????華為公司（Huawei）是世界第二大電信與互聯(lián)網(wǎng)設(shè)備制造商，公司在全球的業(yè)務(wù)開展得非常順利,。這家中國(guó)公司的客戶遍及130個(gè)國(guó)家,，全球排名前50的電信公司中，有45家采用了華為的產(chǎn)品,。2010年,，華為的年收入達(dá)到270億美元，在《財(cái)富》全球500強(qiáng)（Fortune's Global 500）中名列第352名,。今年,，華為的銷售額預(yù)計(jì)將增長(zhǎng)10%，或許它很快就將超過(guò)瑞典的愛立信公司（Ericsson），成為全球第一大通信設(shè)備制造商,。

????但在全球最大的電信市場(chǎng)——美國(guó),，華為卻始終未能打開局面。從十年前初次登陸美國(guó)市場(chǎng),，華為便屢次參與投標(biāo),，卻始終未能獲得美國(guó)主要運(yùn)營(yíng)商的大額合約，這些運(yùn)營(yíng)商包括,，美國(guó)電話電報(bào)公司（AT&T）,、斯普林特公司（Sprint）、T-Mobile公司和威瑞森通訊公司（Verizon）,。

????原因很明顯,。美國(guó)的電信公司與朗訊（Lucent）（目前已被法國(guó)阿爾卡特公司（Alcatel）收購(gòu)）、摩托羅拉（Motorola）和思科（Cisco）等本土公司建立了長(zhǎng)期的合作關(guān)系,。同時(shí),，華為的產(chǎn)品多年來(lái)確實(shí)存在一定的質(zhì)量問(wèn)題——雖然適合新興市場(chǎng)，但對(duì)于美國(guó)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)來(lái)說(shuō),，無(wú)法滿足全天候服務(wù)與可靠性的要求,。但現(xiàn)在，華為推出了業(yè)內(nèi)最卓越,、最具創(chuàng)新性和運(yùn)行速度最快的設(shè)備,。質(zhì)量不再是個(gè)問(wèn)題。在近期的一次會(huì)議中,，尖端技術(shù)投資銀行家弗蘭克?奎特隆稱華為公司已成為行業(yè)的新晉領(lǐng)袖,。

????但華為所面臨的阻力，并不僅僅來(lái)自同行的正當(dāng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),。包括即將擔(dān)任美國(guó)駐華大使的美國(guó)商務(wù)部長(zhǎng)駱家輝在內(nèi),，多位美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)議員極力游說(shuō)國(guó)會(huì)抵制華為進(jìn)入美國(guó)市場(chǎng)。同時(shí),，美國(guó)監(jiān)管部門此前已經(jīng)駁回了華為在美國(guó)的三次收購(gòu),，并在今年早些時(shí)候，迫使華為剝離其收購(gòu)的3Leaf公司資產(chǎn),。目前這家位于加利福尼亞州的云計(jì)算公司已經(jīng)倒閉,。

????美國(guó)政界和民間均強(qiáng)烈排斥華為,，原因何在,？簡(jiǎn)而言之，就是恐懼,。

????作為中國(guó)首批國(guó)際化大公司之一,，華為認(rèn)為自己只不過(guò)被當(dāng)作發(fā)泄憤怒的出氣筒。由于美國(guó)人對(duì)中國(guó)崛起的擔(dān)憂，以及對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全和竊取知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)等問(wèn)題的憂慮,，華為成了名副其實(shí)的替罪羊,。而隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退以及隨之而來(lái)的國(guó)內(nèi)焦慮情緒的蔓延，美國(guó)人的擔(dān)憂日益加劇,。政客們認(rèn)為,，愈加強(qiáng)硬的中國(guó)在國(guó)際社會(huì)中的地位得到了進(jìn)一步提升，而華為則是中國(guó)的代言人,，因此,，打擊華為可以為自己輕松加分。而另外一個(gè)原因是根深蒂固的保護(hù)主義在作祟,，一些公司擔(dān)心華為的進(jìn)入會(huì)壓縮他們的利潤(rùn),，正如華為進(jìn)入歐洲市場(chǎng)時(shí)的情形。

