過考驗(yàn),,也沒有盈利,因此當(dāng)利率上漲和風(fēng)投融資速度放慢時(shí),,它們就會(huì)面臨風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。Sanders Morris Harris公司的鮑爾稱,銀行業(yè)務(wù)過度集中于任何一個(gè)行業(yè),,“最終會(huì)導(dǎo)致金融過度,,引發(fā)大災(zāi)難”。

他還表示,,硅谷銀行與儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)的狀況有一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的相似之處,,引發(fā)了最近的銀行擠兌,。

他說:“儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)時(shí)期的銀行貸款機(jī)構(gòu)和硅谷銀行等科技貸款機(jī)構(gòu),,將自己樹立成經(jīng)濟(jì)中的典型,它們都心照不宣地要求貸款方將存款存在貸款機(jī)構(gòu),?!彼忉尩溃瑸榱俗寖?chǔ)戶繼續(xù)投資,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)和硅谷銀行都額外提供了許多華而不實(shí)的條件,。“你不能強(qiáng)迫借款人將資金存到你的貸款機(jī)構(gòu),,因?yàn)檫@是違法的,,但你能夠通過不斷勸說,影響他們這樣做,?!北热纾韫茹y行向客戶提供亞馬遜(Amazon)的云計(jì)算信用積分,、DocuSign服務(wù)折扣,,甚至高檔紅酒。

鮑爾表示,,這種經(jīng)營策略使硅谷銀行能夠迅速吸引存款,,因?yàn)槠鋬?chǔ)戶集中,主要是人脈廣泛的科技公司開立的大額儲(chǔ)蓄賬戶,?!皳碛写箢~存款的儲(chǔ)戶在聽到銀行倒閉的傳聞后,選擇分散存款,,突然之間,,銀行的存款狀況從四分之三滿的杯子變成了只有八分之一滿。這時(shí),,銀行變得無力償債,?!?/p>

一些關(guān)鍵區(qū)別

雖然儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)和當(dāng)前的銀行業(yè)動(dòng)蕩有許多相似之處,但兩者之間還是存在一些重要的區(qū)別,?;蛟S最重要的區(qū)別是,現(xiàn)在的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)有能力介入危機(jī),,挽救局面,。

1983年,在儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)期間,,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)估計(jì),,為了償付存在倒閉的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)的有保險(xiǎn)儲(chǔ)戶,大約需要250億美元,。但美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)歷史學(xué)家表示,,儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)的保險(xiǎn)基金、聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款保險(xiǎn)公司僅有60億美元儲(chǔ)備資金,。

科羅拉多大學(xué)丹佛分校(University of Colorado-Denver)的講師,、Econ One Research的總經(jīng)理邁克爾·J·奧蘭多對《財(cái)富》雜志表示:“當(dāng)時(shí),面對迅速惡化的問題,,這些機(jī)構(gòu)的存款保險(xiǎn)嚴(yán)重不足,,這影響了監(jiān)管者的選擇?!钡珚W蘭多稱,,現(xiàn)在,監(jiān)管者有大量“滅火的手段”,,至少在近期內(nèi)可以幫助減少銀行倒閉產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響,。奧蘭多同時(shí)是美國聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備系統(tǒng)(Federal Reserve System)的研究經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。

儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)與硅谷銀行和簽名銀行破產(chǎn)之間的另外一個(gè)區(qū)別是最近銀行擠兌的速度,。社交媒體和銀行業(yè)應(yīng)用程序的流行,,讓儲(chǔ)戶能夠快速發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行的問題,并取走資金,。

科羅拉多州立大學(xué)(Colorado State University)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教授斯蒂芬·韋勒告訴《財(cái)富》雜志:“[硅谷銀行]的擠兌主要來自科技行業(yè),,科技行業(yè)的從業(yè)者精通社交媒體,而且他們有強(qiáng)大的能力在48小時(shí)內(nèi)取走所有可用現(xiàn)金,。而在儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)期間,,擠兌的時(shí)間長達(dá)數(shù)周、數(shù)月甚至數(shù)年,。這是一個(gè)慢速崩潰過程,。”

