????以做空中國(guó)著稱(chēng)的對(duì)沖基金經(jīng)理吉姆?查諾斯去年晚些時(shí)候在接受《財(cái)富》雜志(Fortune)采訪時(shí)稱(chēng),中國(guó)正在“做一些絕無(wú)先例的事情”,。他指的是已持續(xù)多年的大規(guī)模建設(shè)熱潮,。2008年中國(guó)政府推出的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激方案向經(jīng)濟(jì)體系注入了4萬(wàn)億元人民幣(5,860億美元),更是起到了推波助瀾的作用,。他預(yù)計(jì)房地產(chǎn)投機(jī)泡沫終將破滅,,導(dǎo)致房屋閑置,更大范圍內(nèi)的經(jīng)濟(jì)遭殃,。
????對(duì)于那些支持查諾斯的人們而言,,中國(guó)發(fā)布的一些數(shù)據(jù)顯示,他的判斷可能是對(duì)的,。
????據(jù)《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》( New York Times)報(bào)道,,中國(guó)國(guó)家審計(jì)署日前宣布,寬松的貸款標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以及地方政府借款大幅增加(當(dāng)然是用于建設(shè)項(xiàng)目)可能已導(dǎo)致債務(wù)堆積如山,,無(wú)力償還,。樓市下跌或某種形式的經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩或?qū)⑹惯@些難以數(shù)計(jì)的不良貸款大白于天下。
????在這份政府報(bào)告發(fā)布的同時(shí),,中國(guó)國(guó)家審計(jì)署審計(jì)長(zhǎng)劉家義周一在講話中稱(chēng),,“一些地方政府融資平臺(tái)的管理不規(guī)范,盈利能力和償債能力都相當(dāng)薄弱,?!睂徲?jì)署官員和人民銀行的官員們表示,地方政府債務(wù)占中國(guó)GDP的27-30%,,合計(jì)1.7-2.2萬(wàn)億美元,。這樣的數(shù)字高于預(yù)期?!都~約時(shí)報(bào)》指出,,借款不僅投向了房地產(chǎn)建設(shè),也投向了橋梁,、隧道,、地鐵和公路等低回報(bào)基建項(xiàng)目。
????地方政府為借款而設(shè)立的投資公司估計(jì)有6,500-10,000個(gè),,它們打造的建設(shè)熱潮使依賴(lài)出口的中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)免受到全球經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩的極度痛苦,。
????雖然有人說(shuō)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)的擴(kuò)大能促進(jìn)消費(fèi)、帶動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),,但中國(guó)依然需要依賴(lài)出口來(lái)保持經(jīng)濟(jì)快速增長(zhǎng),,為龐大的人口創(chuàng)造就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家蓋瑞?謝林撰文指出,,中國(guó)的人均GDP 需達(dá)到5,000美元,,才會(huì)出現(xiàn)顯著的非必需支出。但謝林表示,,只有約8%的人口有這樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力,。而且隨著通脹存在失控的威脅,老百姓也需要上調(diào)工資,。
????中國(guó)正在發(fā)生的一切聽(tīng)起來(lái)有些耳熟,,它讓我們想起了曾經(jīng)在美國(guó)發(fā)生的情況,。由于民眾無(wú)法分享到經(jīng)濟(jì)推動(dòng)財(cái)富增長(zhǎng)帶來(lái)的好處,20世紀(jì)90年代美國(guó)官員放寬了貸款標(biāo)準(zhǔn),。結(jié)果:地方政府支出躍增,,房地產(chǎn)泡沫讓投資者感到紙面富貴,建設(shè)熱潮創(chuàng)造了就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì),,而債務(wù)卻無(wú)法償還,。
????與美國(guó)當(dāng)年的情形類(lèi)似,證券化使中國(guó)的信貸問(wèn)題進(jìn)一步復(fù)雜化,,它將潛在的有毒貸款風(fēng)險(xiǎn)傳遞給了投資者,。根據(jù)惠譽(yù)(Fitch Ratings)去年發(fā)布的一份特別報(bào)告,所謂的“非正式證券化”在中國(guó)大熱(2010年被叫停),。這意味著中國(guó)將銀行貸款(而不是有按揭貸款支持的債券)重新打包成投資產(chǎn)品,。惠譽(yù)的一項(xiàng)聲明稱(chēng),,這股趨勢(shì)“(扭曲了)中國(guó)銀行業(yè)的信貸數(shù)據(jù),,包括機(jī)構(gòu)層面和整個(gè)銀行體系層面,導(dǎo)致信貸增長(zhǎng)和信貸敞口普遍被低估,?!?/p>
????惠譽(yù)的中國(guó)銀行業(yè)評(píng)級(jí)主管朱夏蓮當(dāng)時(shí)表示,正如美國(guó),,那些希望調(diào)整貸款余額的銀行以及那些希望有更高收益率的投資者都?xì)g迎證券化和表外記賬,;由于中國(guó)對(duì)有信貸抵押的投資產(chǎn)品的處理類(lèi)似于超安全的銀行存款,投資者自然相信它們是有擔(dān)保的,。朱夏蓮目前對(duì)中國(guó)的情形仍心存憂慮,,近日又稱(chēng)中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)一直依賴(lài)寬松的信貸。
????查諾斯的中國(guó)觀點(diǎn)最終可能會(huì)得到證實(shí),;但他說(shuō)中國(guó)正在“做一些絕無(wú)先例的事情”,,這一點(diǎn)無(wú)疑是錯(cuò)誤的。中國(guó)正在進(jìn)行的“舉債——假裝貸款狀況良好”的賭局與全球一些最大經(jīng)濟(jì)體的所作所為如出一轍,。但美國(guó)和歐洲的下場(chǎng)告訴我們,,這場(chǎng)賭局沒(méi)有勝算。問(wèn)題不是中國(guó)是否會(huì)撞上債務(wù)墻,,而是何時(shí)撞上,。 |
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????Jim Chanos, the hedge fund manager who is famously shorting China, told Fortune late last year that the country was "embarking on something unprecedented." He was referring to the massive construction boom that has been underway for years, and that was supercharged by a 2008 stimulus package that pumped four trillion yuan ($586 billion) into the economy. In his opinion, the speculative bubble in real estate would end in a big pop, empty buildings, and pain for the country's broader economy.
????For those who side with team Chanos, data is seeping out of China that suggests that he may right.
