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2023與2008金融危機(jī)的“四大不同”

WILL DANIEL
2023-04-22

頂級(jí)投資者稱(chēng)美國(guó)銀行業(yè)比15年前更強(qiáng)大,。

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2019年1月,,橡樹(shù)資本管理公司聯(lián)席主席霍華德·馬克斯,。圖片來(lái)源:SCOTT MCINTYRE—BLOOMBERG/GETTY IMAGES

硅谷銀行(Silicon Valley Bank)和簽名銀行(Signature Bank)破產(chǎn),,瑞士信貸銀行(Credit Suisse)被迫出售給瑞銀集團(tuán)(UBS),,在金融部門(mén)最近的這些不穩(wěn)定重頭戲之后,一些投資者擔(dān)心可能像15年前次貸危機(jī)后那樣,,金融體系中的“傳染”會(huì)蔓延,。但現(xiàn)在塵埃已經(jīng)落定,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)介入以支持儲(chǔ)戶(hù),,行業(yè)的首席執(zhí)行官們將矛頭指向少數(shù)害群之馬——貸款機(jī)構(gòu),,大多數(shù)專(zhuān)家認(rèn)為,銀行最近的問(wèn)題與2008年完全不同,,對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響也不會(huì)那么嚴(yán)重。

現(xiàn)在,,億萬(wàn)富翁投資者霍華德·馬克斯(Howard Marks)也加入進(jìn)來(lái),,他周一表示,雖然最近幾周經(jīng)常將其與全球金融危機(jī)(GFC)相提并論,,但這是沒(méi)有意義的,。

困境債務(wù)資產(chǎn)管理公司橡樹(shù)資本管理公司的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人在周一的一份備忘錄中解釋道,“我認(rèn)為2008年和2023年之間的相似之處僅限于這樣一個(gè)事實(shí),,即在這兩種情況下,,少數(shù)金融機(jī)構(gòu)都存在問(wèn)題,”然后強(qiáng)調(diào)了2008年和今天銀行問(wèn)題之間的四個(gè)主要區(qū)別,。

特殊情況的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)

首先,,馬克斯指出,在全球金融危機(jī)期間,,導(dǎo)致貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)和雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)等傳奇金融機(jī)構(gòu)倒閉的問(wèn)題是普遍存在的,而最近的銀行不穩(wěn)定主要是由有“特殊情況”問(wèn)題的銀行所引起的,。

例如,,硅谷銀行面臨銀行擠兌的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)尤為嚴(yán)重,因?yàn)槠鋬?chǔ)戶(hù)主要集中在創(chuàng)業(yè)領(lǐng)域,,且基本上沒(méi)有保險(xiǎn),。這意味著當(dāng)該行上個(gè)月開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)困境跡象時(shí),關(guān)系密切的儲(chǔ)戶(hù)能夠相互通知,,并在創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的時(shí)間內(nèi)從他們的賬戶(hù)中提取數(shù)十億美元,。

硅谷銀行的管理層在疫情期間收到大量存款后,投資于期限較長(zhǎng)的債券,,但這一風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并未取得回報(bào),。去年,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為抵消通貨膨脹開(kāi)始提高利率時(shí),,這些債券的價(jià)值大幅下跌,,使放貸機(jī)構(gòu)蒙受了數(shù)十億美元未實(shí)現(xiàn)的貸款損失。

“上述情況使硅谷銀行在出現(xiàn)不利情況時(shí)特別容易受到銀行擠兌的影響,,而這種情況的確發(fā)生了,。然而,上述許多因素對(duì)硅谷銀行來(lái)說(shuō)是特殊的,,”馬克斯說(shuō),。“因此,,我認(rèn)為硅谷銀行的失敗并不意味著美國(guó)銀行系統(tǒng)普遍存在問(wèn)題,?!?/p>

這不是2008年的抵押貸款市場(chǎng)“瘋狂”

