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對(duì)沖基金成為新的“影子銀行”,,給金融體系帶來(lái)威脅

Greg McKenna
2025-05-05

這個(gè)幾乎不受監(jiān)管的行業(yè)可能像2008年一樣,,給金融體系帶來(lái)威脅。

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2008年投資銀行雷曼兄弟的破產(chǎn)表明,,影子銀行機(jī)構(gòu)的健康狀況可能給整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。圖片來(lái)源:Oli Scarff—Getty Images

? 根據(jù)金融穩(wěn)定委員會(huì)(Financial Stability Board)的數(shù)據(jù),目前“影子銀行”的規(guī)模達(dá)到250萬(wàn)億美元,,占全球金融資產(chǎn)的49%,。對(duì)沖基金管理的總資產(chǎn)規(guī)模,比2008年增長(zhǎng)了15倍,。近期因?qū)_基金開展高杠桿交易導(dǎo)致的債券收益率暴漲,,引發(fā)了一些擔(dān)憂——這個(gè)幾乎不受監(jiān)管的行業(yè)可能像2008年一樣,給金融體系帶來(lái)威脅,。

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家保羅·麥考利在2007年創(chuàng)造了“影子銀行”這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ),,而在一年多后,雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)便宣告破產(chǎn),。人們很快就發(fā)現(xiàn),,是寬松信貸助推了次貸危機(jī)的爆發(fā),使全球金融體系陷入癱瘓,。近二十年后,,由唐納德·特朗普混亂的關(guān)稅政策引發(fā)的債券市場(chǎng)拋售,再度激起了人們對(duì)類似流動(dòng)性危機(jī)的擔(dān)憂,。

大衰退時(shí)期暴露出的問題是,,除了銀行外,其他各類金融機(jī)構(gòu)也從事借貸業(yè)務(wù),,盡管它們對(duì)整個(gè)金融體系的健康同樣至關(guān)重要,,卻沒有接受與銀行同等程度的監(jiān)管審查。不過這一次的焦點(diǎn)已從投行和抵押貸款機(jī)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)向了對(duì)沖基金和私募股權(quán)公司,。例如,,美國(guó)國(guó)債收益率(隨債券價(jià)格下跌而上升)的異常飆升,揭示了高杠桿對(duì)沖基金交易如何維持貨幣市場(chǎng)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn),,但當(dāng)這些交易崩盤時(shí),,也可能對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)構(gòu)成更廣泛的威脅。

銀行通過將客戶存款轉(zhuǎn)化為長(zhǎng)期非流動(dòng)性資產(chǎn),,如向消費(fèi)者和企業(yè)提供的抵押貸款和其他類型的貸款,。影子銀行本質(zhì)上做著同樣的事情,,只是它們通過向投資者募資和借款而非使用儲(chǔ)戶存款來(lái)開展業(yè)務(wù)。

斯坦福大學(xué)商學(xué)院(Stanford Graduate School of Business)金融學(xué)教授,、該校保守派智庫(kù)胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)高級(jí)研究員阿米特·塞魯表示,,雖然“影子銀行”這個(gè)稱謂聽起來(lái)帶有負(fù)面意味,但其本質(zhì)并無(wú)好壞之分,。事實(shí)上,,將高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款業(yè)務(wù)移出傳統(tǒng)銀行體系可以增強(qiáng)金融系統(tǒng)的韌性。

他對(duì)《財(cái)富》雜志表示:“這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)經(jīng)常被人忽視,?!?/p>

相比傳統(tǒng)銀行,對(duì)沖基金能承擔(dān)更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,因?yàn)樗鼈兿蛲顿Y者募資,,而投資者同意長(zhǎng)期“鎖定”資金,這有助于抵御短期損失,。正如塞魯所說的那樣,,這些投資者往往推動(dòng)著債券和其他證券市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格發(fā)現(xiàn)。

