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????隨著大衛(wèi)?索科爾從伯克希爾哈撒韋（Berkshire Hathaway）辭職,，以及他在伯克希爾計(jì)劃收購(gòu)路博潤(rùn)（Lubrizol）前購(gòu)入后者股票之事被披露，有一點(diǎn)已變得明確,，即投資者需要考慮的不僅僅是誰(shuí)會(huì)接替沃倫?巴菲特?fù)?dān)任公司董事長(zhǎng)和首席執(zhí)行官,，他們還需要認(rèn)真考慮伯克希爾哈撒韋董事會(huì)的更替和治理事宜。

????伯克希爾的治理問(wèn)題對(duì)于其股票投資者而言應(yīng)該不是什么新聞,。任何新的或潛在投資者看過(guò)伯克希爾3月11日遞交的投票委托書(shū)也應(yīng)對(duì)伯克希爾的治理情況一清二楚,。

????隨著美國(guó)證交會(huì)（SEC）對(duì)索科爾事件調(diào)查的推進(jìn)，我們將拭目以待除了近期對(duì)伯克希爾會(huì)計(jì)處理的質(zhì)疑之外,，是否還有其他問(wèn)題已引發(fā)監(jiān)管部門(mén)的警惕,。

????伯克希爾可能會(huì)在哪些方面出問(wèn)題呢？

????以上述投票委托書(shū)來(lái)看,，伯克希爾董事會(huì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)督看來(lái)非常薄弱,。委托書(shū)關(guān)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)督通篇只有寥寥三句話，包括董事會(huì)至少每年兩次“獲得”關(guān)于公司所面臨風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的“報(bào)告”,，至少每年一次“獲得”關(guān)于公司各項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)的“報(bào)告”,。另外，委托書(shū)寫(xiě)道,，審查委員會(huì)負(fù)責(zé)“討論”風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)政策,。

????但委托書(shū)的審查委員會(huì)章節(jié)并未詳細(xì)闡述風(fēng)險(xiǎn)相關(guān)討論，只是說(shuō)審查委員會(huì)“協(xié)助董事會(huì)監(jiān)督”“企業(yè)遵守法律和監(jiān)管要求”,。

????我們希望審查委員會(huì)對(duì)公司的內(nèi)部控制流程有嚴(yán)格的審查——不僅是美國(guó)證交會(huì)提到的會(huì)計(jì)問(wèn)題,，還有與索科爾股票交易相關(guān)的問(wèn)題。

????與大多數(shù)公司分設(shè)薪資,、提名和治理委員會(huì)的做法不同,，伯克希爾將三個(gè)委員會(huì)合并成了一個(gè)。為什么不呢,？合并的委員會(huì)去年只開(kāi)了兩次會(huì),，而委員們出席會(huì)議是沒(méi)有報(bào)酬的，這說(shuō)明伯克希爾并沒(méi)有賦予這些活動(dòng)以重要價(jià)值,。

????審查委員會(huì)開(kāi)了五次會(huì),，在當(dāng)今企業(yè)界這是個(gè)很低的數(shù)字。這能說(shuō)明問(wèn)題,，特別是鑒于伯克希爾近期與美國(guó)證交會(huì)的會(huì)計(jì)之爭(zhēng),，美國(guó)證交會(huì)質(zhì)疑伯克希爾對(duì)所持某些證券減記不足,。

????上述投票委托書(shū)顯示，伯克希爾董事會(huì)去年只開(kāi)了三次全體會(huì)議,。

????委托書(shū)中關(guān)于董事會(huì)行為的描述說(shuō)明董事會(huì)對(duì)伯克希爾現(xiàn)狀的了解可能日益脫節(jié),，這令人不安。委托書(shū)寫(xiě)道,，“2010年的董事會(huì)行為包括一次董事會(huì)年會(huì)……和兩次特別會(huì)議,，以及兩次形成了董事會(huì)一致同意的書(shū)面決議”。

????一年總共三次會(huì),？似乎不是個(gè)很活躍的董事會(huì),。而且，非審查委員會(huì)委員的董事每出席一次董事會(huì)獲得900美元報(bào)酬（數(shù)額有些微不足道）,，全年共計(jì)2,700美元,，這樣的報(bào)酬對(duì)于董事職務(wù)根本算不上什么,。這也很能說(shuō)明巴菲特是如何看待他從董事會(huì)所獲的建議和監(jiān)督的價(jià)值,。

????委托書(shū)對(duì)于很多投資者關(guān)注的問(wèn)題也采取了不以為然的態(tài)度。

????在分離首席執(zhí)行官和董事長(zhǎng)職責(zé)這一問(wèn)題上：“巴菲特先生認(rèn)為,，一名積極參與業(yè)務(wù)的控股股東——過(guò)去40年來(lái)以及現(xiàn)在巴菲特先生都一直是這樣做的——應(yīng)當(dāng)身兼二職[董事長(zhǎng)和首席執(zhí)行官],。這也是伯克希爾董事會(huì)全體成員的共同觀點(diǎn)。董事會(huì)尚未任命一位首席獨(dú)立董事,?！?/p>

????在董事任命問(wèn)題上，委托書(shū)寫(xiě)道,，“在進(jìn)行董事提名時(shí),，治理、薪酬和提名委員會(huì)不尋求多樣性,，不管是何種定義的多樣性,。”當(dāng)然,，年齡組成上也沒(méi)有什么多樣性：董事會(huì)由12位成員構(gòu)成,，其中半數(shù)在79歲至87歲之間，最年輕的董事是48歲,。