馬克斯還解釋說(shuō),全球金融危機(jī)的主要原因是抵押貸款支持證券形式的壞賬過(guò)?!獙⒓彝ベJ款打包在一起供投資者購(gòu)買(mǎi),。

據(jù)這位億萬(wàn)富翁稱(chēng),在全球金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)之前,,投資者和金融機(jī)構(gòu)在住房抵押貸款方面“經(jīng)歷了暫時(shí)的瘋狂”,。他們向“無(wú)法或不愿提供收入或資產(chǎn)證明的”不合格借款人貸款,將這些壞賬(稱(chēng)為次級(jí)抵押貸款)與優(yōu)質(zhì)貸款打包在一起,,創(chuàng)建可投資的抵押貸款支持證券,,然后利用杠桿提高他們創(chuàng)造的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資產(chǎn)的回報(bào)。

馬克斯在周一寫(xiě)道:“縱觀(guān)當(dāng)前形勢(shì),,我想不出有什么能與全球金融危機(jī)核心的次級(jí)抵押貸款高度類(lèi)似,。”他強(qiáng)調(diào),,硅谷銀行的問(wèn)題并不是像全球金融危機(jī)期間那樣由壞賬抵押貸款引起的,,而是由于沒(méi)有保險(xiǎn)且集中的儲(chǔ)戶(hù)基礎(chǔ),以及沒(méi)有考慮到利率上升對(duì)其貸款組合的影響,。

“有些東西或多或少是被過(guò)度炒作的,,或是缺乏實(shí)質(zhì)內(nèi)容的,有些人提到空白支票公司(SPACs)或加密貨幣,,但它們的規(guī)模沒(méi)有那么大,,也許沒(méi)有那么缺乏實(shí)質(zhì)內(nèi)容,當(dāng)然也沒(méi)有在美國(guó)主要金融機(jī)構(gòu)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上,,持有足以危及我們金融系統(tǒng)的金額,。”他補(bǔ)充道,。

規(guī)模問(wèn)題

盡管上個(gè)月硅谷銀行和簽名銀行的倒閉分別是美國(guó)歷史上第二大和第三大銀行倒閉事件,,但馬克斯認(rèn)為,這些失敗并不像全球金融危機(jī)期間所看到的那樣嚴(yán)重,。

硅谷銀行的規(guī)模只有2008年倒閉的華盛頓互助銀行(WaMu)的三分之二,,后者仍然是美國(guó)歷史上破產(chǎn)規(guī)模最大的銀行。他指出:“此外,,由于金融部門(mén)在過(guò)去15年里顯著擴(kuò)張,,2008年,華盛頓互助銀行的3070億美元資產(chǎn)比硅谷銀行如今的2090億美元資產(chǎn)重要得多,?!?/p>

這位億萬(wàn)富翁還解釋說(shuō),在全球金融危機(jī)期間破產(chǎn)的一些金融機(jī)構(gòu)具有“系統(tǒng)重要性”,但他認(rèn)為,,由于硅谷銀行的區(qū)域性和特定行業(yè)的儲(chǔ)戶(hù)基礎(chǔ),,“它還算不上具有系統(tǒng)重要性”。

“全球金融危機(jī)影響了一些真正大型的銀行,,那些家喻戶(hù)曉的銀行,。大多數(shù)人都認(rèn)為,在政府采取行動(dòng)之前,,它即將危及到更大的銀行,。但沒(méi)有理由認(rèn)為硅谷銀行的失敗會(huì)帶來(lái)同樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)?!?/p>

新規(guī)定應(yīng)對(duì)新時(shí)代

最后,,馬克斯強(qiáng)調(diào)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)銀行近期的不穩(wěn)定作出了有效、高效的應(yīng)對(duì),,指出他們能夠介入,,為存款人提供擔(dān)保,并向金融系統(tǒng)注入流動(dòng)性以防止危機(jī)蔓延,。

“因此,,我很難相信硅谷或類(lèi)似的銀行會(huì)引發(fā)足以觸發(fā)不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的金融危機(jī)的連鎖反應(yīng)?!彼f(shuō),。