????最令華為苦惱的是,，美國(guó)暗示華為可能為中國(guó)政府所用,，從事間諜活動(dòng)。關(guān)于華為有中國(guó)軍方背景的傳言經(jīng)常見諸報(bào)端,。這種傳言很大程度上是因?yàn)?，極少在媒體前露面的華為公司創(chuàng)始人兼CEO任正非先生曾是中國(guó)人民解放軍的一名通訊兵，而且華為也是中國(guó)軍方和政府的承包商（這一點(diǎn)與AT&T,、斯普林特和威瑞森在美國(guó)的情形類似）,。華盛頓特區(qū)戰(zhàn)略與國(guó)際研究中心（Center for Strategic and International Studies）專家詹姆斯?劉易斯表示：“這種傳言的背景是，中國(guó)在積極開展間諜活動(dòng),，其實(shí)我們也是如此,。”劉易斯認(rèn)為,，至少,，華為在網(wǎng)絡(luò)領(lǐng)域還存在形象問(wèn)題。他表示：“美國(guó)的國(guó)家安全部門在抵制華為的問(wèn)題上態(tài)度非常一致,?！?/p>

????當(dāng)然，關(guān)于安全問(wèn)題的擔(dān)憂并非空穴來(lái)風(fēng)——凡是涉及網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全領(lǐng)域的任何人都明白,，即便是華為自己也承認(rèn)這一點(diǎn),。畢竟在黑客活動(dòng)日益猖獗的網(wǎng)絡(luò)世界，沒(méi)有一家公司或政府部門敢于冒風(fēng)險(xiǎn),，購(gòu)買不堪一擊的設(shè)備,，為潛在的對(duì)手訪問(wèn)其網(wǎng)絡(luò)大開方便之門。但是由中國(guó)公司銷售的網(wǎng)絡(luò)設(shè)備真的會(huì)帶來(lái)如此巨大的安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)嗎,？華為聲稱,，自己與通用公司（GE）或者IBM公司一樣,，只是一家普通的跨國(guó)公司而已。它的產(chǎn)品遭到黑客入侵的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并不比其他私營(yíng)企業(yè)的產(chǎn)品更高,。而且它還指出,，由華為的主要競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手——愛立信、阿爾卡特-朗訊和諾基亞西門子（Nokia Siemens）推出的大部分設(shè)備其實(shí)也都是在中國(guó)制造的,。如果真的有間諜存在的話,，那該拿什么來(lái)阻止他們對(duì)這些企業(yè)下手呢？

????盡管阻礙重重,，但華為并未表示放棄爭(zhēng)取美國(guó)消費(fèi)者的努力,。為了與運(yùn)營(yíng)商建立良好的合作關(guān)系，并生產(chǎn)適合美國(guó)市場(chǎng)的產(chǎn)品,，華為公司從思科（Cisco）,、愛立信、英特爾（Intel）,、北電網(wǎng)絡(luò)（Nortel）和Sun公司等西方公司聘請(qǐng)了大量高管,。華為全球首席技術(shù)官馬特?布羅斯是第一位進(jìn)入華為管理層的西方人，他之前曾在英國(guó)電信（British Telecom）任職,。而且,，為了改善公司在美國(guó)政府眼中的形象，它還雇傭了由美國(guó)前國(guó)防部長(zhǎng)威廉?科恩領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的游說(shuō)公司,。今年2月份,，華為還發(fā)表了一份公開信，要求包括美國(guó)政府在內(nèi)的所有人對(duì)公司的商業(yè)運(yùn)行進(jìn)行調(diào)查,。