例如所謂的“基差交易”,,即對(duì)沖基金通過買入國(guó)債并賣出與國(guó)債相關(guān)聯(lián)的期貨合約,,利用兩者間的微小價(jià)差獲利。通過套利獲利,,這些對(duì)沖基金解決了因共同基金,、養(yǎng)老基金、保險(xiǎn)公司及其他資產(chǎn)管理機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)國(guó)債期貨的高需求所導(dǎo)致的信貸市場(chǎng)根本性失衡問題,。

但要使這種服務(wù)有利可圖,,對(duì)沖基金必須大規(guī)模舉債,有時(shí)杠桿率高達(dá)50至100倍,。因此,當(dāng)規(guī)模達(dá)8,000億美元的基差交易平倉(cāng)時(shí),,短期債務(wù)市場(chǎng)可能遭受重創(chuàng),。

塞魯表示:“這會(huì)產(chǎn)生連鎖反應(yīng),我們必須時(shí)刻警惕,?!?/p>

替代雷曼兄弟的角色

即便對(duì)沖基金不依賴儲(chǔ)戶存款,也不意味著當(dāng)危機(jī)來(lái)臨時(shí)政府不會(huì)被迫干預(yù),。早在2008年引發(fā)爭(zhēng)議的銀行紓困案之前十年,,對(duì)沖基金長(zhǎng)期資本管理公司(Long-Term Capital Management,LTCM)也曾被認(rèn)為“大而不能倒”,。

LTCM的核心業(yè)務(wù)是利用高杠桿押注債券市場(chǎng)的套利機(jī)會(huì),,該公司一度持有全球約5%的固定收益資產(chǎn),。但當(dāng)1998年俄羅斯債務(wù)違約時(shí),該公司的損失導(dǎo)致其難以為繼,。為避免危機(jī)擴(kuò)散,,美國(guó)政府協(xié)調(diào)華爾街投行籌集36億美元救助資金(當(dāng)時(shí)堪稱天價(jià)),使該公司得以有序清算,。

賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)(University of Pennsylvania)沃頓商學(xué)院金融系主任伊泰·戈?duì)柎奶贡硎荆骸拔艺J(rèn)為當(dāng)前的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)敞口要比當(dāng)時(shí)大得多,。”

十年后,,雷曼兄弟和貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)的倒閉幾乎拖垮美國(guó)銀行體系,,甚至危及房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)等政府支持企業(yè)。盡管這些投行都不吸收儲(chǔ)戶存款,,但短期債務(wù)市場(chǎng)仍陷入停滯,。隨著信貸緊縮席卷市場(chǎng),銀行和企業(yè)突然陷入資本枯竭,。

美國(guó)的銀行業(yè)巨頭受到更加嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管和監(jiān)督,,后續(xù)出臺(tái)的《多德-弗蘭克法案》(Dodd-Frank)也著手規(guī)范對(duì)非銀貸款機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)管。

然而自金融危機(jī)以來(lái),,影子銀行體系卻急劇膨脹,。根據(jù)金融穩(wěn)定委員會(huì)的數(shù)據(jù),影子銀行的規(guī)模已達(dá)250萬(wàn)億美元,,占全球金融資產(chǎn)的49%,,2023年增速是傳統(tǒng)銀行業(yè)的兩倍多。彭博社的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,,對(duì)沖基金的管理資產(chǎn)規(guī)模較2008年暴增15倍,。

《多德-弗蘭克法案》中的“沃爾克規(guī)則”禁止投行自營(yíng)交易,實(shí)質(zhì)上限制了其通過套利充當(dāng)做市商的能力,。對(duì)沖基金則趁機(jī)填補(bǔ)了這個(gè)空白,。但它們對(duì)短期債務(wù)的依賴和相對(duì)薄弱的監(jiān)管,引發(fā)了與2008年相似的擔(dān)憂:規(guī)模過于龐大,,可能“大而不能倒”,。

戈?duì)柎奶贡硎荆骸叭绻鼈儽辣P,將波及包括銀行在內(nèi)的金融系統(tǒng)其他部分,,并蔓延至實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì),。”