這位億萬(wàn)富翁補(bǔ)充說(shuō),在全球金融危機(jī)之后實(shí)施的法規(guī),,包括《多德弗蘭克法》(Dodd-Frank Act),,該法創(chuàng)立了金融穩(wěn)定監(jiān)督委員會(huì)和消費(fèi)者金融保護(hù)局,,并為銀行設(shè)立了更高的準(zhǔn)備金要求,,使得今天的銀行比15年前更加強(qiáng)大。

“得益于金融危機(jī)后的規(guī)定,,如今美國(guó)主要銀行的資本充足,,流動(dòng)性充沛,資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表健康,?!彼硎尽?/p>

雖然全球金融危機(jī)導(dǎo)致美國(guó)465家銀行倒閉,,全球范圍內(nèi)還有數(shù)百家銀行倒閉,,導(dǎo)致全球數(shù)百萬(wàn)人失業(yè),流落街頭,,但銀行最近的問(wèn)題不太可能對(duì)金融系統(tǒng)或經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生如此劇烈的影響,。但這并不意味著它們不會(huì)引起問(wèn)題。

“我認(rèn)為硅谷銀行(和簽名銀行)的失敗意義不在于它預(yù)示著更多銀行倒閉,而在于它可能加大投資者和貸款機(jī)構(gòu)之間已經(jīng)存在的謹(jǐn)慎情緒,,導(dǎo)致信貸緊縮進(jìn)一步加劇,,給各行各業(yè)和部門(mén)帶來(lái)更多痛苦?!瘪R克斯寫(xiě)道,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:中慧言—項(xiàng)曦瑩

硅谷銀行(Silicon Valley Bank)和簽名銀行(Signature Bank)破產(chǎn),瑞士信貸銀行(Credit Suisse)被迫出售給瑞銀集團(tuán)(UBS),,在金融部門(mén)最近的這些不穩(wěn)定重頭戲之后,,一些投資者擔(dān)心可能像15年前次貸危機(jī)后那樣,金融體系中的“傳染”會(huì)蔓延,。但現(xiàn)在塵埃已經(jīng)落定,,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)介入以支持儲(chǔ)戶(hù),行業(yè)的首席執(zhí)行官們將矛頭指向少數(shù)害群之馬——貸款機(jī)構(gòu),,大多數(shù)專(zhuān)家認(rèn)為,,銀行最近的問(wèn)題與2008年完全不同,對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響也不會(huì)那么嚴(yán)重,。

現(xiàn)在,,億萬(wàn)富翁投資者霍華德·馬克斯(Howard Marks)也加入進(jìn)來(lái),他周一表示,,雖然最近幾周經(jīng)常將其與全球金融危機(jī)(GFC)相提并論,,但這是沒(méi)有意義的。

困境債務(wù)資產(chǎn)管理公司橡樹(shù)資本管理公司的聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人在周一的一份備忘錄中解釋道,,“我認(rèn)為2008年和2023年之間的相似之處僅限于這樣一個(gè)事實(shí),,即在這兩種情況下,少數(shù)金融機(jī)構(gòu)都存在問(wèn)題,,”然后強(qiáng)調(diào)了2008年和今天銀行問(wèn)題之間的四個(gè)主要區(qū)別,。

特殊情況的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)

首先,馬克斯指出,,在全球金融危機(jī)期間,,導(dǎo)致貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)和雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)等傳奇金融機(jī)構(gòu)倒閉的問(wèn)題是普遍存在的,而最近的銀行不穩(wěn)定主要是由有“特殊情況”問(wèn)題的銀行所引起的,。

例如,,硅谷銀行面臨銀行擠兌的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)尤為嚴(yán)重,因?yàn)槠鋬?chǔ)戶(hù)主要集中在創(chuàng)業(yè)領(lǐng)域,,且基本上沒(méi)有保險(xiǎn),。這意味著當(dāng)該行上個(gè)月開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)困境跡象時(shí),關(guān)系密切的儲(chǔ)戶(hù)能夠相互通知,,并在創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的時(shí)間內(nèi)從他們的賬戶(hù)中提取數(shù)十億美元,。