????既然面臨重重阻撓,，那么，退出美國(guó)市場(chǎng),，享受其在美國(guó)之外其他地區(qū)的驕人成績(jī)不是更容易嗎,？或許吧。但是,，美國(guó)公司每年在電信設(shè)備上的投入高達(dá)300億美元,，而且，隨著整個(gè)行業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)升級(jí)到4G技術(shù),，這一投入將大幅上升,。如果華為能夠讓懷疑者改變態(tài)度，它將在美國(guó)獲得巨大的利潤(rùn),。讓華為退出美國(guó)市場(chǎng),？絕無(wú)可能。

華為在華盛頓的代言人

????威廉?普盧默是華為公司負(fù)責(zé)美國(guó)政府關(guān)系事務(wù)的負(fù)責(zé)人,，他衣冠楚楚,，處事圓滑，是一位狂熱的“推銷員”,。普盧默是8個(gè)孩子的父親,。去年，47歲的普盧默加入華為公司,，在此之前,，他在諾基亞公司（Nokia）工作了12年，負(fù)責(zé)同樣的事務(wù)?，F(xiàn)在,，他有大把的機(jī)會(huì)展示自己的韌勁。依靠17張幻燈片,，普盧默已經(jīng)與美國(guó)政府中所有愿意傾聽華為方面信息的人員進(jìn)行過(guò)接觸,。而且，他還總結(jié)出一句精煉的說(shuō)法：“華為就是華為,，它不是中國(guó)政府,。”

????今年3月,，就在美國(guó)監(jiān)管部門強(qiáng)行要求華為剝離其對(duì)3Leaf公司的收購(gòu)之后不久,，普盧默便拜訪了國(guó)會(huì)委員會(huì)中負(fù)責(zé)國(guó)家安全問(wèn)題的幾位“冷臉”委員。在談到那次會(huì)面時(shí),，普盧默明顯非常激動(dòng),。據(jù)他回憶，那些人都暗示華為需要聽從中國(guó)政府的意愿,。普盧默卻告訴他們：“當(dāng)然不是,。”他強(qiáng)調(diào)華為并不是一家國(guó)有企業(yè),?！敖衲辏ㄓ霉具€向巴基斯坦出售了150列火車頭,。按照這種邏輯,，如果美國(guó)與巴基斯坦開戰(zhàn)，是不是通用公司就會(huì)讓火車脫軌,？這種邏輯非常愚蠢,。跨國(guó)公司不可能拿自己的未來(lái)冒險(xiǎn),?！?/p>

????華為從一家創(chuàng)業(yè)公司成長(zhǎng)為跨國(guó)集團(tuán)的速度讓人瞠目結(jié)舌。公司創(chuàng)始人兼CEO任正非曾在中國(guó)軍隊(duì)中服役10年,，他所服役的軍隊(duì)相當(dāng)于美國(guó)的陸軍工程兵團(tuán)（Army Corps of Engineers）,。1983年,，其所在部隊(duì)解散，任正非在那次大裁軍中被迫復(fù)員,。公司表示,，任正非憑借2,500美元積蓄，以及從親戚那里籌來(lái)的資金,，于1987年成立華為,。（任正非幾乎從不接受采訪，對(duì)于本文內(nèi)容也未做出任何評(píng)論,。）

????華為聲稱公司沒(méi)有任何政府背景,。正如普盧默經(jīng)常強(qiáng)調(diào)的那樣，公司的總部位于深圳,，毗鄰香港,，遠(yuǎn)離北京。華為在國(guó)內(nèi)的收入僅占公司總收入的36%,。華為方面表示,，政府在公司未持有任何股權(quán)，公司為100%集體所有,。任正非持有公司1.42%的股份,。華為表示，公司不能進(jìn)行公開招股,，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)規(guī)定,，禁止大型集體所有制企業(yè)上市。魏尚進(jìn)在紐約哥倫比亞商學(xué)院（Columbia Business School）負(fù)責(zé)中國(guó)商業(yè)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究,。他指出,，如果進(jìn)行IPO，將使公司的管理層一夜之間成為億萬(wàn)富翁,。但如果這樣,，這些高管可能會(huì)離開公司，并帶走數(shù)十年的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和專業(yè)知識(shí),。