ETF供應(yīng)商Simplify Asset Management的投資組合經(jīng)理兼首席策略師邁克爾·格林指出,,美國(guó)銀行業(yè)增長(zhǎng)最快的業(yè)務(wù)正是向?qū)_基金,、私募股權(quán)基金和信貸機(jī)構(gòu)以及先買后付公司發(fā)放貸款。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的周度數(shù)據(jù)顯示,向影子銀行部門發(fā)放的貸款規(guī)模已超1.2萬(wàn)億美元,。格林創(chuàng)立的一家對(duì)沖基金曾獲得喬治·索羅斯注資,,且他管理過彼得·蒂爾的個(gè)人資本。他認(rèn)為2008年式災(zāi)難重演的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)清晰可見,。

他表示:“爆發(fā)危機(jī)的可能性大增,,幾乎毫無(wú)懸念?!?/p>

以基差交易為例,,在市場(chǎng)動(dòng)蕩時(shí)期,對(duì)沖基金可能面臨保證金催繳和強(qiáng)制平倉(cāng)壓力,。但當(dāng)對(duì)沖基金大規(guī)模拋售國(guó)債時(shí),,市場(chǎng)可能難以消化。對(duì)流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的擔(dān)憂會(huì)蔓延至回購(gòu)市場(chǎng)(為短期借貸的基石,,以美債為主要抵押品),。

在新冠疫情初期曾上演過這種情景,迫使美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在數(shù)周內(nèi)購(gòu)入1.6萬(wàn)億美元國(guó)債,。在近期的拋售潮中,,經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和其他市場(chǎng)觀察家們一直密切關(guān)注央行是否會(huì)再次出手干預(yù)。金融研究辦公室(Office of Financial Research)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,,美國(guó)十大對(duì)沖基金的回購(gòu)借款在過去兩年翻了一倍多,,高達(dá)1.43萬(wàn)億美元。

對(duì)沖基金監(jiān)管困境

有學(xué)者認(rèn)為,,這并不是一種理想的安排,,建議美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)設(shè)立針對(duì)對(duì)沖基金的貸款工具來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)此類國(guó)債市場(chǎng)危機(jī)。但若共和黨人說服財(cái)長(zhǎng)斯科特·貝森特,,限制政府將大型投資機(jī)構(gòu)列為“系統(tǒng)重要性機(jī)構(gòu)”或“大而不能倒的機(jī)構(gòu)”的權(quán)力,,這種設(shè)想將更難實(shí)現(xiàn)。

塞魯指出,,政府在監(jiān)管影子銀行方面始終面臨權(quán)衡,。如果像對(duì)待傳統(tǒng)銀行一樣對(duì)待影子銀行,就會(huì)抑制價(jià)格發(fā)現(xiàn)和從儲(chǔ)戶到用戶的資金配置效率,。但即便機(jī)構(gòu)只是自擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)蔓延的威脅依然存在。

塞魯表示:“不可能兩者兼得,?!?/p>

若僅針對(duì)對(duì)沖基金加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管,,其他機(jī)構(gòu)可能乘虛而入,,重蹈覆轍。畢竟在對(duì)投行的監(jiān)管收緊后,對(duì)沖基金利用了這個(gè)契機(jī)進(jìn)行擴(kuò)張,。

戈?duì)柎奶贡硎荆骸拔铱床怀鲞@能如何提升金融體系的安全性,。”

塞魯雖擔(dān)憂過度監(jiān)管,,但他認(rèn)為監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)聚焦公開和私募市場(chǎng)的透明度,。例如,若對(duì)沖基金承擔(dān)高風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,重要的是厘清其是否與有政府托底的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)存在關(guān)聯(lián),,如華爾街的大銀行。

他表示,,當(dāng)整個(gè)金融體系面臨巨大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)敞口時(shí),,就該對(duì)影子銀行實(shí)施資本要求等監(jiān)管措施。但他以2023年硅谷銀行(Silicon Valley Bank)倒閉為例警示,,醞釀中的危機(jī),,即使涉及到受嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管的傳統(tǒng)貸款機(jī)構(gòu),并且事后看是顯而易見的,,在當(dāng)時(shí)依舊難以被察覺,。