硅谷銀行的管理層在疫情期間收到大量存款后,,投資于期限較長(zhǎng)的債券,但這一風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并未取得回報(bào),。去年,,美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為抵消通貨膨脹開(kāi)始提高利率時(shí),這些債券的價(jià)值大幅下跌,,使放貸機(jī)構(gòu)蒙受了數(shù)十億美元未實(shí)現(xiàn)的貸款損失,。

“上述情況使硅谷銀行在出現(xiàn)不利情況時(shí)特別容易受到銀行擠兌的影響,而這種情況的確發(fā)生了,。然而,,上述許多因素對(duì)硅谷銀行來(lái)說(shuō)是特殊的,”馬克斯說(shuō),?!耙虼耍艺J(rèn)為硅谷銀行的失敗并不意味著美國(guó)銀行系統(tǒng)普遍存在問(wèn)題,?!?/p>

這不是2008年的抵押貸款市場(chǎng)“瘋狂”

馬克斯還解釋說(shuō),全球金融危機(jī)的主要原因是抵押貸款支持證券形式的壞賬過(guò)?!獙⒓彝ベJ款打包在一起供投資者購(gòu)買(mǎi),。

據(jù)這位億萬(wàn)富翁稱(chēng),在全球金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)之前,,投資者和金融機(jī)構(gòu)在住房抵押貸款方面“經(jīng)歷了暫時(shí)的瘋狂”,。他們向“無(wú)法或不愿提供收入或資產(chǎn)證明的”不合格借款人貸款,將這些壞賬(稱(chēng)為次級(jí)抵押貸款)與優(yōu)質(zhì)貸款打包在一起,,創(chuàng)建可投資的抵押貸款支持證券,,然后利用杠桿提高他們創(chuàng)造的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資產(chǎn)的回報(bào)。

馬克斯在周一寫(xiě)道:“縱觀(guān)當(dāng)前形勢(shì),,我想不出有什么能與全球金融危機(jī)核心的次級(jí)抵押貸款高度類(lèi)似,。”他強(qiáng)調(diào),,硅谷銀行的問(wèn)題并不是像全球金融危機(jī)期間那樣由壞賬抵押貸款引起的,,而是由于沒(méi)有保險(xiǎn)且集中的儲(chǔ)戶(hù)基礎(chǔ),,以及沒(méi)有考慮到利率上升對(duì)其貸款組合的影響,。

“有些東西或多或少是被過(guò)度炒作的,或是缺乏實(shí)質(zhì)內(nèi)容的,,有些人提到空白支票公司(SPACs)或加密貨幣,,但它們的規(guī)模沒(méi)有那么大,也許沒(méi)有那么缺乏實(shí)質(zhì)內(nèi)容,,當(dāng)然也沒(méi)有在美國(guó)主要金融機(jī)構(gòu)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上,,持有足以危及我們金融系統(tǒng)的金額,。”他補(bǔ)充道,。

規(guī)模問(wèn)題

盡管上個(gè)月硅谷銀行和簽名銀行的倒閉分別是美國(guó)歷史上第二大和第三大銀行倒閉事件,,但馬克斯認(rèn)為,這些失敗并不像全球金融危機(jī)期間所看到的那樣嚴(yán)重,。

硅谷銀行的規(guī)模只有2008年倒閉的華盛頓互助銀行(WaMu)的三分之二,,后者仍然是美國(guó)歷史上破產(chǎn)規(guī)模最大的銀行。他指出:“此外,,由于金融部門(mén)在過(guò)去15年里顯著擴(kuò)張,,2008年,華盛頓互助銀行的3070億美元資產(chǎn)比硅谷銀行如今的2090億美元資產(chǎn)重要得多,?!?/p>