有專家甚至指出,,硅谷銀行可能經(jīng)歷了史上第一次因社交媒體導(dǎo)致的銀行擠兌,,他們說,,知名風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者曾經(jīng)迅速警告投資組合公司取走存款。Bahnsen Group的首席投資官大衛(wèi)·巴恩森對《財(cái)富》雜志表示,,他認(rèn)為“毫無疑問”,,是強(qiáng)大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者“助長了銀行擠兌”。這是一個(gè)快速的過程,。

后果:大規(guī)模整合

韋勒教授是區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展研究所(Regional Economic Development Institute)的聯(lián)席所長,。他警告,在所有金融機(jī)構(gòu)當(dāng)中,,最近的危機(jī)可能對小型銀行的影響最為嚴(yán)重,。硅谷銀行倒閉暴露出聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司有限的保險(xiǎn)只能夠?yàn)樾⌒徒鹑跈C(jī)構(gòu)兜底,無法為更具有系統(tǒng)重要性的機(jī)構(gòu)提供保障,。聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司的保險(xiǎn)對儲(chǔ)戶的保額不超過25萬美元,。他說:“大銀行擁有小銀行不具備的優(yōu)勢,”那就是幾乎“一定”會(huì)得到政府的全力救助,?!按蠖荒艿梗勾筱y行擁有壓倒性的吸引力,。”

自從儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)爆發(fā)以來,,小型社區(qū)銀行的數(shù)量持續(xù)減少,。據(jù)聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司統(tǒng)計(jì),1980年,,全美由聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司承保的銀行超過14,000家,,2021年卻不足4,500家。

韋勒表示,,這是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的問題,。他在一項(xiàng)研究中分析了社區(qū)和區(qū)域銀行對美國經(jīng)濟(jì)的積極影響,尤其是在大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)覆蓋不足的農(nóng)村地區(qū),。

2022年,,韋勒與貝爾蒙特大學(xué)(Belmont University)的盧克·佩塔克以及威斯康辛大學(xué)麥迪遜分校(University of Wisconsin-Madison)的特莎·康羅伊聯(lián)合發(fā)表了一篇論文。韋勒發(fā)現(xiàn),,擁有更多社區(qū)銀行的地區(qū)“整體上區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)更繁榮,,并且提高了區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)承受宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊的韌性?!鄙鐓^(qū)銀行帶來的好處包括企業(yè)倒閉減少,,房價(jià)更有彈性,就業(yè)增長更強(qiáng)勁,。

他說:“我們的研究顯示,,[資產(chǎn)規(guī)模]10億美元以下的社區(qū)銀行,,實(shí)際上對于創(chuàng)業(yè)和就業(yè)增長至關(guān)重要,尤其是在美國農(nóng)村地區(qū),。正是這些銀行,,可能因?yàn)榇舜挝C(jī)而最終倒閉?!?/p>

然而,,今年3月21日,美國財(cái)政部的部長珍妮特·耶倫對游說團(tuán)體美國銀行家協(xié)會(huì)(American Bankers Association)表示,,如果“小型銀行機(jī)構(gòu)”面臨“存款擠兌可能導(dǎo)致危機(jī)蔓延”,,她可能會(huì)采取“類似措施”來阻止儲(chǔ)戶擠兌。

《財(cái)富》雜志采訪的多位專家稱,,可悲的是,,小銀行的悲劇是可以避免的。阿爾特曾經(jīng)在儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)后協(xié)助監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)起草立法,。他表示,,他的建議在20世紀(jì)80年代末和90年代初經(jīng)常被忽視,而且那些錯(cuò)失的機(jī)會(huì)目前正在對美國經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生影響,。

他提到曾經(jīng)在立法中要求銀行測試加息環(huán)境下的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表狀況,。他說:“這個(gè)要求被寫入法律。但實(shí)際上沒有機(jī)構(gòu)執(zhí)行?,F(xiàn)在,,立法中依舊沒有與利率風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有關(guān)的內(nèi)容。因此,,這就是一條我們很快就會(huì)忘記的教訓(xùn),。事實(shí)上,我們早已知道一直以來都存在監(jiān)管空白,,這應(yīng)該引起監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的重視,,但事實(shí)卻并非如此?!?/p>

在最近的銀行倒閉風(fēng)波之后,,回顧儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)得到的教訓(xùn)就是,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu),、高管和投資者會(huì)忘記金融業(yè)歷史上最重要的教訓(xùn),,并重蹈覆轍。