塞魯表示:“監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和市場(chǎng)都不是萬(wàn)能的,必須保持謙遜,,它們都難以完全捕捉到所有風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。”

特別是當(dāng)復(fù)雜的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)潛伏于暗處之時(shí),。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:劉進(jìn)龍

審校:汪皓

? 根據(jù)金融穩(wěn)定委員會(huì)(Financial Stability Board)的數(shù)據(jù),,目前“影子銀行”的規(guī)模達(dá)到250萬(wàn)億美元,占全球金融資產(chǎn)的49%,。對(duì)沖基金管理的總資產(chǎn)規(guī)模,,比2008年增長(zhǎng)了15倍。近期因?qū)_基金開展高杠桿交易導(dǎo)致的債券收益率暴漲,,引發(fā)了一些擔(dān)憂——這個(gè)幾乎不受監(jiān)管的行業(yè)可能像2008年一樣,,給金融體系帶來(lái)威脅。

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家保羅·麥考利在2007年創(chuàng)造了“影子銀行”這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ),,而在一年多后,,雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)便宣告破產(chǎn)。人們很快就發(fā)現(xiàn),,是寬松信貸助推了次貸危機(jī)的爆發(fā),,使全球金融體系陷入癱瘓。近二十年后,,由唐納德·特朗普混亂的關(guān)稅政策引發(fā)的債券市場(chǎng)拋售,,再度激起了人們對(duì)類似流動(dòng)性危機(jī)的擔(dān)憂,。

大衰退時(shí)期暴露出的問題是,除了銀行外,,其他各類金融機(jī)構(gòu)也從事借貸業(yè)務(wù),,盡管它們對(duì)整個(gè)金融體系的健康同樣至關(guān)重要,卻沒有接受與銀行同等程度的監(jiān)管審查,。不過這一次的焦點(diǎn)已從投行和抵押貸款機(jī)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)向了對(duì)沖基金和私募股權(quán)公司,。例如,美國(guó)國(guó)債收益率(隨債券價(jià)格下跌而上升)的異常飆升,,揭示了高杠桿對(duì)沖基金交易如何維持貨幣市場(chǎng)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn),,但當(dāng)這些交易崩盤時(shí),也可能對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)構(gòu)成更廣泛的威脅,。

銀行通過將客戶存款轉(zhuǎn)化為長(zhǎng)期非流動(dòng)性資產(chǎn),,如向消費(fèi)者和企業(yè)提供的抵押貸款和其他類型的貸款。影子銀行本質(zhì)上做著同樣的事情,,只是它們通過向投資者募資和借款而非使用儲(chǔ)戶存款來(lái)開展業(yè)務(wù),。

斯坦福大學(xué)商學(xué)院(Stanford Graduate School of Business)金融學(xué)教授、該校保守派智庫(kù)胡佛研究所(Hoover Institution)高級(jí)研究員阿米特·塞魯表示,,雖然“影子銀行”這個(gè)稱謂聽起來(lái)帶有負(fù)面意味,,但其本質(zhì)并無(wú)好壞之分。事實(shí)上,,將高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款業(yè)務(wù)移出傳統(tǒng)銀行體系可以增強(qiáng)金融系統(tǒng)的韌性,。

他對(duì)《財(cái)富》雜志表示:“這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)經(jīng)常被人忽視?!?/p>

相比傳統(tǒng)銀行,,對(duì)沖基金能承擔(dān)更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),因?yàn)樗鼈兿蛲顿Y者募資,,而投資者同意長(zhǎng)期“鎖定”資金,,這有助于抵御短期損失。正如塞魯所說的那樣,,這些投資者往往推動(dòng)著債券和其他證券市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格發(fā)現(xiàn),。

