????資金分別流向小型和大型風(fēng)投公司

????就在三年前，還有人說有限合伙人“根本不會(huì)開具小面額支票”來為種子階段風(fēng)投提供資金,。最新動(dòng)態(tài)是,，種子階段已經(jīng)被廣為接受，但問題是“我的種子基金有能力按既定比例為那些最終的贏家提供資金嗎,？”簡單來說就是,，如果你按450萬美元的融資前價(jià)值為打車服務(wù)商Uber公司提供了種子基金，而且你有權(quán)保持自己的股權(quán)份額,，你當(dāng)然希望繼續(xù)行駛投資權(quán),。在私募市場中填補(bǔ)這個(gè)缺口的競賽正在進(jìn)行之中。

????目前種子基金占所有新設(shè)立基金的67%,，是六年前占比的兩倍,。雖然它們只占整個(gè)風(fēng)投行業(yè)總資本的6%，這依然是一個(gè)重大的結(jié)構(gòu)性變化,。

????Money Bifurcating into Small & Large

????Just 3 years ago there was talk of LPs “not being able to write small enough checks” to fund seed-stage VCs. The new narrative is seed-stage is here to stay, but “will my seed funds be able to fund the prorata of their winners?” Stated simply — if you seed funded Uber at $4.5m pre-money valuation you certainly would want to exercise your right to continue investing if you had pro-rata rights. The race is on to plug this gap in the private markets.

????Seed funds now represent 67% of all funds being created now, which is up 100% from 6 years ago. And while it only represents 6% of the total capital of the VC industry — this is a meaningful shift in structure.

????另一方面,，在過去幾年中大型基金變得更大，這大幅提高了風(fēng)投行業(yè)的整合規(guī)?！壳霸陲L(fēng)投領(lǐng)域,，66%的有限合伙人資金都集中在后期或完整周期風(fēng)投公司手里，此類資金在2014年的規(guī)?？赡苓_(dá)到170-200億美元,。

????為什么會(huì)這樣？

????? 許多養(yǎng)老基金規(guī)模過大,，無法進(jìn)行小額投資,，它們都愿意按0.5-1億美元的規(guī)模向其他基金提供資金。如果它們不希望自己在一只基金中的份額超過10%，相應(yīng)的基金規(guī)模就應(yīng)該在5-10億美元之間,。

????? 基金中的基金（它們從大型養(yǎng)老基金,、主權(quán)財(cái)富基金等基金那里融資，然后將這些資金分解成更小的單位）所銷售的經(jīng)常是“渠道”,。它們所說的其實(shí)是自己可以通過關(guān)系來投資紅杉資本（Sequoia）,、基準(zhǔn)資本（Benchmark）、格雷洛克（Greylock）,、凱鵬華盈（Kleiner Perkins）和加速資本（Accel）等風(fēng)投巨擘,，而規(guī)模較大的基金往往無法實(shí)現(xiàn)直接投資。

????當(dāng)然,，找到過去5-7年中最佳“新興經(jīng)理人”的難度要大得多,，合廣投資（Union Square Ventures）、星火資本（Spark Capital）,、首輪資本（First Round Capital）,、真資本（True Ventures）、格雷克羅夫特（Greycroft）,、晶圓集團(tuán)（Foundry Group）和Thrive and Upfront Ventures等公司的表現(xiàn)都不錯(cuò),。難點(diǎn)在于如果沒能進(jìn)入前一兩輪融資，你就再也無法投入資金,，原因是它們也會(huì)出現(xiàn)“超額申購”現(xiàn)象,。

????走在前列的基金中基金意識(shí)到，它們的差異化源泉更多地在于把資金投入新出現(xiàn)的市場領(lǐng)跑者,，而不是老牌風(fēng)投公司,，原因是大多數(shù)有歷史的基金中基金都有一定的老關(guān)系。

????最讓人困惑的數(shù)據(jù)是那些資金規(guī)模在1-5億美元之間的“傳統(tǒng)風(fēng)投公司”,。自2008-2009年“大衰退”以來,，這些風(fēng)投公司一直處于萎縮狀態(tài)，從獲得資金的風(fēng)投公司數(shù)量以及此類風(fēng)投公司的總資金規(guī)模來說都是這樣,，這種情況似乎和成功的新興基金的崛起形成了鮮明對(duì)比,。截至2014年，傳統(tǒng)風(fēng)投公司的數(shù)量及其所獲資金在短短六年時(shí)間里減少了一半,，原因是資金轉(zhuǎn)向了更早或更晚的投資階段,。

????At the other end of the spectrum large funds have gotten even larger in the past few years which has massively increased the amount of consolidation in our industry as 66% of LP money into venture is now concentrated in late-stage or full-cycle VCs, which is likely $17-20bn in 2014.

????Why is this?

????? Many pension funds are simply too large to write small checks and favor the ability to write $50-100 million checks to funds. If you don’t want to be more than 10% of a fund that implies fund sizes in the $500 million-$1 billion range.

????? Fund of funds (who take money from large pensions, sovereign wealth funds, etc. and break it into smaller sizes) often sell “access.” What they’re really saying is that they have the relationships to be able to invest in Sequoia, Benchmark, Greylock, Kleiner Perkins, Accel, etc. and the bigger funds often can’t get in directly.

????Of course it’s much harder to identify “emerging managers” who it turns out have been some of the best performers over the past 5-7 years such as Union Square Ventures, Spark Capital, First Round Capital, True Ventures, Greycroft, Foundry Group, Thrive and Upfront Ventures. The challenge is that if you don’t get into the first 1-2 funds you don’t get in at all because they, too, become “over subscribed.”

????The pioneering fund of funds realize that their source of differentiation is much more about getting into the newer market leaders than the established venture capitals since most historic fund-of-funds have some level of old-line access.

????The most puzzling bit of data was that “traditional VC” — funds in the $100 million-$500 million range — seemed to be shrinking since the Great Recession in both numbers of VCs getting funded and in terms of total dollars in this class of VC and this seemed to fly in the face of the rise of successful emerging funds. By 2014, traditional VC would have halved in just 6 years in both number of funds and dollars allocated to category as dollars are shifting earlier & later.