????外界通常認(rèn)為華為擁有中國(guó)軍方背景,。但普盧默認(rèn)為，這種誤解是因?yàn)閷⑷A為與另外一家公司弄混了,。他指出有另外一家名字類似的中國(guó)公司,，實(shí)際上確實(shí)是由中國(guó)人民解放軍軍官領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，并在薩達(dá)姆?侯賽因統(tǒng)治時(shí)期,，向伊拉克出售過(guò)光纖通訊設(shè)備,。普盧默表示，2001年,，《亞洲華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》（Wall Street Journal Asia）的一篇文章中錯(cuò)誤地混淆了這兩家公司,，之后該文章在被《2006年蘭德報(bào)告》（Rand Report）引用——從此之后,，這種錯(cuò)誤的說(shuō)法便以訛傳訛地流傳開來(lái)。普盧默表示：“這里面存在混淆,。華為在當(dāng)時(shí)從來(lái)沒(méi)有提供過(guò)任何軍用技術(shù),。”

????美國(guó)對(duì)外關(guān)系委員會(huì)（Council on Foreign Relations）的中國(guó)問(wèn)題專家,，以及反恐與國(guó)家安全問(wèn)題資深研究員亞當(dāng)?西格爾表示,，聲稱中國(guó)政府與中國(guó)的私營(yíng)企業(yè)完全沒(méi)有關(guān)系,，并不足以說(shuō)服美國(guó)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全部門,。去年，中國(guó)政府便強(qiáng)制要求所有政府供應(yīng)商提交其加密代碼,。中國(guó)政府還動(dòng)不動(dòng)就以進(jìn)行腐敗調(diào)查為威脅,，甚至對(duì)被判貪污的公司高管處以極刑，以此保持對(duì)公司的有效控制,。西格爾表示：“中國(guó)的私營(yíng)企業(yè)通常需要揣摩,，政府下一步想要做什么?！?/p>

????為了減緩美國(guó)社會(huì)對(duì)安全問(wèn)題的擔(dān)憂,，華為公布了其源代碼，并允許一家名為電子沖突協(xié)會(huì)（Electronic Warfare Associates）的公司對(duì)其進(jìn)行持續(xù)監(jiān)控,。這一舉措在印度和英國(guó)已經(jīng)獲得成功,。EWA公司負(fù)責(zé)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施技術(shù)部的總裁兼CEO約翰?林奎斯特表示，華為公司接受了國(guó)防部和情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)最高級(jí)別的安全調(diào)查,，因此可以同步所有已知的網(wǎng)絡(luò)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),。華為的客戶都可以利用EWA的調(diào)查，放心購(gòu)買華為的設(shè)備,。但林奎斯特也承認(rèn)：“沒(méi)有任何產(chǎn)品敢保證100%無(wú)故障,。”但安全專家認(rèn)為,，真正的缺陷通常不會(huì)在交付時(shí)顯現(xiàn),，或許會(huì)在六個(gè)月之后，當(dāng)需要補(bǔ)丁或更新時(shí)才會(huì)出現(xiàn),。但林奎斯特表示,，持續(xù)監(jiān)控的對(duì)象將包括后續(xù)補(bǔ)丁。他表示：“任何問(wèn)題都不會(huì)逃過(guò)我們的眼睛,，這一點(diǎn)我非常自信,。”

????Huawei, the world's second-largest supplier of telecom and Internet gear, has little trouble garnering business around the globe. The Chinese company has customers in 130 countries, sells equipment to 45 of the world's top 50 telcos, and brought in $27 billion in revenue in 2010 -- enough to rank No. 352 on Fortune's Global 500 list. With sales on pace to grow another 10% this year, it's likely that Huawei (pronounced "HWAH-way") will soon race past Sweden's Ericsson and take over as the globe's No. 1 manufacturer of communications equipment.