例如所謂的“基差交易”,即對(duì)沖基金通過買入國(guó)債并賣出與國(guó)債相關(guān)聯(lián)的期貨合約,,利用兩者間的微小價(jià)差獲利,。通過套利獲利,這些對(duì)沖基金解決了因共同基金,、養(yǎng)老基金,、保險(xiǎn)公司及其他資產(chǎn)管理機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)國(guó)債期貨的高需求所導(dǎo)致的信貸市場(chǎng)根本性失衡問題。

但要使這種服務(wù)有利可圖,,對(duì)沖基金必須大規(guī)模舉債,,有時(shí)杠桿率高達(dá)50至100倍。因此,,當(dāng)規(guī)模達(dá)8,000億美元的基差交易平倉(cāng)時(shí),短期債務(wù)市場(chǎng)可能遭受重創(chuàng),。

塞魯表示:“這會(huì)產(chǎn)生連鎖反應(yīng),,我們必須時(shí)刻警惕?!?/p>

替代雷曼兄弟的角色

即便對(duì)沖基金不依賴儲(chǔ)戶存款,,也不意味著當(dāng)危機(jī)來(lái)臨時(shí)政府不會(huì)被迫干預(yù)。早在2008年引發(fā)爭(zhēng)議的銀行紓困案之前十年,,對(duì)沖基金長(zhǎng)期資本管理公司(Long-Term Capital Management,,LTCM)也曾被認(rèn)為“大而不能倒”。

LTCM的核心業(yè)務(wù)是利用高杠桿押注債券市場(chǎng)的套利機(jī)會(huì),,該公司一度持有全球約5%的固定收益資產(chǎn),。但當(dāng)1998年俄羅斯債務(wù)違約時(shí),該公司的損失導(dǎo)致其難以為繼,。為避免危機(jī)擴(kuò)散,,美國(guó)政府協(xié)調(diào)華爾街投行籌集36億美元救助資金(當(dāng)時(shí)堪稱天價(jià)),,使該公司得以有序清算,。

賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)(University of Pennsylvania)沃頓商學(xué)院金融系主任伊泰·戈?duì)柎奶贡硎荆骸拔艺J(rèn)為當(dāng)前的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)敞口要比當(dāng)時(shí)大得多?!?/p>

十年后,雷曼兄弟和貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)的倒閉幾乎拖垮美國(guó)銀行體系,,甚至危及房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)等政府支持企業(yè)。盡管這些投行都不吸收儲(chǔ)戶存款,,但短期債務(wù)市場(chǎng)仍陷入停滯。隨著信貸緊縮席卷市場(chǎng),,銀行和企業(yè)突然陷入資本枯竭。

美國(guó)的銀行業(yè)巨頭受到更加嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管和監(jiān)督,,后續(xù)出臺(tái)的《多德-弗蘭克法案》(Dodd-Frank)也著手規(guī)范對(duì)非銀貸款機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)管。

然而自金融危機(jī)以來(lái),,影子銀行體系卻急劇膨脹,。根據(jù)金融穩(wěn)定委員會(huì)的數(shù)據(jù),,影子銀行的規(guī)模已達(dá)250萬(wàn)億美元,占全球金融資產(chǎn)的49%,,2023年增速是傳統(tǒng)銀行業(yè)的兩倍多,。彭博社的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,對(duì)沖基金的管理資產(chǎn)規(guī)模較2008年暴增15倍,。

《多德-弗蘭克法案》中的“沃爾克規(guī)則”禁止投行自營(yíng)交易,,實(shí)質(zhì)上限制了其通過套利充當(dāng)做市商的能力。對(duì)沖基金則趁機(jī)填補(bǔ)了這個(gè)空白,。但它們對(duì)短期債務(wù)的依賴和相對(duì)薄弱的監(jiān)管,引發(fā)了與2008年相似的擔(dān)憂:規(guī)模過于龐大,,可能“大而不能倒”,。

戈?duì)柎奶贡硎荆骸叭绻鼈儽辣P,將波及包括銀行在內(nèi)的金融系統(tǒng)其他部分,,并蔓延至實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì),。”