鮑爾說:“經(jīng)濟(jì)記憶的半衰期約為三至五年,。之后人們就會(huì)忘記以前的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,重新開始盲目借貸的循環(huán)?!保ㄘ?cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:劉進(jìn)龍

審校:汪皓

Samuel Clemens, also known as Mark Twain, didn’t live to see the bank runs and market crash of 1929, nor was he around for 1987’s “Black Monday,” the Great Recession of 2008, or the latest banking crisis centered on the demise of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). But a famous aphorism often ascribed to Twain sums up the financial panics that have come and gone since his time: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”

The reverberations that have spread through the banking system after SVB’s collapse seem to rhyme very closely with a particular panic from the late 1980s: the savings and loan (S&L) crisis. Both then and now, the Federal Reserve was rapidly hiking interest rates to fight stubborn inflation. The ploy worked—and appears to be working again today—but at the cost of devaluing interest rate-sensitive assets, like the U.S Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities that make up a large portion of many banks’ balance sheets. Add to that lax regulations, executive mismanagement, and an overreliance on a single type of depositor, and a potential repeat of the nightmare S&L crisis is creating sleepless nights for many of today’s regional bank executives.

The memory of 2008 and the Great Financial Crisis is coloring regulators’ response to the new crisis, particularly with relaxations of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act being blamed for SVB’s demise. But the possibility of regional bank contagion after SVB’s collapse recalls the specifics of the S&L crisis more than anything, as the billionaire investors Ray Dalio and Larry Fink both pointed out soon after it started.

For his part, Fink wrote in his annual shareholder letter last week that “we don’t know yet” whether the consequences of the latest crisis “will cascade throughout the U.S. regional banking sector (akin to the S&L Crisis) with more seizures and shutdowns coming.” But like the S&Ls of the ‘80s, the recent failures of SVB, as well as Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank, add up to the loss of regional institutions that, taken together, posed such a systemic risk that D.C. put taxpayer money on the line.

The now-defunct SVB and Signature Bank also faced issues that the CEOs of S&Ls in the ‘80s couldn’t have imagined due to the rise of social media. But as George Ball, chairman of the investment firm Sanders Morris Harris, put it in an interview with Fortune:

“The case of SVB may be very different from the S&Ls in some ways, but the arithmetic behind it was timeless—long leverage, with depositors or lenders losing faith, creates instant catastrophe, no matter what.”

Fortune spoke with economists, former Fed officials, investment managers, and more about the similarities and differences between financial crises of the past and today’s banking instability. The combination of rising interest rates and the systemic risk posed by the failure of small and medium-sized regional financial institutions drew comparisons to the S&L crisis from every one of them. And it’s worth being alert to this rhyme of financial history because the S&L crisis saw more than 1,000 lenders go bust nationwide over a 15-year period between 1980 and 1995 during the S&L crisis, as the U.S. General Accountability Office has calculated, ultimately costing taxpayers more than $160 billion.

A brief history and a moral hazard

A short history lesson: Savings and loan associations were first established in Pennsylvania in 1831, when banks didn’t offer residential mortgages. These institutions, also called “thrifts,” allowed communities to band together to help each other purchase homes.

Many S&Ls came to provide lower mortgage rates than banks, but correspondingly paid out lower rates on deposits. The status of these lenders in the U.S. banking system grew over the coming years due to their low costs, and by 1932, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act was established to supervise the S&L industry with the goal of helping lower-income Americans achieve home ownership. Two years later, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was created to insure deposits at S&Ls as they expanded.

By 1980, there were almost 4,000 S&Ls nationwide with total assets of $600 billion—including roughly half of all outstanding U.S. home mortgages at the time. But when Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker took office in 1979, he was determined to slay what economists have now come to call “the Great Inflation.” In a model that current Fed Chair Jerome Powell seems to have taken to heart, Volcker jacked up interest rates with unprecedented speed and aggression, leading President Jimmy Carter to endure a brutal recession toward the end of his only term in office. Within a few years (and after another brief recession), a period of price stability called the “Great Moderation” set in, but not before everything changed for S&Ls.