這位億萬(wàn)富翁還解釋說(shuō),在全球金融危機(jī)期間破產(chǎn)的一些金融機(jī)構(gòu)具有“系統(tǒng)重要性”,,但他認(rèn)為,,由于硅谷銀行的區(qū)域性和特定行業(yè)的儲(chǔ)戶(hù)基礎(chǔ),“它還算不上具有系統(tǒng)重要性”,。

“全球金融危機(jī)影響了一些真正大型的銀行,,那些家喻戶(hù)曉的銀行。大多數(shù)人都認(rèn)為,,在政府采取行動(dòng)之前,,它即將危及到更大的銀行。但沒(méi)有理由認(rèn)為硅谷銀行的失敗會(huì)帶來(lái)同樣的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),?!?/p>

新規(guī)定應(yīng)對(duì)新時(shí)代

最后,馬克斯強(qiáng)調(diào)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)銀行近期的不穩(wěn)定作出了有效,、高效的應(yīng)對(duì),,指出他們能夠介入,為存款人提供擔(dān)保,,并向金融系統(tǒng)注入流動(dòng)性以防止危機(jī)蔓延,。

“因此,我很難相信硅谷或類(lèi)似的銀行會(huì)引發(fā)足以觸發(fā)不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的金融危機(jī)的連鎖反應(yīng),?!彼f(shuō)。

這位億萬(wàn)富翁補(bǔ)充說(shuō),,在全球金融危機(jī)之后實(shí)施的法規(guī),,包括《多德弗蘭克法》(Dodd-Frank Act),該法創(chuàng)立了金融穩(wěn)定監(jiān)督委員會(huì)和消費(fèi)者金融保護(hù)局,,并為銀行設(shè)立了更高的準(zhǔn)備金要求,,使得今天的銀行比15年前更加強(qiáng)大,。

“得益于金融危機(jī)后的規(guī)定,如今美國(guó)主要銀行的資本充足,,流動(dòng)性充沛,,資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表健康?!彼硎?。

雖然全球金融危機(jī)導(dǎo)致美國(guó)465家銀行倒閉,全球范圍內(nèi)還有數(shù)百家銀行倒閉,,導(dǎo)致全球數(shù)百萬(wàn)人失業(yè),,流落街頭,但銀行最近的問(wèn)題不太可能對(duì)金融系統(tǒng)或經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生如此劇烈的影響,。但這并不意味著它們不會(huì)引起問(wèn)題,。

“我認(rèn)為硅谷銀行(和簽名銀行)的失敗意義不在于它預(yù)示著更多銀行倒閉,而在于它可能加大投資者和貸款機(jī)構(gòu)之間已經(jīng)存在的謹(jǐn)慎情緒,,導(dǎo)致信貸緊縮進(jìn)一步加劇,,給各行各業(yè)和部門(mén)帶來(lái)更多痛苦?!瘪R克斯寫(xiě)道,。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:中慧言—項(xiàng)曦瑩

After the latest instability in the financial sector, headlined by the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank as well as Credit Suisse’s forced sale to UBS, some investors were concerned that “contagion” could spread through the financial system like it did after the subprime mortgage crisis some 15 years ago. But now that the dust has settled, with regulators stepping in to backstop depositors and industry CEOs pointing the finger at a few black sheep lenders, most experts believe that banks’ recent issues were nothing like 2008, and the impact on the economy won’t be nearly as severe.

Now, billionaire investor Howard Marks is chiming in, too, arguing Monday that while comparisons to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) have been common in recent weeks, they just don’t make sense.

“I think the similarities between 2008 and 2023 are limited to the mere fact that, in both instances, problems existed at a few financial institutions,” the cofounder of distressed debt asset manager Oaktree Capital Management explained in a Monday memo before highlighting four main differences between banks’ issues in 2008 and today.

‘Special case’ lenders

First, Marks noted that during the GFC, the problems that took down legendary financial institutions like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were widespread, while the latest banking instability was largely caused by “special case” problem banks.