ETF供應(yīng)商Simplify Asset Management的投資組合經(jīng)理兼首席策略師邁克爾·格林指出,,美國(guó)銀行業(yè)增長(zhǎng)最快的業(yè)務(wù)正是向?qū)_基金,、私募股權(quán)基金和信貸機(jī)構(gòu)以及先買后付公司發(fā)放貸款。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的周度數(shù)據(jù)顯示,,向影子銀行部門發(fā)放的貸款規(guī)模已超1.2萬(wàn)億美元,。格林創(chuàng)立的一家對(duì)沖基金曾獲得喬治·索羅斯注資,且他管理過彼得·蒂爾的個(gè)人資本,。他認(rèn)為2008年式災(zāi)難重演的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)清晰可見,。

他表示:“爆發(fā)危機(jī)的可能性大增,幾乎毫無(wú)懸念,?!?/p>

以基差交易為例,在市場(chǎng)動(dòng)蕩時(shí)期,,對(duì)沖基金可能面臨保證金催繳和強(qiáng)制平倉(cāng)壓力,。但當(dāng)對(duì)沖基金大規(guī)模拋售國(guó)債時(shí),市場(chǎng)可能難以消化,。對(duì)流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的擔(dān)憂會(huì)蔓延至回購(gòu)市場(chǎng)(為短期借貸的基石,,以美債為主要抵押品)。

在新冠疫情初期曾上演過這種情景,,迫使美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在數(shù)周內(nèi)購(gòu)入1.6萬(wàn)億美元國(guó)債,。在近期的拋售潮中,經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和其他市場(chǎng)觀察家們一直密切關(guān)注央行是否會(huì)再次出手干預(yù),。金融研究辦公室(Office of Financial Research)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,,美國(guó)十大對(duì)沖基金的回購(gòu)借款在過去兩年翻了一倍多,,高達(dá)1.43萬(wàn)億美元。

對(duì)沖基金監(jiān)管困境

有學(xué)者認(rèn)為,,這并不是一種理想的安排,,建議美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)設(shè)立針對(duì)對(duì)沖基金的貸款工具來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)此類國(guó)債市場(chǎng)危機(jī)。但若共和黨人說服財(cái)長(zhǎng)斯科特·貝森特,,限制政府將大型投資機(jī)構(gòu)列為“系統(tǒng)重要性機(jī)構(gòu)”或“大而不能倒的機(jī)構(gòu)”的權(quán)力,,這種設(shè)想將更難實(shí)現(xiàn)。

塞魯指出,,政府在監(jiān)管影子銀行方面始終面臨權(quán)衡。如果像對(duì)待傳統(tǒng)銀行一樣對(duì)待影子銀行,,就會(huì)抑制價(jià)格發(fā)現(xiàn)和從儲(chǔ)戶到用戶的資金配置效率,。但即便機(jī)構(gòu)只是自擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)蔓延的威脅依然存在,。

塞魯表示:“不可能兩者兼得,。”

若僅針對(duì)對(duì)沖基金加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管,,其他機(jī)構(gòu)可能乘虛而入,,重蹈覆轍。畢竟在對(duì)投行的監(jiān)管收緊后,,對(duì)沖基金利用了這個(gè)契機(jī)進(jìn)行擴(kuò)張,。

戈?duì)柎奶贡硎荆骸拔铱床怀鲞@能如何提升金融體系的安全性?!?/p>

塞魯雖擔(dān)憂過度監(jiān)管,,但他認(rèn)為監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)聚焦公開和私募市場(chǎng)的透明度。例如,,若對(duì)沖基金承擔(dān)高風(fēng)險(xiǎn),,重要的是厘清其是否與有政府托底的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)存在關(guān)聯(lián),如華爾街的大銀行,。