????Yet success in the world's biggest telecom market, the U.S., has been hard to come by. Despite bidding again and again since it first entered America a decade ago, the company has yet to win a single big contract from the top-tier U.S. carriers, AT&T (T), Sprint (S), T-Mobile, and Verizon (VZ).

????There are some good reasons for that. U.S. telecom companies have long relationships with home-grown suppliers like Lucent (now part of France's Alcatel), Motorola (MMI), and Cisco (CSCO). It's also true that for many years Huawei's gear just wasn't that good -- fine for emerging markets, perhaps, but not for the 24/7 service and reliability required by U.S. networks. Today, however, Huawei is building some of the best, most innovative, and fastest equipment in the industry. Quality is no longer an issue. Uber tech investment banker Frank Quattrone recently cited Huawei as one of the industry's new leaders in remarks to a conference crowd.

????But Huawei is facing resistance that goes beyond pure competition with its peers. Several members of Congress, joined by Gary Locke, the U.S. Commerce Secretary soon headed to Beijing as the next U.S. ambassador, have lobbied hard against Huawei. Meanwhile, U.S. regulators have blocked it from three acquisitions, and earlier this year forced it to unravel its purchase of a defunct California cloud-computing company called 3Leaf.

????What's behind the groundswell of public and private opposition? In a word, fear.

????As one of the first Chinese companies to emerge as a global powerhouse, Huawei contends that it's a punching bag, a victim of worries about an ascendant China and growing concerns about cybersecurity and intellectual-property theft. This concern is deepened by American anxieties caused by the Great Recession and the accompanying mood of U.S. declinism. For politicians, hitting out at an increasingly assertive China taking on new prominence in the world -- and at Huawei as its proxy -- is an easy way to score political points. Another factor is protectionism by entrenched players that fear having their margins pinched, as happened in Europe when Huawei entered the market there.

????Particularly vexing for Huawei is the suggestion that the company could be used to spy on behalf of the government in Beijing. Unverified assertions that the company is "linked" to the Chinese military appear regularly in news articles. The charges are largely based on the fact that Huawei's media-shy founder and CEO, Ren Zhengfei, once served in the People's Liberation Army as a telecom technician, and that the company (like AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon in the U.S.) is a military and government contractor in its home country. "The context of all this is, China is very active in espionage, as are we," says James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.? At a minimum, says Lewis, Huawei has an image problem in cyber circles. "The national security community in the U.S. is united in its opposition to Huawei," he says.

????Certainly there are very real security concerns to consider -- a fact that virtually everyone in the cybersecurity world is quick to state and that Huawei itself concedes. In a world in which hacking is proliferating, no company or government agency wants to risk giving potential enemies the means to access its network by buying vulnerable equipment. But is the security risk really greater if the network's parts were sold by a Chinese company? Huawei argues that it's a multinational just like GE (GE) or IBM (IBM), and is only as vulnerable to intrusion as any other private corporation. It also points out that most equipment made by its main competitors -- Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent, and Nokia Siemens -- is manufactured in China. What's to stop Chinese spies from infiltrating those operations?

????Despite those barriers, Huawei shows no sign of giving up on its efforts to win over U.S. customers. To build relationships with carriers and develop products for the U.S. market, it has hired a slew of executives from Western companies such as Cisco (CSCO), Ericsson, Intel (INTC), Nortel, and Sun. Matt Bross, Huawei's global chief technology officer and the first Westerner to reach Huawei's c-suite, joined from British Telecom. To work on its image in Washington, it engaged the lobbying firm of former Defense Secretary William Cohen. And in February, Huawei published an open letter inviting anyone, including the U.S. government, to investigate its business practices.

????Rather than jump through hoop after hoop, wouldn't it be easier for Huawei just to retreat and be happy with its impressive growth everywhere outside America? Perhaps. But U.S. companies spend some $30 billion a year on telecom equipment, a figure that is set to rise as an industrywide network upgrade to 4G technology continues. If Huawei can convert its doubters, there are huge profits to be made in America. Give up? No way.