????Most recently, China's top auditor said that loose lending standards and a sharp rise in local government borrowing (for building projects, of course) may have created a mountain of debt that cannot be repaid, reports the New York Times. All it will take is a fall in housing, or some sort of economic slowdown, to reveal an untold number of bad loans.
????In a speech that coincided with the release of the government report, the head of China's national audit office Liu Jiayi said Monday: "The management of some local government financing platforms is irregular, and their profitability and ability to pay their debts is quite weak." Audit officials and Chinese central bankers say that local government debt accounts for between 27% and 30% of China's GDP, and totals $1.7 trillion to $2.2 trillion. Those numbers come in higher than estimated. The Times notes that borrowed money has been used to finance not only real estate construction, but also low-return infrastructure projects like bridges, tunnels, subways, and roads.
????The estimated 6,500 to 10,000 local government investment companies created to borrow money have made a construction boom that has kept China's export-reliant economy from feeling the extreme pain of the global economic slowdown.
????Despite talk of a burgeoning middle class that can support the Chinese economy with consumption, the country still relies on exports to keep the economy growing fast enough to create jobs for its large population. It takes a per-capita GDP of $5,000 to create meaningful discretionary spending power in China, writes economist A. Gary Shilling. But Shilling says only about 8% of the population has that kind of economic clout. And with inflation threatening to run out of control, citizens will need higher wages, too.
????What's happening in China should sound familiar because it is reminiscent of what happened here in the US. Confronted by an economy that couldn't deliver real wealth to the people, our bureaucrats loosened borrowing standards in the 1990s. The result: an uptick in local government spending, a real estate bubble that made investors feel artificially wealthy, a construction boom that created jobs, and debt that can't be repaid.
????China even exacerbated the credit problem with securitization, just like we did, spreading potentially toxic loans around to investors. So-called informal securitization became popular (but was then frozen in 2010) in China, according to a special report published last year by Fitch Ratings. This simply means that the Chinese re-packaged bank loans (rather than mortgage-backed bonds) into investment products. The trend "[distorted] Chinese banks' credit data at an institutional and system level, resulting in pervasive understatement of credit growth and credit exposure," according to a statement from Fitch.
????Just like in the US, securitization and off-balance sheet accounting was encouraged by banks that wanted to adjust their loan balances and investors who wanted higher yields, said Charlene Chu, the head of Fitch's Chinese bank ratings. And since China's credit-backed investment products have been treated like ultra-safe bank deposits, investors believe that they carry an implicit guarantee, according to Chu. Fitch's Chu remains worried about China, and has recently said that the country has been dependent on loose credit to grow.
????At the end of the day, Chanos will probably be proven right on China; but he erred when he said that the country was embarking on something unprecedented. The country is making the same lend-and-pretend-that-the-loans-are-good gamble that the world's largest economies have all made. And as you can see from what has happened in the US and all over Europe, it's a losing bet. The question is not whether China will hit the debt wall, but when. |