他表示,,當(dāng)整個(gè)金融體系面臨巨大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)敞口時(shí),就該對(duì)影子銀行實(shí)施資本要求等監(jiān)管措施,。但他以2023年硅谷銀行(Silicon Valley Bank)倒閉為例警示,,醞釀中的危機(jī),即使涉及到受嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管的傳統(tǒng)貸款機(jī)構(gòu),,并且事后看是顯而易見的,,在當(dāng)時(shí)依舊難以被察覺。

塞魯表示:“監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和市場(chǎng)都不是萬(wàn)能的,,必須保持謙遜,,它們都難以完全捕捉到所有風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。”

特別是當(dāng)復(fù)雜的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)潛伏于暗處之時(shí),。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

譯者:劉進(jìn)龍

審校:汪皓

? “Shadow banking” now accounts for $250 trillion, or 49% of the world’s financial assets, according to the Financial Stability Board. Hedge funds manage 15 times more assets combined than they did in 2008. The recent spike in bond yields—caused by hedge funds unwinding heavily leveraged trades—has some people worrying this largely unregulated business could pose a 2008-style threat to the financial system.

Economist Paul McCulley coined the term “shadow banking” in 2007, just over a year before Lehman Brothers collapsed. Soon, it became clear easy credit had helped fuel the subprime mortgage meltdown that brought the global financial system to its knees. Nearly two decades later, a bond market sell-off triggered by President Donald Trump’s chaotic tariff rollout has sparked fears of a similar liquidity crisis.

The Great Recession highlighted how various institutions besides banks engage in lending without the same level of regulatory scrutiny applied to banks, even if they are also crucial to the health of the broader financial system. This time, however, the focus has shifted from investment banks and mortgage originators to hedge funds and private-equity firms. For example, an unusual spike in U.S. Treasury yields, which rise as the price of the bonds fall, has put a spotlight on how highly leveraged hedge-fund trades help keep money markets humming—but might also pose a wider threat to the economy when they unravel.

Banks, of course, turn cash deposits from customers into long-term, illiquid assets like mortgages and other types of loans to consumers and businesses. Shadow banking institutions essentially do the same thing, but by raising and borrowing funds from investors instead of using consumer deposits.

While the “shadow banking” descriptor might sound sinister, there is nothing inherently bad about it, said Amit Seru, a professor of finance at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and senior fellow at the university’s Hoover Institution, a conservative-leaning think tank. In fact, shifting risky lending outside traditional banking can improve the financial system’s resilience.

“That’s often a point which is lost,” he told Fortune.

Hedge funds can take much bigger risks than banks because they raise capital from investors who often agree to “l(fā)ock up” their money for an extended period, helping insulate the firm from short-term losses. As Seru noted, these investors often facilitate price discovery in markets for bonds and other securities.

One example is the so-called “basis trade,” when hedge funds buy Treasuries and sell futures contracts linked to those bonds to take advantage of tiny price discrepancies between them. By profiting off the arbitrage, these firms address a fundamental imbalance in credit markets created because mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and other asset managers have high demand for Treasury futures.

But hedge funds must borrow heavily to make the service worthwhile, sometimes using up to 50- to 100-times leverage, so markets for short-term debt can be hit hard when the $800 billion trade unwinds.

“That creates ripple effects,” Seru said. “You always need to worry about ripple effects.”

Filling in for Lehman Brothers

Just because hedge funds are not funded by consumer deposits doesn’t mean the government may not be forced to step in when things go south. A decade before the controversial bank bailouts in 2008, hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management was also deemed “too big to fail.”

LTCM’s business centered on making highly leveraged bets on arbitrage opportunities in bond markets. It eventually came to hold about 5% of the world’s fixed-income assets, but the firm took unsustainable losses when Russia defaulted on its debt in 1998. To prevent a broader crisis, the U.S. government orchestrated a $3.6 billion rescue package—a massive sum at the time—from Wall Street banks that allowed the firm to liquidate in an orderly fashion.

“The exposures that we are dealing with now, I think, are much bigger than that,” said Itay Goldstein, the finance department chair at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.