Huawei's man in Washington

????William Plummer, Huawei's trim and very polished government-relations point man, is an avid runner. Since he joined the company last year, the 47-year-old father of eight, who spent 12 years in a similar role at Nokia, has had ample opportunity to demonstrate his endurance. Plummer has been meeting with virtually anyone in government willing to listen to Huawei's side of the story (bolstered by a 17-slide PowerPoint pitch). He's also developed a mantra that encapsulates his message: "Huawei is Huawei, not the Chinese government."

????This past March, just after regulators forced Huawei to unravel its 3Leaf acquisition, Plummer met with a half-dozen stern-faced members of a congressional committee focused on national security. Recounting the episode, Plummer gets visibly agitated as he recalls how the staffers suggested that Huawei was beholden to the wishes of Beijing. "Well, no," Plummer says he told them, emphasizing that Huawei is not a state-owned enterprise. "This year GE sold 150 locomotives to Pakistan. Following that logic, if the U.S. went to war with Pakistan, then GE would derail the trains? That's just silliness. That's not how a multinational company would want to risk its future."

????Huawei's rise from startup to international powerhouse happened remarkably fast. Ren, the founder and CEO, served for 10 years in China's equivalent of the Army Corps of Engineers. In 1983 the corps was disbanded, and he was let go as part of a mass demobilization. The company says Ren founded Huawei in 1987 with $2,500 in savings plus funds collected from family members. (Ren almost never gives interviews and would not comment for this article.)

????Huawei argues that it has no ties to the Chinese government. As Plummer likes to point out, the company is headquartered in Shenzhen, across the border from Hong Kong and far from Beijing. Huawei derives just 36% of its revenue inside China. The government has never taken any ownership stake, says Huawei, and the company is 100% employee-owned; Ren holds 1.42%. Huawei says it cannot launch a public stock offering because of Chinese rules that prevent companies with large employee ownership from going public. An IPO would also make much of the company's top management instant billionaires, points out Shang-Jin Wei, who chairs Chinese Business and Economy studies at Columbia Business School in New York. Those executives would likely leave, lopping decades of experience and expertise off the top of the company.

????Huawei is often mentioned as having links with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). But Plummer says that it's a case of mistaken identity. He points to another Chinese company with a similar name which was in fact headed by a PLA officer and may have sold optical communications gear to Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The mix-up, Plummer says, erroneously became part of a Wall Street Journal Asia article in 2001, then was referenced in a 2006 Rand Report -- and has been falsely repeated ever since. "There was some confusion there," says Plummer. "Huawei has never delivered any military technologies at any time."

????But the assertion of a complete separation between the Chinese government and private Chinese companies is not terribly convincing to the cybersecurity community, according to Adam Segal, a China expert and senior fellow for counterterrorism and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations. Beijing last year forced all government suppliers to turn over their encryption codes. Beijing also dangles the threat of corruption investigations to keep companies in line, even executing executives convicted of graft. "Private companies in China are always wondering what the government is going to want next," Segal says.

????To alleviate security concerns, Huawei has volunteered to reveal its source code -- as it has done with success in countries such as India and the U.K. -- and allow ongoing monitoring through a company called Electronic Warfare Associates (EWA). The company has top security clearance with defense and intelligence agencies and therefore can stay abreast of all known cyber risks, says John Lindquist, president and CEO of EWA's infrastructure technologies group. Any Huawei customer can take advantage of EWA's vetting as part of a "trusted delivery" purchase of Huawei equipment. Still, Lindquist concedes, "nothing is 100% fail-safe." While security experts say the real vulnerabilities come not when the equipment is delivered but perhaps six months later when a patch or update is required, Lindquist says ongoing monitoring looks in on patches after the fact. "I'm very confident we'll find anything that's there," he says.