Silicon Valley Bank, for example, was particularly at risk of a bank run because its depositors were highly concentrated in the startup space and largely uninsured. This meant that when the bank began to show signs of distress last month, the well-connected depositors were able to alert one another and pull billions from their accounts in record time.

SVB’s management also took a risk that didn’t pay off when it invested in bonds with long maturities after receiving an influx of deposits during the pandemic. When the Fed jacked up interest rates to counter inflation starting last year, the value of these bonds declined dramatically, leaving the lender with billions in unrealized loan losses.

“The sum of the above rendered SVB particularly vulnerable to a bank run if adverse circumstances developed—and they did. However, many of the above factors were peculiar to SVB,” Marks said. “Thus, I don’t think SVB’s failure suggests problems are widespread in the U.S. banking system.”

This wasn’t 2008’s mortgage market ‘insanity’

Marks also explained that the main cause of the Global Financial Crisis was a glut of bad debt in the form of mortgage-backed securities—bundles of home loans packaged together for investors to buy.

Investors and financial institutions “experienced temporary insanity with respect to residential mortgages” in the lead up to the GFC, according to the billionaire. They loaned money to unqualified borrowers “who couldn’t or wouldn’t document income or assets,” packaged those bad loans (called subprime mortgages) together with good loans to create investable mortgage-backed securities, and then used leverage to boost returns on the risky assets they created.

“Looking at the current situation, I can’t think of anything that’s highly analogous to the subprime mortgages at the heart of the GFC,” Marks wrote Monday, emphasizing that SVB’s issues weren’t caused by bad mortgages like during the GFC, but instead by an uninsured and concentrated depositor base as well as not accounting for the impact of rising rates on their loan portfolio.

“There are things here or there that have been overhyped or are short on substance—some people will point to SPACs or cryptocurrencies—but they’re not as massive in scale, perhaps not as lacking in substance, and certainly not held on the balance sheets of America’s key financial institutions in amounts sufficient to endanger our financial system,” he added.

A size issue

While the collapse of SVB and Signature Bank last month amounted to the second- and third-largest bank failures in U.S. history, Marks argued that the failures weren’t on the same scale as what was seen during the GFC.

SVB was just two-thirds the size of Washington Mutual (WaMu), which collapsed in 2008 and remains the largest bank to fail in U.S. history. “Further, since the financial sector has expanded meaningfully in the last 15 years, WaMu’s $307 billion of assets in 2008 were much more significant than SVB’s $209 billion today,” he noted.

The billionaire also explained that some of the financial institutions that went bust during the GFC were “systemically important,” but he doesn’t think that “can be said of SVB” owing to its regional and industry specific depositor base.

“The GFC affected some truly large banks—household names—and most people believed it was on the way to jeopardizing even bigger ones before the government stepped in. There’s no reason to think the failure of SVB poses the same risk.”

New regulations for a new era

Finally, Marks highlighted regulators’ effective and efficient response to banks’ recent bout of instability, noting that they were able to step in and backstop depositors and inject liquidity into the financial system to prevent contagion.

“Thus, I find it hard to believe that SVB or the like can set off a chain reaction sufficient to trigger an irreversible financial crisis,” he said.

The billionaire added that regulations enacted after the GFC, including the Dodd-Frank Act, which created the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and established higher reserve requirements for banks, have made banks today much stronger than they were 15 years ago.

“Thanks to the post-GFC rules, the major U.S. banks today are well capitalized and have significant liquidity and healthy balance sheets,” he argued.

While the GFC took down 465 banks in the U.S., and hundreds more around the world, leaving millions out of work and on the streets worldwide, banks’ recent issues are unlikely to have such a dramatic impact on the financial system or the economy. But that doesn’t mean they won’t cause problems.

“My sense is that the significance of the failure of SVB (and Signature Bank) is less that it portends additional bank failures and more that it may amplify preexisting wariness among investors and lenders, leading to further credit tightening and additional pain across a range of industries and sectors,” Marks wrote.

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