As interest rates rose sharply, the value of the fixed rate assets—mainly mortgages—that were held by the S&Ls declined, said Konrad Alt, who had a front-row seat to the end of the S&L crisis as counsel to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee and later as Chief of Staff and Senior Deputy Comptroller at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency between 1989 and 1996. “At the same time, the cost of their funding rose, so they had to pay more money to attract deposits. Eventually, they developed what we call negative spread,” which essentially means they all started to lose money and become insolvent.

Alt, who has since founded the investment firm Klaros Group, said that he was a young lawyer by the time he got involved in the S&L crisis, and what he saw “in almost every one of them was a lot of really sketchy behavior—very imprudent loans, other kinds of activities.” Just as with some of the more unsavory revelations about SVB giving out fine wines and all-expenses-paid ski trips to woo Bay Area clientele, S&Ls pulled in clients with “l(fā)ending against racehorses, golf courses, and artwork” and lived lavish lifestyles—“the corporate jets, all that stuff was real.”

Alt said he thinks mismanagement at S&Ls was common during the late ‘80s because these were dying businesses that had the unwavering support of regulators—and S&L executives were well aware of that.

“If you have a business with no equity and no economic value, why not gamble? If you lose, the deposit insurer [FSLIC] takes over, and you didn’t have any money in it anyways, so you haven’t really lost anything. If you win, ‘Hey, that’s great, Bonanza,’” he said. “And so that kind of behavior became rampant in the S&L industry.”

If he was a bank supervisor now, Alt said he’d definitely worry about the “moral hazard” issue in which a government bailout of a failed bank incentivizes excessive risk-taking by its leadership. Bank owners and managers who know their business is insolvent—as appeared to be the case with SVB—essentially know they won’t be allowed to fail by the government. Alt said that fact could lead to an attitude where managers “throw the long bomb and take risks.”

A familiar macroeconomic equation

The U.S. economy’s reopening in 2021 after coronavirus vaccines became available coincided with the highest inflation since Volcker’s tenure in the ‘80s, and Powell has responded by raising rates faster than any of his predecessors in hopes of cooling the economy and quashing it. And just as in the 1980s, as interest rates have risen, the value of the fixed rate assets on banks’ balance sheets (Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities) has gone down. As a result, U.S. banks were sitting on over $600 billion in losses in their loan portfolios as of the end of 2022, according to the FDIC.

The deterioration of value was especially bad at SVB. By the end of last year, the bank had over 90% of its bond holdings in long-dated mortgage-backed securities that were yielding less than 2%. Rising interest rates meant those bonds were now worth a lot less, so when depositors flooded the bank in early March to ask for their money back amid fears it would collapse, SVB didn’t have enough cash on hand to give them.

Konrad Alt noted that banks are now once again in a situation where interest rates are rising, long-dated fixed rate assets are losing value, and deposits are under pressure. “So, we’re on track there. And if you look down that track, you might reasonably say, ‘Hmm, this could start to look a lot like the S&L crisis.’”

A deadly overconcentration

Another key similarity between the S&L crisis and the problems at SVB and Signature Bank is overconcentration on one sector. S&Ls almost entirely focused on providing mortgages, which led to problems when home values declined in the ‘80s amid rising interest rates. Meanwhile, SVB largely served tech companies that were often untested and unprofitable, leaving them at risk as rates rose and VC funding slowed. Ball, from Sanders Morris Harris, said that overconcentration by banks on any one sector will “ultimately create excesses that end up in catastrophe.”

He also noted that there was a key similarity between the situation at SVB and what happened to S&Ls that made the latest bank run happen fast.

“The bank lenders in the S&L era and the tech lenders personifying them in today’s economy—like at SVB—both tacitly required their lenders to keep their deposits with the lending organization,” he said, explaining that both the S&Ls and SVB offered lots of extra bells and whistles to keep depositors invested. “You can’t force a borrower to do that, it’s against the law, but you can use persuasion and influence them to do that.” For example, SVB handed out Amazon cloud computing credits, discounts on DocuSign services, and even fine wines to clients.

Ball argued that this way of doing business led deposits at SVB to be pulled quickly because its depositor base was so concentrated in large accounts of well-connected tech companies. “People with those big deposits looked to diversify them when they heard rumors, and then suddenly, the well was not three-quarters full, it was only one-eighth full. And at that point, you had insolvency.”