????關(guān)于股東決定薪酬（say on pay）的投票：伯克希爾建議盡可能降低頻率,，每三年一次——而不是投資者及委托投票顧問(wèn)更傾向于的每年一次。

????因此,，是的,，伯克希爾的公司治理問(wèn)題已經(jīng)說(shuō)得很明白了，但投資者的問(wèn)題是關(guān)于未來(lái),。

????如果巴菲特離開(kāi),，會(huì)發(fā)生什么？那時(shí)的投資者能接受這種老式的公司治理模式嗎？基于這樣缺乏作為的董事會(huì)以及高層態(tài)度,，巴菲特的接班人將繼承怎樣的企業(yè)文化,？公司治理將如何實(shí)施？一個(gè)開(kāi)會(huì)次數(shù)如此稀少,、疏于行動(dòng)的董事會(huì)能幫助伯克希爾邁向未來(lái)嗎,？針對(duì)這些問(wèn)題的質(zhì)詢，伯克希爾未做出回應(yīng),。

????伯克希爾不僅需要一個(gè)足可勝任的沃倫?巴菲特接班人來(lái)引領(lǐng)公司向前發(fā)展,，還需要一個(gè)健全的董事會(huì)行使監(jiān)督職能，以促進(jìn)公司未來(lái)發(fā)展,。這些是長(zhǎng)期股東現(xiàn)在應(yīng)考慮的問(wèn)題,，因?yàn)檫@些問(wèn)題將對(duì)后巴菲特時(shí)代的伯克希爾做出最終的考驗(yàn)。

????In the wake of David Sokol's resignation from Berkshire Hathaway and the revelation of his stock purchases ahead of Berkshire's planned acquisition of Lubrizol (LZ), it has become clear that investors need to consider more than just who will succeed

????Warren Buffett as chair and CEO. They will also need to seriously consider succession and governance practices on Berkshire Hathaway's board.

????The issues with Berkshire's (BRKA) governance should not be news to investors in Berkshire stock. Any new or prospective investor reading the company's March 11 proxy filing should have received the message about Berkshire's governance loud and clear.

????As the SEC's investigation of the Sokol matter moves forward, it will be interesting to see whether issues beyond its recent accounting inquiries at Berkshire have caused the regulator any alarm.

????What were some of the signposts of an accident waiting to happen at Berkshire?

????Using the proxy as a guide, the Berkshire board's risk oversight appears to be very weak. Devoting just three sentences to risk oversight, the proxy says the board "receives reports" at least twice a year about risks that the corporation faces and at least once a year about the company's business segments. It also says the audit committee "discusses" risk assessment and risk policies.

????The proxy's section on the audit committee doesn't elaborate on its risk-related discussions. The section does say that the committee "assists the Board with oversight of" the "Corporation's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements."

????Let's hope the audit committee is undertaking a serious review of the internal controls process at the firm -- not only the accounting issues cited by the SEC, but also the issues surrounding Sokol's trades.

????Unlike most firms with separate committees for compensation and nominating and governance, Berkshire combines the committees into one. And why not? The combined committee only met twice last year and the directors earn no fees for attending those meetings, which suggests that the company does not place significant value on these activities.

????The audit committee met five times, a low figure in today's corporate world. It's telling, especially in light of the company's recent accounting run-in with the SEC in which the regulator questioned the lack of write-downs of certain Berkshire securities.

????According to the proxy, the board as a whole only met three times last year.

????The proxy's descriptions of the board's actions suggest that it is disconcertingly disconnected from the goings on at Berkshire. "Board of Directors' actions were taken in 2010 at the Annual Meeting of Directors … and at two special meetings and upon two occasions by directors' unanimous written consent," the proxy states.

????Three meetings in all? Not a very active board, it seems. Then again, the $900 in payments per meeting (a paltry sum) for the non-audit committee members, for a grand total of $2,700 each, isn't much compensation for serving on the board. This could very well be a reflection of how Buffett values the advice and oversight he receives from the board.

????The proxy also takes a dismissive tone toward issues that many investors care about.

????On separation of the CEO and chair roles: "It is Mr. Buffett's opinion that a controlling shareholder who is active in the business, as is currently the case and has been the case for Mr. Buffett for over the last 40 years, should hold both roles [of Chair and CEO]. This opinion is shared by Berkshire's full Board of Directors. The Board of Directors has not named a lead independent director."

????On board nominations: "In identifying director nominees, the Governance, Compensation and Nominating Committee does not seek diversity, however defined," the proxy notes. Certainly, there isn't much diversity in age: the board consists of 12 members, half of whom range in age from 79 to 87. The youngest member is 48.

????On say on pay: Berkshire recommends say on pay as infrequently as possible -- every three years -- versus the annual basis investors and their proxy advisors generally prefer.

????So yes, the governance issues at Berkshire are clearly spelled out, but the question for investors should be about the future.

????What will happen if and when Buffett exits? Will the old style governance model work for investors then? What kind of culture will his successor inherit based on this disengaged board and the tone at the top? How will governance operate? Will a board who meets so infrequently and does so little be able to help Berkshire bridge to the future? Berkshire did not respond to a request for comment on these issues.

????It is not just Warren Buffett's successor who will need to navigate the company forward capably. Berkshire will also need the right kind of board to oversee and promote its future. These are the questions that long-term shareholders ought to consider now, as they will serve as the ultimate tests of Buffett's legacy.