Ten years later, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns failed, threatening to bring much of America’s banking system, as well as federally backed enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, down with them. Neither investment bank took consumer deposits, but markets for short-term debt seized anyway. Suddenly, as a broad credit crunch ensued, banks and corporations were starved of capital.

Along with dramatically increasing regulation and oversight on the country’s biggest banks, the subsequent Dodd-Frank reform legislation also addressed nonbank lenders.

Still, the shadow sector has exploded since the financial crisis. It now accounts for $250 trillion, or 49% of the world’s financial assets, according to the Financial Stability Board, more than doubling the growth rate of traditional banking in 2023. Hedge funds, in particular, manage 15 times more assets combined than they did in 2008, per Bloomberg.

The Volcker Rule, part of Dodd-Frank, banned investment banks from proprietary trading and, therefore, serving as market makers by aggressively pursuing arbitrage opportunities. Hedge funds have stepped in to fill the void. Their reliance on short-term debt and relative lack of oversight, however, poses similar concerns to 2008: They are now very big, and they may be “too big to fail.”

“If they blow up, this is going to affect other parts of the financial system, including banks, and then spill over to the real economy,” Goldstein said.

In fact, lending to institutions like hedge funds, private equity and credit firms, and buy-now, pay-later companies is the fastest-growing part of the U.S. banking system, noted Michael Green, portfolio manager and chief strategist at Simplify Asset Management, an ETF provider. Loans to the shadow banking sector have surpassed $1.2 trillion, according to weekly data from the Federal Reserve. Green, who founded a hedge fund seeded by George Soros and managed the personal capital of Peter Thiel, sees clear risk of a 2008-style calamity.

“It’s dramatically more likely,” he said, “l(fā)ike not even close.”

For example, when it comes to the basis trade, periods of market stress can leave hedge funds vulnerable to margin calls and other pressures to liquidate their positions. When hedge funds dump massive amounts of Treasuries, however, the market may struggle to absorb them. Concerns about illiquidity risks can then spill over into repo markets, a cornerstone of short-term lending, where U.S. debt is the dominant form of collateral.

This scenario played out during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, compelling the Federal Reserve to purchase $1.6 trillion in Treasuries over a few weeks. During the recent sell-off, economists and other market watchers have looked closely for signs the central bank would again need to intervene. Over the last two years, America’s 10 largest hedge funds have more than doubled their repo borrowing to $1.43 trillion, according to the Office of Financial Research.

Regulating hedge funds

Some academics say this arrangement is not ideal and have proposed the Fed set up a lending facility for hedge funds to address these types of crises in the Treasury market. But that’s a far less realistic scenario if Congressional Republicans convince Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to curtail the government’s ability to designate major investment firms as systemically important, or “too big to fail.”

There are persistent trade-offs in regulating these types of shadow-banking institutions, Seru said. Treat them more like traditional banks, and you inhibit price discovery and the efficient movement of funds from savers to users. But the threat of contagion looms, even if firms are just risking their own capital.

“You can’t have it both ways,” Seru said.

Also, tightening the screws on just hedge funds likely won’t help if it enables another type of institution to step in and essentially do the same thing. After all, that’s what happened when hedge funds took advantage of the increased scrutiny on investment banks.

“I’m not seeing how this is making the financial system safer,” Goldstein said.

While Seru worries about heavy-handed oversight, he said regulators need to focus on transparency in both public and private markets. For example, if hedge funds are taking on lots of risk, it’s important to know if they are linked to lenders who are backstopped by the government, like the big Wall Street banks.

If exposure to the broader system is significant, he said, that’s when measures like capital requirements should be applied to shadow-banking institutions. But Seru warns a brewing crisis—even when it involves traditional, highly regulated lenders and is seemingly obvious in hindsight—can be hard to spot, citing the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in 2023.

“One’s got to be a bit humble on what the regulators can catch and what the markets can catch,” Seru said, “and realize that there [are] going to be issues in both sectors.”

Especially when complex risks lurk in the shadows.

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