Some key differences

While the S&L crisis and the current era of banking instability may share many similarities, there are also a few key differences. Perhaps the most important of those is the ability of today’s regulators to step in and save the day.

In 1983, during the midst of the S&L crisis, regulators estimated it would cost roughly $25 billion to pay off the insured depositors at failed lenders. But the S&Ls’ insurance fund, FSLIC, had reserves of just $6 billion, according to Fed historians.

“Deposit insurance for those institutions back then was woefully inadequate for the scale of the problem as fast as it came, and that affected the choices of the regulators,” Michael J. Orlando, a lecturer at the University of Colorado-Denver and managing director of Econ One Research, told Fortune. But these days, said Orlando, who also served as a research economist in the Federal Reserve System, regulators have plenty of “water to bring to the fire,” which should help reduce the economic fallout from recent bank failures—at least in the near term.

Another thing that differentiates the S&L crisis from the failures at SVB and Signature was the speed of the latest bank runs. The rise of social media and banking apps has enabled depositors to quickly recognize when there is an issue with their bank and withdraw their funds.

“[SVB] was a run largely in the technology sector that’s full of people well versed in social media, and their ability to wipe out all of the available cash within 48 hours was really tremendous,” Stephan Weiler, professor of economics at Colorado State University, told Fortune. “Whereas, in the savings and loan crisis, it took weeks, months, years. It was kind of a crash in slow motion.”

Some experts have even argued that SVB could be the first social-media led bank run in history, noting that well-known venture capitalists had quickly warned their portfolio companies to pull their money. David Bahnsen, chief investment officer of The Bahnsen Group, told Fortune that he believes there is “no question” that powerful venture capitalists helped “foster a run on the bank.” Slow motion, this was not.

The fallout: The great consolidation

Prof. Weiler, who also serves as co-director of the Regional Economic Development Institute, warned that of all financial institutions, smaller banks are likely to be hurt the most by the latest crisis. SVB’s collapse exposed how limited FDIC insurance, which protects depositors up to $250,000, is for smaller institutions compared with more systemically important ones. “The big banks have something that the little banks don’t,” he said—a near “guarantee” of a full bailout. “Too big to fail makes the attraction of bigger banks pretty overwhelming.”

Smaller community banks have been declining in number ever since the S&L crisis. In 1980, there were more than 14,000 FDIC insured banks nationwide, but in 2021, there were less than 4,500, according to the FDIC.

Weiler says that’s a big problem, pointing to his research that breaks down the positive impacts that community and regional banks have on the U.S. economy, particularly in rural areas often underserved by larger institutions.

In a study published last year alongside Belmont University’s Luke Petach and the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s Tessa Conroy, Weiler found that areas with more community banks have “improved regional economic prospects, both generally and in terms of their resilience to macroeconomic shocks.” Benefits include fewer business closures, more resilient home prices, and better employment growth.

“We’ve done studies that show that community banks that have [assets of] $1 billion or less are actually crucial to entrepreneurship and job growth, especially in rural America,” he said. “But it’s precisely those banks that may end up getting shut out because of this crisis.”

However, on Tuesday, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen told the lobbying group the American Bankers Association that she could take “similar actions” to backstop depositors at “smaller institutions” if they “suffer deposit runs that pose the risk of contagion.”

The sad part is small banks’ pain was likely avoidable, according to multiple experts Fortune spoke with. Alt, who helped write legislation for regulators after the S&L crisis, said that his recommendations were often ignored in the late ’80s and early ’90s, and the U.S. economy is facing the repercussions of those missed opportunities today.

He gave the example of when he put into legislation a requirement for banks to test their balance sheets in a rising interest rate environment. “That was in statute. None of the agencies actually implemented that,” he said. “Today, there is still no interest rate risk component. So that was a lesson learned and quickly forgotten. And the fact is, we’ve known that this was a gap for a long time….regulators should have caught it, and they didn’t catch it.”

The takeaway from looking back at the S&L crisis in the wake of recent bank failures may well be that regulators, executives, and investors tend to forget the most important lessons from financial history and repeat the same mistakes.

“The half-life of economic memory is about three to five years,” Ball said. “After that, everyone becomes oblivious to old risks and the cycle of uninformed lending begins again.”

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